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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

File No. 173/2/6/1 Pt. 1

SUBJECT: IRAQ - POLITICAL - STATES
KLLRDS

SECRET.

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE

STATEMENT OF REASONS UNDER SECTION 40 OF THE ARCHIVES ACT 1983

Series: A1838/272

Item: 173/2/6/1 Pt 1

Title: Iraq - Political - States - Kurds

DECISION: The folios listed below are wholly/partially exempt under sub-section 33(1)(a) and (b) of the Archives Act 1983

5, 8, 9, 16-26, 27, 36, 37-39, 40, 42-52, 53, 54-55, 56-57, 84-86, 87-88, 89-91, 95-96, 115-118, 133-134, 140-144, 154-166, 173-174, 180-185, 216-218, 220-221, 223-229, 230-231, 270-271, 284.

FACTS ON WHICH THESE DECISIONS ARE BASED:

The exempted folios contain one or more of the following:

- intelligence/information the release of which could cause damage to Australia's security and international relations.
- information provided in confidence by a foreign government, the disclosure of which would constitute a breach of that confidence.
- the identity of an overseas intelligence agency/agent. The country concerned has requested that the Australian Government not release this identity in this context.
- intelligence/information the release of which could cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth.

RELEVANT SECTIONS OF THE ACT:

33(1)(a) '...a Commonwealth record is an exempt record if it contains information or matter... the disclosure of which under this Act could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the Commonwealth'.

33(1)(b) '...a Commonwealth record is an exempt record if it contains information or matter...communicated in confidence by...a foreign Government...to the Government of the Commonwealth...being information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act would constitute a breach of that confidence'.

REASONS FOR THESE DECISIONS:

International relations are dependent upon the adequate flow of information between one country and another. If disclosure would lessen the confidence of another country in the Government of Australia, that is sufficient ground for a finding that disclosure could reasonably be expected to damage international relations under s33(1)(a) of the Archives Act.

The foreign government has asked that the information not be released to the public. The release of this information would therefore constitute a breach of confidence owed to that foreign government within the meaning of s33(1)(b) of the Archives Act.

The release of this information would be likely to result in restriction of intelligence provided to Australia. This would cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth within the meaning of s33(1)(a) of the Archives Act.

This information is still afforded security protection by a foreign government. The release of this information would therefore constitute a breach of confidence owed to that foreign government within the meaning of s33(1)(b) of the Archives Act.

The folios contain information which reveals the capability, methods, objectives, sources, areas of interest, or operations of an Australian intelligence agency, the release of which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth within the meaning of s33(1)(a) of the Archives Act.

Australian Archives

Decision maker:	
Position number:	30926
Date:	9/8/99



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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

3/12/38

Confidential

No.

251. 15/24
143/2/1

Memo no. 681

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE.

STRAND.

LONDON, W.C.2.

16th May 1964

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

Iraq

Burton (Iraq desk officer, Foreign Office) described the Kurdish situation as extremely confused. The cease-fire between the Kurds and the Iraqi Army remained intact and there had been a series of talks between Kurdish leaders and emissaries of the Government. As a result of the latter, some sort of secret but temporary arrangements appeared to have been agreed to by Mulla Mustafa Barzani and the Central Government under which Kurdish officials had been restored to positions in the Administration and a limited amount of local autonomy had been granted the Kurdish regions. Burton observed that it seemed virtually certain, however, that, as far as the Kurds were concerned, the stress on the agreement (which falls far short of the Kurds' minimum requirements) should be on its interim nature. Unless Baghdad is prepared to make further substantial concessions in the next months or so, the Foreign Office thought that resumption of hostilities could well re-occur. Burton commented that, as if in the knowledge that negotiations are bound to collapse, the Iraqi Defence Ministry were already making military preparations for a renewal of fighting.

2. Ambivalence had, in fact, been the keynote of the Central Government's dealings with the Kurds ever since the cease-fire. On the one hand, in the knowledge that the present truce is extremely popular with the country at large (not least with the Army), the Iraq Government must be anxious to secure a permanent settlement. This explained their obvious attempts at reconciliation which, incidentally, included the despatch of senior Iraq Ministers to see Mulla Mustapha in his mountain stronghold rather than demanding that the latter come to Baghdad. On the other hand, and apart from Baghdad's understandable resistance to the extreme Kurdish demands, they have (e.g. by refusing to appoint Kurds to the Cabinet; by discrimination against Sunni Moslems in the new Constitution; and by denying the Kurds prominent positions in the new National Oil Company) seemingly adopted an attitude which cannot fail but to alienate the Kurds.

3. Burton said that, on the Kurdish side, the latest division between Mulla Mustapha and his tribal groups and the Kurdish Democratic Party (led by Jalal Talabani) had recently become more serious. There have been one or two instances of shootings and, during one period two or three weeks ago, there was a danger of a full-scale

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civil war erupting between the ^{two} ~~five~~ groups. Burton explained that, whereas Mulla Mustapha, terrified by the sufferings of the Kurdish tribes, is reluctant to commit them to further fighting, the KDP is pressing for a renewal of hostilities. Bitter criticism has been levelled at Barzani for accepting the cease-fire, and the current KDP line was to hold out for nothing less than complete Kurdish autonomy. It will be recalled (paragraph 14 of our memorandum 100) that, at the time of the cease-fire, the KDP had made some progress towards the implementation of a de facto administration in the Kurdish-held regions.

4. Burton said, in reply to a question, that the Foreign Office did not suspect the Soviet Union of currently playing any positive role in Kurdish affairs. Generally, Soviet policy was not to allow their sympathy for Kurdish autonomy to interfere with the more important strategy of keeping on good terms with the recognised Middle Eastern Governments. Since the disturbances in Hama - which the Syrian Government had accused Iraq of fomenting - Damascus had been threatening to lend material support to the Iraqi Kurds. The Foreign Office were not inclined to take these threats seriously. Nor, no doubt, were the Iraqis. Just in case, the latter had taken the precaution of moving two divisions of the Iraqi Army to the Syrian frontier.

5. You will have seen press reports to the effect that the Iraqi Government has announced a new Constitution, some provisions of which are to be implemented immediately and some (including the election of a National Assembly) within a three-year transitional period. The attached savingram from the British Embassy in Baghdad provides a useful summary. Burton listed the main features as follows: -

- (a) Taken together with the speech made by President Aref when introducing it, the Constitution represents a political manifesto for eventual union with the UAR. By embodying the aim of Arab unity "beginning with unity with the UAR" in the Constitution, the Iraqis seem to be going much further than mere lip-service to unity would require.
- (b) The Constitution glosses over the Kurdish problem. Kurdish rights are touched on in one sentence only of Article 19 (see paragraph 4 of attachment) and then in terms no more precise - indeed, if anything less so - than those of the 1958 Constitution. It is very much doubted whether Kurdish leaders can possibly accept them as a guarantee of their rights or as a sufficient answer to the demands which they have been pressing for for so long.
- (c) The Constitution is not as socialistic as that of the UAR. The private sector need only operate "under the general direction of the state." On the other hand, there is a significant clause claiming for the state a monopoly of disposal over the country's national resources. Burton described this as giving constitutional validity to Law 80 of 1961 which expropriated 99.5 per cent of the IPC oil concessionary area.

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
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- (d) The fact that the National Council of the Revolution Command (the enigmatic body established after the revolution of February, 1963) is to remain in being with large and overriding powers makes nonsense of the claim in the preamble that Iraq is to be a "democratic" state.

6. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to Cairo and Washington.



(Lance Joseph)

for Senior External Affairs Representative

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Name of Paper TIMES.

Published at LONDON.

File No.

Date

173/2/183
13/2/64

IRAQ PLANS TO RECONSTRUCT NORTH

CEASE-FIRE WITH KURDS COMPLETE

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

BAGHDAD, FEB. 12

Plans of the Iraq Government for the northern area of the country after the cease-fire between the Kurds led by Mullah Mustapha Barzani and the Iraq Army were announced today by Abdul Karim Farhan, Minister of Guidance. He told a press conference that the cease-fire was complete in all areas and Army units were now withdrawing gradually to their encampments according to a special plan.

Prisoners of both sides were in the process of being released, and the Minister said the Government was anxious to abolish the emergency measures, including the military courts in the north and the revolutionary court in Baghdad.

It is the Government's intention to reconstruct the north, said the Minister, and he believed this will cause a boom in the national economy. Many fertile areas had been deserted during the hostilities but these would be recultivated.

"The Kurds are a great part of the Iraq nation who enjoy the same rights as other citizens. They are close brothers linked to us by history, religion, intermarriage and a common destiny," he said.

NETWORK OF ROADS

Asked if Mullah Mustapha wanted to leave northern Iraq for any other Arab country, the Minister replied that he enjoyed the rights of any other citizen and was entitled to go anywhere he wished.

The reconstruction plans, approved by a special Cabinet meeting, are to be implemented as soon as possible. They include the construction of a network of roads linking the north with central and south Iraq, and the building of a number of hospitals, clinics, police posts, and schools. People will be assisted to reconstruct their damaged homes, villages will be revived on modern lines, and industrial projects will be created which depend on the raw materials available in the north. The plan will encourage and develop agriculture and employ the most modern implements to cultivate the land.

The Government newspaper *Al Jumhour* today published several interviews with Ministers who gave further details of the Government's intentions. All restriction on the marketing of foodstuffs are to be abolished. Employees dismissed because of the emergency are to be reinstated. The Government is to build a 9m. dinars (£3m.) sugar mill and lay a pipeline for natural gas from Kirkuk to Baghdad.

The Minister of Guidance also said the Government intended to build a television station for the north and a medium-wave radio station, both of which would broadcast to the Kurdish people in their own language.

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D. 4.09 p.m. February 11, 1964

R. 4.40 p.m. February 11, 1964

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 122 of February 11,
Repeated for information to:

Kuwait

Ankara

and Saving to: Washington Algiers Nicosia Moscow

Following is a translation of Mulla Mustafa Barzani's appeal to the Kurds as announced by the Minister of Guidance on Baghdad Radio last night:

"In response to the wish of Field Marshal Abdul Salam Arif, President of the Republic, to maintain unity within the country, to save innocent blood, and to end fighting amongst brothers, and since the goodwill of the government has been established, we have decided to take the initiative towards a cease-fire and to call upon our brethren to return to their homes and to engage in normal activities in freedom. Through these steps the national authorities will be enabled to hasten measures to ensure the return of normal life, peace and tranquillity to the region, they will also have an opportunity to admit the national rights of the Kurds within the Iraqi State in a single national unity, and to place Arab-Kurdish brotherhood on the strongest foundations to safeguard it from weakness and protect it from the plots of the imperialists, the plotters and the covetous. All must understand that the sovereignty of law and the restoration of peace and order in the region cannot fail to solve all problems, no matter how difficult. May God guide the steps of the loyal and crown their endeavours with success in the cause of the unity, progress and prosperity which they desire for the people and country."

2. This was followed by an official statement signed by President Arif as follows:

"In accordance with the public interest, and in response to the appeal of Mulla Mustafa to our brothers the Kurds, and out of a desire to restore normal conditions in the northern part of our dear country, and to end the machinations of imperialism and its lackeys, to eradicate exploitation, to spare innocent blood and in the higher national interest, we have decided as follows:

(1) To admit the national rights of our Kurdish brethren within the people of Iraq in a single fraternal national unity, and to enshrine this fact in the interim constitution.

(2) To release those arrested, detained or convicted in connexion with past events in the north, to issue a general amnesty, and to remove the ban placed on the movable and immovable property of persons whose property has been attacked.

(3) To restore local administrations in the northern region.

(4) To restore (government) officials and employees to their work in this region.

(5) To remove the restrictions placed on the marketing of foodstuffs of various kinds in the north.

(6) To undertake immediately the rehabilitation of the northern region, and to establish various committees to alleviate the difficulties in the way of this, to bypass the normal channels in doing so, and to consider compensation for those who suffered damage.

(7) To compensate justly the owners of lands whose lands were inundated by the Dokan and Darbandikhan dams.

(8) Measures will be taken to ensure the restoration of peace and tranquillity in the northern region. We call upon our Kurdish brethren to return to normal life so that they may enjoy the blessings of this country and to close ranks against the conspiracy of imperialism and its agents. Our Kurdish brothers should understand that we will work towards ensuring their legitimate rights in the same way as those of other citizens of Iraq.

Baghdad telegram No. 122 to Foreign Office

- 3 -

(9) All ministries concerned must issue the necessary ordinances, orders and instructions to implement the contents of this statement."

Foreign Office pass Saving to Washington, Algiers, Nicosia and Moscow as my telegrams Nos. 3, 1, 1 and 2 respectively.

[Repeated as requested to
Foreign Service Posts.
Copy sent to Tel. Section C.R.O.
for repetition Saving to Nicosia]

173/2/1280
SECRET

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(LR 6/9G)
(August 13, 1963)
(22171)

RESEARCH DEPARTMENT MEMORANDUM

THE KURDISH PROBLEM IN IRAQ, 1958-63

(with Historical Introduction)

SUMMARY

A. Introduction and background (paragraphs 1-4).

B. In Iraq the Kurdish minority was promised a certain measure of autonomy, especially in such matters as education, &c., but dilatoriness on the part of the Government and revolts by the Kurds prevented it from being put into effect. In Iran, the Kurds managed to attain a degree of autonomy in the Mahabad area with Soviet aid during the war, but lost it again when Soviet troops withdrew. Turkish attempts to assimilate the Kurds have not succeeded and have led to periodic revolts. The Kurdish minority in Syria is not at present an important political factor (paragraphs 5-9).

C. After the 1958 Revolution, Qasim at first found it politic to encourage the Kurds in order to strengthen his own position. The hopes of the Kurds were turned to disillusionment later by the Government's neglect of them (paragraphs 10-13).

D. The development of a group within the Iraqi Government favouring closer ties with the United Arab Republic encouraged a leaning towards the Communists, both on the part of Qasim and of the Kurds, who sided with the Government in the suppression of the Mosul revolt of March 1959 (paragraphs 14-16).

E. Fighting began in 1959 between pro and anti-Communist factions amongst the Kurds; and the latter's desire for independence was stimulated by the Government's rejection of a petition for reforms in Kurdistan. Qasim's policy of arming one faction in order to control others led to further conflict (paragraphs 17-23).

F. By 1961 the Barzanis had gained the upper hand over their tribal enemies and achieved a considerable measure of control over Iraqi Kurdistan, the success of which brought other tribes over to their side. Qasim claimed to have crushed the revolt, but it flared up again in the following spring, and continued until Qasim was overthrown in February 1963 (paragraphs 24-32).

G. There was no evidence of significant help being sent to the Kurds from outside Iraq. Indeed, Soviet aid to the Iraqi Army had an adverse reaction on Kurdish opinion. The Kurdish rebels under Mulla Mustafa are divided into two basic groups—tribal forces and supporters of the United Democratic Party of Kurdistan (U.D.P.K.). The Iraqi forces did not show themselves over-effective, although bombing by the air force caused great destruction. By early 1963 most of Iraqi Kurdistan was in Kurdish hands (paragraphs 33-38).

H. After a preliminary period of friendship, the Communists' interests diverged from those of the Kurds, the Communist line being that the Kurds must work peacefully with other sections of the Iraqi population for eventual autonomy. The Communists' first aim is the establishment of "national democracies" with some degree of autonomy for the Kurds. There is no evidence that the Russians really wish to see an independent Kurdistan. Nevertheless the Iraqi Communists found it politic to pay lip-service to Kurdish ambitions; and it suits the Russians to keep the Kurdish pot simmering, for the effect upon Turkey and Iran, and also on the present Government in Iraq (paragraphs 39 and 40).

SECRET

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A

I. With the downfall of Qasim, the way was opened for a negotiated settlement between the Kurds and the new Government, whose outlawing of Communism brought upon it the hostility of the USSR. But the negotiations broke down, and in June 1963 hostilities recommenced. The object of the present revolt is to secure regional autonomy for the Kurds of Iraq, although a desire for eventual independence and union with Kurds beyond the frontier cannot be excluded (paragraphs 41-47).

Annex A.—Summary of relevant articles of Iraqi Government's declaration to the Council of the League of Nations, 1932.

Annex B.—*Curriculum vitae* of Mulla Mustafa Barzani up to 1958.

Annex C.—Map showing areas inhabited by Kurds.

Annex D.—Map of Kurdish areas of Iraq.

PART I.—INTRODUCTION

The racial origins of the Kurds are obscure and they combine the physical features of various races; their language, however, is of Indo-European origin, bearing a close relation to Persian. They are mostly Sunni Moslems, although a few tribes are Shi'i and some belong to obscure sects such as the Ali Ilahi, Shaikh Bagheri and Yazidi. "Kurdistan" in its broadest sense means the territory inhabited by the Kurds as a homogeneous community. It is divided between Turkey, Iraq and Iran, with small overlaps into the Soviet Union and Syria; thus its boundaries do not coincide with any international frontiers or internal administrative divisions, and even within generally Kurdish areas there are to be found pockets of Assyrians, Armenians and Turks. The number of Kurds in the world has been variously estimated between 3 million (by a League of Nations Commission in 1925) and 12 million (by Kurdish rebel sources in Iraq in 1962). The most probable figure is about 4 to 5 million, including about a million in Iraq, which, with a Kurdish minority of some 16 per cent of the total population, possesses the highest ratio of Kurds to non-Kurds.

2. The Kurds are divided into transhumant* semi-nomads living a largely feudal and tribal life, and settled Kurds, living either as peasants or in towns such as Damascus, Mosul, Baghdad, Kermanshah, &c., where—particularly in Iraq—the more educated are to be found in trade, the army or the civil service. There seems to have been little love lost between the peasant and tribal Kurds in Iraq and their more educated brethren in local administration, who have to a certain extent become identified in interests with the (Arab) "establishment". In recent years the growth of the oil industry in some towns of Iraqi Kurdistan has brought about the emergence of a Kurdish urban proletariat within what was originally Kurdish tribal territory.

3. The regions inhabited by Kurds form a land bridge, albeit a mountainous one, between the oil-producing areas of Iraq and the southern borders of the Soviet Union. Thus a united Kurdistan, if such a State were possible, would have great strategic importance. However, the Kurds have never been united politically as one people (chiefly because of physical obstacles), but have lived a tribal and often nomadic life with its attendant disputes and differing dialects and customs; nor have they ever submitted totally to the Iranian, Turkish or Arab central Governments who have exercised sovereignty over them. In spite of the Kurds' consciousness of separate racial identity, Kurdish revolts have not as a rule partaken of a "national" character, but have been the expression by isolated tribes, or small groups of tribes, of discontent with local administration or economic conditions.

4. Kurdish nationalism in its modern form arose during the present century amongst certain of the intelligentsia of Constantinople and other towns of the Ottoman Empire, such as Diyarbakir and Damascus. The Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination appealed to the various subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire and, with other foreign influences, helped to produce Kurdish nationalism in the form that we know to-day. A contributory factor may have been the Kurds' fear

* *I.e.*, seasonally moving livestock to a different region.

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that an Armenian State would be established in Eastern Turkey, where the two peoples inhabited the same areas, and where the Kurds might fear Armenian reprisals for their part in the massacre of 1915. Whilst Kurdish nationalism was thus in existence in the larger towns of the Ottoman Empire, Kurds in the provinces seem to have been motivated more by racialism, tribal feuds and desire for gain than by political ideals. The nationalists in Damascus played an important role in making Kurdish aspirations known to the Western world—a function performed to this day by members of the (Syrian) Badr Khan family. The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) envisaged an autonomous Kurdistan, but was never ratified because of Turkish opposition. Instead, the Kurds of Turkey, Iraq and Syria found themselves divided by international frontiers where before there had been but provincial boundaries. Thus, as the Kurds (apart from the small number in Soviet Transcaucasia) were now split into four sections instead of the previous two, they found themselves more divided than before. Their subsequent history in each sector is described in paragraphs 5–8 below.

Iraqi Kurdistan

5. In Iraq, under British tutelage from 1920 to 1936, steps were taken to improve conditions among the Kurds, but the efforts of the British High Commissioner to induce the Iraqi Government to grant a special régime to the Kurdish districts were hampered by a series of Kurdish revolts. Those of 1924 and 1930–31 were led by a notable of Suleimaniya, Shaikh Mahmud, who had, in 1919, occupied Suleimaniya and entitled himself Ruler of all Kurdistan, and that of 1931–32 by Sheikh Ahmad Barzani. The primary aim of both these leaders was to be left alone to exercise their feudal authority over as many of their fellow-Kurds as they could contrive to control, rather than any wider objective of, e.g., a comprehensive Kurdish State; but they were undoubtedly able to play upon racial and traditional tribal feelings to gain support. Obligations were placed upon the Iraqi Government and the Mandatory Power by the recommendation of the League of Nations Frontier Commission, which visited the Kurdish areas of Iraq in 1925, to take measures for "Kurdicisation" of the administration, courts and schools of those areas. The British Government was working for the liquidation of the Mandate by 1932, a fact which gave rise to Kurdish fears for their status in the future, the more so since there were no safeguards written into the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 30, 1930. However, in 1932, after nine petitions to the League of Nations by various Kurdish bodies, a formal declaration regarding minorities' rights was made by the Iraqi Government to the Council of the League, the relevant paragraphs of which are summarised at Annex A. Succeeding Iraqi Cabinets delayed the introduction of these changes; but when Mulla Mustafa Barzani (see Annex B) and members of his tribe came out in open revolt in 1945, this was due less to Kurdish nationalism than to personal ambition, allied with economic discontent (in particular shortages of grain and clothing) and local grievances with Government officials. Mulla Mustafa was eventually defeated by the Iraqi Army with the help of heavily-subsidised Kurdish chiefs hostile to him, and fled to Iran (see next paragraph).

Iranian Kurdistan

6. In Iran, the Kurds, who under the weak Government of the Qajar Dynasty, had been left more or less to their own devices, were repressed under Reza Shah (1921–41), but after his abdication the return of the tribal leaders soon led to a re-establishment of lawless conditions. Iranian Army attempts to maintain order were attended by varying degrees of success. In 1941, after the entry into Iran of British and Russian forces, the Kurds were at first mildly encouraged by the Russians, who feared a deterioration of the military situation in the Caucasus and wished for friendly relations with possible dissidents. Subsequently the Russians repressed them in the interests of peace and quiet along the supply line across Iran. In 1943 there were signs that Kurdish nationalism, as distinct from mere lawlessness, was raising its head and that its leaders were in touch with the Tudeh Party. During 1944 a local notable, Qazi Muhammad of Mahabad, emerged as Kurdish nationalist leader. Although he visited Tehran to try and convince the central Government of his loyalty, he later went to Baku, in company with other Kurdish leaders; there the Russians advised them to join the "Azerbaijan Democratic Party", in return for which they would receive Soviet support for their independence movement. By

1945 a "Kurdish Republic" was in existence, under Russian protection, and enjoying limited support in and around Mahabad; but this too collapsed in the following year when the USSR withdrew its troops from Iran. Qazi Muhammad submitted to the Iranian Government, whose authority was thus re-established, and he, with several others, was later executed. Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who had taken refuge in Iran after his defeat in Iraq, escaped with some of his followers to the Soviet Union. Since then the picture has been one of increasing central Government authority in the area, and a certain amount of material progress—new roads, asphalt streets, water supplies, &c.—stimulated by the tour of that province by the Cabinet in the summer of 1958. When, in 1962, the Iranian Government embarked on its programme of land reform, it selected Kurdistan as one of the first areas for its application. This is aimed at undermining the position of the landlords and Aghas, and it is hoped that the rank and file will come to feel that their interests are as well served by remaining in a tolerant and reasonably progressive Iran as by fighting to unite with their brethren in other countries.

Turkish Kurdistan

7. Turkish Kurdistan is a mountainous country, and its inhabitants' way of life is largely tribal and feudal. In Ottoman times there were periodical revolts, and the Turkish Republic's policies of laicisation and Westernisation produced yet more in 1925, 1926, 1930 and 1937-38. Fighting in these revolts was savage, and the ruthlessness with which the army repressed each rising generally sowed the seeds of the next one. Thus Turkish attempts at assimilation of the Kurds have failed, and they remain one of the larger thorns in Turkish flesh. Discontent seems to have been rooted more in oppression by the Turks and dissatisfaction with material conditions than in Kurdish nationalism or pan-Kurdism; but revolts have tended to take on a racial aspect, although not all Kurdish tribes are involved at any one time. The presence in the National Assembly of some 36 Kurds, members of the New Turkey Party (N.T.P.), ensures that for the present the Government's official policy to Kurds in Turkey remains fairly "soft", but it is certain that the authorities would in no way wish their Kurds to regard themselves as anything other than Turkish nationals. As the N.T.P.'s Kurdish members represent the landowners and tribal elements, who have, therefore a stake in the central Government, which in turn does not interfere in the feudal system prevailing in Eastern Turkey, no recurrence of organised Kurdish disaffection in Turkey is foreseen at present. The Government remains alert, however, to the danger of Kurdish nationalism, particularly in student circles.

Kurds in Syria

8. According to Syrian sources the Kurdish community in Syria is thought to number up to 250,000; the majority live in tribal groups along the Turkish frontier, are engaged in agriculture and are generally rather backward. Although they sometimes complain of discrimination by the Syrian authorities, as do most minority groups in Syria from time to time, they are not thought to be very politically conscious and are in any case too few to carry much weight. However, the Syrian Government has been a little uneasy lately about Kurdish infiltration from Turkey and Iraq into the Jezireh area, where they might in the future present a threat to the security of Syria. In Damascus there is a community of about 20,000 Kurds, some of whose leaders, notably Dr. Nafizi and the Badr Khan brothers, have shown themselves to be partisans of an autonomous Kurdish State; but their activities have confined themselves largely to cultural and intellectual fields. Dr. Kamran Ali Badr-Khan, now resident in Paris, periodically appeals to the United Nations for Kurdish independence (see paragraph 33), but meets with little public response and does not seem to be recognised as an official spokesman for the Kurds in Iraq.

Kurds in the USSR

9. According to the 1959 census there were 58,799 Kurds in the USSR, of whom approximately 16,000 were in Georgia and 26,000 in Armenia. They are mainly settled and a Soviet-style culture has been imposed upon them. The Russians have paid some attention to Kurdish cultural matters and published a new Kurdish grammar in 1962.

PART II.—THE KURDISH PROBLEM IN IRAQ, 1958–63

Effect of the 1958 Revolution

10. Upon assuming power in July 1958, Qasim was faced with the fact that the separatist tendencies of the Kurds were likely to be as much of a problem to his régime as they had been to his predecessors. The collapse of the *ancien régime* also perhaps gave the Kurds more hope of independence from Baghdad or, at least, of autonomy. On July 27, 1958, Qasim announced the text of an "Interim Constitution for the Transitional Period in Iraq", which annulled the Iraq Basic Law and all its amendments. Article 3 of this Constitution stated "The structure of Iraq is based on co-operation between all citizens. Their rights will be respected, and their freedoms safeguarded. The Arabs and the Kurds are considered partners in this homeland. This Constitution recognises their national rights within the limits of Iraq unity". Initially, however, the Kurds seem to have held aloof from the Revolution, contenting themselves with making public assertions of support whilst waiting for some practical good to accrue to them. In August 1958 "Zhin" (Life), a Kurdish weekly, explained to its readers that "the realisation of Kurdish aspirations will require time, and we must arm ourselves with patience". Another factor in Kurdish support for the Revolution may have been the hope of the more educated Kurds that it would bring about the gradual removal of the feudal system in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Qasim's Policy Towards the Kurds

11. In general Qasim's policy towards the Kurds was to recognise them as a distinct entity in Iraq but to insist that they were part of the Iraqi nation and must work with the Arabs for the common good. Initially he is thought to have feared intervention in Iraq on the part of neighbouring countries who were members of the Baghdad Pact. His early concessions to Kurdish feeling may therefore have been due to the need to prevent other countries exploiting them as a weapon against his régime. He may also have had in mind that Kurdish hostility, even without foreign intervention, might well prove fatal to his régime at a critical time. How far he may have intended to go in his concessions to the Kurds, we cannot be sure. However, it is fair to assume that he inherited from the previous régime the idea that the Kurds in Iraq are a nuisance, that they should be repressed if they show signs of separatism, and that, if quiet, they can safely be neglected. Thus Qasim was merely carrying on the traditional Iraqi Kurdish policy which is responsible for the present revolt (paragraph 43 below) as it was for that of 1945.

Kurdish Membership of Presidential Council

12. Baghdad gestures towards encouragement of the Kurds in 1958 included the presence of a Kurd in the three-man Presidential Council; a son of Shaikh Mahmud (a noted Kurdish leader in the early days of the Mandate), as Minister of Public Works; and a visit in August by Brigadier Arif, before his downfall, to Kurdish areas, where he seems to have been enthusiastically received, and where he was welcomed by Shaikh Latif, son of Shaikh Mahmud.

Return of Mulla Mustafa from the USSR

13. The Kurds reciprocated for a short time after the Revolution. In a message sent from the USSR congratulating Qasim on the Revolution, Mulla Mustafa, leader of the Barzani tribesmen who revolted in 1945 (see paragraphs 5 and 6 and Annex B), said, "long live Arab-Kurdish fraternity under the banner of Iraqi unity". In August 1958, Mulla Mustafa was granted permission for himself and two companions, Mir Haj Ahmad and Asad Khoshawi, to return to Iraq; there is reason to believe that Qasim may have invited him to return. The Government allotted pensions and funds for their accommodation in Baghdad. Mulla Mustafa, indeed, was given a former residence of Nuri as-Sa'id. For some time he continued to side with Qasim, and from time to time issued calls for closer unity.

The Communists' Attitude to the Kurds

14. Towards the end of 1958, however, a split developed within the Iraqi Government over closer ties with the U.A.R. Kurdish opinion, fearing that the Kurds would be vastly outnumbered in such a union, aligned itself with Qasim and his friends, who were against such ties. The Communists, too, sided with Qasim and

acquired wider influence in Iraq as a result of his dependence upon them. Thereafter there were reports of an increase in Communist activities in Kurdish areas and of talks between the Communist Party of Iraq and Kurdish parties. The Communists, who had little to gain from moves towards greater Arab unity, exerted themselves to win over the Kurds and to curb separatist tendencies or channel them in the direction of Communism. On November 10, the Iraqi Communist Party (Ittihad ash-Sha'ab group) and the United Democrat Party of Kurdistan (U.D.P.K.) published a "Pact of Co-operation", in which the right of the Kurds to determine their own development was recognised, but "schismatic" ideas were condemned as a trick of the imperialists. Mulla Mustafa's policy at that time of supporting Kurdish-Arab unity within Iraq and expressing confidence in the Government's professions of goodwill towards the Kurds—as in the Interim Constitution—was no doubt responsible for the United Democratic Party's toning down their advocacy of Kurdish independence to the point where they could meet the Communist point of view. It may be doubted, however, that, in view of Mulla Mustafa's past dealings with Iraqi Governments, he really trusted Qasim. He may have thought it prudent to wait and see what Qasim would do and meanwhile prepare for revolt in case the new Government should prove, in fact, no more willing to grant concessions to the Kurds than any of the old ones.

The Mosul Revolt

15. In March 1959, when Colonel Shawwaf raised a revolt against the Government in support of Nasser and a wider Arab nationalism, numbers of Kurds who feared such a development supported the Iraqi Army in its suppression of the revolt. Afterwards they were sent back to their areas (though not disarmed). In the confused period between the start of the revolt and the arrival of Government forces, the Kurds found themselves in alliance with the Communists in street-fighting against the insurgents. However the U.D.P.K. claimed that it was their political views and discipline that prevented the whole of Northern Iraq from being subdued by the Communists.

Return of Kurds from USSR

16. In April 1959 some hundreds of Kurds returned, some with Russian wives, to Iraq from the Soviet Union, whither they had fled after Mulla Mustafa's defeat in 1945-46 (see paragraph 6), and were paid pensions on a scale according to their rank. At one time there were fears that some of these Kurds might be Communists, or that some Soviet Kurds might have been infiltrated into their ranks, but nothing more was heard of this possibility.

Refugees from Iraqi Kurdistan in Iran

17. In May 1959 Her Majesty's Embassy in Tehran reported that the normal seasonal migration of Kurds from Iraq into Iran was being systematically prevented on the Iraqi side and subjected to close security control on the Iranian. At the same time stories appeared in the Iranian Press of defections of Iraqi Kurds to Iran and of fighting between Kurds and Iraqi Government forces. There were also reports of fighting between the Barzanis and the Loulan section of the Baradost. By the end of May the Iranian acting Foreign Minister, Dr. Sadr, informed Her Majesty's Ambassador that there were several hundred refugees from Iraq in Iran and that more were expected. The Iranian Government were uncertain whether to let them stay in Iran or not. Her Majesty's Government advised them to do their utmost to maintain the tranquillity of the area. There were at this time rumours that the Iranians might be plotting to use the Kurdish situation to their own advantage, e.g., by arming refugees and sending them back to Iraq, but this they denied.

18. The fighting mentioned in the preceding paragraph was apparently due to discontent among certain Kurdish tribes at the Baghdad Government's tendency to Communism and the help which other Kurdish factions, e.g., the Barzanis, were rendering to the Iraqi Army to prevent Kurds from fleeing to neighbouring countries.

Mulla Mustafa's Desire for Kurdish Autonomy

19. By October 1959, however, it became apparent that all was not well between Qasim and Mulla Mustafa. The former was reputedly unwilling to encourage the Kurds in any separatist ideas by allowing them the educational and administrative autonomy which Mulla Mustafa had stated that he wished to achieve

—he was also reported as saying that his long-term aim was the establishment of an independent Kurdish State. The U.D.P.K.'s Constitution of October 1959 showed evidence of a strong Communist bias, but is it not known whether this really represented Kurdish views or was merely written in to curry favour with Qasim who then—some six months after the Mosul revolt—appeared to be relying on Communist support.

Registration of the United Democratic Party of Kurdistan (U.D.P.K.)

20. The situation remained uneasy in 1960, with trouble between the Barzanis and the Zibaris, chiefly over land and the murder of a Zibari by the Barzanis. When in February political parties were again licensed by the Government, the United Democratic Party of Kurdistan, of which Mulla Mustafa was the leader, produced a revised programme, which was subsequently amended by Qasim to exclude references to Kurds in other countries; this change was accepted by the party. The revised programme contained several noticeable changes from that of the 1959 Constitution (see paragraph 19), amongst them a marked toning-down of the Communist bias.

Her Majesty's Ambassador's Interview with Mulla Mustafa

21. Her Majesty's Ambassador asked to call on Mulla Mustafa as soon as the U.D.P.K. was licensed, and on February 21 had an interview with him and his brother, Shaikh Ahmad, in the course of which Mulla Mustafa said that almost all the Kurds were in favour of Communism because they recognised practical help when it was given to them, and that "a drowning man clutches at a straw". It is likely that by "Communism" Mulla Mustafa meant Communist Governments—who might produce material aid—rather than the theories of the local Communists. Her Majesty's Ambassador gave a general account of the meeting to Hashim Jawad, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, in an attempt to allay suspicions that the British were plotting with the Kurds. (It also aroused some nervousness on the part of the Turkish Government.)

Split between Kurdish Democrats and Communists

22. On April 20, 1960, the official organ of the U.D.P.K., *Khabat*, published an attack on the Communist Party (the Ittihad ash-Sha'ab group, subject to Moscow and banned in Iraq) which it accused of trying to impose its will on all other groups in the country. This was the first open sign of a split between the U.D.P.K. and the Communists, although (see paragraph 20) the U.P.D.K.'s programme had already toned down the party's pro-Communist bias. The more feudal elements were in any case already opposed to Communism and seemed to reflect opposition to Communist efforts to exploit Kurdish Nationalist sentiment. The Ittihad ash-Sha'ab group contended that "isolationist separatist conceptions in the democratic movement only serve the enemies of the Kurdish people".

Kurdish Delegation to Qasim and Further Unrest

23. By 1960, Kurdish opinion was also hardening against Qasim's Government, on the grounds that they had been promised a better deal but that in the event no attention had been paid to their needs. On August 23, a group of Kurdish leaders submitted to Qasim a note relating their grievances and asking *inter alia* for agricultural reform; the prevention of attempts to widen the breach between the Kurds, the Arabs and the Turkish minority; and liberty for the Kurds to prevent the spread of Communism in their area. Qasim was angered by the note and refused to see the delegation. There were again reports of talk about independence, which had been soft-pedalled since the Revolution, and of fighting between the Barzanis and their traditional enemies, the Zibari, Harki and Baradost tribes. These fights were said to be taking on a political character as a result of Qasim's *divide et impera* policy of arming the Zibaris. *Khabat*, the official paper of the U.D.P.K., denounced the "aggression by Kurdish feudalists" and called on the Government to put an end to it. The upshot was to exacerbate further the Kurds' relations with Qasim.

Barzanis' Defeat of Tribal Enemies

24. During the first half of 1961 this unrest continued to increase. In June Qasim sent for Shaikh Ahmad Barzani, who, however, apparently made no commitments. Raids by hostile tribes against the Barzanis and limited counter-attacks by them continued until early July, when they unleashed a full-scale offensive

against their attackers. This resulted in victory for the Barzanis and the flight of many of their opponents to Turkey and Iran and to parts of Iraq where the Government could protect them. Iraqi Army units arrived on the scene towards the end of July, but took no action.

Kurdish Successes

25. Mulla Mustafa's vigorous attack and the army's inaction swung over to his side many Kurdish leaders who so far had looked askance at what they considered his Leftish leanings. They ousted or neutralised most Government posts in their tribal areas, until by the end of August the semicircle of mountains from north-west of Mosul to south-east of Kirkuk was effectively under Kurdish authority. From mid-July pamphlets were circulated by the U.D.P.K. which, while affirming the party's loyalty to the Iraqi Republic, called for the end of martial law and of repressive action against the party, the establishment of democratic Government, the observance of Kurdish national rights, increased industrial development, and the exemption of tobacco plantations from agrarian reform.

Counter-attack by Qasim

26. At the beginning of August the Kurds seem to have given the Government one month in which to accept their demands. By early September there was no settlement in sight and the Kurds extended their area of control, attacking Government posts and establishing road-blocks. Qasim finally took military action on September 10, and after some 10 days of fighting large-scale resistance by the Kurds was reported as having ceased. Subsequent events proved that was only a temporary respite. Mulla Mustafa, although reported as being wounded, in hiding, &c., was thought to be holding out in the remoter hills.

Qasim's Accusations Against the British

27. Qasim, who had at first played down the seriousness of the situation, on September 7 blamed the "imperialists" for the rising, and the Iraqi Press accused the British, the I.P.C., the Americans and CENTO. On September 23 Qasim accused Her Majesty's Embassy of financing the revolt, at the same time exculpating the Soviet Union. The latter probably were not concerned, and indeed were in somewhat of a dilemma: on the one hand, the Iraqi Army was dependent on them for supplies, while on the other hand, they had in the past aided Mulla Mustafa and might well wish to make use of him again in the future. The Iraqi Communists took the line that Mulla Mustafa was a loyal citizen of the Republic and had been unjustly attacked, while the chiefs on the Iranian frontier were imperialist agents who must be suppressed.

28. In September, the U.D.P.K. decided to take up arms with the tribes in a tactical alliance whose objectives for the time being would be largely nationalistic. The party's President, Mulla Mustafa, in his capacity as head of a fighting tribe was already in revolt against the Government (paragraph 24). This led to the party's dissolution by the Government (on October 10) on charges of undermining security and creating dissension. In early October Shaikh Ahmad, for reasons which are not altogether clear, sent a telegram to Qasim proclaiming his loyalty to the Government's cause. One theory is that, by so doing, he was able to secure Barzan against attack by the Government and so give the Barzani tribesmen a safe base, freeing them for action in other areas. (This is not a new manoeuvre in the history of the Barzani brothers' various campaigns against the Government.) After a breathing space, there were again reports that Mulla Mustafa was gaining the upper hand in the mountainous areas near Amadiya, and in January 1962 that a cease-fire had been declared for peace talks, which however came to nothing. Fighting then continued during the spring of 1962, with Iraqi forces containing the area in revolt but apparently unable to make any headway in the mountainous areas.

Kurdish Attacks on Oil Installations

29. On April 1, Kurdish rebels attacked an oil company installation at Shuwana, without accomplishing much; in August they attacked a degassing station and blew up a pipeline complex near Kirkuk. In an attack on October 12 on an oil installation at Ain Zalah, the British fields superintendent, D. C. Dankworth, was carried off by a band of Kurds, and later released into Iran. Later another I.P.C. employee, F. Gosling, was abducted and subsequently released. These actions

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represented an attempt by the Kurds to gain publicity outside Iraq for their continuing revolt. The Iraqi Government were concerned that the Kurds might embark on a policy of sabotaging the oil fields, which it would be practically impossible for the Government to prevent. However, Mulla Mustafa shrank from this both because of the effect it would have had on Arab opinion and also because he did not wish to precipitate a crisis in the country (by disrupting the economy) until he was sure that the successor Government would be to his liking, i.e., by coming to a prior arrangement with other opposition elements.

End of Negotiations

30. By early July Shaikh Ahmad Barzani had been summoned to Baghdad for an interview with Qasim, but the negotiations broke down and he was apparently thereafter detained in Baghdad.

Journalists' Visits to Kurdistan

31. In July 1962, the Kurds succeeded in arranging for an American and a Swiss journalist to tour Kurdistan and write up the revolt from the Kurdish side. It was in the course of one of the tours, in August, that Mulla Mustafa appealed unsuccessfully, through articles written by D. A. Schmidt of the *New York Times*, for American help in the struggle for independence. D. Adamson of the *Sunday Telegraph* was also invited on a tour of the area, which he described in his paper.

Battle of Rowanduz Gorge

32. The rebels emerged successful from a series of battles along the Rowanduz Gorge in August, as a result of which the Raikan and Loulan tribes' contingents (who had been aiding the army) withdrew and two army brigades were surrounded. Shaikh Rashid Loulan fled and sought refuge in Turkey, which was refused. The Kurds continued to hold their own throughout the winter until, on February 8, 1963, Qasim and his Government were overthrown by a military *coup d'état* (see paragraph 41).

Kurdish Appeal to Security Council

33. On October 18, 1962, the *New York Times* reported that Amir Kamran Ali Badr Khan (of the Syrian family), a professor of Kurdish literature and language in Paris, had announced that the Kurdish rebels would send a petition to the Security Council's President for October (V. Zorin of the USSR), asking for an international committee to be sent to Kurdistan and for a halt to be ordered to what they termed "Qasim's policy of genocide". Nothing apparently came of this, and there were reports that the Soviet delegate would in any case not raise the matter. Badr Khan, however, also sent a circular letter to Missions to the United Nations. Attempts to advertise the Kurdish cause abroad were also made by such organisations as the Kurdish Students' Association in Europe (Komeleye Xwendikarani Kurd le Ewropa—K.S.A.E.) and Dr. Kamran Badr Khan's "Kurdish delegation" and "Centre for Kurdish Studies". It was reported that in 1962 members of the K.S.A.E. set up a Committee for the Defence of Kurdistan (C.D.K.), to publicise the revolt in Iraq and to obtain financial support for it—a certain amount appears to have been forthcoming from Communist Governments (cf. paragraph 34), chiefly Czechoslovakia. About a quarter of the C.D.K.'s membership is Communist, but the remainder is thought to favour a non-Communist Kurdistan. The C.D.K. are in touch with the rebels in Iraq, and it was Ismet Sherif Vanli, President of the K.S.A.E., who in June 1962 arranged the Swiss journalist's visit (paragraph 31 above). The K.S.A.E. at first reflected the U.D.P.K.'s line supporting Qasim, but later as Kurdish separatism gathered momentum, it too opposed him.

Help from Outside

34. There was no evidence to support the Iraqi Government's accusations that the Kurds had received equipment from other Governments, apart from the possibility that Turkish and Iranian frontier officials might be turning a blind eye to the smuggling of non-military supplies (food, clothing, &c.). It is believed that the Kurds received cash from the Iranian Government and that Kurdish tribesmen were given training in heavy weapons units of the Iranian Army. The Shah and some of his advisers, prompted perhaps by their apprehensions of a violently Arab-nationalist Iraq, and possibly an Arab Union dominated by Nasser, on their frontier,

were tempted to consider supporting the Iraqi Kurds. The British and American Ambassadors, when consulted, pointed out the danger to Iran of encouraging Kurdish separatism, and told the Iranian Foreign Minister that Iran's interests would be better served by doing what she could to promote a settlement of the dispute. It is possible that the Kurds received some financial aid from the Communist *bloc*, but in view of the Communists' attitude to the revolt at the time (see paragraph 39 below), this is not likely to have been substantial. A Kurdish student group was allowed to raise privately a small supply of funds in Communist capitals. The fact that the Kurds possess quantities of Russian arms can be explained by their capture of Government posts and by the desertion of army and police personnel. Indeed, outside the context of this revolt, it was to the Government forces that the Russians supplied arms, which were used against the Kurds. Knowledge of this fact may have tended to make the Russians less popular among the Kurds.

Kurdish Rebel Forces

35. The Kurdish rebel forces, numbering probably about 10,000 men, consist of various elements:

- Mulla Mustafa's Barzanis, numbering about 800;
- his tribal allies;
- partisans of the U.D.P.K. or persons operating under its direction;
- police deserters—perhaps about 60 per cent of the police in Kurdistan—and army deserters;

several hundred miscellaneous volunteers, including some fugitives from Iran. Their arms consist chiefly of various types of rifle, machine-gun, and mortar, much of this equipment having been captured from Government forces or brought over by deserters. Because of the mountainous nature of the territory they hold, they do not appear to have made much use of motor transport so far. Mulla Mustafa, the acknowledged leader of all these elements, possesses not only a charismatic attraction for his followers but also proved ability as a guerilla leader. Nevertheless there is some division of purpose between the U.D.P.K. and the tribal groups, who, although they have combined against a common foe, cannot be said to be natural allies and might well turn on each other if they were victorious.

Iraqi Government Forces Involved

36. Before Qasim's demise, the Government had two infantry divisions, with supporting arms including artillery and armour, involved in Kurdistan, apart from the local police, many of whom seemed to be unreliable and to have no stomach for fighting their fellow-countrymen. The Government used aircraft for bombing villages in rebel areas, thus causing widespread destruction and loss of life (chiefly to non-combatants in the villages). The Iraqi Army showed itself to be fairly inefficient, particularly in the mountainous areas where it was unable to make any good use of its tanks. In order to forestall fifth-columnists and future deserters, a policy was adopted of moving Kurdish personnel to other areas and using Arab troops in Kurdistan. The morale of the latter was not good and they were unused to operating in the mountains.

Kurdish-controlled Areas

37. By early 1963, most of Iraqi Kurdistan was under rebel control (or, at least, out of effective Government control), with the exception of the main northern towns of the plain: Kirkuk, Erbil and Suleimaniya. Other towns were either in rebel hands, or surrounded but retained by army garrisons who were there on sufferance. This had the advantage for the Kurds that they could buy food in the towns, while the presence of the garrisons restrained Qasim from bombing them and so alienating the sympathies of the inhabitants from the Kurdish cause.

The Role of the U.D.P.K.

38. From the information available it would seem that the U.D.P.K. is now strongest in the Southern area of Iraqi Kurdistan and particularly in such towns as Suleimaniya, which has for long been a centre of Kurdish nationalism, and where there is an urban proletarian population open to more up-to-date political influences than the predominantly tribal areas of the North. Such towns as Kirkuk, centre of the oil industry in Iraq, possess similar populations which are less exposed to

tribalism and its loyalties. While the "Kurdish nationalist" tribal movement may now be widely supported by the U.D.P.K., many of whose members are educated, urbanised Kurds, it seems likely that, if Kurdistan were to gain some measure of autonomy, the U.D.P.K. and the Aghas would once more find themselves in opposition to each other, since the former stands for some measure of social progress and most of the latter would presumably prefer the *status quo*. Mulla Mustafa is the natural fighting leader of the Kurds in arms against the Iraqi Government, but the party might well prefer another President in time of peace. Even were the Kurds to achieve their present aims, therefore, there is little prospect of a peaceful settled future for them.

The Communist Attitude to the Kurdish Revolt, 1961-62

39. As mentioned in paragraphs 14 and 15 above, for some time after the Revolution of 1958 the Iraqi Communist Party and the Kurds were broadly agreed in supporting Qasim, but had begun to diverge again by the spring of 1960 (cf. paragraph 22 above). By 1962, the Communists, fearing that the Kurdish revolt might unseat Qasim and allow a Right-wing Nationalist Government to come to power, were issuing pamphlets calling for a negotiated solution to the Kurdish problem. On February 26, 1962, *Pravda* strongly attacked Qasim for his "vicious" policy of using the Iraqi armed forces against the Kurds who were attempting to secure the national rights guaranteed to them by the Provisional Constitution and criticised his efforts to represent their just demands as a separatist movement and their leaders as imperialist agents. The editorial added that the C.P.I. supported the U.D.P.K. in favour of a peaceful settlement of the problem. In April the newspaper *Saut al Ahrar* published an "Appeal to establish Peace in Iraqi Kurdistan" (backed by a large demonstration in Baghdad), calling on the Government to prevent further loss and damage to the State. This appeal, which was signed originally by 11 men, of whom only two were Kurds and all were known for their Left-wing views, met with a poor reception by the Government. In May, Communist papers published lists of a further 500 signatories, eight of whom were arrested and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. The Communists objected violently and accused the Government of isolating itself from the "popular masses" by repressing all democratic forces. In August 1962 they claimed that the problem was "widening the breach between the Government and national forces" and thus permitting the "Imperialists" to re-establish themselves. The I.C.P. demanded self-government for Iraqi Kurdistan within the Iraqi Republic, to be achieved by means of "a peaceful mass struggle on a broad national front". This, however, must not replace the right of self-determination for the Kurdish nation, including the formation of an independent State for the whole of Kurdistan; "but that is a matter for the future" (*"World Marxist Review"*, August 1962). (For the Communist line since Qasim's fall, see paragraph 44 below.)

The Communist Attitude to Kurdish Independence

40. From the foregoing and from other indications, it would appear that the present Soviet line on independence for Kurds outside Iraq is that agitation for this would only weaken the hand of, and perhaps alienate, the Communist Parties of those countries. The first essential is the establishment of a "national democratic" Government, i.e., one following a Communist line or entirely Communist-controlled. With the establishment of such a system, and possibly thereafter a degree of autonomy for the local Kurds, most of the latter's wrongs would be righted and they would have no cause to feel themselves an oppressed minority. In the short term, the Russians would probably prefer to have seen Qasim survive, in the hope that he could be pushed, either by the Communists or by a United Front, in the direction of "national democracy". None the less, the Iraqi Communists felt obliged to offer autonomy or possibly eventual independence to the Kurds in order not to incur their hostility. A further Soviet motive to keep the Kurdish pot simmering, if not boiling over, is the trouble it can cause for Turkey and Iran and the present Government in Iraq.

The Situation after the Iraqi Revolution of February 8, 1963

41. On February 8, 1963, a military *coup d'état* overthrew Qasim and his Government, and Qasim himself and several of his associates were executed very

shortly afterwards. The group of army officers who seized power (the National Council of the Revolutionary Command) appointed a Government which was Ba'athist in complexion, strongly anti-Communist and headed by Abdul Salam Arif. The Government soon issued a declaration announcing *inter alia* their intention to bring about the "national unity of the people with all its requirements of Arab Kurdish fraternity . . . respecting the minorities' rights and thus enabling them to take part in national life". Two Kurds were made Ministers in the new Government: one of them, Baba Ali, son of Shaikh Mahmud Barzinja of Suleimaniya, had also been a Minister in Qasim's Government. There were indications that the new régime wished to come to terms with the Kurds—indeed they could hardly afford not to for the time being—while the Kurds, for their part, appeared to be determined on autonomy. A message from the U.D.P.K., broadcast on Baghdad Radio on February 9, spoke of the establishment of a "just self-government for our people within the beloved Iraqi Republic". By the end of February talks were being held in Baghdad between the new Government and a Kurdish delegation led by Jalal Talabani, and later a Government mission, composed of the two Kurdish Ministers and the Chief of Staff, went to the north for talks with Mulla Mustafa. On March 9 it was announced that the Government was prepared to grant the Kurds their "national rights on the basis of decentralisation"—a concession said to have been wrung from it by Mulla Mustafa's threat to recommence hostilities.

42. Both sides were reported to have agreed to negotiate, but it became apparent that the Kurds were demanding more than the Government were prepared to concede, in particular a percentage of Iraq's oil income and the withdrawal of Arab troops from Kurdistan. In addition they wanted various local affairs to be handled by a Kurdish executive council appointed by a legislative council elected by the residents of Kurdistan. The new Iraqi Government seemed not to be in earnest in their negotiations, and carried out precautionary troop reinforcements in the north. The two Kurds in the Cabinet, Fuad Arif and Baba Ali, resigned. The announcement, in Cairo on April 17, of agreement between the U.A.R., Iraq and Syria on a form of Federal Union further stiffened the Kurdish attitude, since it sharply emphasised the risk of the Kurds becoming a still smaller minority in a new and wider Arab State. Kurdish memoranda were addressed to the Arab delegations and a Kurdish emissary discussed the question with Nasser in Cairo. It was reported that the Kurds had postulated that, in the projected Federal Union, Iraqi Kurdistan should be a fully autonomous, equal member.

43. A successful conclusion of the negotiations with the Iraqi Government became increasingly more improbable, and on June 8, widespread skirmishing commenced between the Iraqi Army and the Kurds. On June 10, 1963, the Government issued an ultimatum to the Kurds that they should lay down their arms or take the consequences, and civil war began once more in Kurdistan.

Changes in Communist Attitude to Kurds

44. The new régime's suppression of Communists in Iraq caused a violent reaction on the part of international Communism and brought calls for a Kurdish revolt against it by Radio Peyk-e Iran, a station broadcasting from East Germany. Officially, the C.P.S.U. confined itself to a statement broadcast on February 16 condemning the new régime, presumably since it did not wish to alienate it entirely. The Soviet Union is, of course, in a delicate position *vis-à-vis* Middle Eastern Governments which are not pro-Western but which repress their Communists. A *Pravda* article of January 22 acknowledges this dilemma in general terms but does not say what can be done about it—except of course, that in the end nothing can stop the spread of Communism. Between the February 8 Revolution and early June 1963 there were several reports of Kurdish attacks on pro-Communist villages and bands; but after the resumption of hostilities in Kurdistan there were reports of Communists who were sought by the Iraqi authorities joining the Kurds with their arms. There were also rumours that some of the Iraqi Communist exiles in Czechoslovakia had gone to join Mulla Mustafa. Whatever its relations with the Iraqi Government, however, Communism's attitude towards Kurdish independence did not change, for on June 15 Tass issued a statement condemning the Ba'ath Party and calling for "Kurdish national autonomy within the framework of the Republic".

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Conclusion*Objects of the Present Revolt*

45. Neither Mulla Mustafa nor Ibrahim Ahmad, Secretary-General of the U.D.P.K., have described the aims of the present revolt as being the institution of a completely independent Kurdistan. They declare that they are hoping for autonomy for the Kurds within the several countries they inhabit, although their ultimate policy regarding a completely independent Kurdistan might depend on the willingness of those countries to grant local autonomy. However it should be borne in mind that, although they might be content with regional autonomy, independence has for centuries been the dream of almost every Kurd. Moreover, it is extremely unlikely that either Iran or Turkey would ever grant any formal autonomy to minorities whose existence has been officially denied. It is worthy of note that both Mulla Mustafa and the U.D.P.K. deny that they are Communists, and in view of the Kurdish mastership of the art of opportunism their opposition so far to the C.P.I. and their undoubted nationalism, there is no reason to suppose that ideological Marxism would find a strong foothold amongst them.

Possibilities of Success

46. From the military point of view the rebels would seem to be able to control the mountain areas without outside help; but by themselves, without modern equipment, they would hardly be able to maintain their control of any parts of the plain for long. On the other hand the Government, while able to hold the plains, would probably be unable to seize or hold mountainous areas, because of the army's lack of training in mountain warfare, the superior morale of the Kurds and the relative ineffectiveness of inefficiently-used aircraft against guerilla forces in the mountains. During the revolt of 1962-63 the Kurds continuously extended the range of their raids into the plains and the Government forces regularly failed to stop them.

47. There are three factors in this present revolt which distinguish it from previous revolts in Iraq:

- (a) the solidarity of the Iraqi Kurds *vis-à-vis* the Government (Mulla Mustafa having defeated pro-Government tribes, such as the Zibaris and Shaikh Rashid Loulan's section of the Baradost, and won over tribes that had previously remained neutral) has given the revolt more of a national character than, for instance, that of 1945.
- (b) The movement for social and agrarian reform (as represented by the U.D.P.K.) is stronger than in previous revolts, where the main emphasis was on preserving the positions of the Aghas involved.
- (c) Whereas, in the past, it has been the Kurdish intelligentsia who have called for a national State, without for the most part having a material stake in the revolt or any apparent close connection with the dissidents, it now seems that there is a close degree of solidarity between the Kurdish expatriates and their kinsmen on their native hills.

Middle East Section,
Research Department,
Foreign Office.

ANNEX A

Summary of Declaration of the Iraqi Government on the Protection of Minorities—Made in 1932 to the Council of the League of Nations

Article 1 states that these stipulations shall be recognised as fundamental laws of Iraq and shall not be interfered with by other laws or official actions, nor superseded by future laws.

Article 4 guarantees the right of Iraqi nationals to equal civil rights irrespective of their race, language or religion.

Article 5 guarantees to minorities equality before the law with other Iraqi nationals, and the right to maintain their own charitable, educational, religious and social institutions.

Article 8 deals with the allocation of official funds for minorities' educational, religious and charitable purposes, and for the provision of primary education in the minorities' own languages.

Article 9 stipulates the *qadhas* in which the official languages shall be Kurdish or Turkish in addition to Arabic, and requires that officials in those *qadhas* shall be conversant with those languages, and where possible shall be selected from Iraqis from one of these areas.

Article 10 declares these articles to be "of international concern" and stipulates that they shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

ANNEX B

Mulla Mustafa Barzani


The Barzani confederation of Kurds live in the mountainous tract of Iraqi territory just south of the Turkish border and north-west of the strategically important Rowanduz Gorge, which carries the main road from Mosul and Erbil to Rezaiyeh in Iranian Azerbaijan (see Map).

2. Mulla Mustafa is about 50 years old, and although the Zibaris are his tribe's hereditary enemies, is married to a member of that tribe. The "Mulla" part of his name is a proper name and not a religious title.

3. In 1935 Shaikh Ahmad Barzani, the paramount chief of the Barzanis and Mulla Mustafa's elder brother, was forced to flee to Turkey as a result of the suppression of a tribal war. Mulla Mustafa, who took over the leadership of the tribe, was invited to Baghdad to discuss Kurdish grievances with the Iraqi Government, but was arrested on arrival and interned at Suleimaniya. In 1943 he escaped to Barzan and headed a revolt which resulted in the Iraqi Government making concessions to the Kurds including, in 1945, an amnesty to the Barzanis and their associates. Mulla Mustafa remained in rebellion, however, and was eventually defeated by the Iraqi Army with the aid of the Zibari Kurds, thanks to whom the army was able to cross the mountain barrier separating the village of Barzan from the outside world. With some of his followers he then fled to Iran where he joined Qazi Mohammad, the President of the "Mahabad Republic" (see paragraph 6). During this period he was in contact with the Russians, who were then occupying North-West Iran, and in 1944 he visited Baku with other Kurdish notables. When the Mahabad Republic collapsed in 1946 with the withdrawal of Russian troops, Mulla Mustafa and his followers were offered terms by the Iranian Government, which they refused, and the majority of the tribesmen and some of the leaders were driven back into Iraq by Iranian troops. Mulla Mustafa, however, with some of his supporters, doubled back through Turkish territory into Iran and thence to Soviet Azerbaijan, where he remained until October 1958. While there he claims to have attended a Soviet Staff College, and there were reports that his supporters received infantry training.

SECRET





*International
Boundary
Study*

269
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NO. 27 JAN. 30, 1964

**IRAQ - TURKEY
BOUNDARY**



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268

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This study was done by Professor Lewis M. Alexander of the University of Rhode Island under the Policy Research Studies program, a contract research program administered by the External Research Staff of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Government agencies may obtain additional information and copies of the study by calling the Geographer, Room 8744, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. (Telephone: Code 182, Extension 4508).

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY STUDY


No. 27

Iraq - Turkey Boundary

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The Geographer
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Bureau of Intelligence and Research



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IRAQ - TURKEY BOUNDARY

I. BOUNDARY BRIEF

The Iraq - Turkey boundary is 219 miles in length.¹ It begins in the west on the Tigris River at its junction with the Habur Nehri (Nahr al Khābūr), and for 36 miles follows the thalweg, or main channel of the Habur and its tributaries. North of the town of Zākhū (Zakho), the boundary begins a meandering course across the Kurdish Alps, following alternately streams and mountain crests, and rising in places to over 7,000 feet, until its junction with the boundary of Iran. The boundary has been demarcated along its entire length.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Geographical

The area through which the Iraq - Turkey boundary passes is one of transition between the Kurdish Alps to the north and the foothills--and beyond them the desert lowlands--to the south. Except for the extreme western sector, the boundary lies at elevations of 4-6,000 feet, descending briefly in the steep valleys of southward-flowing streams, or rising to over 7,000 feet, particularly in the easternmost areas. Although the boundary frequently follows minor water divides, the entire region lies within the drainage area of the Tigris River and of one of its major tributaries, the Great Zab. Sixty miles to the north is Lake Van, while Lake Rezā'iyyeh (formerly Lake Urmia) is thirty miles east of the boundary in Iran. The boundary area itself is maturely dissected by the upper streams of the Tigris system, and, except in the extreme west, is a very rugged area.

Average temperatures range from the mid-thirties in January to the low seventies in July. Because of the terrain, precipitation is higher in the border area than to the south, averaging 20 to 30 inches per year. Although the predominant vegetation in the uplands south of the boundary is grass and low shrub, much of the region in the immediate vicinity of the boundary is forested and timber products are a traditional export from this area, the logs being floated downstream to the drier, treeless regions of Iraq. North of the boundary the rugged, forested Kurdish Alps rise to well over 10,000 feet and extend for over 100 miles through the sparsely-inhabited area of southeastern Turkey.

In northern Iraq, soils are of good quality in the valleys of the Tigris system and in intermontaine basins, but on the Turkish side of the boundary there is little level or gently-sloping land and only thin soils. Major areas of agricultural production in Iraq are (1) north and northeast of Zākhū, and (2) in the broad valley of the Great Zab River. Irrigation is unnecessary for agriculture here. Principal products are tobacco, raisins, gall nuts, wool, and mohair, but the total volume of exports from this region to other parts of Iraq is not great. Manufacturing in the boundary area is virtually nonexistent.

¹ Measured on the AMS 1:250,000 maps showing the boundary.

The Iraq - Turkey boundary passes through an area traditionally inhabited by the Kurds, who are spread also across the northern and eastern borders into Turkey and Iran. There are approximately 1,250,000 Kurds in Iraq, at least 2.5 million in Turkey and another 1.5 million in north-western Iran. The Kurds have maintained their own language and customs and have resisted assimilation into Iraq, Turkey, or Iran. They are settled primarily in the rural and less accessible parts of the boundary area, while Arab Iraqis tend to be concentrated in the towns and villages south of the border. To the north, except for the town of Çölemerik (Hakkâri), there are only small villages within thirty miles of the boundary; here again Kurds predominate, living in relatively remote areas. The desires of the Kurds in Iraq for political autonomy were recognized by the Council of the League of Nations, which in 1925 suggested that they be given autonomy as part of the general boundary settlement. The final Treaty made no mention of the Kurds. However, when Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations, the Iraqi government was required to subscribe to several guarantees to the Kurds, including bilingual schools, courts, and administration in the Kurdish areas. In recent years, they have frequently pressed the Baghdad Government for recognition of their "national" (primarily cultural) rights. In southeastern Turkey, the Kurds have fared no better so far as autonomy is concerned. The Treaty of Sèvres, in 1920, provided for an autonomous and possibly independent Kurdistan within Turkey, but the Treaty never came into effect and a revolt by Kurdish nationalists in 1925 was put down by Turkish troops. There was further trouble in 1930 and again in 1936, but, since then, there has been little organized political agitation north of the Iraq - Turkey boundary.

No railroads or major roads cross the boundary. Prior to World War I, when the Mosul vilayet was part of the Ottoman Empire, a major road connected Zākhū via the Tigris valley with Turkey, while another followed the valley of the Great Zab, linking Al'Amādiyah (Amādia) in Iraq with Çölemerik. Today, only secondary roads connect the two countries with one another, and there is little traffic along them. In Turkey, south of the Lake Van lowlands, the only major town is Çölemerik (pop. 4,200), located 21 miles from the boundary in the upper valley of the Great Zab. In Iraq, the principal towns near the boundary are Zākhū (pop., 5,000), 3 miles from the border, Al'Amādiyah (pop., 3,000), 13 miles away, and Az Zibār and 'Aqrah (Aqrā), both with populations of about 1,000, located 12 and 22 miles, respectively, from the boundary. Zākhū, Al'Amādiyah and 'Aqrah are connected by highway to the south with Mosul (Al Mawṣil) but Az Zibār, in the valley of the Great Zab, is linked with 'Aqrah only by a circuitous and very poor road. In addition to these towns, there are a number of small villages and the overall aspect of the boundary area is one of scattered rural populations and poor communications. Thirty miles south of the boundary is the beginning of the rich wheat-growing area of Mosul (Al Mawṣil) the "breadbasket" of Iraq, while 25 miles south of the westernmost part of the boundary is the Iraqi town of 'Ayn Zālah, site of one of the country's productive oil wells. The movement of people and of goods southward from the boundary area toward Mosul is either via the highways from Zākhū, Al'Amādiyah and 'Aqrah, or down the valleys of the Tigris and Great Zab Rivers. North of the boundary there is little focus of routes, except along the upper valley of the Great Zab, until one reaches the Lake Van area, relatively flat and low (at some 5600 ft.) when compared to surrounding mountains.

B. Historical

The area crossed by the Iraq - Turkey boundary has long been a scene of conflict between the Turks and the Arabs. By the 8th century A.D., the Arabs were firmly in control of the Mosul region but, in the 11th century, Turkish mercenaries came to exercise a certain amount of power in this area. To the north, the Kurds, who have inhabited the uplands south and east of Lake Van for at least 3,000 years, maintained an independent kingdom from the 10th to the early 12th centuries, after which it was overwhelmed by the Saljug Turks. Mosul was conquered by Mongol armies in the 13th and 14th centuries and, in 1534, it was incorporated by the Turks within their empire. After this, Mosul and its surroundings were, for the most part, politically subordinate to the Turkish administration at Baghdad; not until 1879 did Mosul become a separate vilayet within the Ottoman Empire, equal in political status to the Baghdad vilayet. Its population on the eve of World War I consisted of 300,000 Kurds, 170,000 Arabs, and 40,000 Turks, as well as a scattering of Christians and Yezidis, an esoteric sect whose following are largely of Kurdish stock.

At the end of World War I, Turkey, a defeated country, signed in 1920 the Treaty of Sèvres, which was never ratified. Article 27 defined the southern boundary of Turkey as coinciding for the most part with the northern border of the vilayet of Mosul. A resurgent Turkey denounced the Treaty of Sèvres and it was replaced in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne, in which (article 3) it was provided that the frontier between Turkey and the new British-mandated country of Iraq would be "laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months." In the event no agreement could be reached between the two Governments within the allotted time, the dispute was to be referred to the Council of the League of Nations. Pending the decision to be reached on the final location of the boundary, no military or other movement was to take place which would modify the existing state of the disputed boundary, that is, its existing coincidence with the northern border of the Turkish vilayet of Mosul.

British and Turkish representatives met in May and June of 1924 but without positive results. The British argued that inclusion of Mosul vilayet within Iraq was already a fait accompli, and the only point in question was where the northern border of the Mosul area should be. They suggested a line varying 5 to 25 miles north of the vilayet border on the grounds that it passed through some of the highest elevations in the Kurdish Alps and thus strategically it was a better international boundary for Iraq than was the old Turkish administrative border. The Turks, however, urged that the new international boundary follow the southern border of Mosul vilayet, claiming that if a plebiscite were held in the vilayet it would show a majority of the population in favor of continued Turkish control there. The dispute was then referred to the League of Nations and in October, 1924, the Council established the "Brussels Line" as the provisional boundary between Turkey and Iraq--the line following almost exactly the northern border of the Mosul vilayet.

From November, 1924 to March, 1925, a special three-member Commission, appointed by the League, investigated the boundary problem. Its recommendation, the following July, was that the Brussels Line be accepted as

the international boundary between Turkey and Iraq. The dispute was then referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague for advisory opinion, and in November 1925 the Court recommended the awarding of the former Mosul vilayet to Iraq.

By the Treaty between the United Kingdom, Iraq, and Turkey, signed June 5, 1926, the Iraq - Turkey boundary was finally settled. The boundary was to follow the Brussels Line except that in the area south of the Turkish villages of Aluman and Ashuta (Aşuta) a minor rectification was made in Turkey's favor in order to include in Turkish territory a road connecting these two points. Demarcation of the boundary was to be undertaken as soon as possible and permanent Frontier Commission was established to meet at least once every six months to handle frontier problems. A frontier zone was set up, 75 kilometers (45 miles) in width on both sides of the boundary, within which each country would seek to insure that no pillage and other hostile acts took place across the border from one country to another. By September, 1927, the entire frontier had been demarcated. A measure of the care with which the Treaty was drawn up may be seen by the fact that, since 1926, there have been no serious incidents whatever along the boundary between.

III. BOUNDARY DESCRIPTION

The Iraq - Turkey boundary begins in the west on the thalweg of the Tigris River at its junction with the Habur Nehri (Nahr al Khābūr) along the common border with Syria. Its elevation here is approximately 1,000 feet. It follows the thalweg of the Habur River eastward for 15 miles and then that of the Hezil Suyu (Nahr al Hayzal), a tributary to the Habur, for another 21 miles. In this western area, the boundary separates the liwā' of Mosul in Iraq from the vilayet of Mardin in Turkey. Leaving the Hezil, at an elevation of about 3,000 feet, the boundary proceeds northeast and then east for 29 miles, rising to elevations of over 7,000 feet and forming a drainage divided between various streams of the Tigris system. After leaving the Hezil River the boundary is joined on its northern side by the Turkish vilayet of Hakkāri.

For a distance of 15 miles, the boundary joins the upper Habur River system. Eastward, the boundary again coincides with a drainage divide and continues for 22 miles to reach the Great Zab River, coming from the north to join the Tigris River below Mosul. The valley of this river forms the only natural north-south route through the Kurdish Alps to the lowlands about Lake Van, but, at present, is little used. The boundary follows the Great Zab downstream for less than a mile, then again meanders eastward for 13 miles until it meets the Av-i-Mārik, a tributary of the Great Zab, which it follows downstream for 3 miles. This stream marks the border in Iraq between the liwā's of Mosul and Irbil. Turning again east, the boundary crosses the highlands at elevations frequently above 7,000 feet, following for short distances various tributaries of the Shamsdinān River, itself a tributary of the Great Zab. Eighty miles east of its junction with the Great Zab, the boundary meets the gorge of the Kūchūk River, still another tributary of the Great Zab. For the remaining 42 miles the boundary follows the Hājji Bak (Hacıbeysuyu), a tributary of the Kūchūk, upstream to the frontier of Iran.

There are no towns or major highways in the immediate boundary area and no important roads cross it along its entire length. To the north is the remote Kurdish area of southeastern Turkey; to the south a smaller, but also remote area, yet one which has at times been the scene of serious fighting between Kurdish and Iraqi forces. Although superimposed on a fairly homogeneous area, the boundary itself has caused few problems to

either of the countries it separates in the years since its final delimitation. The boundary divides tribes and kinship groups, but nomadic Kurdish herdsmen customarily cross freely (except in times of hostility) in both directions on informal laissez-passer.

IV. TREATIES

The three treaties relating directly to the delimitation of the present Iraq - Turkey boundary were all concluded in the decade following World War I. The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) laid down the Turkish border with "Mesopotamia" along the northern boundary of the vilayet of Mosul. The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) provided that the boundary be settled by "friendly agreement" or, failing this, that it be decided by the Council of the League of Nations. The 1926 Treaty between Great Britain, Iraq, and Turkey delimited the final boundary.

A. Treaty of Sèvres between Turkey and various Allied powers, signed at Sèvres, August 10, 1920.

Article 27, II, 3 defined the Turkish frontier with "Mesopotamia" as proceeding from the Tigris "in a general easterly direction to a point to be chosen on the northern boundary of the vilayet of Mosul ... thence eastwards to the point where it meets the frontier between Turkey and Persia, the northern boundary of the vilayet of Mosul, modified, however, so as to pass south of Amadia." The salient in the area of Amadia was subsequently ignored.

B. Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and various Allied powers, signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923.

Article 3 (2) provided that the frontier between Turkey and Iraq (the League of Nations having approved the British mandate for Iraq in July 1922) should be laid down in friendly arrangement between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months. If no agreement could be reached within the nine months the dispute would be referred to the Council of the League of Nations. The dispute ultimately was referred to the Council and on October 29, 1924 the Council established the Brussels Line (following almost exactly the northern border of Mosul vilayet) as a provisional boundary.

C. Treaty of Angora, between the United Kingdom, Iraq, and Turkey, signed at Angora (Ankara) June 5, 1926.

Article 1 stipulated that the boundary between Turkey and Iraq would follow the Brussels Line except for a modification south of Alamun and Ashuta so as to include in Turkish territory all of the road between the two points. Article 3 provided for demarcation of the boundary, which was carried out the following year, while Article 10 set up a frontier zone, 75 kilometers in width on both sides of the boundary, within which each country would guard against hostile acts taking place across the border.

V. SUMMARY

The Iraq - Turkey boundary passes through an isolated, mountainous region, inhabited on both sides by Kurdish peoples. The boundary has been demarcated and there are no major points of dispute on the boundary between the two nations. Continued military action by Kurdish forces in Iraq against the Iraqi government may in time lead to unintentional violations of the border by one or both of the belligerent groups; other than this however there is nothing to indicate potential friction in the boundary area.

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AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
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NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

2 December 1963


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Memorandum No. 1847

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA A.P.C.

Kurds in Iraq

We enclose a communication received on this subject from
Emir Bedir-Khan, a "representative of the Kurdish People".


for Delegation

ACW/mm



Barbizon-Plaza Hotel
106 Central Park South
New York 19, N. Y.
Telephone: CIRCLE 7-7000

add- 5P
New York, October 14, 1963



Your Excellency:

The member states of the United Nations Organization have on several occasions given proof of their determination to act on the international level as the defenders of the oppressed peoples, and I cannot think that there can be an exception in the case of the Kurdish people.

For this reason, the Kurdish people, who have been fighting since June 8, 1961, to have their national rights acknowledged by the Government of Iraq, take the liberty of addressing Your Excellency again, with a view to enlisting your intervention with all international organizations, so that an end be made to the oppression and massacre of the Kurdish civilian population, and steps be taken for the recognition of their national rights.

We demand, at least, that a fact-finding commission be sent to Iraq, as others have been sent to other areas of conflict. The Iraqi government has always claimed that the Kurdish problem is an internal one. As it is known, the Kurdish question is a national question, a question of national rights; on the other hand, the atrocities committed by the Iraqi Army have reached such dimensions that it can no longer be considered a simple internal affair of Iraq.

May I point out that the United Nations Organization resolutions of December 11, 1946, 1948, and of December 14, 1960, are also to be taken into consideration.

Your intervention at this international juncture will, at the same time, cause the Iraqi Government to become aware of its own paradoxical attitude in denouncing imperialism on the one hand, and practicing it in its worst form themselves.

I wish to inform Your Excellency of these facts, and I enclose additional material to offer proof of what has taken place.

Kindly accept, Your Excellency, my sincere thanks in advance for every action you may be willing to take on behalf of the Kurdish people.

Sincerely yours,

K. Bedir-Khan

Emir K. Bedir-Khan
Representative of the Kurdish People

- Enc.: 1. Memorandum of the Problem of Iraqi Kurdistan
2. Copy of report by Associated Press correspondent

260
New York, September 24, 1963

MEMORANDUM ON THE PROBLEM OF IRAQI KURDISTAN

Kurdistan belongs to those rugged regions through which no invasion has passed without perishing or being transformed. It is an area of high mountains where the beginnings of the people go back into antiquity as witnessed by the customs and beliefs to which they adhere. The present habitation of the Kurds is distinguished by its structure and resources of the Anatolian plateau, the plain of Mesopotamia and the highland of Iran. Kurdistan is a geographic entity forming the lines of a ridge. Naturally protected, the areas of Kurdistan favored the formation of an integrated society with its own type of human relationship, its own religious practices, its own language and its own civilization.

Since June 8, 1961, there exists a state of war between the people of Kurdistan and the Iraqi government.

After the First World War, the British government created the state of Iraq by combining a part of the Arab lands with the southern part of Kurdistan. This putting together of two different peoples and countries was dictated mainly by imperial reasons and oil interests. The British government by creating Iraq in this fashion did it on the pretext that the Arab territory alone would not be viable economically and could not be defended militarily. It is evident that these proceedings were in flagrant violation of the Wilsonian principle of self-determination of peoples and the declaration of France and Great Britain on Nov. 8, 1918, that their aim in the Near East was "the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations."

Not only did the creation of Iraq in this fashion run counter to the above declaration, but the Treaty of Sevres of August 10, 1920, Section III, Kurdistan, Article 64, para. 3, establishes conclusively that the inclusion of South Kurdistan into Iraq was provisional only, reading that "no objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such independent Kurdish State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been included in the Mosul Vilayet," i.e. Iraqi Kurdistan. No consideration was taken of the aspirations of the Kurdish people motivated by their ethnic and cultural individuality. It was, therefore, natural that the Kurds, as much, if not more, than the peoples of the old vilayets of Baghdad and Basrah, expected national independence. Now it appeared that the British efforts in reality aimed only in detaching the south western part of Kurdish territory (where the oil wells lie) from the rest of Kurdistan before the fate of the latter was definitely decided, in order to join it, against the unanimous will of the Kurdish population, to Iraq, a new national entity purely Arab in essence.

The Kurds resisted and there followed a series of revolts. On Dec. 24, 1922, the British High Commissioner made the following statement: "His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of Iraq recognize the right of the Kurds living within the frontiers of Iraq to establish a Kurdish government inside these frontiers. They hope that the different Kurdish elements will as soon as possible reach an agreement among themselves concerning the form they desire this government to take and the boundaries to which they wish to extend. The Kurds will send responsible delegates to discuss the economic and political relations with His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Iraqi Government."

This statement, like the others, remained a dead letter. An Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was signed in 1930 and thereafter Iraq became a member of the League of Nations. Great agitation resulted among the Kurds. This is how Captain Philip Mumford, for seven years member of the British Intelligence Service, reported on developments: "The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, defining our relations with Iraq when this country would have become independent, was published in June 1930. There followed petitions and disturbances among the Kurds who attempted, wisely or not, to boycott the elections of that summer. This agitation ended by a revolt when the Iraqi army fired on a Kurdish crowd. Sheikh Mahmoud took this as a pretext to launch an open revolt. Mahmoud asked for a limited form of autonomy under British protection and protested against the direct influence of the government of Baghdad. It was hoped that the government would be able to settle the conflict alone. It quickly became evident that this was out of the question owing to the depth of Kurdish feeling and the incompetence of the Arab army. The Royal Air Force had to bear the largest part of the operations. The bombing of Kurdish villages became inevitable if the rebellion were to be got under control. And even then Sheikh Mahmoud did not surrender until eight months later..." (From a lecture given at an ordinary session of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. XX, January 1933).

In a concluding note (S.G. of May 8, 1931) Sir Henry Conway Dobbs, former Iraqi High Commissioner, exactly summed up the situation of the Kurds in Iraq and defined the responsibilities of Great Britain: "It is a fact that there is a danger that British forces can come to be employed as a mercenary instrument of tyranny in the hands of a government which is encouraged to commit acts of tyranny against its subjects, knowing that they are deprived of the natural remedy against tyranny, that is, hope of a successful insurrection. And the weight of this system will fall in the first place on the non-Arabs, the most important and most warlike minority, the Kurds."

These uprisings have never completely ceased. It is a fact that for two years the Iraqi army has been unable to crush the Kurdish warriors in the field, although it has been especially trained by the British in mountain warfare and provided with small tanks designed for operations in mountainous country. It has therefore ruthlessly resorted to air bombardments, artillery and tank attacks against the civilian population in an effort to destroy the Kurdish people. Big towns like Amadiye, Raniye, Kaysandjak and others have been completely destroyed. An economic blockade of Iraqi Kurdistan deprives the people of all aid from outside."

After the coup d'etat of 1958, the provisional constitution of Iraq, Article III, declared that the natural rights of the Kurds was guaranteed by that constitution. The Iraqi government stated that they were partners in the country. But no measure was taken to implement that statement.

Weakened by its military defeats, the regime of Kassem was overthrown in February 1963. The Kurdish people then stopped the fight: the new masters in Baghdad having in effect promised that the claim of autonomy in Iraqi Kurdistan will be satisfied. After a period marked by subterfuge, the National Command of the Revolutionary Council declared officially on Mar. 9, 1963, that it recognized "the national rights of the Kurdish people." On Mar. 11, the Vice-President of the Iraqi government, M. Saleh el Saadi, declared solemnly: "The Kurdish provinces will receive their own administration in all their dominions...The decision we have taken is primarily to conform to the principles of the rights of the people to choose their future, and secondly it is the result of an objective analysis of the actual situation in Iraq."

An official delegation began then negotiations with the Government in Baghdad. On Apr. 24, 1963, after the publication of the tripartite agreement of Cairo regarding the creation of an Egyptian-Syrian-Iraqi federation, the Kurdish delegation presented to the Iraqi government a memorandum outlining a basis for negotiations concerning the future of Kurdistan.

The Ba'ath party in power in Iraq tried to gain time. For this Pan-Arabic, chauvinistic and Fascist party it is very difficult to recognize the autonomy of the Kurds. While the negotiations were in full progress, Baghdad suddenly in a vehement proclamation accused the General Moustapha el Barzani to be "associated with the imperialists, reactionaries and Zionists" (!!!) and demanded of all insurgents to deliver up their arms within twenty-four hours. But the fact was that the military attack against the Kurds had already begun and the airplanes did not cease - and still do not cease - to bombard the villages. A veritable genocide is in progress.

In September 1963 the Congress of the International Red Cross in Geneva received a message from General Barzani, Commander-In-Chief of the Revolutionary army in Kurdistan, in which he protested against the genocide of the "civilian and unarmed masses of his people." After pointing out that the Iraqi army "blindly bombs cities and villages of Kurdistan, killing hundreds of women, children and aged people, and continue in the systematic massacre or collective transfer by force of the civilian population of the oil regions of Kurdistan," General Barzani demands compliance with the laws of warfare and invited the International Red Cross to visit the liberated regions of Kurdistan, asking at the same time for medical aid and food for a population threatened by famine. The Iraqi government has refused all aid offered to the Kurdish civilian population by the International Red Cross.

Furthermore, in August 1963 the Kurdish army command, in compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, submitted a list of Iraqi army personnel which they had made prisoners, in order to effect an exchange of prisoners. The International Red Cross in turn approached the Iraqi government to furnish it with a list of Kurdish army prisoners in their hands so that an exchange may be effected in due course. The Iraqi government never replied to this request for the simple reason that they murder all Kurdish prisoners. Likewise the appeal of the Red Cross to be permitted to bring medical aid and essential

Food stuffs to the suffering Kurdish civilian population remained unanswered. When the Iraqi atrocities became known, American humanitarian societies and others approached the Iraqi government with a view to obtaining permission for sending help to the Kurdish population, but again all efforts met with the inhuman refusal of the Iraqi government.

These developments have indeed proved beyond doubt that the Iraqi government is and never has been, able to solve the Kurdish and other of its problems in a peaceful and democratic way. The successive bloody coups d'etat are a further evidence of its complete inability to deal successfully with its internal and external problems. Obviously, this is one of the main causes of the intense suffering of not only the Kurdish people, but also of the Arab population and the artificial animosity existing between these two nations.

The public opinion of the world, the governments of many states and a number of internationally known humanitarian societies have condemned the operations of the Iraqi government as genocide. So have many correspondents of some of the leading newspapers of the world, notably Dana Adam Smith of the "New York Times;" M. Eric Rouleau of "Le Monde;" Jean Charles Chauvel of the "Figaro;" Richard J. Ander Egg of the Swiss Radio; David Adamson of the "Sunday Telegraph;" and Peter Zahn and Mr. Lovar, who made a television film and have seen with their own eyes the outrageous crimes of the Iraqi government.

As you know, the Kurdish question has been brought to the notice of the United Nations and the Social and Economic Committee, and has been the subject of an exchange of notes between various governments. It is no longer a question within the sole competence of the Iraqi government, but has assumed international dimensions. Although the Iraqi government has for more than two years announced to the world that the Kurdish Liberation Movement has been crushed, yet in spite of the gigantic array of tanks, heavy artillery, airplanes throwing incendiary bombs, etc., the world knows that the very opposite is true, that the Kurdish Liberation Army is today more successful in its operations than ever.

Since the establishment of the United Nations, this great organization has been instrumental in obtaining the independence of many nations, some of them even smaller in number and of less ancient civilization than the Kurds. The United Nations has acted in this matter as the sensitive conscience of mankind. The Kurdish people in Iraq, who number two million, almost a third of the total population, form a distinct ethnic group and have a right to the fulfilment of their national aspirations. Despite the incredible injustice and cruelties perpetrated against them and in spite of their deep attachment to their national identity, knowing that their inalienable rights are more precious than considerations of appeasement, they demand nothing more than national autonomy within the state of Iraq. This modest demand is a clear evidence that there exists no animosity between the Kurdish and Arab peoples, and that it is the burden of the Iraqi government to have to recognize the natural and historical claims of the Kurds. For centuries there has existed a bond of friendship and mutual respect between the Kurds and the Arabs.

The Kurdish people appeal to the conscience of all nations for active and sympathetic help. They are entitled to the right of self-determination conceded to all peoples, great and small. They cannot achieve their freedom without the moral support of the governments assembled at the United Nations. We would wish that every delegate to the United Nations would acquaint himself with all the facts concerning the Kurdish problem which cries out for a just solution. We call on all governments to put aside all considerations of a false peace and

co-operate wholeheartedly in the struggle of the Kurdish people for self-determination.

It is almost half a century since the Kurdish people have pressed for the fulfilment of the promises made to them after the First World War, tens of thousands of Kurdish men, women and children have been slaughtered, thousands of Kurdish towns and villages destroyed, unspeakable tragedies occur daily, and yet the Iraqi government is allowed to continue its dreadful course without any action taken against it or official protest from the United Nations members.

As you are aware, the Mongolian delegation to the United Nations very graciously consented to bring the Kurdish Problem before the present session of the United Nations but was obliged to withdraw its proposal for lack of sufficient support. It is the fervent hope of the Kurdish people that in the not distant future the governments represented at the United Nations in sufficient number will realize the importance of the Kurdish problem and support placing it on the agenda of the United Nations meetings.

BITTER CIVIL WAR GOING ON IN IRAQ

EDITOR'S NOTE -- A bitter civil war, little reported to the outside world, is being fought in Iraq, the area of ancient Mesopotamia. Correspondent Alex Efty is back from two months on that front and tells in this dispatch how the war is affecting the Kurdish minority of Iraq.

By ALEX EFTY

NICOSIA, Cyprus (AP) - A pall of gray smoke from the blazing countryside hangs over the mountains of northern Iraq, where the Iraqi government is trying to crush the two-year-old Kurdish revolt with a scorched earth policy.

Government planes bomb villages to ruins, set fire to vast tracts of the green countryside and machine-gun anything that moves.

The 1.5 to 2 million colorful, turbaned Kurds live in a mountain region about the size of West Virginia. Their leaders demand self-rule in terms the government says it cannot grant. Fearing that self-rule by the Kurds threatens Iraq's rich northern oilfields and could lead to an independent Kurdish state, the government has decided to settle the Kurdish problem once and for all.

The horrors of war have hit hardest on the plains and in the central section of Iraqi Kurdistan, in the remote valleys near the Turkish border, inhabited by about 1,000 families from the tribe of rebel leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani.

Driven back by incessant air and artillery attacks, some Barzani families have fled to the border and reportedly sought asylum in Turkey.

Kurdistan is about 250 miles long by 100 miles wide. This correspondent spent eight weeks on foot and horseback traveling through more than 400 miles of it.

Rebel leaders told me 20,000 Kurds - mainly women, children and noncombatants - have been killed since the fighting began in September 1961.

They claim 90 per cent of the crops in the grain-producing lowlands and half the fields in the mountain valleys have been destroyed by the government's scorched earth policy. Hundreds of precious livestock - cattle and goats - have perished.

Despite the attacks and the rout of the Barzani families, tough tribesmen in the north and a well-organized, uniformed army in the south part of Kurdistan appear in control of almost all the mountain regions.

The army has penetrated into the mountain terrain only on five main roads where its tanks could spearhead the advances. Armed with rifles, and some captured machine guns and mortars, the Kurdish guerrillas cannot fight tanks or planes.

The rebels claim more than 90 per cent - 40,000 to 50,000 men - of the Iraqi army is in the battle against them. The rebel force totals about 15,000 expert mountain fighters. Their guerrilla tactics and ambushes for the past two years

have confined government forces to the heavily guarded oil centers such as Kirkuk, half a dozen major towns, the lowland and along the twisting mountain roads.

Despite ringing government claims of victory, the rebels maintain they haven't lost a battle since the government offensive was renewed in June. They say their own death toll in battle since then is less than 100 men, and insist they have killed 20 or 30 times that many government troops.

I saw scores of villages that had been hit by frequent air attacks and long-range artillery bombardment, and watched planes strafing the least sign of movement - a grazing goat, a chicken pecking in the dust.

I watched planes dropping napalm and incendiary bombs and saw miles of green mountain land burned to a blackened wasteland of windblown ash.

Hundreds of villages are in ruins, and hardly a hamlet in Kurdistan is not scarred with bomb craters. In some areas every village is deserted. The men are fighting the government and the women, children and elderly have moved to the slopes.

There they live like primitive cave dwellers, sheltering in caves, beneath the trees or in the shadow of big rocks on the boulder-strewn hillsides.

At the sound of an approaching plane, frantic mothers lift their multicolored, ankle-length dresses and gather the children together. They pack their families into small caves they have dug among the rocks, waiting for the overhead drone to pass.

The government offensive was started in 1961 by dictator Abdel Kerim Kassem. The Kurds declared a cease-fire last February when Kassem was executed in a revolution by the Ba'ath Socialist party. The Ba'ath resumed the attack in June.

Kurdish leaders claim that the death toll of civilians in the three months of war since June is as high as the number killed during 18 months war under Kassem.

Kurdish morale appears high despite their bloodshed and the destruction of villages and crops. Rebel leaders say the harshness of the government assault has forged the strongest national unity the tribes have known in 50 years of Kurdish uprisings.

"If we had more rifles our army would be far bigger," said one officer, "and if we had antitank or antiaircraft guns, we would control all Kurdistan, including the lowland cities."

They note it took two complete government army divisions with armored support, plus aircraft, to push along the mountain road into Barzan, reoccupying villages the guerrillas said they did not try to hold.

At that rate, the rebels maintain, it would take the army years to occupy the hundreds of mountain villages, many inaccessible to tanks.

Page 3.

"We are getting stronger every day, and the government is getting weaker," said rebel chieftain Barzani. "The strain is too much for the government. Time is on our side."

As he was speaking two Soviet MIGs of the Iraqi air force screamed overhead.

Glancing briefly at them through the foliage of an old maple tree under which he was sitting, Barzani declared: "It is true that planes can go anywhere and bomb villages and kill women and children but all the same they can never defeat us in the mountains."

Barzani's headquarters is in a narrow, rocky canyon in the foothills of towering Mt. Piris.

Asked whether he had any objections to mention of the location, the 61-year-old leader replied: "On the contrary, go ahead and write where we are. We have no secrets here. If the army decides to come after us they are welcome. We are anxious to meet them ourselves."

Taken from "The Messenger-Inquirer," Owensboro, Kentucky - September 15, 1963



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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 32

1st October, 1963.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

IRAQ - KURDS: ARAB UNITY.

Craddock (Assistant-Foreign Office) today confirmed recent press reports that the Iraqi Army is doing much better against the Kurds than previously. (In a two-fringed campaign they have managed to penetrate deep into the territory of the Barzani tribe and almost to the Turkish and Iranian borders). Craddock said that the tactics adopted by the Army had much to do with this. These were essentially to try and starve the Kurds into obedience by ruthlessly destroying villages and crops. The Army had also had some success in rooting out caches of arms and ammunition.

2. On the other hand, Craddock pointed out, in mounting their attacks, the Iraqi Army's lines of communication had been dangerously over-extended. And, though the Army may control the main roads and well-defined tracks, their lack of domination of the countryside laid them open to successful guerilla attacks. Certainly the war was not over yet and, eventually, there may be required a political settlement to end it.

3. Craddock said that, with the onset of the winter rains, the Iraqi Army can be expected to withdraw to the main garrison centres though, for reasons of prestige, they will probably try to keep a few outposts in the newly won territory.

4. The Foreign Office had no evidence to suggest that the Kurds were receiving material support from outside. Craddock thought that Soviet attention was too much engrossed with its relations with China to interest itself in what must, after all, be classified as a secondary matter. Craddock, however, warned against assuming that the Kurdish cause had been abandoned altogether. There had, in fact, been some association recently between the Kurdish movement in exile and the extreme left-wing opposition to the present Iraq Government. At least active diplomatic support could always be switched on again if necessary.

5. Asked to comment on the weekend statement by the Syrian Ba'ath that discussions were to commence shortly between Iraq and Syria aimed at uniting the two countries, Craddock said he thought this was unlikely to lead to anything concrete. Perhaps there would be scope for military and economic co-operation - the two fields so far mentioned by the governments concerned - but this would almost certainly stop short of complete union. The two regimes were basically still suspicious of one another. Neither wished to be involved in the other's internal problems, and there were a host of minor factors (Iraqi's fears of Syrian business dominance; differing pace of socialisation; Syrian suspicion of the concept of union following the disastrous experiment of 1958; Iraqi reluctance to share oil revenues; etc.) all cautioning against precipitate action.

6. Craddock cautioned, however, that the eventual union of Iraq and Syria should not be ruled out altogether. Unity was the professed aim of the Ba'athists and, in this particular case, it represented a means of carrying the attack to the U.A.R. The Ba'athists, particularly those in Damascus, believe that if they can show that Syria and Iraq are leading,

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and the U.A.R. following, the vanguard of Arab Unity, then they will be able to destroy Nasser's influence in the Arab world.

7. In Craddock's opinion, the Ba'athists may, in fact, have been having the better of the deal with Nasser. He thought that Cairo Radio's frantic diatribes and crude appeal to the masses to smash the Ba'ath's "fascist rule" suggested sterility of ideas rather than a deal from strength.

8. Continuing, Craddock speculated that Ba'athist ideology had probably had a fair deal of success in capturing the support of Arab intellectuals. He thought that one particular attraction was the Ba'ath's appeal to nationalism as well as unity. Unlike Nasser, whose trumpet-call for Arab Unity, and insistence on a one-party state, means in practice Egyptian satellisation of the merged countries, the Ba'athists, being loosely organized, with no real formal structure or rigidly enforced party discipline, stress "national democracy", implying that merger need not, and should not, mean submission of an historic or recently acquired national identity. And, Craddock said, in this difference, lies the Ba'athists' strength; since, though Arabs have sufficient in common to make them desire unity, they are also sufficiently different to make them wish to preserve their local idiosyncracies unlevelled by any federal hegemony. It is the Ba'ath, and not Nasser, who promises to give this recognition of the "personality" of the various countries involved in any Arab Union.

9. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to Washington and Cairo.



(Lance Joseph)

for Acting Senior External Affairs Representative.

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173/2/1

Memorandum No. 582

25th September, 1963.

The Australian Mission to
the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

Kurds in Iraq

.... As supplementary material to our item on the Kurdish question included in the General Assembly brief, you may be interested in having the Foreign Office's comments (attached) on it.

2. Our sources of information conflict on some points, such as the size of the total Kurdish population and the degree of Soviet influence within it. However, we tend to agree with the Foreign Office's estimate that the Kurds number from about one to one and a half million in Iraq. The size of the minority in Turkey is perhaps the most difficult to judge. The Turkish Government does not acknowledge its existence, describing the Kurds as "mountain Turks" instead.

3. We are not in a position to make any confident estimate of the degree of Soviet influence in the Kurdish movement. American sources do not regard it as being very great. Soviet support for the Kurdish struggle appears to be based more on a desire to embarrass the Ba'athist regime than on any genuine pro-Kurdish sympathies. Similarly we suspect that any co-operation between Kurds and Iraqi communists would be essentially tactical based on a desire to consolidate the opposition to the government. Another factor accounting for Kurdish connections with the Soviet Union in the past is that the U.S.S.R. was the only state bordering on Iraq which was prepared to grant asylum to the Kurds following the overthrow of the Kurdish republic in 1946.

4. Apart from these points we are inclined to agree with the Foreign Office's comments on our paper on the Kurdish question.

u
(Charles Lee)
for the Secretary

Z. 49

SEP 1963

CANBERRA

In reply quote No.

28th August 1963

1387

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

Kurds in Iraq

We left with the Foreign Office towards the end of July a copy of the departmental paper attached to your memorandum No. 404 of 12th July, 1963 (your file 173/2/1), but were unable until this week to see the relevant department again in order to obtain their considered comments.

2. Craddock, Assistant Head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, told us this week that he agreed broadly with the assessment in your paper, and with the American comments in Washington Savingram 921, which we showed to him at the time of our discussion.

3. Craddock made the following comments on points of detail in your paper :

Paragraph 1:

The Foreign Office estimate the Kurdish population of Iraq at between 1 and 1½ million, and would put the total number of Kurds at between 4 and 5 million.

The Foreign Office do not regard the Shia sect as predominant in Iraq, but say that the Sunnis and Shias are of about equal strength.

Paragraph 5:

Craddock agreed that the Kurds had put forward extreme demands, and that these demands became even more extreme after the announcement of the Egyptian-Iraqi federation. Despite the extreme nature of these demands, however, Craddock considered that the Kurdish position had been broadly negotiable. On the other hand, he considered that the Iraqi Government had shown virtually no sign of a sincere desire to negotiate.

Paragraph 7:

Craddock agreed that the Iraqi Government's hopes for an early end to the fighting are optimistic. On the other hand, the Iraqi forces have been doing better than one would

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have expected during the last few weeks. In particular, their capture of Barzan is of some importance. Craddock said that the Iraqis seemed to be aiming at a two-pronged penetration, one to the north-east and one due north almost to the Turkish border, with the apparent intention of cutting up the territory held by the Kurds. They seemed to be achieving some success in this plan although the extension of their lines of communication could in due course cause them trouble.

Paragraph 8:

Craddock agreed generally with your comments in this paragraph. He agreed in particular that the Iranian attitude was ambivalent. On the one hand they considered that a continuance of Kurdish unrest would have a useful weakening effect on the Arabs, and in any case the Iranians tended to think of themselves as protectors of the Kurds. The exact scale of material help from Iran was difficult to assess, but it was probable that there was not a great deal of it; certainly substantial quantities of food passed across the border, but much of this might be inspired by normal commercial motives rather than any high political design. On the other hand, the Iranians were adopting a sensible attitude towards the new Iraqi Government; they had taken a number of steps towards closing the frontier and had even given some limited co-operation to the Iraqis. On balance it was likely that the Iranians would come down on the side of preferring good relations with Iraq.

4. Craddock made the following comments on the activities of other neighbours :

- (a) The Turks: The general interest of the Turks lay in keeping the Kurds down, and they had therefore given ready co-operation to the Iraqi Government in sealing the frontier.
- (b) The Syrians: The Syrians had given some limited help to their fellow Baathists in Iraq and had also co-operated in sealing the frontier.
- (c) U.A.R.: The attitude of the UAR was equivocal. They were happy to see the Baathist regime in Baghdad discomfited, but at the same time they recognised that the Kurdish revolt was a threat to Pan-Arabism. In terms of practical action the UAR tended to sit on the sidelines.

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Paragraphs 10 and 11


Craddock would not agree that the Kurdish national movement had so far remained free of Soviet influence. He said that the Kurdish Democratic Party had suffered quite a substantial amount of Soviet penetration before it was purged in 1960. Even now there was still a fair amount of Communist influence amongst the Kurds in urban areas, although Craddock agreed that it was difficult to judge how much of this was based on opportunism and how much on ideological conviction.

Craddock believed that Russian actions had been influenced partly by a desire to discomfort the anti-Communist Baathist Government, and partly by a long-term aim of working on the Kurds for their own purposes. The Russians had threatened to discontinue all aid to Iraq and recent reports indicated that the Russians had in fact refused to supply certain spares for the Russian-equipped air force. Craddock doubted, however, that Moscow would go to the point of discontinuing aid entirely. On any broad strategy the Iraqis were more important to the Russians than the Kurds.

Craddock said that the Afro-Asian bloc had reacted unfavourably to the Russian action in circulating the letter to the President of the Security Council, and it appeared that this reaction had caught Moscow a little by surprise. Following this, Russian propaganda on the issue had eased off for a while, although there were signs that it was picking up again. Mongolia, which had obviously been put up to it by Moscow to press for consideration of the genocide item, had subsequently agreed with the Afro-Asian group to drop it; the item had not in fact yet been removed from the agenda.

5. Craddock said finally that there had been some recent rumours of a renewal of Iraqi-Kurd negotiations. Craddock himself did not believe that the Iraqis were yet in the mood for serious negotiation, and in any case he did not believe that they would be prepared to negotiate with Barzani. Craddock did not, however rule out the possibility that the Iraqis were having some form of contact with individual Kurdish leaders, probably with the intention of trying to split the leadership.

6. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Washington, Moscow and Cairo.


(A.J. Eastman)

Senior External Affairs Representative

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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 1455

11th September, 1963

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Kurds

The following is text of Saving No. 38, dated
2nd September, from Ankara to the Foreign Office:

"As reported in the press, a group of 800
Barzani refugees crossed into Turkey in the Hakkari
province, on August 28. The group was said to
include women and children but the majority were
armed tribesmen fleeing from the Iraqi army. The
tribesmen were disarmed by the Turkish Gendarmerie
and the whole group sent to a refugee camp.

In a general statement on foreign affairs to the
National Assembly on September 2 the Turkish Foreign
Minister said that mass movements of Kurdish refugees
into Turkey were beginning, as a result of operations
by Iraqi Government forces. At the request of the
Iraqi Government and in accordance with the pact of
friendship and good neighbourliness between Turkey
and Iraq, a three-man radio liaison team had been
sent to Iraq to ensure immediate transmission to the
Turkish frontier authorities of information supplied
by the Iraqi authorities.

Earlier in his statement Mr. Erkin had repeated
his government's denial of Communist allegations
that Turkey was actively helping the Iraqi Government
and denied that Turkey had supplied napalm bombs to
the Iraqis.

2. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Cairo
and Washington.

(Lance Joseph)
for Senior External Affairs Representative.

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THE KURDISH REVOLT IN IRAQ

Kurdish minorities exist in Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran. There are also between 60,000 - 100,000 Kurds in the Soviet Union. The desire for an independent state of Kurdistan has been strongest among the Iraqi Kurds. Estimates of the total number of Kurds vary from 4,000,000 to the Kurds' own estimate of 12,000,000. There are about one million in Iraq and they differ from the bulk of the population in that they are not Arabs, they are Sunni Moslems (whereas the Shia sect is predominant in Iraq) and have their own traditional social organisation. Tribal rivalries within the Kurdish community were originally strong but, as actions against Kurds became increasingly indiscriminate during the last years of the Kassim regime, these became less important and Kurdish opposition to Kassim became more united.

Kurdish desires for some form of autonomy were recognised by the abortive Treaty of Sevres in 1920, which provided for the creation of an independent State of Kurdistan in former Ottoman territory. No such state was created and the first of a number of Kurdish revolts broke out in 1922. These continued until 1945 when the Iraqi government succeeded in suppressing the movement. The leaders of the 1945 revolt, headed by Mulla Mustafa Barzani, fled to the Soviet-occupied northern region of Iran where a Soviet-supported Azerbaijani People's Republic was in existence. The western region of this was then declared independent as the Kurdish People's Republic, with the Soviet-backed Kurdish Democratic Party in control. Soviet support for the Republic was withdrawn in 1947 however and the Iranian government soon reconquered the area. Barzani and some of his followers then fled to the Soviet Union where they remained until invited back in 1958 by Kassim, following his overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy.

During the early part of the Kassim regime Kurdish-Arab relations were reasonably good, but as time passed Barzani suspected that Kassim intended to suppress Kurdish separatism.

On the eve of the outbreak of the revolt in August, 1961, the Kurds were seeking a wide degree of regional autonomy, with administration in their area to be by Kurdish officials and policed only by Kurdish security forces, with a larger Kurdish voice in national affairs as well. Barzani's distrust of Kassim was deep, however, and during negotiations with the government Kurdish demands rose steadily, culminating in a virtual demand for independence rather than autonomy.

Kurdish Relations with the new Government

Following Kassim's overthrow in February, 1963, the new Iraqi government appointed two Kurds to the new cabinet. It also announced its willingness to grant the Kurds "national rights on a basis of decentralisation". Negotiations began aimed at resolving Kurdish differences with the Central Government but these were protracted and ended with the Kurds demanding the creation of what would have been virtually a Kurdish-Iraqi federation. This proved unacceptable to the government and the negotiations collapsed. Meanwhile its reinforcement of military posts in the Kurdish area also led the Kurds to doubt the government's sincerity. The two Kurdish ministers resigned in protest against the Government's resumption of hostilities against the Kurds.

Present Kurdish demands are for local autonomy, a larger

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share of government spending in the Kurdish area, use of the Kurdish language in local government, and the teaching of Kurdish in local schools.

On 10th June, the government announced the resumption of fighting. It put the blame on the Kurds, who, it alleges, made unacceptable demands for a share of Iraq's state oil and other revenues on a per capita basis and for the exclusion of all Arab troops from Kurdistan to be replaced by a Kurdistan Army Corps. The government has concentrated large forces in the area, but its hopes for an early end to the fighting may well be optimistic.

There are no present indications of unrest spreading to Kurdish areas of Turkey, Iran and Syria as the minorities there do not appear to be as restive as in Iraq. Should the fighting prove to be protracted it is likely that Army morale may be weakened. This in turn could ultimately weaken its loyalty to the regime. The Iranian government has been pursuing a somewhat ambivalent policy towards the Kurds, who have been receiving some aid via Iran. While Teheran is concerned that fighting in Iraq might arouse active dissidence among its own Kurds, it is interested in keeping Kurdish resistance alive in Iraq as a counterforce to Pan-Arabian and Nasserist influences which Iranians regard as an even more serious threat than Kurdish nationalism. One of Barzani's close associates, Colonel Djalal Talabani, has stated that Barzani's movement is interested only in Iraqi Kurds and does not wish to have international complications.

Communist and Soviet Activities

Despite Barzani's extensive residence in the Soviet Union and Moscow's increase in pro-Kurdish propaganda, the Kurdish nationalist movement has so far remained free from Soviet influence. Soviet support for Kassim has not been forgotten by the Kurds. Even the Kurdish Communists differ with their Iraqi comrades in that they support Barzani's rebellion.

The anti-Communist domestic policy pursued by the new Baghdad regime, however, will probably result in increased Soviet

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attempts to use the Kurdish question as a means of embarrassing it and even of working for its downfall. The Mongolian draft resolution alleging genocide, at the past session of UNESCO, may be evidence of this. The Soviet government has also warned Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria that the co-operation of foreign governments in the Iraqi suppression of the Kurds would constitute intervention in Iraqi internal affairs and would be contrary to United Nations principles. There may be other Soviet moves against Iraq in preparation, but on present evidence we think it unlikely that the Russians will go beyond international propaganda actions of the kind they have so far undertaken. The Russians have stated that they support only Kurdish autonomy within the Iraqi state, a position which protects them from charges of fostering separatism within an Arab state.

Australian Attitude

We have been concerned at recent reports of the fighting, which allege the destruction of entire villages by the Iraqi Army and Air Force. These reports have not yet been confirmed however.

Should the Kurdish question be discussed, our view is that we wish to see the rights of minorities respected. We would welcome a ceasefire. In the absence of any definite proof of genocide, however, we feel that the matter should be treated as falling within Iraqi's domestic jurisdiction.

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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

3/12/38

Memo No. 1455

11th September, 1963

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2.



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Earlier in his statement Mr. Erkin had repeated his government's denial of Communist allegations that Turkey was actively helping the Iraqi Government and denied that Turkey had supplied napalm bombs to the Iraqis.

2. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Cairo and Washington.

(Lance Joseph)

for Senior External Affairs Representative.

Mr. Sturges

*Mr. Humphries
to see*

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BEIRUT, AUG. 19 (UPI)--KURDISH LEADER MULLAH MUSTAFA BARAZANI HAS REJECTED AN IRAQI PEACE BID AIMED AT ENDING THE THREE-MONTH-OLD VIRTUAL CIVIL WAR IN NORTHERN IRAQ, REPORTS FROM BAGHDAD SAID TONIGHT.

THE REPORTS SAID IRAQI DEFENSE MINISTER COL. SALAH AMMASH MET WITH ABBAS MERMEND, AN AIDE TO BARAZANI, AND OFFERED 20 MILLION POUNDS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE KURDISH AREAS.

HE PLEDGED AN IMMEDIATE FIVE MILLION POUND PAYMENT TO THE KURDISH TRIBES ON CONDITION THEY ENDED THE FIGHTING AND BARAZANI LEFT IRAQ. THE REPORTS SAID.

ACCORDING TO THE REPORTS, THE KURDS MAINTAINED THEIR EARLIER POSITION OF NO SETTLEMENT UNTIL SALEH EL YUSSOUFI, A LEADER OF THE KURDISH NEGOTIATING DELEGATION TO BAGHDAD, WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON.

YUSSOUFI WAS ARRESTED IN THE CAPITAL BEFORE FIGHTING RESUMED IN EARLY JUNE. THE KURDS ALSO WERE REPORTED DEMANDING THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF 3,000 TRIBESMEN ALLEGEDLY HELD IN IRAQI JAILS.

JB1035A

ME

173/2/11

PARIS, AUG. 13 (UPI)--KURDISH TRIBESMEN, FIGHTING FOR SELF-RULE IN NORTHERN IRAQ, PLAN TO LAUNCH A WOO-THE-WEST CAMPAIGN TO DISPEL SUSPICIONS THEY ARE PRO-COMMUNIST, KURDISH SOURCES SAID TODAY.

RECENT SOVIET CRITICISM OF THE BAGHDAD REGIME WHICH OVERTHREW PRESIDENT ABDEL KARIM KASSEM HAS BEEN INTERPRETED BY MANY DIPLOMATS AS SUPPORT FOR THE KURDS. BUT THE KURDS ALREADY ARE TRYING TO TURN TO THE WEST, THE SOURCES SAID.

THE KURDS CLAIM AMERICAN AND BRITISH ARMS FLOWING INTO +NEUTRALIST+ BAGHDAD ARE BEING USED AGAINST THEM.

HOWEVER, KURDS HERE DISMISS REPORT THAT GOVERNMENT BOMBINGS AND INFANTRY ATTACKS HAVE SCORED DECISIVE VICTORIES AGAINST KURDISH VILLAGES IN THE RUGGED MOUNTAINS OF NORTHERN IRAQ.

THE LATEST IRAQI OFFENSIVE FOLLOWED THE REFUSAL OF THE IRAQI BATH PARTY TO FULFILL ITS AGREEMENT TO GIVE THE KURDISH PROVINCE SELF-RULE IN EXCHANGE FOR SUPPORT AGAINST KASSEM.

MORE

BU4:18A

UPI-58

ADD KURDS PARIS X X X KASSEM.

IT CAME ON THE HEELS OF BAGHDAD'S PURGE OF IRAQI COMMUNISTS AND SUPPORTERS OF PRESIDENT GAMAL ABDEL NASSER OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (UAR).

SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, COL. JALAL TALABANI, WHO IN THE SPRING SOUGHT NASSER'S HELP, WAS REPORTED TO HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT IN BERLIN BETWEEN HIS PARTY, THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND THE IRAQI COMMUNISTS. THE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED IN SECRET MEETINGS THIS MONTH, THE SOURCES SAID.

EMIN KANURAN ALI BEDIR-KHAN, FORMER PROFESSOR AT THE FRENCH SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL LANGUAGES AND LONG-BASED IN PARIS, WILL VISIT THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN IN SEPTEMBER TO TRY TO CLARIFY THE KURDS CAUSE.

KURDISH SOURCES SAID BEDIR-KHAN HOPES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CURRENT EASING OF EAST-WEST TENSION TO WIN SUPPORT AT THE FORTHCOMING UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETING.

BEDIR-KHAN WILL TRY TO CONVINCE THE WEST HIS MOVEMENT SEEKS LOCAL AUTONOMY IN IRAQ.

THE KURDS ALSO WANT TO +NEUTRALIZE+ PRO-WEST TURKEY AND IRAN--IN WHICH ABOUT 10 MILLION KURDS LIVE--BUT WILL GUARANTEE THAT NO SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENTS WILL BE LAUNCHED AGAINST EITHER GOVERNMENT.

THERE IS ALMOST NO HOPE OF THIS BECAUSE OF THE WESTERN AID TURKEY AND IRAN RECEIVE--EVEN IF THE KURDS WERE WITHOUT COMMUNIST SUPPORT.

AND HURTING THE KURDISH CAUSE WILL BE OUTSPOKEN BACKING FROM THE COMMUNIST STATES, HEADED BY OUTER MONGOLIA, WHICH HAS ASKED THAT IRAQI REPRESSION AGAINST COMMUNISTS AND KURDS BE PLACED ON THE U.N. ASSEMBLY'S AGENDA.

BU4:23A

~~FILE~~



THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILITY.

Name of Paper NEW YORK TIMES.

File No.

Published at PARIS.

Date

KURDS TRY TO BAR IRAQI ARMY DRIVE

Forces Move West to Block
Dividing of Rebels' Area

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT

Special to The New York Times.

BEIRUT, Lebanon, July 31—

Gen. Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani, leader of the Kurdish insurgents in Iraq, is moving westward to head off a determined Iraqi Army effort to cut the Kurdish area in half by driving to the Iranian border.

According to reliable first-hand information from the Kurdish side, General al-Barzani, commanding tribal forces, successfully stood off drives in western Kurdistan. But partisans of the Kurdish Democratic party on the southern and eastern fronts have suffered a succession of reverses.

Most important, they have lost control of Gall Ali Beg Pass, which controls access to Ruwandiz and thenortheastern part of the country.

Guerillas under General al-Barzani's command, the informant said, halted an Iraqi drive aimed at his home village, Barzan, and in so doing smashed an Iraqi battalion near Dohuk. In radio messages to other Kurdish units 10 days ago, General al-Barzani asked for 300 mules to carry off arms and other seized supplies.

Kurds Head Eastward

Thus reinforced, General al-Barzani headed east through hill country called Baradost to help partisans halt the Iraqi Army advance beyond Ruwandiz toward the Iranian border at Khane. His men reported fighting east of Rezanok 10 days ago.

Informants said the Kurdish insurgents had received no material help from the Soviet Union even though the Soviet radio is vigorously supporting their cause. General al-Barzani is still asking for help from the West.

There are no units of Kurdish or Arabic Communists fighting on the insurgents' side, the informants said, and the Arab Communists who fled to the mountains from the south have been isolated and supplied with food. They have not been asked to bear arms for the Kurds, the sources said.

According to the informants, several small units of the Iraqi Army commanded by anti-Baathists have defected to the Kurdish side. They also have not been asked to bear arms.

General al-Barzani, the informants said, has radio equipment that could probably be heard as far as Beirut. But he lacks skilled operators and technicians.

Drive to Divide Forces

The purpose of the Iraqi drive from Ruwandiz toward Khane, just over the border in Iran, appears to be to separate General al-Barzani, with his predominantly tribal forces in the west, from the forces dominated by the Kurdish Democratic party, operating in the south and along the Iranian border.

Technically, all Kurdish forces are under the command of General al-Barzani, who is also president of the Kurdish Democratic party, but in practice party partisans are directed by Ibrahim Ahmed, secretary general of the party. They have subordinated tribal leaders to the military structure, in which many Kurdish officers who defected from the Iraqi Army have found places.

General Dislikes Party

General al-Barzani, who has under his direct orders the greater part of forces numbering 20,000 to 25,000 men and who last year and this year carried out the majority of successful operations, is contemptuous of the Kurdish Democratic party and its military efforts.

Experience since the Iraqi Army resumed the war June 10 seems to have borne out his belief that the Kurds under their traditional tribal leaders are more effective guerrilla fighters than men recruited by the political party.

Generally, the Kurds are continuing the classic tactics of resisting the army's advance, then withdrawing intact without taking losses and waiting for opportunities to pick off exposed or isolated individuals and units. But it has not been working well except where General Barzani was in command in the west. Under the Baathist regime, the Iraqi Army seems to have devised new and more effective tactic for dealing with the guerrillas.

In the field, the Iraqi Army is concentrating its forces as rarely before. Instead of bombing villages scattered across all of Iraqi Kurdistan, the air force is concentrating on the immediate area of military operations. It is also advancing behind artillery barrages than in the past.

The Iraqi Infantry is also making more use of tanks to shield its advance in the north. The Kurds have rarely found opportunities to engage their enemy in hand-to-hand combat or close-in rifle fire.

Name of Paper **TIMES.**

File No. **48/2/1**

Published at **LONDON.**

Date **173/2/1**

NEW IRAQI CONVERSATIONS WITH KURDISH REBELS REPORTED

From Our Middle East Correspondent

BEIRUT, AUGUST 1

Reports of new talks between the Government and Kurdish rebels in Iraq have reached Beirut. According to travellers from Baghdad, the Government's ruthless military pressure is beginning to tell and some of Mustafa al Barzani's followers are wavering. The Government, on its side, is only too willing to try to end an embarrassing campaign.

The main immediate point in the talks is what should happen to Barzani, himself. The Government wants his surrender, while the Kurdish representatives want him to stay free, even if they renounce his leadership.

Entire Kurdish villages are said to have been destroyed by the Government, and even if some settlement is reached now the memory of this will remain. It is Iraq's bad luck that among her Kurds should be the one who has fanned Kurdish nationalism, while in neighbouring countries the Kurds are unmovable.

CAIRO AGREEMENT

With characteristic Arab disregard of acts and events when the subject is unity, the Iraq Government continues to speak of carrying out the Cairo agreement of last April for federation with Egypt and Syria, as if nothing had changed the situation since. An announcement just made in Baghdad entrusts a Ministry for Federal Union Affairs with preparing the way for a referendum and other steps laid down in the agreement, even though President Nasser last week disavowed it.

In Syria the talk is of internal reconciliation to precede Cabinet changes. Some followers of Akram Hourani, a Baath deviationist, may be drawn in though Hourani himself may still be formally indicted for his political past.

Nuances of all the manoeuvres are difficult to follow but it is true that more of foreign intercession seems again to have taken hold in Syria. Executions of unionists have stopped, at least for the time being.

Dressed in a khaki uniform, the King spoke enthusiastically and loudly from a dais decorated with national flags.

"If there has been discord in the past, let us remember that it was the Arabs who have suffered as a result of those cleavages", he said. "Let us also remember that our common destiny and the future of our Arab leaders to renounce their whims and to abandon personal ambitions."

"Israel has been established in the heart of the Arab nations as a base to be used against all Arabs should they attain a position where they could act freely and objectively. This base was formed in accordance with imperialistic and Zionist ambitions to the detriment of the Arab nation and homeland at large."

He added that the Arabs' discord had helped the loss of Palestine, and he urged the Arab leaders not to forget the standing lesson of the Palestine catastrophe. His army would continue acting as a bastion for the Arab nation against imminent dangers. He hoped that his brothers in the Arab world would realize "what a magnificent job is being done by the armed forces on a long front line with the enemy."

He looked forward to the day when his brothers in Arab countries would offer some form of financial assistance "so that we become better prepared to repel and put down any adventures against our beloved homeland."

Speaking on international affairs, the King said: "We wholeheartedly support the right of self-determination by all nations and the achievement of freedom and independence over tyranny and aggression. Our international relations will continue to be maintained on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and mutual cooperation; those who are friendly to our nation are our friends and those who are inimical are our enemies. We will continue to be loyal to the United Nations Charter and the principles of human rights, and we shall respect their application in the handling of all international cases."

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INWARD SAVINGRAM

LJH.

I. 20375.

DATED: 30TH JULY, 1963.

FROM:

REC'D: 31ST JULY, 1963.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.SAV. 921. CONFIDENTIAL.

PASS CAIRO, TEL AVIV.

COPIES TO LONDON, U.N. NEW YORK AND OTTAWA.

YOUR MEMORANDUM 598.KURDS IN IRAQ.

1. STATE DEPARTMENT DOUBTED 30TH JULY WHETHER RUSSIA WOULD PUSH KURDISH QUESTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND LIKEWISE THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT MONGOLIA WOULD FOLLOW UP THIS ITEM IN UNGA BECAUSE ALL THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND MOST OF THE AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES SUPPORTED IRAQ.

2. THERE HAD BEEN A LOT OF SPECULATION WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON THE MOTIVES OF THE RUSSIAN AND MONGOLIAN ACTIONS IN THE U.N.

A CONSENSUS OF THE VARIOUS VIEWS WAS AS FOLLOWS-

(A) RUSSIA WANTED TO GET THE PRESENT IRAQ GOVERNMENT OUT OF POWER AND WAS CREATING UNREST AS A MEANS TO THIS END.

(B) RUSSIA HOPED TO EMBARRASS THE WEST, PARTICULARLY BY ALLEGATIONS THAT TURKEY AND IRAN WERE HELPING THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT TO SUPPRESS THE KURDS.

(C) RUSSIA WANTED TO MAINTAIN ITS POSITION OF SUPPORTING "NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS" PARTICULARLY, IN VIEW OF THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT.

(D) RUSSIA WANTED TO BUILD UP GOODWILL AMONG THE KURDS FOR FUTURE PURPOSES.

3. IT WAS THOUGHT MOST UNLIKELY THAT RUSSIA WOULD COME TO THE POINT OF BREAKING OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.

LIKEWISE, IT WAS THOUGHT VERY DOUBTFUL THAT RUSSIA WOULD CUT DOWN ON ITS PROGRAMME OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO IRAQ.

4. THE GOVERNMENT'S MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST THE KURDS WAS NOT GOING WELL.

5. THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT WAS WELL ENSCONCED AT THE PRESENT TIME BUT ITS ABILITY TO SURVIVE IN THE LONG TERM WAS DOUBTFUL AND THE BAATHISTS MIGHT LIVE TO REGRET THE DAY THEY BEGAN TO EXECUTE THEIR OPPONENTS.

6. IN VIEW OF THE CONFUSION LEFT AS A RESULT OF KASSIM'S RULE, IT WAS TOO EARLY TO PREDICT WHETHER THE BAATHISTS WOULD BE ABLE TO IMPLEMENT THEIR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES SUCCESSFULLY AND PROVIDE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT SIMILAR TO THAT OF NASSER.

IRAQ HAD SUBSTANTIAL NATURAL RESOURCES AND ITS MAIN NEED WAS FOR TRAINED PERSONNEL, AND TO A CERTAIN EXTENT CAPITAL.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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INWARD SAVINGRAM

LJH.

- 2 -

I. 20375.

7. BOTH IRAQ AND SYRIA WOULD PROBABLY BE VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF MERGING THE TWO COUNTRIES WHICH SEEMED AN UNLIKELY PROSPECT.

NASSER WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT AND DIRECTED MOST OF HIS IRE AGAINST THE BAATHISTS IN SYRIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

MIN. & DEPT E.A.

A/MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE

1st August, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

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AFME@ INF
CAIRO TEL AVIV

July 1963

THE KURDISH REVOLT IN IRAQ

Kurdish minorities exist in Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran. There are also between 60,000 - 100,000 Kurds in the Soviet Union. The desire for an independent state of Kurdistan has been strongest among the Iraqi Kurds. Estimates of the total number of Kurds vary from 4,000,000 to the Kurds' own estimate of 12,000,000. There are about one million in Iraq and they differ from the bulk of the population in that they are not Arabs, they are Sunni Moslems (whereas the Shia sect is predominant in Iraq) and have their own traditional social organisation. Tribal rivalries within the Kurdish community were originally strong but, as actions against Kurds became increasingly indiscriminate during the last years of the Kassim regime, these became less important and Kurdish opposition to General Kassim became more united.

Current Notes

Page Two

Kurdish desires for some form of autonomy were recognised by the abortive Treaty of Sevres in 1920, which provided for the creation of an independent State of Kurdistan in former Ottoman territory. No such state was created and the first of a number of Kurdish revolts broke out in 1922. These continued until 1945 when the Iraqi government succeeded in suppressing the movement. The leaders of the 1945 revolt, headed by Mulla Mustafa Barzani, fled to the Soviet-occupied northern region of Iran where a Soviet-supported Azerbaijani People's Republic was in existence. The western region of this was then declared independent as the Kurdish People's Republic, with the then Soviet-backed Kurdish Democratic Party in control. Soviet support for the Republic was withdrawn in 1946 however and the Iranian government soon reconquered the area. Barzani and some of his followers then fled to the Soviet Union where they remained until invited back in 1958 by Kassim, following his overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy.

Current Notes

Page Three

During the early part of the Kassim regime Kurdish-Arab relations were reasonably good, but as time passed Barzani suspected that the government intended to suppress Kurdish separatism.

On the eve of the outbreak of their revolt in July, 1961, the Kurds were seeking a wide degree of regional autonomy, with administration in their area to be by Kurdish officials and policed only by Kurdish security forces, with a larger Kurdish voice in national affairs as well. Barzani's distrust of General Kassim was deep, however, and during negotiations with the government Kurdish demands rose steadily, culminating in a virtual demand for independence rather than autonomy.

Following General Kassim's overthrow in February, 1963, the new Iraqi government appointed two Kurds to the new cabinet. It also announced its willingness to grant the Kurds "national rights on a basis of decentralisation". Negotiations began aimed

Current Notes

Page Four

at resolving Kurdish differences with the Central Government but these were protracted and ended with the Kurds demanding the creation of what would have been virtually a Kurdish-Iraqi federation. This proved unacceptable to the government and the negotiations collapsed. Meanwhile, its reported reinforcement of military posts in the Kurdish area also proved disquieting to the Kurds. The two Kurdish ministers resigned in protest against the Government's resumption of hostilities against the Kurds.

Present Kurdish demands are for local autonomy, a larger share of government spending in the Kurdish area, use of the Kurdish language in local government, and the teaching of Kurdish in local schools.

On 10th June, the government announced the resumption of fighting and concentrated large forces in the Kurdish area. It put the blame on the Kurds, who it alleges, made unacceptable demands for a share of Iraq's state oil and other revenues on a per

capita basis and for the exclusion of all Arab troops from
Pakie Kurdistan to be replaced by a Kurdistan Army Corps.


There are no reports at present of unrest spreading to
Kurdish areas of Turkey, Iran and Syria. One of Barzani's
close associates, Colonel Djalal Talabani, has stated that
Barzani's movement is interested only in Iraqi Kurds and does not
wish to have international complications.

Despite Barzani's extensive residence in the Soviet
Union and Moscow's increase in pro-Kurdish propaganda, it is
believed that the Kurdish nationalist movement has so far remained
free from Soviet influence. Divisions within the Iraqi Communist
Party are reported to have emerged as a result of the Kurdish
question.

On 2nd July, Outer Mongolian proposed a draft resolution
for the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly alleged that
the Iraqi government was pursuing a "policy of genocide against the

Kurdish people". This failed to attract support, however, and
was not pursued any further.

On 9th July, ¹⁹⁶³/~~1958~~, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr.
Gromyko, headed a Note to the Ambassadors of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and
Syria in Moscow warning these four countries that the co-operation
of foreign governments in the Iraqi suppression of the Kurds would
constitute intervention in Iraqi internal affairs and would be
contrary to United Nations principles. On the same day, the
Permanent Representative of the U.S.S.R. to the United Nations sent
a letter to the President of the Security Council and circulated it
to all delegations accusing the Iraqi authorities of "brutally
exterminating" the Kurdish population and alleging that "certain
neighbouring States" and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO)
had been interfering in "the praeticidal war" against the Kurds.
The following day the Permanent Representative of Iraq sent a reply
to the President of the Security Council rejecting these allegations
and accusing the Soviet Union of unwarranted interference in Iraq's
internal affairs.



SECRET

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In reply quote No.

Memorandum No. 747/63

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

18th July, 1963.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

KURDISH PROBLEMISRAEL

In the absence of Mr. Kirtley on leave, we have obtained the report of the New Zealand representative upon [REDACTED] representatives on 16th July, 1963. Copies of this report are forwarded herewith.

....

Alan Renouf
(Alan Renouf)
Minister.

Encl.

(1) to Canberra
- part of it on Kurdish file
& other part on Israel file

u

Mr. LEE
Duplicate copy on 173/2/1
copy distributed to
S + S. E. A. Parrot
East Asia Section
I. C. Parrot
To (see)
SECRET

Name of Paper TIMES.

File No.

Published at LONDON.

Date

RUSSIAN PROTEST ABOUT KURDS

COLD REACTION IN IRAQ

FROM OUR MIDDLE EAST CORRESPONDENT

BEIRUT, July 11

Iraq has responded tersely to the lecture that she, Turkey, Iran and Syria have received from Russia on the situation in north Iraq, where the Baghdad Government is fighting the Kurds. Russia, so the reaction in Baghdad seems to be, should look to her own trouble with China and leave Iraq alone.

According to published reports, the ambassadors in Moscow of Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria were all handed statements complaining of interference in north Iraq by "member states of the military-colonialist Cento block". This interference included "measures of a military nature." The dragging into the conflict of other forces and states and the granting to external forces of strongholds close to the Soviet frontiers created a threat to the security of a number of states, including the Soviet Union.

VIOLENT HOSTILITY

One reaction to this strong protest—there was also mention of "bloody outrages against the peaceful Kurdish people"—has been to wonder whether Russia is angling to interfere on the side of the Kurds. The Baghdad Government's violent hostility towards communists might, it is argued, make the Soviet Union want to do what she can for the Kurds. Iraq, however, has no common frontier with Russia, and short of perhaps trying to send the Kurds supplies and making further protests at the United Nations there does not seem much that Russia can do.

Syria, but not Iran and Turkey, has sided openly with Baghdad against the Kurds, and she is not in the Cento pact. A report that Syrian units are fighting against the Kurds has been denied, but the Syrian Government is bound to be with the Iraq Government. Both are Baathist and both are Arab. According to a report from Amman even Jordan has, in the name of Arab co-operation, promised support to Iraq in opposing an attempt by Outer Mongolia to bring the case of the Kurds before the next United Nations General Assembly.

Nothing has been known here of any move by Iran or Turkey either to cower or to encourage the Kurds. Turkey has more than two million Kurds and Iran more than one million, and their policy has seemed to be to do nothing that might embroil these communities in Iraq's storm. BEIRUT, July 11.—Kurdish supporters of Mulla-Mustafa al Barzani lost 400 dead in a battle in northern Iraq last week, Iraq's Presidential Affairs Minister, Mr. Hazem Jawad, has stated in Baghdad, according to Baghdad Radio today. Government forces' casualties in the battle, at Haibat Sultan mountain, were only a few injured, the Minister said.—Reuter.

MH

INWARD CABLEGRAM

I.17803

FROM:

DATED: 3RD JULY, 1963.
2000AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED
NATIONS,
NEW YORK.RECVD: 4TH JULY, 1963.
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CONFIDENTIAL.REPEATED WASHINGTON
REPTD LONDON FR EXTERNAL SAV. BAG 472
REPEATED CAIRO SAV. BAG 31.KURDS IN IRAQ.

OUR LEASED LINE SAVINGRAM NO.34.

IRAQI MISSION TOLD US TODAY THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD THE OTHER
AFRO ASIANS WOULD BE ASKING MONGOGIA TO WITHDRAW ITS REQUEST
FOR INSCRIPTION OF AN ITEM ON IRAQ! S 'POLICY OF GENOCIDE'
AGAINST THE KURDS.

AFRO-ASIANS WOULD ARGUE THAT THIS WAS A MATTER ESSENTIALLY
WITHIN THE DOMESTIC JURISDICTION OF IRAQ.

IRAQI MISSION CONSIDERAD THAT THE REQUEST FOR INSCRIPTION
WAS A PURE PROPAGANDA STUNT SINCE THE COMMUNISTS MUST REALIZE
THAT THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE RECOMMENDING
THE ITEM FOR INSCRIPTION.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

4TH JULY, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SEC A/SS UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME@ E AF ME INF
DL IC
TEL AVIV

Despite intensified military activity, the Iraq army's campaign against the Kurds is making little headway. Should the conflict be protracted, as appears likely, the army's morale may suffer, and its loyalty to the present Ba'athist government may eventually be undermined.

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Cul 32/63

The USSR has been giving the Kurds propaganda support but not, apparently, any material assistance. Despite the arrest of numerous local communists by the Iraq Government, and an indication by the government that it wishes to turn to the West for its supplies of arms, there does not appear to be any sign of a substantial reduction in Soviet aid to Iraq. The main threat to the Ba'athist government, however, does not appear to be presented by the communists, but by extreme Arab nationalists and Nasserites.

⑦ 173/2/1

in status in Kee.

LONDON JULY 18 (UPI)--TANKS, ARTILLERY, JET FIGHTERS AND BOMBERS ARE BEING USED BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN AN ALL-OUT BID TO SETTLE FINALLY ONE OF THE MAJOR DANGERS FACIT IT--THE CONTINUED STUBBORN REBELLION 1,500,000 KURDS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY.

COURIERS ARRIVING FROM THE NORTHERN AND NORTH-EASTERN AREAS OF IRAQ--THE REGION GNERALLY KNOWN AS KURDISTAN--REPORT THAT MORE THAN THREE DIVISIONS OF THE IRAQI ARMY, OR ABOUT 60 PERCENT OF ITS TOTAL STRENGTH, ARE WAGING A RUTHLESS CAMPAIGN THERE AGAINST THE FOLLOWERS OF THE KURDISH LEADER, MUTPV JW.

THE NEW FIGHTING ERUPTED RECENTLY AFTER A FIVE-MONTH TURCE STARTING WITH THE OVERTHROW OF THE ASSASSINATED IRAQI DICTATOR, ABDEL KARIM KASSEM, FEBRUARY 8.

OFFICIALLY THE FIGHTING BEGAN JUNE 12 ON THE XPIRY OF A 24 HOUR IRAQI GOVERNMENT ULTIMATUM TO THE KURDS TO SURRENDER THEIR ARMS AND END THEIR DEMANDS FOR AUTOMONY. IN FACT THE COURIERS CLAIM--AND THEIR CLAIMS ARE SUPPORTED BY DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES--THE IRAQUIS LAUNCHED THEIR ATTACK ON THE EVENING OF JUNE 8, WELL BEFORE THE ULTIMATUM WAS EVEN ISSUED.

MORE.

JB/DO2.24P

UPI-206

ADD IRAQ LONDON XXX ISSUED.

ON THE SAME DAY THEY ARRESTED AND IMPRISONED THE KURDISH NEGOTIATING TEAM IN BAGDAD--DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TEAM WAS IN BAGDAD UNDER A SAFE-CONDUCT GUARANTEE FORM THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT.

SINCE JUNE 8 IT IS ALLEGED IRAQI ARMY UNITS HAVE SWEEPED THOROUGH THE PLAINS USING TANKS AND BULDOZERS TO RAZE KURDISH VILLAGES TO THE GROUND AND NAPALM BOMBS TO DESTROY THE REOPENING WHEAT FIELDS AND THE ORCHARDS.

CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES, WHO HAVE LEFT THE AREA SINCE THE FIGHTING BEGAN, CLAIM THAT IN THE AREA OF AL-QOSH, NORTH OF MOSUL, IRAQI TROOPS HAVE SUROUNDED A NUMBER OF VILLAGES, PENNING THE KURDISH POPULATIONS INSIDE, WHILE PLANES AND ARTILLERY METHODICALLY DESTROY THE HOUSES ONE BY ONE.

NO RELIABLE ESTIMATE OF KURDISH CASUALTIES IS AVAILABLE SO FAR, BUT IT IS BELIEVED TO RUN INTO MANY HUNDREDS, MOSTLY WOMEN, GHILDREN AND THE AGED.

THE FIGHTING MEN SLIPPED AWAY INTO THEIR STRONGHOLDS IN THE FAR NORTHERN MOUNTAINS--WHERE THEY HELD OUT AGAINST KASSEM FOR 18 MONTHS--AS SOON AS THE NEW FIGHTING BEGAN.

DESPITE THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT CLAIMS OF ALL-OUT SUCCESSES, THE BESTT INDICATIONS REACHING HERE ARE THAT THE OPERATIONS SO FAR HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED MERELY IN THE WELL-ROADED PLAINS AREA, WITH LITTLE OPPOSITION FROM THE KURDISH FIGHTING UNITS.

THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT IS REFUSING TO ALLOW ANY FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS TO VISIT THE FIGHTING AREA.

MORE.

JB/DO229P

THIRD IRAQ LONDON XXX AREA.

KURDISH COURIERS CLAIM THAT IRAQI ATTEMPTS TO DRIVE INTO THE MOUNTAINOUS AREA HAVE BEEN DRIVEN BACK WITH HEAVY CASUALTIES--200 DEAD IN ONE PROBE TOWARD THE VILLAGE OF AZMIR, NORTH OF SULAIMANIYA.

AZMIR IS CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN THE SCENE OF A PARTICULARLY BRUTAL INCIDENT WHEN IRAQI TROOPS, UNDER THE COMMAND OF BRIGADIER SADEK MUSTAFA, THE SULAIMANIYA AREA COMMANDER, REPORTEDLY USED A SHIELD OF KURDISH WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN FRONT OF THEIR UNITS.

COURIERS ALLEGE THAT WHEN KURDISH AMBUSHING UNITS ON THE NEARBY HILLS OPENED FIRE ON THE TROOPS AFTER THE LIVING SHIELD HAD PASSED BY, IRAQI TANKS DELIBERATELY MOWED DOWN THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN BEFORE COVERING THE RETREAT OF THE TROOPS BACK INTO SULAIMANIYA.

THIS INCIDENT IS ALLEGED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE ON JUNE 13. ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE 15 A KURDISH SUICIDE UNIT, CONSISTING LARGELY OF RELATIVES OF THE DEAD WOMEN AND CHILDREN, ATTACKED THE IRAQI ARMY OFFICERS CLUB IN SULAIMANIYA--A TOWN WELL INSIDE THE AREA WHICH THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMS TO CONTROL--INFLECTING HEAVY CASUALTIES IN RETALIATION FOR THE AZMIR INCIDENT.

KURDISH UNITS ARE ALSO KNOWN TO HAVE RAIDED DOWN INTO THE KIRKUK REGION--ALSO ALLEGED TO BE GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED--ATTACKING THE INSTALLATIONS OF THE BRITISH-CONTROLLED IRAQ PETROLEUM COMPANY.

MORE.

JB/D0332P

UPI-208

FOURTH IRAQ LONDONXXX COMPANY.

DURING THE TRUCE PERIOD, BARAZIANI SENT WARNINGS TO FOREIGN EMBASSIES IN BAGDAD THAT, IF THE FIGHTING RESUMED, HE WOULD NOT HESITATE TO ATTACK THE PATROLEUM COMPANY INSTALLATIONS--WHICH WERE NEVER DAMAGED DURING THE KASSEM PERIOD--IN A BID TO WEAKEN THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT BY CUTTING OFF ITS OIL REVENUES.

SOURCES CLOSE TO THE COMPANY REPORT THAT IT IS WELL AWARE OF THE DANGERS IT NOW FACES, AND THAT IT IS EXPECTING EARLY MAJOR SABOTAGE BIDS AGAINST ITS MAIN INSTALLATIONS IN THE HOSUL REGION.

IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT ONE OF THE FACTORS CLAIMED TO HAVE HELPED IN BRINGING ABOUT THE FALL OF KASSEM WAS HIS FAILURE TO END THE KURDISH REBELLION, A FAILURE WHICH EMBITTERED THE IRAQI ARMY AND LED IT TO TURN AGAINST HIM.

DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES HERE ARE AGREED THAT UNLESS THE NEW IRAQI REGIME CAN WIN EARLY AND DECISIVE SUCCESSES IN THE NEW ROUND OF FIGHTING--AND THERE ARE AT PRESENT NO INDICATIONS THAT THIS IS LIKELY ACCORDING TO REPORTS FROM JURDISTAN--IT TOO MIGHT FACE THE THREAT OF REBELLION INSIDE THE ARMY.

IRONICALLY, KURDISH SOURCES CLAIM THAT THE NEW IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD A BETTER CHANCE THAN EVER TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE KURDISH PROBLEM. THE SOURCES ALLEGE, HOWEVER, THAT ALL ATTEMPTS TO ACHIEVE A SOLUTION IN BAGDAD HAVE BEEN BALKED BY WHAT THE KURDS CLAIM IS THE FAILURE OF THE NEW IRAQI REGIME TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH.

MORE.

FIFTH IRAQ LONDON XXX FAITH.

THE SOURCES ALLEGE THAT BAGDAD, DESPITE A PROMISE TO THE CONTRARY, FAILED TO RELEASE AN ESTIMATED 3,500 KURDISH PRISONERS TAKEN DURING THE KASSEM REGIME, EVEN THOUGH THE KURDS RELEASED THE 2,000 PRISONERS THEY WERE HOLDING. 216

THEY ALSO CLAIM THAT, AGAIN DESPITE A PROMISE TO THE CONTRARY, BAGDAD FAILED TO LIFT THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE THAT KASSEM FLUNG AROUND THE KURDISH AREAS AND THAT THE NEW REGIME USED THE FIVE-MONTH TURCE PERIOD MERELY TO BUILD UP ITS ARMED FORCE FOR THE NEW ASSAULT.

DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS ARE AGREED THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ANTI-KASSEM COUP OF FEBRUARY, WHEN THE IRAQI ARMY WAS GROUPED MAINLY AROUND BAGDAD, THE KURDISH FORCES COULD EASILY HAVE SEIZED CONTROL OF NORTHERN IRAQ. IN FACT THEY DID NOT DO SO, BUT VOLUNTARILY ENDED THEIR CAMPAIGN ON THE PROMISE OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH THE NEW REGIME.

THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT NOW CLAIMS THAT THERE CAN BE NO AUTONOMY FOR KURDISTAN ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT IS +PART OF THE ARAB HOMELAND+ AND THAT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO CREATE +ANOTHER ISRAEL.+

THE KURDS POINT OUT THE KURDISTAN HAS BEEN RACILLY AND LINGUISTICALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ARAB WORLD FOR CENTURIES, AND THAT IT BECAME PART OF WHAT IS NOW IRAQ ONLY FOLLOWING THE BIG POWER DIVISION OF THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE END OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR.

MORE.

JB/D0340P

SIXTH IRAQ LONDON XXX WORLD WAR.

THEY ATTACK THE IRAQI REGIME FOR SUPPORTING DEMANDS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE BRITISH CONTROLLED ADEN COLONY, WHILE REFUSING THE SAME RIGHT TO THE KURDS INSIDE ITS OWN BORDERS.

FOR THE WEST, A CONTINUATION OF THE FIGHTING CAN ONLY HAVE BAD RESULTS, IN THAT IT PROLONGS THE INSTABILITY INSIDE IRAQ AND SERIOUSLY THREATENS A VITAL OIL AREA.

WELL-QUALIFIED OBSERVERS EXPRESS STRONG DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER THE IRAQI ARMY, ROAD-BOUND BY ITS RUSSIAN-BUILT TANKS AND TRUCKS, WILL EVER BE ABLE TO CLEAN OUT THE MOUNTAIN AREAS.

FOR THEIR PART, KURDISH COURIERS MAKE CLEAR THAT AS FAR AS BARAZANI IS CONCERNED THE FIGHT IS NOW ONE FOR NATIONAL SURVIVAL, AND THAT FROM HERE ON, NO QUARTER OR MERCY CAN BE EXPECTED FROM THE KURDISH SIDE.

JB/D0342P

(F) 173/2/1
M.E.

Name of Paper SYDNEY MORNING HERALD.

File No.

173/2/1

Published at SYDNEY.

Date

17-7-63

21

Rebel Threat To Iraq Oil

TEHERAN, July 16 (A.A.P.).—

Kurdish rebels opposing Iraqi Government troops in northern Iraq may be forced to attack Western-owned oil installations to cripple the regime's offensive, a Kurdish leader has warned.

The Ba'ath socialist regime in Iraq has ordered a full-scale war to crush the rebellion of Kurdish chieftain Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who is seeking an autonomous Kurdistan in the northern mountains of Iraq.

The general secretary of the Kurdish Democratic Party, Ibrahim Ahmed, said the Kurds had warned foreigners to evacuate the northern areas where the oil installations are situated.

The Kurds have already kidnapped two West Germans, Gerhard Liesche, 33, and Hans Hatz, 54, from a construction camp.

They are being held at the secret headquarters of the rebels.

Asked if the warning in-

cluded the Iraq Petroleum Company, which is jointly owned by American, British, French and Dutch interests, Ahmed said: "We don't want to disturb the oil companies."

"This is not because we are their agents, but because we do not want to give the impression to the Western Powers that we are Communists."

"But if the situation continues as it is, we will be forced to act against the oil installations to deprive the Government of its most important source of revenue."

The Iraq Petroleum Company provides 90 per cent of Iraq's foreign exchange and employs a large number of foreigners at fields near Kirkuk, in the Kurdish area.

Name of Paper SYDNEY MORNING HERALD.

File No.

Published at SYDNEY.

Date

GOVT. FACES A GRAVE CRISIS IN IRAQ

TODAY the regime in Iraq is clearly facing a grave crisis. There have been reports that four Ministers in the Government have resigned in protest against the renewed hostilities now being undertaken against the Kurds. So unity at the centre is damaged.

Next, there are no signs that the campaign now being waged by the Iraqi Army aiming at destroying the forces of Mullah Mustafa Barzani is having any conclusive success. It is true that the Directorate of Military Operations claimed that 400 Kurds surrendered with their arms. But few believe that the Kurdish people in Iraq are likely to cease resistance soon.

Finally, in the current difficulties facing the Iraq regime, a recent important article in "Pravda" seemed to give a direct warning to Iraq that Soviet aid would be stopped if the present policies of the Baghdad Government were continued. In particular, Moscow attacked the Iraqi Government's campaign against the Kurds.

This Soviet regard for the Kurdish minority in Iraq does not, of course, spring from any enlightened and liberal viewpoint. Moscow has never forgiven the Iraq regime that replaced General Kassem for the slaughter of Communists which took place in February. Under the Government of the late dictator, supporters of Moscow had achieved positions of influence throughout the whole country. They were particularly strong in the information and broadcasting services. But then, without pity, they were rooted out in a campaign of murder more brutal than anything that Kassem himself had ever contemplated.

From COLIN JACKSON

Clearly, one of the great dangers that President Aref must face today is that the remaining Communist elements within Iraq will now try to make a common cause with the dissident Kurdish community.

At the time of the successful coup in February, many informed observers believed that the new Government was the best that Iraq could expect in the circumstances. Dominated by the Baath Socialist Party, the take-over forces were described as a "middle-class revolution."

Persecution

It seemed likely that President Aref would attempt first to improve relations with Egypt and Syria. Secondly, the Baghdad Government appeared likely to move away from a pro-Soviet line in foreign policy towards an outlook that at any rate would accept Western oil interests and military aid for the nation. Finally, the calibre of some of the new Administration raised hopes that after the chaotic interregnum of General Kassem a fresh attempt would be made to continue the country's economic advance, including some genuine social reforms.

However, these early hopes of a new efficient regime in Baghdad have not materialised. To begin with, like its predecessors, the Govern-

ment of President Aref has been unable to avoid a policy of persecution and intolerance towards its opponents. This is not only the case with the Communists. The Movement of Arab Nationalists, pro-Nasser in outlook, has been eliminated by the Baath power group.

Independent liberal opinion in Baghdad, including many of the nation's intellectuals, has been shocked by the arbitrary character of Government decisions and the strong-arm tactics of the National Guard. Kassem had his sessions of torture and mass-arrest, and President Aref seems unable to avoid following him. There have been criticisms, too, that the Baath Party in power has packed the Civil Service with its own supporters, regardless of the ability of the appointees.

On the economic front President Aref and his regime face many problems, and they have solved few since coming into office. The regime has expressed its intention of honouring agreements made with the Iraq petroleum companies. The almost total breakdown of relations between the companies and General Kassem is not likely to be repeated, but a satisfactory working arrangement still has not been reached. And the fighting in the north, including the reported destruction of two oil wells, is not likely to improve matters.

Bitter People

Another acute problem facing the present Government is the continuing accumulation of workless Iraqis who flock to the capital seeking employment; it is estimated that there are 500,000 impoverished people living in the Serifis slum shacks built of palm leaves and mud without even water or sanitation.

One answer would be for a concentrated effort at the settlement of extra land made available for cultivation as a result of the dams constructed under the old Development Board plan. But with the Administration packed by party favourites rather than men of ability, the chance to get Iraq moving economically remains remote.

On the international front increasingly it seems that President Aref and his Baath followers in Iraq are determined to set themselves up as rivals for the political leadership of the Arab world against the desires of Cairo. It is true that Baghdad might be prepared to see President Nasser assume a limited constitutional role as the titular head of the Arab peoples in unity. But in practical politics the Baath Socialists in Iraq, backed by the Army, seem to see themselves as an



PRESIDENT AREF



MULLAH MUSTAFA BARZANI


expanding force based on Iraq which will eventually gather all other Arab leaders into a united Socialist front.

In Libya, for example, Saudi Arabia and Jordan the regime claims in Baghdad that the Baath Socialists are more popular than President Nasser with his socialism built on personal dictatorship as illustrated in Cairo. The Government in Baghdad claims to be in close and friendly contact with Mr Ben Barka in Morocco and the supporters of Abdullah Asnaq in Aden. Many Baath Socialist leaders in Baghdad are now hopefully saying that this friendly alliance with Left-wing leaders throughout the Arab world will challenge and defeat the claims of Cairo to dominate the Middle East.

However, big talk abroad may be rendered quite fruitless unless the Iraq Government can quickly quell the Kurdish insurrection at home. All the signs are that the new Government attacks will be more bloody and costly than previous campaigns. It is said that practically the whole of the Iraq Army is now operating in the Kurdish area. So the battle continues with no hope of an early victory, and meantime the crisis becomes more grave in Baghdad.

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AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

11th July, 1963

File No. 606/3

Memorandum No. 1123

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra. A.C.T.

Kurds in Iraq

Attached are copies of press releases put out by the Soviet Mission to the United Nations containing texts of statements by the Soviet Government to Iraq and Iran concerning the Kurds.

[Signature]
Permanent Representative

PCJC/m

[Handwritten signature]

Mr L.A.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 210

MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

136 EAST 67th STREET, NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

No. 24

July 10, 1963

SOVIET STATEMENT TO IRAQ

On July ninth 1963 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A.Gromyko received Ambassador of the Iraqi Republic Mr.Feisal Haizaran and handed him a Statement of the Soviet Government in connection with the developments in the North of Iraq.

Following is the text of the Soviet Government's Statement to the Government of the Iraqi Republic.

"The Soviet Government finds it necessary to make the following statement to the Government of the Iraqi Republic.

The Iraqi Government is, doubtlessly, aware of the resolute condemnations by the Soviet people and other peoples of the world of the bloody outrages being committed by the Iraqi authorities against the peaceful Kurdish people who account for nearly one quarter of the population of the country. There is no doubt that such developments can only weaken the Iraqi state and damage its international positions and also enable the forces of colonialism to make use of these events for undermining Iraq's independence and for strengthening their positions in the Near and Middle East.

In this case the Soviet Government finds it necessary to draw the Iraqi Government's attention to the threat that arises due to the interference of other states in the events now taking place in the North of Iraq. This interference is fraught with a definite danger for the cause of maintaining peace in the area of the Near and Middle East.

According to the information at the disposal of the Government of the USSR, the member states of the military-colonialist CENTO bloc rejected by the Iraqi people have embarked on the road of interference in the events taking place in the North of Iraq up to and including measures of military nature. According to official statements of representatives of the member states of the CENTO bloc in which the imperialist powers play the first fiddle, a special discussion was held by this bloc on the question of outlining general policy with regard

to the movement of the Kurds and the position of the Iraqi Kurds was discussed from the viewpoint of taking joint measures against the Kurds. The press of the Arab countries reported a number of conferences of military representatives of Iraq, Turkey and Iran which discussed also the plans for military operations against the Kurds with a view to suppressing the Kurdish movement and it was planned to use troops of certain states neighbouring on Iraq for fighting against the Kurds on the territory of Iraq. According to the same reports, an agreement was reached in the course of the conferences on joint military operations against the Kurds.

The armed forces of Syria are also known to directly participate in the battles against the Kurds in the North of Iraq.

No matter how accurate are these or other details in the reports about the developments in North Iraq, everything goes to show that the fact of the implication of foreign states in these developments gives rise to no doubts. And this gives ground for serious concern on the part of every government which is aware of its responsibility for the destinies of the world.

The Soviet Government finds it necessary to emphasise resolutely that the policy of the Iraqi Government which gives the imperialist forces and opportunity for interference in the Near and Middle East is fraught with serious consequences.

All this brings back the memory of the events connected with the preparation and realisation of the tripartite imperialist aggression against Egypt in the autumn of 1956.

The interference of foreign states in the developments now taking place in the territory of the Iraqi state is a matter of concern not for Iraq only. The dragging into the conflict of other forces, other states and the granting to external forces connected with the aggressive military-political blocs of strongholds close to the Soviet frontiers creates a threat to the security of a number of states including the Soviet Union.

Taking all this into consideration, the Government of the Soviet Union is compelled to come out with this statement and the warning it contains. The Soviet Government sincerely hopes that the Government of Iraq would not permit the continuation of foreign interference in the events now taking place in the North of Iraq and would put an end to this interference.

The Soviet Government takes this opportunity to declare that, given reciprocal desire on the part of Iraq, it will continue pursuing the policy of developing good relations with the Iraqi Republic."

- * -

On the same day A.A.Gromyko received Ambassador of Iran Mr.Tah-muras Adamiyat, Ambassador of the Turkish Republic Mr.Fahri Koruturk and Ambassador of the Syrian Arab Republic Mr.Jawdat Atassi and handed them the Statements of the Soviet Government on the same question.

* * *

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 207

MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

136 EAST 67th STREET, NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

No 25

July 10, 1963

STATEMENT OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT
TO GOVERNMENT OF IRAN

Following is the full text of the Statement of the Soviet Government to the Government of Iran:

"The Soviet Government deems it necessary to state the following to the Shahinshah Government of Iran:

A bloody massacre of the Kurdish people, accounting for almost a quarter of the population of Iraq, is now being carried out by the Iraqi authorities in the Northern part of Iraq. Extensive military operations against the peaceful Kurdish towns and villages are under way. Forces employing aviation, tanks and artillery are brutally annihilating peaceful population, including children, women and the old folk.

Vast areas are being turned into ruins and the peaceful populace is being evicted in mass from their native places. The extermination of a whole nation is actually going on.

All this is taking place only because the Kurds in Iraq justly demand respect of their lawful national and civil rights, equality with the other citizens of the Iraqi Republic.

The Government of Iran is informed without doubt about the facts relating to the cruel massacre of the Kurds, which is being carried out near the frontiers of Iran and the Soviet Union. The tragedy of the Kurds in Iraq continues and has already turned into an international problem.

All this arouses the legitimate anger of world public opinion at large. What is now happening in North Iraq signifies the trampling underfoot of the principles of the United Nations, the Universal Human Rights Declaration, signifies genocide, that is a policy of the mass extermination of people because of race, nation or religion, condemned by all of mankind and declared by the United Nations as the gravest international crime. There is both the signature of the Soviet Union and Iran under the convention condemning genocide.

The Soviet Government possesses information that certain states, uncluding Iran, have embarked upon the road of interfering in the events taking place in North Iraq, upto and including measures of a military nature. According to the published official statements of spokesmen of the military-colonial CENTO pact, where the tune is set by the imperialist powers, the CENTO bloc has discussed specially the question of drawing up a common policy with regard to the Kurdish movement, and what is more the position of the Iraqi Kurds was considered in the light of taking joint steps against the Kurds. The press has reported about several meetings of military representatives of Iraq, Turkey and Iran, which discussed also plans of military operations agains the Kurds with a view to stamping out the Kurdish movement, and it was proposed to use the forces of certain states bordering on Iraq to fight the Kurds in the territory of Iraq.

According to the selfsame reports and agreement was reached during the meetings on joint operations agains the Kurds. It is known also that the armed forces of Syria are participating directly in the fighting against the Kurds, jointly with the Iraqi forces.

Regardless of how precise these or other details in the reports on the events in North Iraq are, judging by everything the fact that foreign states have a hand in these events is beyond doubt. And precisely this gives ground for serious concern of every government which is aware of its responsibility for the destinies of the world.

Such a policy of the CENTO governments is fraught with serious consequences.

All this brings to memory the events linked with the preparation and carrying out of tripartite imperialist aggression against Egypt in the autumn of 1956.

The Iranian side has justly stated more than once that it is necessary to abide by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. This is correct and this principle is one of the cornerstones of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. But the question arises -- how are we to reconcile the abovesaid statements of Iran with the fact that the Iranian authorities are trying themselves to interfere in the affairs of neighbouring countries jointly with other CENTO nations?

The Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that nobody should interfere in the affairs of Iraq. The Government of Iran, obviously, cannot but agree with this, too. But if this is so how is one to assess the reported facts testifying to the interference of foreign states in the war in North Iraq.

After all, if one state or group of states embarks under this or that pretext on the road of armed interference in the affairs of another state, it thereby openly tramples underfoot the principles of the United Nations. Then the field of cooperation among states,

especially, among neighbouring nations, gets narrowed-down to a dangerous extent. The place of goodneighbourhood among states is taken in this case by enmity, strife and conflicts.

Troubled by the development of events in the area of the southern frontiers of the Soviet Union and guided by the interests of upholding peace, the Government of the USSR has decided to set forth to the Shahinshah Government of Iran these considerations and serve warning about the danger linked with this outside interference in the events taking place inside the Iraqi state. It hopes sincerely that the Shahinshah Government will weigh all the circumstances when determining its policy towards the events in Iraq.

The Soviet Government avails itself of this opportunity to state that it is firmly set on following the road of further improving relations with Iran and wishes the people and Government of Iran prosperity and peaceful development in conditions of lasting goodneighbour relations with the Soviet Union and the other states. It hopes that the measures which were carried out of late by the Soviet and Iranian sides and which are planned for the future will benefit both our states.

x x x

The Soviet Government's Statements to the Governments of the Turkish Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic are identical with the statement forwarded to the Government of Iran.

COPY

OF LETTER FROM 204
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

11th July, 1963

File No. 606/3

Memorandum No. 1123

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra. A.C.T.

Kurds in Iraq

Attached are copies of press releases put out by the Soviet Mission to the United Nations containing texts of statements by the Soviet Government to Iraq and Iran concerning the Kurds.

Permanent Representative

PGJC/m

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM

I.

FROM;

Dated: 6th July, 1963.

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI.

Rec'd: 12th July, 1963.
I. 18575

Saving. No. 30 (CONFIDENTIAL)

Repeated: Repeated New York (U.N.) No. 3,
London No. 20, Washington No. 19.

INDIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

I talked today with V.C. Trivedi (the Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs concerned with the United Nations).

2. He told me that last year, after India had voted in the General Assembly for the Western resolution on Korea, the Soviet Union had made strong representations to India against this action. India had replied that it was not going to compromise on such a question in future, and had pointed out that North Korea had given strong support to Peking for its armed attacks on India. Trivedi mentioned to me, too, the position adopted by the Indian delegation at the last session of the General Assembly on refugees in Hong Kong and against an invitation to Communist China to attend the next conference on the peaceful use of atomic energy (India voted for the Australian amendment which had the effect of excluding Communist China from an invitation). Trivedi told me that at the next session of the General Assembly India would adopt the same attitude on these questions as last year.

3. Trivedi told me that some of the Africans were talking of using the question of Chinese representation to blackmail the United States into supporting the expulsion of South Africa and Portugal (in a somewhat similar way to their forcing the United States two years ago to support the admission of Mongolia so that Mauritania would be admitted). Trivedi understood that the United States had approached De Gaulle to ask him to use his influence with the Brazzaville States to prevent their becoming party to anything like this.

4. Trivedi said India would continue to support the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. To some extent this was a case of going through the motions, but India genuinely believed that China's exposure to contacts and pressures and ideas from other countries would be beneficial in the long run. In the short run of course it would be "sheer hell" and the first few sessions of the General Assembly after China's admission would present great problems for everyone including the Russians.

CONFIDENTIAL

Cap. 2 on Kuadr.

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INWARD SAVING ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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5. Trivedi expects a bitter and unpleasant session of the General Assembly, with South African and Portuguese questions well to the fore. He said that India is in an embarrassing position. It is not in sympathy with a lot of the African moves but it is being criticized among the Afro-Asians on the ground that it is becoming conservative and too much in the pocket of the West. The recent conference of the International Labour Organization had put India in a most difficult position, and India had satisfied nobody, internationally or domestically.

6. Trivedi told me that Mongolia had asked to have inscribed on the agenda of the next session of the General Assembly an item on the treatment of the Kurds in Iraq. Trivedi understood that all the Arabs would support Iraq in opposition to inscription, and if so he felt therefore it would be kept off the agenda. Attempts were now being made in the Afro-Asian group to persuade Mongolia not to go ahead with the item.

Plimsoll.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
A/MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE

12th July, 1963.

SEC A/Ss UN ER PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA@ SEA
EAF&ME E AF ME INF DL MT IC PPO
HONG KONG KARACHI

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173/2/1

379

12th July, 1963

The Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

KURDS IN IRAQ.

.... Please refer to your savingram No. 38 of 10th
July, 1963. We are enclosing a departmental paper
concerning the Kurds in Iraq.

(C. Lee)
for the Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL



Pink Copy. 200
CONFIDENTIAL

173/2/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
CANBERRA.

In reply quote No.

12th July, 1963

The Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

Memo. No. 404
The Senior External Affairs Representative,
LONDON.

Memo. No. 223
The Australian Embassy,
MOSCOW.

Memo. No. 210
The Australian Embassy,
CAIRO.

KURDS IN IRAQ.

We enclose a departmental paper and a U.N. telegram No.38 of 10th July about the Kurds in Iraq,

2. For London and Washington. Would you please discuss with Foreign Office/State Department the significance of these Soviet moves. Our own tentative estimate is indicated in the attached paper.

Ch. Lee
(C. Lee)
for the Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

THE KURDISH REVOLT IN IRAQ

Kurdish minorities exist in Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran. There are also between 60,000 - 100,000 Kurds in the Soviet Union. The desire for an independent state of Kurdistan has been strongest among the Iraqi Kurds. Estimates of the total number of Kurds vary from 4,000,000 to the Kurds' own estimate of 12,000,000. There are about one million in Iraq and they differ from the bulk of the population in that they are not Arabs, they are Sunni Moslems (whereas the Shia sect is predominant in Iraq) and have their own traditional social organisation. Tribal rivalries within the Kurdish community were originally strong but, as actions against Kurds became increasingly indiscriminate during the last years of the Kassim regime, these became less important and Kurdish opposition to Kassim became more united.

Kurdish desires for some form of autonomy were recognised by the abortive Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, which provided for the creation of an independent State of Kurdistan in former Ottoman territory. No such state was created and the first of a number of Kurdish revolts broke out in 1922. These continued until 1945 when the Iraqi government succeeded in suppressing the movement. The leaders of the 1945 revolt, headed by Mulla Mustafa Barzani, fled to the Soviet-occupied northern region of Iran where a Soviet-supported Azerbaijani People's Republic was in existence. The western region of this was then declared independent as the Kurdish People's Republic, with the Soviet-backed Kurdish Democratic Party in control. Soviet support for the Republic was withdrawn in 1947 however and the Iranian government soon reconquered the area. Barzani and some of his followers then fled to the Soviet Union where they remained until invited back in 1958 by Kassim, following his overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy.

During the early part of the Kassim regime Kurdish-Arab relations were reasonably good, but as time passed Barzani suspected that Kassim intended to suppress Kurdish separatism.

On the eve of the outbreak of the revolt in August, 1961, the Kurds were seeking a wide degree of regional autonomy, with administration in their area to be by Kurdish officials and policed only by Kurdish security forces, with a larger Kurdish voice in national affairs as well. Barzani's distrust of Kassim was deep, however, and during negotiations with the government Kurdish demands rose steadily, culminating in a virtual demand for independence rather than autonomy.

Kurdish Relations with the new Government

Following Kassim's overthrow in February, 1963, the new Iraqi government appointed two Kurds to the new cabinet. It also announced its willingness to grant the Kurds "national rights on a basis of decentralisation". Negotiations began aimed at resolving Kurdish differences with the Central Government but these were protracted and ended with the Kurds demanding the creation of what would have been virtually a Kurdish-Iraqi federation. This proved unacceptable to the government and the negotiations collapsed. Meanwhile its reinforcement of military posts in the Kurdish area also led the Kurds to doubt the government's sincerity. The two Kurdish ministers resigned in protest against the Government's resumption of hostilities against the Kurds.

Present Kurdish demands are for local autonomy, a larger

-2-

share of government spending in the Kurdish area, use of the Kurdish language in local government, and the teaching of Kurdish in local schools.

On 10th June, the government announced the resumption of fighting. It put the blame on the Kurds, who it alleges made unacceptable demands for a share of Iraq's state oil and other revenues on a per capita basis and for the exclusion of all Arab troops from Kurdistan to be replaced by a Kurdistan Army Corps. It has concentrated large forces in the area, but its hopes for an early end to the fighting may well be optimistic.

There are no present indications of unrest spreading to Kurdish areas of Turkey, Iran and Syria as the minorities there do not appear to be as restive as in Iraq. Should the fighting prove to be protracted it is likely that Army morale may be weakened. This in turn could ultimately weaken its loyalty to the regime. The Iranian government has been pursuing a somewhat ambivalent policy towards the Kurds, who have been receiving some aid via Iran. While Teheran is concerned that fighting in Iraq might arouse active dissidence among its own Kurds, it is interested in keeping Kurdish resistance alive in Iraq as a counterforce to Pan-Arabian and Nasserist influences which Iranians regard as an even more serious threat than Kurdish nationalism. One of Barzani's close associates, Colonel Djalal Talabani, has stated that Barzani's movement is interested only in Iraqi Kurds and does not wish to have international complications.

One consequence of the renewed fighting is that the likelihood of an Iraqi attack on Kuwait has receded further.

Communist and Soviet Activities

Despite Barzani's extensive residence in the Soviet Union and Moscow's increase in pro-Kurdish propaganda, the Kurdish nationalist movement has so far remained free from Soviet influence. Soviet support for Kassim has not been forgotten by the Kurds. Even the Kurdish Communists differ with their Iraqi comrades in that they support Barzani's rebellion.

The anti-Communist domestic policy pursued by the new Baghdad regime, however, will probably result in increased Soviet attempts to use the Kurdish question as a means of embarrassing it and even of working for its downfall. The recent Mongolian draft resolution alleging genocide may be evidence of this. The Soviet government has also warned Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria that the co-operation of foreign governments in the Iraqi suppression of the Kurds would constitute intervention in Iraqi internal affairs and would be contrary to United Nations principles. There may be other Soviet moves against Iraq in preparation, but on present evidence we think it unlikely that the Russians will go beyond international propaganda actions of the kind they have so far undertaken.

15th July, 1963.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM

197

AM

FROM.

I.18468

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

SENT. 10TH JULY, 1963
1610
RECD. 11TH JULY, 1963
1630

UN38. UNCLASSIFIED.

REPEATED WASHINGTON, LONDON (FOR EXTERNAL) SAVING 555
CAIRO-SAVING 32.

KURDS IN IRAQ.

SECRETARIAT HAS CIRCULATED LETTER (TEXT BY BAG) DATED 9TH JULY FROM PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR TO PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH ACCUSES IRAQI AUTHORITIES OF 'BRUTALLY EXTERMINATING' THE KURDISH POPULATION AND ALLEGES THAT 'CERTAIN NEIGHBOURING STATES' AND CENTO HAVE BEEN INTERFERING IN THE 'FRATRICIDAL WAR' AGAINST THE KURDS.

LETTER CONCLUDES AS FOLLOWS:-

'THE INTERFERENCE OF FOREIGN STATES IN THE EVENTS TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE BORDERS OF THE IRAQI STATE IS NOT THE CONCERN OF IRAQ ALONE.

THE INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT OF OTHER FORCES AND OTHER STATES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT BY THE AGGRESSIVE FORCES OF BASES CLOSE TO THE SOVIET BORDERS ARE CREATING A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF A NUMBER OF STATES, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION, A MATTER WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CANNOT REGARD WITH INDIFFERENCE.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.S.R., CONCERNED AT THE EVOLUTION OF EVENTS IN THE AREA OF THE SOUTHERN BORDERS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ACTING IN THE INTERESTS OF THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE, DRAWS THE ATTENTION OF MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN THE EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN NORTHERN IRAQ.

THE CONTINUANCE OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN THESE EVENTS MAY COMPEL OTHER STATES TO TAKE STEPS TO ELIMINATE THIS INTERFERENCE AND PROTECT THEIR OWN SECURITY.

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT FEELS IT ESSENTIAL TO BRING THIS MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT IF INTERFERENCE BY EXTERNAL FORCES IN THE EVENTS IN NORTHERN IRAQ CONTINUES, IT MAY BECOME NECESSARY TO CONVENE THE SECURITY COUNCIL SO THAT THE NECESSARY MEASURES MAY BE TAKEN TO PUT AN END TO SUCH INTERFERENCE'.

MIN & DEPT E.A.
A/MIN & DEPT DEFENCE

11TH JULY, 1963

173
151/2/1

SEC A/SS UN PAC&AM S&SEA EAF&ME E AF ME@ INF DL IC

→ ~~Mr Lee~~ This is a good note I
think! Wd it make
a Current Note, 1/6/7
entirely amended, 1/6/7

~~Mr. Rowland~~

Thanks. 11/7

~~Kurds~~

If we still
doubt for such 2
Or wd it be worth
sending to ports,
as distinct from PIB?

~~Mr Harry~~

This note will be for PIB =
it sets out the background: and concludes
that The Russians, while taking a slap
at Iraq and seeking to embarrass (or
even bring down) its present anti communist
regime, are not likely to get
more directly involved.

Instructions are going to
ECOSOC delegation to effect that
we wd prefer not to see the
Soviet item inscribed (Article 2-7
applies) but the Afrikanians shd
be allowed to take the lead; and
Western countries consulted.

We expect that the item
won't be inscribed.

Copy to UN

LM 11/7

→ File: 173/2/1

CONFIDENTIAL

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THE KURDISH REVOLT IN IRAQ

Kurdish minorities exist in Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran. There are also between 60 - 100,000 Kurds in the Soviet Union. The desire for an independent state of Kurdistan has been strongest among the Iraqi Kurds. Estimates of the total number of Kurds vary from 4,000,000 to the Kurds' own estimate of 12,000,000. There are about one million in Iraq and they differ from the bulk of the population in that they are not Arabs, they are Sunni Moslems (whereas the Shia sect is predominant in Iraq) and have their own traditional social organisation. Tribal rivalries within the Kurdish community were originally strong but, as actions against Kurds became increasingly indiscriminate during the last years of the Kassim regime, these became less important and Kurdish opposition to Kassim became more united.

Kurdish desires for some form of autonomy were recognised by the abortive Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 which provided for the creation of an independent State of Kurdistan in former Ottoman territory. No such state was created and the first of a number of Kurdish revolts broke out in 1922. These continued until 1945 when the Iraqi government succeeded in suppressing the movement. The leaders of the 1945 revolt headed by Mulla Mustafa Barzani fled to the Soviet-occupied northern region of Iran where a Soviet-supported Azerbaijani People's Republic was in existence. The western region of this was then declared independent as the Kurdish People's Republic, with the Soviet-backed Kurdish Democratic Party in control. Soviet support for the Republic was withdrawn in 1947 however and the Iranian government soon reconquered the area. Barzani and some of his followers then fled to the Soviet Union where they remained until invited

.... /2.

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-2-

back in 1958 by Kassim following his overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy.

During the early part of the Kassim regime Kurdish-Arab relations were reasonably good, but as time passed Barzani suspected that Kassim intended to suppress Kurdish separatism.

On the eve of the outbreak of the revolt in August, 1961, the Kurds were seeking a wide degree of regional autonomy, with administration in their area to be by Kurdish officials and policed only by Kurdish security forces, with a larger Kurdish voice in national affairs as well. Barzani's distrust of Kassim was deep, however, and during negotiations with the government Kurdish demands rose steadily, culminating in a virtual demand for independence rather than autonomy.

Kurdish Relations with the new Government

Following Kassim's overthrow in February, 1963, the new Iraqi Government appointed two Kurds to the new Cabinet. It also announced its willingness to grant the Kurds "national rights on a basis of decentralisation". Negotiations began aimed at resolving Kurdish differences with the Central Government but these were protracted and ended with the Kurds demanding the creation of what would have been virtually a Kurdish-Iraqi federation. This proved unacceptable to the government and the negotiations collapsed. Meanwhile its reinforcement of military posts in the Kurdish area also led the Kurds to doubt the government's sincerity. The two Kurdish ministers resigned in protest against the Government's resumption of hostilities against the Kurds.

Present Kurdish demands are for local autonomy, a larger share of government spending in the Kurdish area, use of the Kurdish language in local government, and the teaching of Kurdish in local schools.

On 10th June the government announced the resumption of fighting. It put the blame on the Kurds, who it alleges made unacceptable demands for a share of Iraq's state oil and other

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...../3.

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-3-

revenues on a per capita basis and for the exclusion of all Arab troops from Kurdistan to be replaced by a Kurdistan Army Corps. It has concentrated large forces in the area, but its hopes for an early end to the fighting may well be optimistic.

There are no present indications of unrest spreading to Kurdish areas of Turkey, Iran and Syria as the minorities there do not appear to be as restive as in Iraq. Should the fighting prove to be protracted it is likely that Army morale may be weakened. This in turn could ultimately weaken its loyalty to the regime. The Iranian government has been pursuing a somewhat ambivalent policy towards the Kurds, who have been receiving some aid via Iran. While Teheran is concerned that fighting in Iraq might arouse active dissidence among its own Kurds, it is interested in keeping Kurdish resistance alive in Iraq as a counterforce to Pan-Arabism and Nasserist influences which Iranians regard as an even more serious threat than Kurdish nationalism. One of Barzani's close associates, Colonel Djalal Talabani, has stated that Barzani's movement is interested only in Iraqi Kurds and does not wish to have international complications.

One consequence of the renewed fighting is that the likelihood of an Iraqi attack on Kuwait has receded further.

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Despite Barzani's extensive residence in the Soviet Union and Moscow's increase in pro-Kurdish propaganda, the Kurdish nationalist movement has so far remained free from Soviet influence. Soviet support for Kassim has not been forgotten by the Kurds. Even the Kurdish Communists differ with their Iraqi comrades in that they support Barzani's rebellion.

The anti-Communist domestic policy pursued by the new Baghdad regime, however, will probably result in increased Soviet attempts to use the Kurdish question as a means of embarrassing it and even of working for its downfall. The recent Mongolian draft resolution alleging genocide may be evidence of this.

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...../4.

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-4-

The Soviet Government has also warned Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria that the co-operation of foreign governments in the Iraqi suppression of the Kurds would constitute intervention in Iraqi internal affairs and would be contrary to United Nations principles. There may be other Soviet moves against Iraq in preparation, but on present evidence we think it unlikely that the Russians will go beyond international propaganda actions of the kind they have so far undertaken.

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM

AM

FROM.

I.18468

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.SENT. 10TH JULY, 1963
1610
RECD. 11TH JULY, 1963
1630UN38. UNCLASSIFIED.REPEATED WASHINGTON, LONDON (FOR EXTERNAL) SAVING 555
CAIRO-SAVING 32.KURDS IN IRAQ.

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LETTER CONCLUDES AS FOLLOWS:-

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MIN & DEPT E.A.
A/MIN & DEPT DEFENCE

11TH JULY, 1963

190

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

RB

0.14312

TO:

Sent: 11th July, 1963
1820

Australian Consulate-General,
GENEVA.

395. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

Lude

Your 511.

We would not wish to see Soviet item inscribed, but prefer Afro Asians to take lead in opposing inscription. Case is one where domestic jurisdiction argument should properly be used.

2. You should concert action with Western group.

MIN. & DEPT E.A. (855/6/36/1)
(855/11/3)

A/MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
A.G.'S DEPT
P.M.'s.

11th July, 1963

SEC A/Ss LA UN ER PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME
E AF ME INF DL IC

① 173/2/1

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM

IM

I.17918

FROM:

DATED: 3RD JULY, 1963.

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE
UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

REC'D: 5TH JULY, 1963.

SAV.34 UNCLASSIFIED.

REPEATED WASHINGTON, REPEATED LONDON (FOR EXTERNAL) SAVING BAG 544
REPEATED CAIRO SAVING BAG 30, REPEATED GENEVA SAVING BAG 63.

KURDS IN IRAQ.

ON 2ND JULY MONGOLIA REQUESTED THE INCLUSION IN THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF THE FORTHCOMING SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AS AN ITEM OF AN IMPORTANT AND URGENT CHARACTER, OF THE QUESTION "THE POLICY OF GENOCIDE CARRIED OUT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ AGAINST THE KURDISH PEOPLE".

2. THE ACCOMPANYING EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM TALKS OF THE KURDS' "JUST DEMAND FOR NATIONAL AUTONOMY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE IRAQI STATE"-. AND OF THE GOVERNMENT'S "POLICY OF BLOODY REPRESSION AGAINST THE KURDISH PEOPLE", WHOSE "VERY EXISTENCE IS THREATENED".

3. FOLLOWING DRAFT RESOLUTION IS SUBMITTED TOGETHER WITH THE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM:

"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

"PROFOUNDLY DISTURBED AT THE MASS EXTERMINATION OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE TAKING PLACE IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ,
RECOGNIZING THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES AGAINST THE KURDISH POPULATION CONSTITUTE GENOCIDE AGAINST THE KURDS,

"RECALLING THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN ITS RESOLUTION OF 11 DECEMBER 1946 AFFIRMED THAT GENOCIDE WAS A CRIME CONDEMNED BY THE CIVILIZED WORLD AND CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT AND AIMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WHETHER THAT CRIME WAS COMMITTED ON RELIGIOUS, RACIAL, POLITICAL OR ANY OTHER GROUNDS,

"CONDEMNS THE ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ AGAINST THE KURDISH POPULATION OF IRAQ-,

"CALLS UPON THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO CEASE ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE KURDISH POPULATION AND TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE KURDS REGARDING THE SATISFACTION OF THEIR NATIONAL DEMANDS."

MIN. & DEPT E.A.

A/MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE

6TH JULY, 1963.

SEC A/SS UN PAC&AM EA S&SEA SA EAF&ME AF ME INF DL IC
COLOMBO KARACHI LONDON NEW DELHI OTTAWA TEL AVIV WELLINGTON

(P) 173/2/1

NEW YORK, JULY 4 (UPI)--IRAQ'S AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS SAID TODAY THE DEMANDS OF THE KURDS FOR AUTONOMY ARE SUCH THAT NO GOVERNMENT COULD ACCEPT WITHOUT SACRIFICING THE INDEPENDENCE AND NATIONAL INTEGRITY OF ITS PEOPLE.+

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IN A LETTER TO THE NEW YORK TIMES ADNAN PACHACHI SAID NO STATE CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTRIBUTE TO ITS OWN DESTRUCTION BY ALLOWING SEPARATE ARMIES ON ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY, AND THEREFORE BARZANIS DEMANDS WERE REJECTED.+

+IT IS NOT QUITE CORRECT TO SAY THAT THE RECENT ACTION OF THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT MAY BRING ABOUT FOREIGN INTERVENTION. ON THE CONTRARY, THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN NOW GOING ON WAS NECESSITATED BY THE MOUNTING EVIDENCE OF FOREIGN INFILTRATION AND THE INFLUENCE IN THE BARZANI REBELLION WHICH STRENGTHENS THE BELIEF THAT THIS IS NO LONGER A LOCAL MOVEMENT WITH LIMITED DEMANDS BUT PART OF A FOREIGN-INSPIRED AND SUPPORTED EFFORT TO UNDERMINE THE IRAQ STATE AND DESTROY ITS NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE.+

D0625P

Ⓐ 173/2/1
~~M.E.~~



187

C. Lee, Esq.,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

*With the Compliments
of*

MR. E. V. VINES

Encl: Copy of letter to
Mr. Griffith, Prime
Minister's Department
dated 1st July, 1963.
Ref: Resumption of Fighting
in Kurdistan.

*British High Commission
Canberra*

1st July, 1963.

186

POL.127/2

1st July, 1963

Resumption of Fighting in Kurdistan.

Iraqi/Kurdish negotiations on the degree of autonomy to be given to the Kurds which had been going on since the Revolution in February this year ended on June 10 with the Iraq Government's announcement of the resumption of fighting, putting the blame on the Kurds. The Kurds did not ask for independence but short of this demands were extreme. The main sticking points for the Government were probably the Kurdish demand for a share of Iraq's oil and other state revenues on a per capita basis and the exclusion of all Arab troops from Kurdistan to be replaced by a Kurdistan Army Corps. We and the Americans have urged both sides to reach a settlement but there seems however to have been little serious negotiation.

2. The Iraq Government is now clearly making an all-out effort to settle the Kurdish problem once and for all. It has assembled large forces (about two-thirds of the Iraqi army) in the North and is hoping for a quick victory. But Qasim failed in a similar attempt and the struggle may well return to the stalemate which existed before the recent revolution with the Kurds retaining control in the mountain areas and creating insecurity in nearby towns especially Erbil, Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya.

3. The situation contains a number of dangers. Unsuccessful hostilities could jeopardise the present Iraqi regime. Fighting will increase Russian opportunities for trouble-making in Kurdistan. Clandestine Communist broadcasts since February have incited the Kurds to revolt and Soviet press and radio are now openly supporting the Kurds and accusing the imperialists of compelling the Iraqis to abandon negotiations. There is also a danger of unrest spreading to Kurdish areas of Turkey, Iran and Syria. Finally there is a considerable risk of damage to the Iraq petroleum company's oil installations around Kirkuk and of the reduction or interruption of oil production.

4. I am enclosing a copy of this letter to Mr. Lee in the Department of External Affairs.

A.T. Griffith, Esq.,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

E. V. VINES.

(F) 173/2/1



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CABLE ADDRESS
AUSTUNAT. NEW YORK

TELEPHONE
YUKON 6-7676

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.



24th June 1963

File No. 606/3

Memorandum No. 1015/63

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

Kurdish Revolt

....

Attached for your information is a copy of a
Press Release dated 31st June 1963, put out here by the
Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations.

dk. & bod.

for Permanent Representative

MTC/fdb

*Regina: R. M. H. has been
transferred from
209/11/30.*

ms. att. by u



PRESS RELEASE

21 June 1963

One of the main aims of the Revolution of last February was to put an end to the armed conflict in northern Iraq. Soon after the establishment of the present Government, an immediate cease-fire was ordered, all Kurdish political prisoners were released and all the Kurdish officials and Government employees, who were arbitrarily dismissed by the former regime, were reinstated. The economic blockade, which was imposed on the Kurdish districts, was lifted and emergency food supplies were flown to the distressed Kurdish areas in the North. Contacts were immediately established with Barzani and other rebel leaders with a view to eliminating the causes which led to the armed conflict. The good faith of the Government was amply shown when, on the 9th of March, barely a month after the Revolution, it announced its acceptance of the principle of decentralization in the administration of the Kurdish areas, and established joint committees to study the details. As a further proof of good faith, the Government invited representatives of the Kurds to join in the negotiations which led to the Cairo declaration of April 17, 1963, establishing the Federal Union of Egypt, Iraq and Syria. However, soon thereafter, the Barzani group presented new demands which no self-respecting government could accept. They demanded, for example, the establishment of a separate Kurdish army. No State in the world can accept the establishment of more than one army on its national territory and we have only to look at the recent example of the Congo to see the tragic consequences of allowing a separate gendarmerie in Katanga. In fact, Barzani's demand for a separate army shows conclusively that his real aim is the separation of the Kurdish inhabited areas from the rest of Iraq, and not, as he has proclaimed, the achievement of internal autonomy. To accept these demands would be tantamount to the dissolution of the Iraqi State and the destruction of its national and territorial integrity.

The present fighting was provoked by repeated acts

of lawlessness committed by the Barzani rebels over the last six weeks. They include criminal assaults on Kurds, who refused to cooperate with them, the sacking of defenceless villages, attacks on isolated police posts and numerous acts of highway robbery and banditry. They also tried to induce Kurds, serving in the Armed Forces and the Police, to defect. During the first week of June, apparently emboldened by the Government's patience and reluctance to precipitate an open armed conflict, the Barzani rebels attacked army units and transports. It then became apparent that peaceful means would no longer suffice and the Iraqi army was ordered to clear the northern districts of the Barzani rebels. Operations are now proceeding satisfactorily and it is hoped that law and order will soon be fully restored in the whole area. The fact that the Barzani rebels started the fighting while negotiations were going on, shows clearly that they were not serious or sincere in their professed desire for a peaceful and just settlement of the problem. The leader of their negotiating delegation left Iraq more than four weeks ago, during which time he made numerous hostile declarations against the Government. Instead of returning to Baghdad to resume the negotiations, he went to Europe to continue the propaganda campaign against Iraq.

There is no doubt that the continuous incitement to rebellion and the open support to the Barzani rebels from certain foreign quarters were important elements in encouraging Barzani to resort to fighting and violence.

As soon as the military campaign ends, the Government intends to put into effect its program of decentralization -- the details of which are now being worked out with loyal and truly representative Kurdish elements. In addition to the rights enjoyed by all the citizens of Iraq, the decentralization program provides, among other things, for the establishment of one fully autonomous Kurdish province which will include all the districts in which the Kurds are a majority. The province will be administered by bodies elected directly by the Kurdish people. Secondly, the cultural identity of the Kurds will be recognized, their language will be used in all Government departments. Kurdish will be the language of instruction during the first nine years of school.

Before concluding this statement, I would like to emphasize that Barzani represents a dissident movement which the majority of the Kurds oppose. It is this position of comparative isolation from his people which has driven him to use force and violence to achieve his aims. It is estimated that about 10,000 Kurdish partisans are fighting side by side with the regular army against the rebels. This shows conclusively that the present conflict is not between Arabs and Kurds. Our two peoples, who have inhabited the ancient land of the two rivers from time immemorial, have lived in amity and brotherhood for thousands of years. They have shared all the glories and the misfortunes through which our country passed in its long and eventful journey through the centuries. Arab and Kurd have lived side by side, intermarried and are toiling together to restore to their common fatherland its past glory and greatness.

COPY

OF LETTER FROM
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK 17

24th June 1963

File No. 606/3

Memorandum No. 1015/63

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Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

Kurdish Revolt

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Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations.

M. J. COOK

 Permanent Representative

MJC/fdb

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper TIMES.

File No. 173/2/1

Published at LONDON.

Date 21-6-63

FOUR MINISTERS RESIGN IN IRAQ

PROTEST AT ATTACK ON KURDS

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

BEIRUT, JUNE 20

Four Iraq Ministers have resigned in protest against the Government's resumption of hostilities against the Kurds led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, according to a report from Baghdad today in the Arabic language *Al Hayat* and the English language *Daily Star*. The report said that President Arif was trying to persuade the Ministers to withdraw their resignations but had so far failed.

The four include two Kurdish Ministers, retired Major-General Faud Arif (Minister of State for Religious Trusts) and Baba Ali (Agriculture). The other two Ministers are retired Major-General Naji Talib (Industry) and Mahmud Sheet Khattab (Municipalities), both Arabs.

The report, credited to agencies, said that the four Ministers formed the liaison between the Government and the Kurds. When the Government broke off negotiations and arrested Salih al Youssefi, the acting negotiating leader, and resumed fighting, the Ministers considered their mission at an end and resigned.

According to visitors who have been recently in Baghdad the two Kurds resigned early last week and were not at Baghdad airport with the other Ministers when President Sallal of Yemen arrived there on an official visit.

Baghdad radio reported today the return to the city of Mahmoud Khattab after a three-day tour of southern Iraq. The broadcast did not refer to the resignations.

Referring to the operations against the Kurds during the past 24 hours, the radio quoted a statement by the Directorate of Military Operations that 400 had surrendered with their arms.

173/2/1
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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM

C.I.A.(U.S.) MATERIAL IS CONTAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT. IT MUST NOT BE EXPLOITED FOR OTHER THAN NATIONAL SECURITY PURPOSES., IT MUST BE HANDLED STRICTLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AUSTRALIAN SECURITY BOOKLET., NO PART OF ITS CONTENTS MAY BE MADE KNOWN TO A THIRD COUNTRY, INCLUDING COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY MARKED AS CLEARED FOR OR ALREADY DISSEMINATED TO THAT COUNTRY.

RB

I.16717

FROM:

DATED: 17TH JUNE, 1963

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

REC'D: 24TH JUNE, 1963

SAV.697.

SECRET.

AB 378. DATED 14TH JUNE, 1963.

IRAQ RENEWS WAR AGAINST KURDISH REBELS.

1. THE IRAQI REGIME, AFTER LENGTHY BUT HALFHEARTED NEGOTIATIONS WITH KURDISH REPRESENTATIVES, OPENED ITS LONG-EXPECTED CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE REBELLIOUS KURDS EARLY THIS WEEK.

MARTIAL LAW HAS BEEN INSTITUTED IN NORTHERN IRAQ.

CONSIDERABLE SUFFERING, AND POSSIBLE STARVATION, AMONG THE NON-COMBATANT POPULATION IS LIKELY.

2. IRAQI FORCES IN NORTHERN IRAQ HAVE BEEN STEADILY REINFORCED DURING THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS.

IN THE FIRST DAYS OF THE FIGHTING, KURDISH VILLAGES HAVE BEEN SHELLED AND BOMBED, AND SMALL CLASHES BETWEEN IRAQI TROOPS AND KURDISH IRREGULARS HAVE OCCURRED.

THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD BELIEVES THAT THE REGIME'S ESTIMATE THAT IT CAN CLEAN UP THE KURDS IN A FEW WEEKS OR EVEN BY AUTUMN IS FAR TOO OPTIMISTIC.

INTERTRIBAL RIVALRIES AMONG THE KURDS ARE BEING SUBMERGED BY A FEELING OF UNITY AGAINST THE OVERWHELMING ARAB REGIME IN BAGHDAD.

THE RENEWED WAR ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL BE PROLONGED AND COSTLY, AND THE BREACH BETWEEN THE KURDS AND ARABS WILL BE WIDENED SO FAR THAT EVENTUAL COMPROMISE WILL HARDLY BE POSSIBLE.

3. MOSCOW HAS ATTACKED THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES AS A GROSS VIOLATION OF THE ARMISTICE BETWEEN BAGHDAD AND THE REBELS AND AS AN INDICATION THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS EMBARKED ON A POLICY OF "STRAIGHTFORWARD REPRESSION OF THE KURDISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT."

SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE KURDS WHILE QASIM WAS IN POWER WAS LARGELY RESTRICTED TO CLANDESTINE RADIOBROADCASTS, BUT SINCE THE 8TH FEBRUARY BAATHIST COUP, MOSCOW HAS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS OPENLY ESPOUSED KURDISH DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY WITHIN THE IRAQI STATE.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM

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I.16717

4. THE U.S.S.R. AT THE SAME TIME HAS CONTINUED TO SEEK GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE POST-QASIM GOVERNMENT IN IRAQ THROUGH THE MAINTENANCE OF ITS ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID PROGRAM.

IT IS THUS UNLIKELY TO CARRY ITS SUPPORT OF THE KURDISH POSITION BEYOND OCCASIONAL PROPAGANDA ATTACKS.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
A/MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE

24TH JUNE, 1963

SEC A/Ss MR ROWLAND MR LEE MR DOIG MR LOVEDAY MR JOCKEL
MR BRENNAN MR KELLY

173
SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

INWARD SAVINGRAM

173/2/1
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CONFIDENTIAL

SAVINGRAM FROM:

Dated: 18th June, 1963.

The Australian Embassy, Rec'd: 17th June, 1963.
CAIRO.

TO:

The Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

I. 16017

SAV. NO. 43.

CONFIDENTIAL

KURDS

As you know the Iraqi government has rather unexpectedly decided on a breach with the Kurdish rebels and the resumption of military action against them which began two days ago, placing the price of £100,000 sterling on the head of Bazani.

2. This development has only served to worsen Iraqi-UAR relations. The Secretary-General of the Arab League, Hassuna, has deplored the development which he says will only make more difficult for the UAR to resume earlier hopes of federal association with Iraq, partly on political grounds, partly because it will not wish to be associated with what may well turn out to be a guerilla campaign lasting indefinitely. This morning the Minister of Guidance, Hatem, issued a denunciation of Iraqi press for allegedly pro-Kurdish tone of Cairo radio.

complaining about

3. The Kurdish delegation has already returned home:

STUART.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
A/MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE.

17th June, 1963.

SEC A/S's MR LOOMES UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E AF
MEC INF DL IC
LONDON NEW YORK(UN) TEL AVIV WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

171

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

Memo No. 970 17 JUN 1963 12th June, 1963

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Kurdish Activities in Iraq

The British Embassy in Baghdad sent the following telegram to the Foreign Office on 10th June:

"Widespread skirmishing on a small scale appears to have started on June 8. The first Army casualties, whose number we do not yet know, have arrived in Baghdad.

At 10.00 a.m. this morning the Iraq Air Force had not yet started operations against the Kurds but were evidently just about to do so.

Army Headquarters are confident that the operation which they have been planning can be completed within a very few weeks. They are talking in terms of a 'blitzkrieg'. The forces they have concentrated in the North amount to nine infantry brigades, one mechanised brigade, four tank regiments, one armoured car regiment, eleven artillery regiments, with administrative support.

The Kurds apparently intend to meet the Iraqi forces' onslaught with ruthless measures on partisan lines and have made a study of the tactics used by the Yugoslavs against the Germans. They are unlikely to be held back by the factors which inhibited them under the Qasim regime, namely the desire to avoid alienating Iraqi and Western opinion. It is possible for instance that they may be able to paralyse the oil industry by intimidation of local staff in outlying areas even if they do not succeed with any spectacular sabotage, such as blowing-up dams and oil installations. Moreover, the number of Kurds living behind the Army's positions gives considerable scope for subversive action.

The Iraqi Armed Forces' preparations, planning, and command arrangements appear to be much better than anything done under Qasim, but the Army is still no better either as regards training or morale, and the shortage of officers is even more acute. They may prove able to maintain an uneasy contact in the low-lands, thus making it difficult for the Kurds to mount a major raid on the oilfields' area, but if they press intensive attacks into the more difficult country beyond the Army may well be in for some rough handling.

Press conference by the Minister of Guidance this morning contains lengthy justification of Government action by reference to recent Kurdish provocations and indicates the importance attached by the Government to their operations."

CONFIDENTIAL

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- 2 -

2. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Cairo and Washington.

F.R. Dalrymple

(F.R. Dalrymple)
for Senior External Affairs Representative.



CONFIDENTIAL

169

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

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for Senior External Affairs Representative.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper TIMES.

File No.

Published at LONDON.

Date

**KURDS DRIVEN TO
THE HILLS**

FROM OUR MIDDLE EAST CORRESPONDENT

BEIRUT, JUNE 14

With the help of horsemen the Iraq Government now claims to be clearing the Kurds from the lower ground between Mosul and the mountains to the north running along the border with Turkey. Roads leading to places such as Aqra, Dohuk and Zakho are said to be controlled and villages around the oil installations at Ain Zalah have been disarmed.

The Kurds cannot speak for themselves but it is possible their armed men are taking to the hills, leaving their settlements on the fringe of the plain to look after themselves. According to the Government, its horsemen or cavalry consists both of Kurds and Arabs; and since on the other side Arab rebels are helping the Kurds this is not entirely a war of Arabs against Kurds.

To the east, the Government is reported to have removed from the outskirts of Kirkuk thousands of Kurds who drifted there in the past five years. The people have been taken back to villages in escorted Army lorries and Iraqi troops are now camped round Kirkuk.

200 KILLED

It seems the Government is trying to enclose the Kurds in arcs, shutting them off from the rest of Iraq, but not, of course, from the Iranian, Turkish, or Syrian borders. If the Kurds are driven back these three countries will get the backwash more and more. The number of Kurds killed so far has been put by the Government at about 200.

A side issue, but one of much ultimate significance, is the propaganda campaign which the Iraq Government, supported by the Syrian Government and also for the moment by its visitor from Yemen, President Sallal, is conducting. The overriding question is the attitude of Egypt. Though Abdul Kader Hatem, Egyptian Minister of Guidance, has said Cairo's attitude to the Kurds is "very clear" no one in fact, including probably the Egyptians themselves, knows what it is.

According to a Baghdad newspaper, a Cairo broadcast in Kurdish said the "criminals" in the Iraq Government would regret it if a peaceful solution was not found with the Kurds.

Kurd emissaries who have seen President Nasser say he showed "a deep understanding" of their claims. Whatever his views on this, he cannot come out too openly against the Iraq Government, because that would finally destroy the projected federation with Iraq and Syria; but at the same time he probably does not want to side with the Iraq Government, because of the way it has treated his supporters.

BL 127/2



153

DENTIAL

~~C Lee~~
~~DEA~~

*With the Compliments
of the
Official Secretary*

*British High Commission
Canberra*

14.6.63

173/2/1
152

CONFIDENTIAL
TELEGRAM

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS
To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched: 1620 hours 12th June, 1963.
Received: 0800 hours 13th June, 1963.

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

TELEGRAM W NO. 294 CONFIDENTIAL

W No. 294 High Commissioners Canberra, Wellington, Salisbury,
others air mail, Ambassador Dublin Saving.

Following is assessment of situation in Iraq and probable consequences of resumption of Kurdish war. Iraqi Government on 10th June announced that Kurds have been given 24 hours to lay down their arms or accept consequences and that operations were starting at once to clear northern area of rebels. Situation around Kirkuk has been growing increasingly tense during last week and there have been several incidents including one on 7th June in which Iraqi employee of I.P.C. was shot dead by Kurds.

2. Iraqis have assembled considerable forces in north (nine infantry brigades, one mechanised brigade, three tank regiments, one armoured car regiment, eleven artillery regiments with administrative support, totalling about 40,000 men) and are apparently intending short and sharp campaign. Kurds will resort to guerilla tactics. Iraqi forces preparation, planning, and command arrangements appear better than under Kasim; but in view of constant numerous changes in commanders at all levels shortage of officers as a result of dismissals over last two years, and recent regrouping within divisions of the Iraq army, it is unlikely that they will be more effective. Because operations will still have to be conducted against lightly armed enemy in mountainous terrain

/it

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
TELEGRAM

151.

From: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received:

-2-

it is likely that they will be protracted. If this occurs an increasing strain will be thrown on morale and therefore loyalty to present regime of Iraq Army. An unsuccessful campaign could jeopardise position of present Iraqi Government.

3. Hostilities will increase opportunities for Russian trouble-making in Kurdistan. There has so far been no Soviet comment on resumed fighting but Soviet clandestine broadcasts since February revolution have incited Kurds to join forces with Communists to overthrow new regime and Soviet press has supported Kurds' claims to internal autonomy.

4. Iraqi authorities have assured us that steps have been taken to protect oil installations. Nevertheless there is a danger that oil production will be affected and situation may deteriorate to a point where evacuation of some or all of the British staff from Kirkuk is necessary.

5. (To Ottawa). Above has been telegraphed to J.I.R.

Ottawa.

6. (To Wellington and Salisbury) You may inform Commonwealth authorities of the above.

7. (To remaining addressees). Above is for your own information only.

SECRETARY OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM

150

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To: THE ^{Acting} HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

CYPRUS

Despatched: 1620 hours 12th June, 1963.
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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
TELEGRAM

149

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To: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, CANBERRA

Despatched:

Received.

-2-

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SECRETARY OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

173/2/1
148

CAIRO, JUNE 12 (UPI)--IRAQI PRESIDENT ABDUL CALEM AREF WAS QUOTED TODAY AS SAYING THE POSITION OF GOVERNMENT FORCES IN NORTHERN IRAQ IS +VERY GOOD,+ LESS THAN 24 HOURS AFTER THE START OF THEIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST KURDISH REBELS. BAGHDAD RADIO SAID AREF WAS SPEAKING AT THE END OF A TOUR OF THE NORTHERN IRAQ PROVINCES OF KIRKUK AND ARBIL. ARMY FORCES, ASSISTED BY LOYAL KURDISH AND ARAB TRIBES, LAUNCHED OPERATIONS AGAINST REBELS IN THE TWO PROVINCES YESTERDAY AFTER EXPIRATION OF AN ULTIMATUM TO SURRENDER, THE RADIO SAID. GOVERNMENT FORCES +COMPLETELY CLEANED UP+ DABAS AND SAFKAT AND SURROUNDING AREAS IN KIRKUK PROVINCE AND CAPTURED 12 REBELS, THE RADIO SAID. IT SAID FOUR REBEL-HELD VILLAGES IN THE MUWANDIZ AREA OF ARBIL PROVINCE SURRENDERED AND THE REBELS +SUSTAINED HEAVY LOSSES WHICH FORCED THEM TO FLEE THE AREA.+ AREF WAS QUOTED BY BAGHDAD RADIO AS SAYING, +THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH IS VERY GOOD.+

ARBIL PROVINCE COMMANDER COL. BADREDDIN ALY SAID, ACCORDING TO THE RADIO, +CALM NOW PREVAILS IN MOST AREAS OF THE PROVINCE.+

KURDISH REBEL LEADER MUSTAPHA BARZANIS TRIBESMEN ARE FIGHTING FOR THEIR OWN NATIONAL STATE. THE OVERTHROWN OF ABDEL KARIM QASSEM'S GOVERNMENT IN BAGHDAD FEB. 8 RAISED HOPES OF A SETTLEMENT, BUT PEACE TALKS FAILED AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT ISSUED AN ULTIMATUM MONDAY TO THE REBELS TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS OR FACE MILITARY ACTION.

DU12:31A

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THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILITY.

(WITH KURDS--CAIRO)

173/2/1
147

PARIS, JUNE 12 (UPI)--A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF KURDISH LEADER
 M. MUSTAPHA BARZANI TODAY CALLED IRAQI ATTACKS ON KURD
 FORCES A +HOPELESS EFFORT, BOUND TO FAIL.+

M. TALABANI, WHO ARRIVED HERE LATE YESTERDAY WITH ANOTHER OF
 BARZANI'S ASSOCIATES, M. AKRAWI, SAID, +THE IRAQI BAAATH PARTY
 HAS REFUSED A PEACEFUL SOLUTION BECAUSE IT IS LOOKING FOR A
 PRETEXT NOT TO APPLY THE THREE-PARTY AGREEMENT SIGNED IN CAIRO
 APRIL 17 AND TO INSTALL A REACTIONARY DICTATORSHIP IN IRAQ.+

HE SAID HE WOULD COMPLAIN TO THE UNITED NATIONS AGAINST
 +THE GENOCIDE CARRIED OUT BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. +IT IS A
 HOPELESS EFFORT BOUND TO FAIL LIKE THE KASSEM ADVENTURE.+

REFERRING TO U.A.R. PRESIDENT N

REFERRING TO U.A.R. PRESIDENT GAMAL ABDEL NASSER, TALABANI
 SAID, +PRESIDENT NASSER HAS SHOWN A DEEP UNDERSTANDING OF
 THE KURD PROBLEM AND OF THE JUSTICE OF OUR CLAIMS.+

HE SAID HE HAD COME TO FRANCE +TO EXPRESS THE RECOGNITION OF
 THE KURDISH PEOPLE TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE FOR THEIR MORAL BACKING
 AND TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THAT GREAT KURD NATIONALIST, EMIR
 EDIR KHAN, AS WELL AS WITH FRENCH POLITICAL CIRCLES WANTING
 TO KNOW THE TRUE SITUATION.+

LL800AED

ME

UPI-60

URGENT

1ST LEAD BRITAINH(UPI-29)

READ THE END OF THAT PARIS ITEM AS SITUATION.+

0010.6P



THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
 SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILITY.

173/2/1
146

CAIRO, U.A.R., JUNE 11 (UPI)--THE IRAQI GOVERNMENTS ULTIMATUM TO KURDISH REBELS TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS OR FACE MILITARY ACTION EXPIRED TODAY WITH NO INDICATION WHETHER THEY HAVE HEEDED THE ORDER.

THE ULTIMATUM WAS SERVED IN A REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL STATEMENT OVER BAGHDAD RADIO AT 6:30 A.M. LOCAL TIME YESTERDAY AND CALLED ON THE REBELS TO SURRENDER WITHIN 24 HOURS FROM THE TIME OF THE BROADCAST.

BAGHDAD RADIO DID NOT COMMENT ON THE EXPIRATION OF THE ULTIMATUM AND REPEATED YESTERDAYS OFFICIAL STATEMENTS.

OBSERVERS HERE SAID IT WAS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN KURDISH LEADER MUSTAPHA BARZANI WOULD FIGHT IT OUT WITH IRAQI PRESIDENT COL. ABDUL SALAM AREFS GOVERNMENT.

BARZANIS TRIBESMEN HAVE BEEN DEMANDING THEIR OWN NATIONAL STATE FOR YEARS. THE CONTINUOUS VIOLENT AGITATION WAS ONE OF THE CAUSES THAT RESULTED IN THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY COUNCILS OVERTHROW OF ABDEL KARIM KASSEMS REGIME IN BAGHDAD FEB. 8.

OBSERVERS PREDICTED MILITARY OPERATIONS WOULD START SOON, PROBABLY ON A LARGER SCALE THAN UDER KASSEM, WHO FOUGHT THE KURDS IN NORTHERN IRAQ ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY FOR 17 MONTHS UNTIL HIS DOWNFALL.

BARZANI WAS REPORTED TO HAVE MORE THAN 20,000 MEN UNDER ARMS. THE KURDS ARE A FIERCE NOMADIC TRIBE THAT KNOW NO BORDERS.

D0911P

~~173~~

THIS PAGE IS REPRODUCED FROM A BADLY FADED OR ILLEGIBLE SOURCE.
SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILITY.

UPI-186

173/2/1
145

CAIRO, JUNE 10 (UPI)--THE SEMI-OFFICIAL MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) SAID TODAY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO LAUNCH MILITARY ACTION AGAINST KURDISH TRIBESMEN IN THE NORTHERN PART OF IRAQ.

MENA SAID THE IRAQIS WERE LAUNCHING THE ATTACK TODAY AFTER GIVING THE TROUBLESOME TRIBESMEN 24 HOURS TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND DECLARE SUPPORT FOR THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN BAGHDAD.

ACCORDING TO MENA, IRAQ'S NATIONAL COUNCIL OF REVOLUTION CALLED ON THE CITIZENS TO +SUPPORT THE ARMED FORCES AND GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF (KURDISH LEADER MUSTAPHA) BARZANI AND HIS FOLLOWERS.+

THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF IRAQ'S NORTHERN AREA WARNED THE LOCAL POPULATION--IN THE PROVINCES OF KIRKUK, SULAYMANIA AND ARBIL--THAT ANY VILLAGE OFFERING RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT FORCES OR POLICE, THE NATIONAL GUARD OR LOYAL TRIBES PURSUING THE KURDS WILL +BE SHELLED AND DESTROYED.+

BARZANIS TRIBESMEN HAVE BEEN DEMANDING THEIR OWN NATIONAL STATE FOR YEARS. AND THEIR CONTINUAL VIOLENT AGITATION WAS ONE CAUSE FOR THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARYS COUNCIL OVERTHROW OF ABDEL KARIM KASSEMS REGIME IN BAGHDAD FEB. 8.

RH650

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HT
UPI-187

ADD KURDS CAIRO XXX FEB. 8.

BAGHDAD RADIO, ACCORDING TO MONITORING STATIONS, THIS MORNING BROADCAST A COUNCIL PROCLAMATION SAYING CERTAIN KURDS HAVE BEEN HARBORING +COMMUNIST, CRIMINALS AND PERSONS WANTED BY THE GOVERNMENT.+

THE PROCLAMATION ALSO ACCUSED THE CERTAIN KURDS OF RALLYING A REBELLION, TRYING TO DISRUPT BAGHDAD'S AUTHORITY IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES, ATTACKING REMOTE POLICE STATIONS, ROBBING CITIZENS ON HIGHWAYS, CUTTING TELEPHONE LINES FIRING ON IRAQI SOLDIERS, KIDNAPING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND CITIZENS AND STEALING WEAPONS.

IT REFERRED THE KURDS IN QUESTION AS +THIS TRAITOROUS GROUP.+ ANOTHER SPECIAL PROCLAMATION SAID IRAQI PLANES +SHALL BOMB EVERY VILLAGE+ GIVING AID TO THE REBELS.

RH708P

~~M.E.~~

UPI-102

U R G E N T

1ST LEAD IRAQ (UPI-50)

CAIRO, PMAY 11 (UPI)--IRAQI PREMIER MAJ. GEN. AHMED HASSAN BAKRS CABINET HAS RESIGNED AND HE IS FORMING A NEW GOVERNMENT DEDICATED TO THE FORMATION OF A NEW UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC WITH EGYPT AND SYRIA, BAGHDAD RADIO SAID TODAY.

THE MOVE WAS ANNOUNCED LESS THAN 12 HOURS AFTER THE RESIGNATION OF SYRIAN PREMIER SALM BITAR IN DAMASCUS AND THE FORMATION OF A NEW CABINET THERE FOLLOWING PRO-NASSER RIOTS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

BAGHDAD RADIO QUOTED BAKR AS SAYING +THE CREATION OF A UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (INCLUDING IRAQ AND SYRIA) IS A NEW PHASE OF THE IRAQI REVOLUTION REQUIRING THE BUILDING OF A UNIONIST, SOCIALIST SOCIETY.+

+THIS REQUIRES NEW PRINCIPLES IN ELECTING A NEW GOVERNMENT ADEQUATE AND CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT THIS AIM,+ SAID BAKR.

UPI105

ADD 1ST LEAD IRAQ CAIRO X X X BAKR.

THE BAATHIST MAJOR GENERAL BECAME PREMIER AFTER AN IRAQI MILITARY COUP FEB. 8 TOPPLE FORMER PREMIER ABDUL KARIM KASSEM, WHO WAS EXECUTED.

BAKR LED THE IRAQI DELEGATION TO LAST MONTHS CAIRO UNITY TALKS, WHICH AGREED ON A TRI-STATE FEDERATION OF IRAQ, SYRIA AND EGYPT UNDER U.A.R. PRESIDENT GAMAL ABDEL NASSER.

ANNOUNCING THE DISSOLUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT, BAKR PRAISED IT FOR HAVING +BORNE THE BRUNT OF LIQUIDATING THE REMNANTS OF KASSEM'S SHAMEFUL REGIME. ITS GREATEST HONOR WAS THAT ARAB UNITY WAS ACHIEVED DURING ITS PERIOD OF RESPONSIBILITY.+

BUT BAKR SAID THE OLD CABINET WAS FORMED UNDER + DIFFICULT REVOLUTIONARY CIRCUMSTANCES+ AND A NEW GOVERNMENT WAS NEEDED FOR THE REALIZATION OF THE NEW ARAB FEDERATION.

JB639A

UPI-106

THIRD 1ST LEAD IRAQ CAIRO X X X FEDERATION.

BAGHDAD RADIO SAID BAKR AND IRAQI PRESIDENT ABDUL SALAM AREF MET FOR TWO HOURS TODAY WITH EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR AMIN MUWAID.

THE OUTGOING IRAQI CABINET WAS ENTIRELY BA'ATHIST, BUT WAS SPLIT BETWEEN STAUNCH SUPPORTERS OF SYRIAS BITAR AND OTHERS WILLING TO UNITE THE BAATH PARTY WITH NATIONALIST PARTIES SUPPORTING NASSER.

THERE WAS A QUESTION OF WHETHER BAKR SHOULD FOLLOW NASSER'S REQUEST TO INCLUDE NON-BAATHIST NATIONALISTS, AS BAKR'S STATEMENT APPEARED TO INDICATE, OR VEER TOWARDS TIGHTER BAATHIST CONTROL TO BOLSTER THE SYRIAN BAATHISTOU IN THE CURRENT STRUGGLE AGAINST PRO-NASSER FEDERATIONISTS.

JB644A

M.E.

PI-74

BEIRUT, MAY 14 (UPI)--NEW FIGHTING HAS BROKEN OUT BETWEEN KURDS AND IRAQUIS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, REPORTS FROM BAGHDAD TODAY.

TRAVELLERS REACHING HERE FROM THE IRAQ CAPITAL SAID THE FIGHTING HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR THREE DAYS AND IRAQI PLANES WERE BOMBING KURDISH VILLAGES.

THE REPORTS SAID TENSION WAS HIGH OVER A WIDE REGION AND LOCAL INHABITANTS WERE AFRAID TO MOVE OUTSIDE TOWNS AT NIGHT BECAUSE OF CONSTANT KURDISH RAIDS.

THE RESUMPTION OF KURDISH TURBULENCE--WHICH FORMER IRAQI PRESIDENT KADDOB TRIED IN VAIN TO CURB FOR TWO YEARS--DEALT ANOTHER BLOW TO THE FLEDGLING UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (UAR) OF SYRIA, IRAQ AND EGYPT.

NOREDU313A

⑤ 173/2/1

M.E.

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
GARDEN CITY
CAIRO



The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

In reply quote No. 221.5.1.1

Memorandum No. 264

2nd May, 1963.

The Kurds

As you probably know, a Kurdish delegation is currently in Baghdad negotiating a settlement with the new government of Iraq. It has put forward ambitious proposals for regional autonomy, including one for a Kurdish vice-president of Iraq, an Iraqi state comprising two nationalities, Iraqis and Kurds, and for the "Kurdistan" part to be administered by Kurdish executive and legislative councils.

2. The above is common news, but it may not be known that the Kurds have gone so far in their thinking as to envisage, and to discuss with the Iraqis, the ultimate creation of a greater Kurdistan, including the Kurdish regions of Syria, which could form a separate Region of the U.A.R. The Pakistan ambassador here tells me he has this on the authority of the U.A.R. delegation to the recently concluded unity talks, and that this explains the passage in the Federation Manifesto stating that the federation's official religion shall be Islam. The Egyptians did not want this, as they are committed to a secular state and they have an important Christian minority, with key ministers in the government. The Iraqis however insisted because they had to make provision for the Kurds, who are not Arabs, but who are happy to be included with the Arabs in an Islamic confederation. This, if it goes through as the Kurds seem to want, could have consequences not originally intended by the protagonists of Arab unity, including Kurdish irredentism in respect of the Turkish and Iranian areas where Kurds predominate.

Francis Stuart
(Francis Stuart)
Ambassador

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Kurdish Revolt Important In Middle East

BEIRUT, Lebanon (F.N.S.). — The two-year revolt of the Kurdish "nation" under Mullah Mustafa Barzani played a larger role in recent Middle Eastern upheavals than has generally been credited in the world Press.

This is especially true of Iraq, where Gen. Karim Kassem was overthrown and killed last February, to be replaced by a new revolutionary government.

The Kurds are one of those ancient peoples bound together across national frontiers and separated from their neighbours by a common ethnic origin, language, religion, social organisation and culture and geographical roots.

Their population figures are controversial; estimates range from the Kurds' own figure of 12,000,000 in all Kurdistan (Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran together) to the over-conservative figure of 4,000,000.

They are estimated variously to number between 1,000,000 and 2,000,000 in Iraq, more than 1,000,000 in Iran, between 250,000 and 500,000 in Syria, and between 2,000,000 and 6,000,000 in Turkey.

There are also between 60,000 to 100,000 Kurds in ethnic pockets in the Soviet Union, cut off from the Kurdish homeland.

Kurdistan

The Kurds are the direct descendants of the earliest known inhabitants of Kurdistan—the area of the Zagros and Taurus ranges now divided between Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran.

They may be descended from the ancient Medes; both their culture and their language are Iranian, but they are no nearer to the modern Iranians in the political sense than, say, the Spanish to the French.

They are traditionally a tribal highland people, but many live in the Kurdistan plains and there have been urban Kurds for more than 1,000 years.

Nomadism formerly played a large part in Kurdish traditional life, but today—despite the image of nomadic Kurds—seasonal migration with flocks is important only for some tribes; the majority of Kurds are pastoral and agricultural.

One of the most significant aspects of Mullah Mustafa's campaign is said to be the success he has made of uniting Kurds of Kurds.

In this he was certainly aided by the knowledge of

serve as a basis for an Arab-Kurd reconciliation.

The Kurds, however, felt that the declaration was scarcely honoured and nationalist discontent continued throughout the history of the Hashemite dynasty.

When the revolution of 1958 overthrew the monarchy, established a republic of Arabs and Kurds, and withdrew Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, an unparalleled amity sprang up between the two peoples.

The Kassem regime began by promising the Kurds their full and fair share of national rights and economic advance. But the expected increase in social projects, development schemes, the "Kurdizing" of the administration in Iraqi Kurdistan and the increased instruction in the Kurdish language in the schools failed to take place.

Relations between the Kurds and the Baghdad Government deteriorated.

The Kurdish Democratic Party, the nationalist political organisation, was severely curtailed and inspired pieces began to appear in the Baghdad Press denying any national rights to the Kurds.

Unhappy

The Kurds are in a peculiarly unhappy position to seek allies.

They have been joined in the present struggle by their fellow inhabitants of Kurdistan, the Christian Assyrians, who fought the Kassem regime in military alliance with Mullah Mustafa.

But they have never enjoyed the trustworthy support of any neighbouring power or any great power.

Iraq is surrounded by states with Kurdish minorities of their own.

These states are also made up principally of three great West Asian peoples (Arabs, Turks and Iranians) whose nationalist ardour opposes any Kurdish national aspirations.

The Great Powers—the United States and Great Britain on one side and the Soviet Union on the other—have either avoided any suggestion of aid to the Kurdish nationalists or have restricted their assistance to propaganda

The Canberra Times

Pressure From Soviet Russia

● Continued from P. 25.

optimism amongst the Kurds.

But by early March the Kurdish leaders were expressing increasing scepticism about the new leaders' good intentions and these were partly confirmed when on March 8, four days before the deadline, the Baathist Iraqi National Council of the Revolutionary Command issued an extremely cautious statement avoiding all mention of the word "autonomy."

The relatively peaceful Baathist coup d'état in Syria and the subsequent upsurge of pan-Arab nationalist ardour have shifted the spotlight off the Kurdish situation.

Hard news has dried up, but it is certain that the Kurds not only retain de facto autonomy in the area under their control but have consolidated their military position since fighting ceased.

The truce continues and there is an uneasy political detente.

High-level discussions have not been resumed but they are thought to be going on at a lower level.

Two things remain certain. renewed warfare against the Kurds could only weaken the precarious new regime in Iraq and endanger its economy. But, equally, genuine concessions to Kurdish nationalism would endanger the Aref regime's standing within Iraq and vis-a-vis its Arab neighbours.

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One of the most significant aspects of Mullah Mustafa's campaign is said to be the success he has made of uniting Kurds as Kurds.

In this he was certainly assisted by the brutality of Kassem's air war, which did much to create a dramatic sense of solidarity amongst all Kurds.

The creation of the state of Iraq came at the same time that the Kurds came closest to receiving international recognition as an independent nation.

The 1920 Treaty of Sevres gave the Kurds the opportunity for self-determination.

The treaty, however, was abandoned because of the military successes of Mustafa Kemal, who secured a settlement more favourable to Turkey in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which made no reference to the Kurds.

When the British first occupied the Mosul wilaya of the Ottoman empire—which was to become northern Iraq—they installed a Kurdish leader, Sheik Mahmud, as Ruler of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Tyrant

Mahmud soon proved a murderous tyrant, without the tribal support he had claimed.

He was deposed and with him went the closest thing to an autonomous Kurdish government the Iraqi state had known until the recent rise of Barzani.

The British influence in Iraq generally worked to protect the Kurds from aspects of Arab nationalism which would deny any special rights to the Kurds as Kurds.

On the occasion of Iraq's entry into the League of Nations in 1932, the Baghdad government made a declaration confirming the special national rights of the Kurds within the Iraqi state.

This declaration was intended as a constitutional guarantee and might still

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Although the Russians called into being the ill-fated Kurdish Autonomous Republic set up at Mahabad in Persia in 1945; they gave it no material support other than the generals' uniforms with which they equipped the senior officers of the regime. But there are strong indications that the Soviets will again switch policy and attempt to use the Kurds to further Russian ends.

Incited Revolt

The Soviets used the threat of support for Mullah Mustafa Barzani to exert pressure on the Kassem regime, and shortly after the recent revolution began to incite the Kurds to revolt against the new Aref regime, apparently in retaliation for the ruthless crushing of the Communist Party that ensued.

This offer was turned down three days after it was originally made, on February 15th, according to a Kurdish nationalist spokesman.

The Kurds still remember the all-out support given to Kassem by Iraqi Communists and the Soviet Union and despite Mullah Mustafa's former links with the Soviet Union, where he was exiled, his chief negotiator in the Baghdad peace talks, Gen. Jela Talabani, has also stated that the partisan movement and the Kurdish Democratic Party, of which Barzani is president, has neither co-operated with the Communists nor received any help from them during the insurrection.

After the Iraqi coup on February 8, there was a truce and a brief flowering of

Continued P. 26.

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NEW YORK, THURSDAY, MAY 9 (UPI)--SOVIET SUPPORT FOR KURDS IN THEIR STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY+ WAS DESCRIBED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES AS A POSSIBLE +OPENING GUN FOR NEW SOVIET INTERVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.+

THE DAILY IN AN EDITORIAL SAID:

+IT HAS EVEN EMBRACED AS A POTENTIALLY THE KURDS MOST MILITANT ANTI-COMMUNIST LEADER, MULLA MUSTAFA AL-BARZANI.

+THIS MANEUVER IS IN LINE WITH COMMUNIST POLICY OF SEEKING UNITED FRONTS EVEN WITH ANTI-COMMUNIST NATIONAL MOVEMENTS AS A PRELIMINARY TO SEIZING CONTROL OF THEM. THE FIRST SOVIET AIM IS OBVIOUS. IT IS TO INCITE THE MILLION AND A HALF IRAQI KURDS TO END THEIR CEASE-FIRE AND TO RESUME THEIR WAR AGAINST THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT.

THEIR PURPOSE: TO GAIN A NEW SOVIET FOOTHOLD IN THE MIDDLE EAST OR AT LEAST TO DETER BAGHDAD FROM ARRESTING AND EXECUTING IRAQI COMMUNISTS.

+DEMAND THIS IMMEDIATE AIM SEEMS TO BE AN EVEN LARGER ONE. THERE ARE TWO MILLION KURDS IN TURKEY, MORE THAN A HALF MILLION IN IRAN AND A HUNDRED THOUSAND IN SOVIET ARMENIA...+

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Kurds and Reds

Barzani Now Fights Communists, but Autonomy Issue Could Alter Situation

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT

Special to the New York Times.

BEIRUT, Lebanon, March 6.—Behind the autonomy issue now being negotiated by the Kurds with the Iraqi Government is the Communist issue.

This fact lends great significance to the mission led by Gen. Taher Yahia, chief of the Iraqi General Staff, which has just returned from talks with Gen. Mustafa al-Barzani, the Kurdish leader, in the mountains of northern Iraq.

Government and Kurdish sources in Baghdad indicated that a three-hour meeting at the village of Kamimaran was inconclusive and that the conversation might continue in Baghdad.

General Yahia is the Iraqi most likely to carry weight with General Barzani because he won his military position as leading figure in the Feb. 8 coup and a member of the Baath political party after secretly seeking General Barzani's support. General Barzani has said that he promised to support the coup and the new regime if the Government granted autonomy to the Kurds.

If the Government does not now grant rights that add up to autonomy in his opinion, General Barzani has threatened to go to war again. He would then find himself in an embarrassing de facto alliance with the Communists.

Asked about this possibility in the mountains a few days ago, General Barzani declined to recognize the Communist as possible allies.

Barzani Opposing Reds

"I have nothing to do with them," he said. "They were against me and I have no reason to regard them in any other light."

At present General Barzani is the staunchest anti-Communist force among the Kurds. Under his leadership, pro-Communist have been purged from the Kurdish Democratic party's central committee and from other positions. When I entered the Kurdish area last week, one of the first persons I came across was described as a "Communist prisoner."

The man was actually free in the village, but he was under surveillance. Our group drove past another village that guides said had been "occupied" by General Barzani's men because the village leaders had tried to respond to the Communist radio's appeal urging assistance to the deposed Kassim regime.

But it will be hard for General Barzani to maintain this attitude if he thinks he has to fight the new Government as he fought the old one. As one of his associates recalled last week, he warned last summer that if the West persisted in refusing all aid to the Kurds, the time might come when the Kurds would feel obliged to accept Communist aid.

In conversations near Kala

Diza last week, General Barzani's associates blamed the United States for letting this problem arise. If the United States had responded to his urgent entreaties for help last August, they said, General Barzani would now be in a commanding position that Kurdish autonomy would be assured beyond question and the United States would have in post-revolutionary Iraq a strong and committed friend.

If they go to war again, leading officers in General Barzani's forces—which number about 20,000—believe that they could extend their control to almost all of the Kurdish-inhabited parts of Iraq, taking over the smaller Iraqi Army garrisons and police the posts and isolating the larger ones.

Some believe that they could take the towns of Suleimaniya and Arbil. But most acknowledge that the army garrison at Kirkuk, where the Kurds would like to establish the capital of their autonomous area, is too large for them to handle.

Talk about taking towns contrasts with a past reticence based on fear that a guerrilla army could not insure supplies for civil populations and would merely expose Kurdish inhabitants to merciless bombing, against which the Kurds have no defense.

The most likely and significant move by the Kurds, if they resume war, would be to move into the oilfields near Suleimaniya and Mosul. Infiltrating from adjoining hills, they could almost certainly prevent the flow of oil as a means of putting pressure on the Government.

This correspondent reached General Barzani's headquarters outside Kala Diza after a three-day trek on foot and horseback and by jeep.

Officials Cooperate

In this area controlled by what the Kurds call the Pej Herga, meaning "the ones willing to sacrifice themselves," towns and villages are in each case under the dual control of "the military responsible" and "the political responsible." The latter are members of the Kurdish Democratic party.

In many cases they work with officials appointed by the Baghdad Government and in some cases, as at Kala Diza and Koi Sinfak, with the Iraqi police. In those two towns a small number of Iraqi policemen go about their normal duties but do not carry arms. In Kala Diza there is also a small Iraqi Army post that has been allowed to remain intact as long as soldiers did not carry arms.

Larger garrisons, such as the ones at Dokan and Ranieh and about 10,000 men who remain in garrisons between Rowanduz and Shakiawa, are fully armed. But they are isolated.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *Foreign Report*

File No. *173/2/1*

Published at *London*

Date *May 3rd 1962*

Mustapha Barzani, who started with a rebel army of about 1,000 men, is now believed to command a force of around 10,000 and to control the frontiers and most of the countryside.

According to Kurdish estimates, about a third of the Iraqi infantry is composed of Kurds. There are however very few Kurdish officers in the army, and only a limited number of Kurdish non-commissioned officers. In order to reduce the risk of mutiny and defection, General Qasim last year despatched the First Division (mostly Kurdish) to southern Iraq and replaced it in the north by the Second Division (mostly Arab). Even so, the rebels report that their ranks are continually being swollen by Kurdish deserters from the army.

Barzani's early attempts to negotiate a peace with the government came against General Qasim's inflexible demand for unconditional surrender. Since then the rebels' terms have stiffened. To begin with they were asking for a fairer deal for the Kurdish people under Article 3 of the Iraqi revolutionary constitution; now, they are demanding a form of autonomy for the Iraqi Kurds.

The Kurds' secessionary demand meets with little outside support. The Kurds are variously reported to be receiving help from the Soviet Union or, according to the charges levelled by the Iraqi government, from the western powers. But:

1. Tactically, Moscow's interest is still to support General Qasim and other nationalist leaders in other Arab countries. Strategically, on the other hand, it has long been arguable that the Russians would welcome the establishment of a Kurdish republic that might come under Communist control and provide a bridge to the Middle Eastern oil regions (see FOREIGN REPORT of May 7th, 1959, and January 19th, 1961). Barzani himself, though doubtless a nationalist (as was Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam) has often been described as a Communist. He attended the anniversary celebrations of the Russian Revolution in Moscow in November, 1960, and stayed on for two months; while in Moscow, he was reported to have provided anti-Qasim material for Moscow Radio's Arabic service.
2. The West, quite apart from the policy of non-interference in Middle Eastern affairs that it has followed since 1958, is highly unlikely to support a movement that might lead to unrest among the Kurds both in Turkey and in Persia.

Nor are the Kurdish rebels getting wholehearted backing from any of the Iraqi underground factions that oppose General Qasim. Qualified support of these parties is on the following lines:

A.—The Communists (the main party and not the weak breakaway group licensed by General Qasim) have recently given some support to the Kurdish Democratic party's demand for autonomy. This has led to reports that the Kurdish nationalists are following the communist line. But the Kurdish leaders, fighting for their own ends, accept support from where they can get it. They distrust the promises of the local Communist party because these are out of line with the policy still being pursued by Moscow. They believe, with what seems good reason, that the Communist party adopts a sympathetic attitude towards Kurdish autonomy only to maintain its influence in northern Iraq.

Qasim's demand for unconditional surrender, and might, if the government seizes its chance, be used as the basis for negotiation. Otherwise there seems no alternative to the continuance of civil war in the north.

Iraq's Kurdish Cross

As the Kurdish insurrection in northern Iraq awakens from its winter hibernation, General Qasim faces what may be the gravest crisis of the four unstable years of his leadership. During March, the Kurdish partisans who had spent the winter months sheltering in mountain strongholds near the Iraqi-Turkish frontier started moving down towards the plains. They trapped and wiped out a battalion of the Iraqi army in a narrow mountain pass. The effect of this defeat on the rest of General Qasim's army has yet to be measured.

Kurdish leaders claim that the present insurrection differs from all the many earlier revolts of Kurdish tribes against their Arab, Turkish or Persian rulers in that it has now developed into a "national revolution." The revolt started last September under the inspiration of Mullah Mustapha Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish Democratic party. The Kurds resented the government's attempt to curtail teaching in Kurdish in primary schools and the replacement of Kurdish officials by Arabs. The Iraqi government countered the Kurdish revolt in two ways:

1. The air force set out to bomb Kurdish villages and, when it could find them, guerrilla concentrations.
2. Rival tribes, loyal to the government, were armed and formed into an irregular army.

Most of the fighting last autumn was between the partisans and these irregular forces called *chalta*. The Kurdish villages in the north of Iraq were bombed without previous warning, pillaged and ransacked by one or other of the Kurdish military factions and cut off from all their normal sources of supply. But the result, according to the revolutionary leaders, was the almost complete defeat of the *chalta*. Mullah Mustapha Barzani, who started with a rebel army of about 1,000 men, is now believed

to command a force of around 10,000 and to control the frontiers and most of the countryside.

According to Kurdish estimates, about a third of the Iraqi infantry is composed of Kurds. There are however very few Kurdish officers in the army, and only a limited number of Kurdish non-commissioned officers. In order to reduce the risk of mutiny and defection, General Qasim last year despatched the First Division (mostly Kurdish) to southern Iraq and replaced it in the north by the Second Division (mostly Arab). Even so, the rebels report that their ranks are continually being swollen by Kurdish deserters from the army.

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B.—Mr. Kamel Chadarchi, the leader of the former *National Democratic party*, has privately told Kurdish leaders that he is in favour of self-determination for the Kurds. Again, promises made while in underground opposition might not stand up in other circumstances.

C.—The *Progressive Democratic party* (the group led by Mr. Mohammed Hadid which broke away from the *National Democratic party* in order to give its support to General Qasim) has shown greater understanding than the *Nationalist* opposition of the immediate issues for Iraq. (The *Nationalists* incline towards Arab chauvinism.) Mr. Hadid is one of the few responsible people able publicly to criticise the government. Last week, his newspaper *Al Bayan* called upon "all sincere men" to co-operate in ending the war and upon the Kurds to lay down their arms; it went on to insist that Arab-Kurdish bonds should be based on recognition of the Kurdish nationality. The statement, signed by several well-known citizens, continued: "We will resist any attempt to merge the Kurdish nationality with Arab nationality." This is a considerable step beyond General Qasim's demand for unconditional surrender, and might, if the government seizes its chance, be used as the basis for negotiation. Otherwise there seems no alternative to the continuance of civil war in the north.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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Research Memorandum
RNA-10, February 21, 1963

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : INR - Roger Hilsman

SUBJECT: The Outlook for the Iraqi Coup Regime of February 8, 1963

Once the first euphoria of successful revolt is over, the new Iraqi regime will face some serious tests that give promise of a long and possibly painful shakedown period. We here examine some of the outstanding problems facing the Second Iraq Republic in terms of relationships with the populace as a whole, and of politics within the ruling group.

ABSTRACT

The new Iraqi government will soon be beset by personal jealousies and inter-group stresses that will test the resolution and political skill of the Ba'th party, which dominates it. The international character of the Ba'th Movement and its doctrinaire dedication to the achievement of Arab political unity are bound to make difficulties for the party in coping with purely domestic problems. Personalities of considerable talent and popular following, who figured as leaders of previous challenges to Qasim's power, are buried in posts of lesser importance from which they may challenge the Ba'th-selected leadership. Lastly, the Iraqi population is fragmented by ethnic-religious cleavages. In the hinterland, particularly in the South, it is deeply conservative, religious, and tradition-bound. The Kurdish problem, cause of a two-year-old civil conflict, will not be easy to settle. Young, dynamic, and impatient for reform and change, the new government will find problems that call for wisdom, patience, and real leadership and that cannot be solved by mere force or demagoguery.

We believe that there will be some turmoil, false starts and internal readjustments, possibly aggravated by clandestine Nasserist intervention. Eventually, the new ruling group probably can meet its tests reasonably well, and it should give Iraq a more effective administration than it has had for some years.

Troubles With the Country at Large

The Limitations of the Ba'th. Some difficulties are inherent in the nature of the Ba'th movement, which has emerged as the

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overwhelmingly predominant force in the new regime. This pan-Arab international underground never before has controlled a government. Highly selective in recruitment and promotion (its cell structure and methods were consciously modelled on those of the Communist movement), it is proud of being an elite based on the intelligentsia, and never before has sought or needed mass approval and support. Doctrinaire and idealistic, it is now meeting for the first time the practical tests of power. Within Iraq, it has not been widely respected. The prevailing impression that it was "a movement of harebrained schoolboys" was reinforced by the party's inept attempt to assassinate Qasim in October 1959.

The Ba'thist majority in the new government will be very conscious that the rest of the Arab world is watching and will wish to set an example to be imitated—one conducive to the installation of Ba'thist governments in other Arab states as a basis for the political federation that is the party's ultimate goal. The Ba'th in Iraq is a "regional" branch of the "national" (i.e., pan-Arab) movement headquartered in Beirut. It is supposed to seek broad guidance and accept discipline from this "national" leadership, in which it is represented by three elected members: Faysal Khayzuran, resident in Beirut, and 'Ali Salih and Talib al-Shabib, now the Iraqi Interior Minister and Foreign Minister, respectively. As the one "regional" group in command of a government, the Iraqi Ba'thists will naturally seek to impose their will and experience on the "national" leadership, in which they have not hitherto enjoyed much esteem. At the same time, they will be under pressure from Ba'thists elsewhere to conduct themselves so as to further the movement as a whole. This whole complex tends to restrict their room for political maneuver in the purely domestic scene. In short, they will experience the same trials that Soviet leaders often do in reconciling purely national interests with the needs of an international movement. We are inclined to think that national interest will win, but at the expense of much soul-searching and some turmoil.

The Kurdish Problem. There is some evidence of prior consultation between the rebel Democratic Party of Iraqi Kurdistan (DPIK) and the coup group. For some months, the Kurds have advertised that their movement aimed only at getting rid of Qasim, a goal which they knew was shared by most of their Arab compatriots. The Kurdish student group collaborated with the Ba'th student organization in the December-January strike at Baghdad University. Fu'ad 'Arif, a Kurd who never fought with the guerrillas but who was their contact man in Baghdad and a DPIK member, reportedly was included in the Cabinet at rebel chieftain Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani's request.

Telegrams of congratulation and support from several Kurdish leaders have contained pointed reminders that the Kurds have an uncollected debt charged against the new regime. They have good reason

to believe that their long resistance played a large part in weakening Qasim and making the coup possible; they know, too, that they will not be in as strong a position vis-à-vis the central government for a long time to come. Moreover, the fact that clandestine Soviet broadcasts are calling for the Kurds to join the Communist Party of Iraq in resisting the new regime will probably embolden the Kurds to assume an extreme bargaining position, demanding complete regional autonomy and a large share of the income from the oil that is produced in Kurdish territory. The government leaders, on the other hand, now that power is achieved, will no doubt try to shave any prior bargain they may have made. Among themselves, they are now talking loosely about giving Mustafa "half" of what he asks. However, the Army wants peace and the Kurds must be tired of the 20-months-long struggle. And with the disappearance of Qasim, whom Mulla Mustafa deeply distrusted, the greatest impediment to negotiation is gone. An acceptable compromise probably can be found, although not without some tough bargaining. In the long run, Communist efforts to exploit the Kurdish cause probably will not derail the negotiations, since the Kurds are very conscious of the fact that the Communists, who consistently supported Qasim, had refused to help them in their hour of need. Of course, some Kurdish resentment and restiveness will linger as long as the Kurds are forced to submit to any "alien" Arab central authority.

In the future, the new government plans to try to organize an Iraqi nationalist political movement among the Kurds as a counterweight to Mulla Mustafa's potentially separatist and Pan-Kurdish organization. Whether it succeeds or not, such a venture is sure to arouse the ire of the Mulla and other Kurdish nationalist leaders. However, the government will most likely defer this effort until it is well established, when Mulla Mustafa's disgruntlement will be less risky politically.

The Shi'ah. Slightly more than half of the Iraqi population belongs to the heterodox Shi'ah sect of Islam. Despite their numerical advantage and the fact that the orthodox Sunnis are divided by the Kurdish-Arab animosity, the Shi'ah in modern times have been on the outer fringes of political power. This is largely because their religious and social conservatism ill fitted them for political office. Rebellious Shi'ah youth recently have proved somewhat vulnerable to communism, but the adult Shi'ah and their religious leaders stubbornly resisted both the Communists and Qasim, whom they considered irreligious. Indeed they redoubled their pious observances as a means of expressing political dissent.

The Shi'ah, who constitute the great majority of the population south of Baghdad, have received the new order with docility but not enthusiasm. Conservative southern tribal leaders, together with some retired officers and former officials of the monarchy, had

cherished an anti-Qasim plot of their own; at one period they were aiming at a Hashimite restoration through King Husayn of Jordan, who was to have been invited to occupy a dual throne of Iraq and Jordan. Shi'ah personalities have usually held about one-third of the cabinet posts. In the present government, no one is readily identifiable as Shi'ah (although Talib al-Shabib, new Foreign Minister, is from a Shi'ah family). Indeed the only coup regime figure well and favorably known in South Iraq is the new Basra Port Director, 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Uqayli, who was once removed from the southern Army division command because of his wide popularity in that area.

The Ba'th, as a group, are secularist and impatient to achieve social progress. They are likely to push reform as vigorously as did the Qasim government, and more efficiently. If they cannot make allowances for the slower pace and more conservative outlook of the Shi'ah, and exert real leadership, laggard support may turn to tacit or active resistance.

Both the Kurds and the Shi'ah must know that the Ba'th is reputedly intolerant of dissent. Moreover, the party doctrine is strongly oriented toward Arab unity, and both the ethnically different Kurds and the sectarianly different Shi'ah strongly fear any enlargement of Arab borders that would submerge them in a vast Sunni-Arab majority. Iraqi Ba'th leaders are aware of these fears and suspicions; they may or may not deal with them wisely.

Civil vs. Military Rule. A principal feature of the Ba'th movement is that it stands for representative government, with the full panoply of constitution, elections, and party competition. The Iraqi coup was not merely anti-Qasim, but anti-dictatorship. However, there is complete contrast between this idealistic devotion to "democracy" and the conspiratorial life that represents the average Ba'thist's only political training. Too, the party has the goal of introducing similar government into other Arab states as a means of bringing about wider Arab unity. It follows that the Ba'th is no more prepared than other Arab political groups to relinquish power via the ballot.

In Iraq, the party is committed to early restoration of civilian politics, and reportedly chose as Prime Minister General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr because he had no personal ambition and also favored civilian rule. On the other hand, the Ba'th army circle, which actually carried out the coup, is pragmatic and little concerned with political philosophy. For security reasons, this Army group contacted the party proper infrequently; its members were untouched by the ideological debates and frequent exchanges with party colleagues in neighboring countries that were a marked feature of pre-coup Ba'th party life. They are concerned primarily with internal security and the practical aspects of remaining in power. They are thus likely to hold out for the

retention of martial law. The prospect is for a fairly early showdown between civilian ideologists and military pragmatists or, alternatively, an uneasy and strained situation similar to that in Syria, where civilian government carries on with a jealously watchful army command looking over its shoulder. Should the army demand a stronger voice in policy matters, it might prevail on Bakr to be its spokesman from the vantage point of the Prime Ministry.

Stresses Within the Ruling Group

The Person and Role of the President. 'Abd al-Salam Muhammad 'Arif is the most controversial character in the new government. Why he was chosen to head the second republic is hard to see; perhaps the intention was to stress the continuity of the present regime with the original 1958 revolution in which he played a prominent role. In the latter half of 1958, when he tried to undermine Qasim and seize power, 'Arif was an open exponent of union with the UAR, a champion of Nasser, and a fiery, emotional orator. Even Iraqi nationalists looked on him as a dangerous demagogue and some thought him mentally unbalanced. On the other hand, Ba'th party members who introduced him to their anti-Qasim plans in February 1962, after his release from three years in prison, claim to have found him greatly changed. He was not only disillusioned with Nasser, they reported, but also much matured, quiet, thoughtful, well-informed, and conservative in planning.

The coup group reportedly did not inform their President-designate in advance of the intended date of their plot, a fact that may indicate that they do not entirely trust him with inner secrets. They are said also to have exacted from 'Arif an advance pledge that he would content himself with the purely ceremonial role they have mapped out for the Presidency and that he would not promote his personal policies. However, a person who displayed such driving ambition only four years ago may not be content to remain long as a mere figurehead. 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif is one of a handful within the new cabinet who might eventually respond to the blandishments of Nasserist subversion.

The Ba'th Monopoly of Power. Not until December 1962—an earlier target date for the present coup—did the Ba'th conspirators decide to share power and office, should they succeed, with other nationalist groups. One reason for their reluctance was contempt for the hesitancy and indiscipline shown by most of the plotters, with whom they had joined in a short-lived anti-Communist National Front in 1961. Perhaps a deeper reason was their differing views regarding Nasser and the desirability of relying on UAR assistance in effecting the coup.

At length it was decided to give representation to the more liberal of the conspiratorial groups and to the now-defunct Istiqlal, the oldest of Iraq's socialist opposition groups, which for years had carried on under the monarchy. Second-rank leaders were chosen from these groups in the hope of splitting loyalties and thus weakening the non-Ba'th organizations, and also in order to avoid bringing in outstanding personalities who might compete with the Ba'th-directed national leaders.

In the end, Ba'th members kept 12 out of 21 Cabinet posts, including all of the important, prestigious portfolios. They hold the major military commands, and the Ba'th street organization, provided in advance with identifying armbands, immediately became the National Guard. Of the less important Cabinet posts, two were given to political unknowns, two to Kurds (of whom one was a supporter of Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani and the other a non-political moderate who would appeal to anti-Barzani Kurds), two to members of the former Istiqlal, and three to persons representing more pro-Nasser nationalist cabals. This sweeping monopoly of power and the deliberate slighting of leaders of other groups are almost sure eventually to result in jealousies and pressures; indeed, there have been signs that this is already happening.

Personalities: Imbalance of Talent. Individuals who had already achieved wide reputation as nationalist leaders in their own right were passed over by the coup planners, lest they overshadow the chosen top officials. Yet at least two figures frequently mentioned as potential heads of state or government hold relatively minor posts, in which they may sooner or later grow impatient of the restraints of Ba'th party discipline. Najib Talib, the present Minister of Industry, is perhaps the strongest and best known personality in the Cabinet. A popular career military officer, with a reputation for honesty, sincerity, and intelligence, he has the additional prestige of being one of the original Free Officers, associated with Qasim in the 1958 revolution. He is also one of only three Cabinet members who have had previous ministerial experience. He may have been passed over for Prime Minister because of a reputation for being too pro-Nasser, although he does not believe in immediate union.

Another individual of stature who soon may outgrow his present niche is 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Uqayli, Basra Port Director, a nationalist (possibly a Ba'th member) very popular with more conservative elements in Iraq. 'Uqayli was associated with the ill-fated army mutiny of February 1959. The survivors of that movement, plus a number of officers of Mosul origin sometimes called the "Muslawi group," are a coterie that may well develop more leverage politically. They look to 'Uqayli as their spokesman. Their only representative in the present cabinet is the Minister of Municipalities, Brig. Mahmud Shayth Khattab.

Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister 'Ali Salih al-Sa'di, who has had no other career than that of a clandestine organizer, emerges as the potential strongman. Until now, he has been the only link between the civilian Ba'th and the all-important military organization, which he developed almost single-handedly. Most of the Ba'th members now holding office are his personal protégés whom he selected from the party ranks and groomed in their party duties. He has chosen for himself the role that is probably most congenial to him— that of arbiter of internal politics. But his grasp and authority as chief of the predominant party and patron of many high officials will be greater than that of the Prime Minister. 'Ali Salih would probably prefer to be the gray eminence in the background, but he will want to exercise his very real powers, and it is by no means sure that General Bakr is prepared to be undercut by his deputy, or that other officials will easily accept the political domination of the Interior Minister.

The National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC). Still kept secret from the public are the identities of members of the advisory group, predominantly Ba'th, that planned the strategy of the coup, selected the present government, and remain to guide policy from the background. According to its own published decree, it is also the interim legislative body. It forms an interlocking directorate with the Cabinet, but is a separate organization in which doctrinal and party issues are paramount.

If the membership remains as it was before the coup, the NCRC includes seven Ministers — the present Premier, Deputy Premier, Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Communications, Municipalities, and Minister without Portfolio Hazim Jawad, who is responsible in the Cabinet for party affairs and for direction of the paramilitary National Guard. Other probable members are Air Force chief Hardan Tikriti as well as Mundhir Windawi, Khalid Mukhri al-Hashimi, Rajab 'Abd al-Majid, and Hamdi 'Abd al-Majid, about whom almost nothing is known as yet.

The anomalous position of this group may adjust itself with time, as the "extra" members find suitable offices or positions. But unless and until that happens, the NCRC is a potentially irritating government-within-the-government. Although six of its members are, or were, career military officers, it might become the civilian focus of a party-vs.-army dispute.

Coup Planners vs. Coup-Makers. The action of February 8-9 followed quite closely a detailed order of battle designed to be carried out last December. But a series of arrests, retirements, and transfers removed some of the key personnel. As a result, the plan was actually carried out by little-known second-and third-string personnel, who came to play a much more crucial role than originally was intended. There was no place in the advance allotment of offices, for example, for Col. 'Abd al-Karim Mustafa Nasrat, Ahmad Muhammad al-'Azzawi, or 'Ata Muhyi al-Din,

now appointed to the command structure of the National Guard as a reward for their valor in the assault on Qasim's stronghold in the Defense Ministry. There may be other such unexpected heroes whose names we do not yet know. The senior conspirators have had to move over to accommodate these newcomers, who may demand even greater rewards for the key roles they played in the actual overthrow.

The Future of the Communists

The course that the revolt has taken from its inception shows quite clearly that while the new ruling group intends to maintain a neutralist posture and a Soviet presence in Iraq, it is under no illusions as to the dangers inherent in domestic Communist activities. Many of the military members of the present government survived the abortive Mosul mutiny and the Communist excesses of 1959 in Mosul and Kirkuk. The post-coup roundup of Communists with the order to shoot to kill if resisted opens a way for the settling of blood feuds engendered in that short but vicious period of Communist ascendancy. Several hundred Communist Party of Iraq (CPI) activists, carefully spotted and listed by the Ba'ath in the days when the Communists were free to work openly, already have been arrested; a cleaning-out of party members and sympathizers from the armed services is well under way, and ranking Communist officers were removed in the first published decree of the new government. Purges of Communists from the educational system and from the Guidance Ministry are already planned on a more gradual basis.

Under such pressures, the fairly large opportunistic element in the Communist Party will quickly drop away, and the remaining hard core will have little choice but to go underground. The party can look to the USSR for what assistance it can give, consistent with the correct relations the latter is seeking to establish with the new regime, to keep the movement alive. As in Syria, the remaining Communists in Iraq will hope that the restoration of party life will open opportunities to work under the cover of indigenous political parties. However, the fact that the party exposed virtually all of its assets while the Iraqi atmosphere was more hospitable to it will make such covert operations very difficult. Even if it were possible to function openly, the CPI would find that the program of social reform pressed by the new government had left it very few avenues of appeal to the masses.

The CPI has a long history of splintering when under stress of government repression. Among the top party leaders are a few who at times have been more cordial to the views of Peking than to Moscow's policies. A real possibility is that the CPI hard core will fracture under duress, with the more militant faction moving toward the Chinese position.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research Memorandum
RNA-21, April 11, 1962

TO : The Secretary
FROM : INR - Roger Hilsman *Roger Hilsman*
SUBJECT: The Kurdish Revolt: A Critical Challenge to Qasim

ABSTRACT

The Kurdish rebellion in Iraq's northern mountain provinces, which began in the summer of 1961, has entered a new and more active phase now that spring has opened the passes. Iraq's 800,000-plus Kurds (about 1/7 of the total population) are divided into mutually antagonistic tribal groupings and rarely unite in any cause. Attracted by insurgent chieftain Mulla Mustafa Barzani's consistent successes, or alienated by Qasim's mishandling of the situation, more and more Kurds are joining the rebellion; the area in revolt is now far larger than that encompassed by any Kurdish disturbance in the last thirty years, and Kurdish nationalist activity just short of revolt has been aroused in bordering Syria and Iran. The active participation of Kurdish Communists in the uprising has embarrassed the Communist Party of Iraq and the USSR, both of which support the Qasim government. Iraqi military units in the north recently have been reinforced for an all-out push to end the troubles. Although government force probably will prevail eventually, the victory is unlikely to be easy or swift. If the campaign is long drawn out, it may dissipate Qasim's essential military support and bring down his regime. Even if quickly suppressed, the rebellion will leave a troublesome residue of bitterness and further erode Qasim's diminishing popularity.

I. Negotiations Fail

Last fall, Qasim had sufficient armed forces in the northern region to crush the insurrection, but he temporized. Except for air strikes and occasional sorties, the armed forces were employed only to isolate and contain the disturbance; the brunt of the fighting was carried on by irregulars recruited from among traditional tribal enemies of the Barzanis. As a soldier, Qasim knew the burden of enforcing unpopular government policies, and he has been extremely reluctant since coming to power to commit the army to maintaining internal security. Moreover, as long as Kurds fought Kurds the matter remained on the level of chronic intertribal tension, but a serious clash between the largely Arab army and the Kurds raises fundamental and awkward questions of national unity. During much of this time, too, Qasim was

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too preoccupied with his claims to Kuwait to listen to bad news from the Kurdish area, and as winter approached he obviously hoped that the Mulla's followers, driven out of the towns into the inhospitable hills, would drift away from him and that the movement would collapse. This did not happen.

During the winter stalemate, a series of deputations plied between Qasim and Mulla Mustafa's frequently-shifted headquarters near the Turkish border in an attempt to negotiate a settlement. Qasim seems to have made a genuine effort at conciliation. In November, a delegation of eight officers, including four generals, met with the Mulla. At about the same time, Mulla Mustafa's elder brother, Ahmad, came to terms with Qasim and led a large segment of the Barzanis (the original insurgent element) out of the fight. In fact, this was not an act of submission, but a traditional tactic to assure clan survival while leaving Mulla Mustafa free to carry on the struggle. On November 23, Qasim offered a general amnesty to all Kurds who surrendered and pledged loyalty to the government. As a gesture of good faith, early in December he released about 50 Kurdish prisoners being held for nationalist activities. The amnesty was broadcast by radio and by leaflets, but apparently produced scant results. On December 18, Qasim publicly admitted for the first time that the revolt he had "crushed" in September was continuing. Repeated assurances of "merciful" treatment were coupled with an ultimatum to the "remnants" holding out in the north. The rebels were described only as "brigands" and "outlaws," and were not directly named.

In mid-December Col. Hasan 'Abbud Ibrahim, one of Qasim's commanders in the north and a reputed pro-Communist, sought out Mulla Mustafa and offered his services as a go-between. Qasim was displeased by this initiative and relieved Ibrahim of his command. But at the end of the year two cabinet ministers were rumored to be in the north to discuss terms for a settlement. On March 7, Qasim made his most magnanimous gesture, in a public speech at the Officers' Club in Baghdad. The erring Kurds were enjoined to present themselves to "sign the book of common struggle against imperialism" (rather than 'surrender.') The clause "We have forgiven all unconditionally" was twice repeated. In addition, the speech promised repair of the damage caused by air strikes, and a full share for the Kurdish area in the country's economic development plans.

These promises went some way toward meeting the demands expressed when the Kurds first took up arms last summer, but they were no longer enough. December had been a turning-point in the fortunes of the insurgents. A series of successful ambushes of convoys and raids on police posts, with government casualties said to be over 50 in some engagements, had demoralized the mobile police and effectively removed civil control from at least three sub-districts in the Zakho area. The rebel supply position was greatly improved and morale was high. Tribal enemies who had supported the government were persuaded or

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bullied into changing sides or, disheartened, dropped out of the fight. Order could now be restored only by the army, and the Mulla was in no mood to compromise. About March 15, a last effort at negotiation was made by a delegation of seven respected Kurds, sent by 'Abbas Mamand Agha Akho, an ally of Mulla Mustafa's in the fighting of last summer who had since accepted the government's amnesty and agreed to intercede with the Mulla. On March 17, the Mulla reportedly rejected their offers, sending word that he would never trust Qasim and was prepared to fight to the end.

II. Present Situation: Kurdish Strength

During the last two weeks in March, Qasim reinforced the Second (Mountain) Division with an armored car regiment, additional infantry and medium artillery (see map), and by early April was in position to begin the decisive campaign.

The Kurds, on their part, have a strong base of operations near the Turkish border in remote Zakho Qada, which they apparently control. With new support from the Sulaymaniyah area, Mulla Mustafa's forces probably total between 3,000 and 3,500. Although not ordinarily occupying fixed positions, they are able to raid at will north of the shaded line on the map, and even the main roads are unsafe north of Irbil and Mosul. They are well led -- often by Kurdish officer defectors from the Iraqi army or by followers of Mulla Mustafa who, like him, trained in the Soviet army during their eleven-year exile in the USSR. They are also well armed from the stocks of captured police posts (including mortars and light field pieces), although ammunition may become their main problem. About half of the government air drops intended for remote garrisons are said to have fallen into rebel hands. Rebel leaders have begged and extorted ample funds from wealthy Kurds in the cities, and reputedly receive financial help from Iranian and Syrian Kurds as well. They are also reported to have assessed themselves "taxes" to support the insurrection.

III. Kurdish Aims and Demands

On the eve of the outbreak, in July 1961, the only published demands of the rebels were circulated in the form of an open letter to Qasim, specifying nineteen complaints and thirteen demands to be realized "immediately." These did not go beyond the Kurdish interpretation of Article 3 of the temporary Iraqi Constitution, which guarantees full equality of Arabs and Kurds within the Iraqi Republic; in sum, they amounted, however, to a demand for a wide degree of regional autonomy. In addition to industrialization, speedier development, more favorable tobacco and land-tax laws, and education in their own language, the Kurds demanded, in essence, to be administered by Kurdish officials and policed only by Kurdish security forces, and to have a larger

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voice in national affairs as well. This bill of particulars was formulated by the heavily communist-influenced Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP), but the familiar grievances it cites are common to all Kurds and, indeed, were constantly heard before the 1958 revolution.

The successive delegations to Mulla Mustafa during the winter encountered a steadily rising scale of demands. In late December, the Mulla reportedly insisted on full pardon for all his followers, full reparation for property damage, and an indemnity for himself, plus safe conduct out of the country. Such terms, amounting to public humiliation and loss of face, are impossible for the government to accept, and probably were not offered in the serious expectation that they would be met.

Among themselves the Kurds are now talking of independence, not autonomy; the Mulla's recruiters and organizers (largely from the KDP) are warning other Kurds that if the movement does not prevail now, the Kurdish people will be so crushed that their cause will be lost for another generation. Privately, Mulla Mustafa is said to hope that the movement can be kept alive long enough to (a) pull down the Qasim government, and (b) command a hearing in the UN that will focus international attention on the Kurdish people and their aspirations.

IV. The Communist and Soviet Roles

The Soviet Union has a long history of sporadic support of Kurdish irrendentism at such times as it suited its policy line (particularly during the "two-camp" phase of Soviet external relations). In 1946, the short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was created in Soviet-occupied northern Iran, and on its collapse in 1947 Mulla Mustafa and his followers were given asylum in Soviet territory. For the Iraqi Communist Party, however, Kurdish nationalism has been a troublesome ally. The Kurds usually have insisted on a separate Party branch, and have quarrelled continually with the internationally-dictated order of priority that subordinated Kurdish independence to the achievement of "peoples' republics" in the several countries where the Kurds reside.

Now, however, the Kurds' clash with a "liberated" national authority prejudices the USSR's more immediate aims of cultivating good relations with the Iraqi government and with the new regime in Syria. Whatever Kurdish expectations may have been, there is no evidence that they have in fact received any material or financial support from Bloc sources. The Soviet and Bloc communist press, however, has given consistently sympathetic coverage to the Kurdish "national struggle." Treatment in this vein has been a regular feature of Soviet Kurdish-language broadcasts (slightly increased in 1961) and of clandestine broadcasts in Turkish and Persian from East Berlin.

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The crisis, according to the Persian-language Radio Peyk-e Iran, is "partly due to the activities of the imperialists and partly to the anti-democratic policy of 'Abd al-Karim Qasim." Qasim is accused of "continuing the Nuri al-Sa'id policy of force" toward the Kurds, but of being "even more cruel." This propaganda, however, is carefully tailored to the theme of unity and equality within the Iraqi Republic. It avoids any endorsement of independent Kurdistan and has not called upon the Turkish and Iranian Kurds to rise in support of the Iraqi movement. Instead, East Berlin broadcasts have suggested several times that the affair should be settled by negotiation, and have offered the good offices of the Communist Party to end bloodshed.

The uprising has been an even greater embarrassment to the Communist Party of Iraq (CPI). An Arab party leader ruefully admitted to a non-Iraqi communist last fall that the CPI, which supports Qasim, was obliged to allow Kurdish communists to take part in the insurrection or be repudiated by Kurdish nationalists. Leaders of the KDP who are known communists are, indeed, Mustafa's closest lieutenants, directing guerrilla tactics and organizing civilian support. It would seem, however, that they are acting from Kurdish nationalist rather than communist motivations. The Central Committee of the CPI reportedly despatched several members from Baghdad last August to lay down the line for Kurdish members; its principal aims were to head off the idea of Kurdish independence and to persuade KDP leaders to modify their demands. Evidently the CPI has hoped to become the vehicle for a settlement that would extricate Qasim from his Kurdish troubles, win public approval, and obtain sufficiently favorable terms to earn political credit with the Kurds as well.

Now, with the situation deteriorated beyond hope of compromise, the CPI is adopting a new line designed to absolve it from blame for heavy Kurdish losses when and if the revolt is put down. The April issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism contains a long letter from an anonymous "Kurd" that delivers the most blistering attack yet on the Qasim government, but which is almost equally scathing toward the Kurdish "independence movement." The latter, it says, is a creation of the "CENTO imperialists," intended to sow dissension and betray the movement correctly aimed at securing legitimate Kurdish "national rights" (i.e. cultural autonomy). This indicates that some Kurds are, indeed, talking of independence, and also suggests that the CPI hopes to shift the blame for ultimate Kurdish defeat to "the imperialists."

V. Outcome of the Campaign and Political Aftereffects

The reinforced Second Division, if employed resolutely, should be able to quell the insurrection in four to six weeks, but it will not be done without hard and costly fighting. Terrain and the determination born of desperation favor the Kurds. Army morale, on the other hand, is low. The recent reinforcements from the First (Plains) Division, especially, are lowlanders,

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ill equipped for and untrained in mountain fighting.

Both the army and the civilians blame Qasim in the first instance for the Kurdish outbreak. His chosen role of charismatic leader and unifying symbol above all factions and population groups is already effectively destroyed. If the army suffers early, humiliating setbacks in the north, its resentment is likely to turn upon Qasim, who is wholly dependent on army support, and he may be swept from power. A compromise settlement granting the Kurds substantial concessions would now involve serious loss of face for Qasim, and in addition would be a minor political gain for the communists. Even if the revolt is quickly subdued by force, the residual bitterness will last as long as Qasim remains. The Kurds in defeat will be a subjugated people, surly, uncooperative, and vindictive in petty ways whenever the opportunity offers. The Arab majority, while not sympathetic to Kurds or their aspirations, already regard the episode as another demonstration of Qasim's ineptitude, a long chapter in their cumulative discontent with his rule. At the very least, therefore, the outbreak contributes to the steady erosion of Qasim's popularity.

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KURDS THREATEN TO RESUME FIGHT

Leader Bids Iraqis Grant
Them Autonomy or He Will
Declare Independence

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT

Special to The New York Times.
KALA DIZA, Iraq, Feb. 28—
Mullah Mustafa al-Bargani said
today that he had ordered his
men to "return to their position"
to be ready to fight again
if the Iraqi Government does
not soon recognize the Kurds'
right to autonomy.

Many of the Kurdish forces
had gone on leave since Mullah
Mustafa ordered a cease-fire on
the day after the Feb. 8 revolution
in Baghdad.

At a midnight meeting with
correspondents in his ever-moving
headquarters, now at the
foot of the snow-capped Zagros
Mountains, the Kurdish leader
declared: "If they don't declare
our autonomy within the Iraqi
Republic, then we will fight
and maybe we will have to
declare our independence."

First Public Threat

This was the first time that
the 59-year-old chief of the
Kurdish rebellion had publicly
threatened to declare the independence
of the Kurds in Iraq.
He estimated that there were
2,000,000 Kurds in the country.

"We are not begging for our
rights," the general went on.
"If they don't declare our rights
we will fight for them until
death, and even if this should
mean separation from the Iraqi
Republic."

Sitting on a carpet in the
great, high-ceilinged reception
hall of one of the Kurdish
gentry's farmhouses, Mullah
Mustafa seemed bursting with
confidence in the strength of
his guerrilla army and contemptuous
of those opposing him.
He mixed good-humored horseplay
with his threats. He took
a camera from an importunate
photographer and insisted that
he was going to take as many
pictures of the photographer as
the photographer had taken of
him.

Around him in the town of
Kala Diza and adjoining villages
slept hundreds of red-and-white-turbaned
veterans of the Kurdish movement.
Tomorrow the general, riding a gray
and white Persian stallion, will
move off to new headquarters.

Mullah Mustafa said that he
had not approved the trip of

Chief Bids Kurds Prepare to Fight Unless Iraq Grants Them Autonomy

Continued From Page 1, Col.

his representative, Jelal Talabani,
with Iraqi leaders to Cairo
and Algiers. "Talks there have
nothing to do with us," he said
with evident annoyance.

He gave the impression that
he was angered not only because
his representative had agreed
to make the trip but also because
he felt it indicated that the
Iraqi Government was not dealing
seriously with the Kurdish demand
for autonomy.

[In Baghdad Jelal Talabani
said on Thursday, upon returning
from Algiers, that talks with
President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the
United Arab Republic and Premier
Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria had
been most useful in obtaining
general Arab support of an Iraqi
move to give the Kurds autonomy.
Mr. Talabani said that he had
telegraphed Mullah Mustafa about
the trip and, receiving no answer,
had taken this for approval.]

Mullah Mustafa said that he
had a moral commitment from
leaders of the Baath party, who
are now the dominant element
in the Iraqi Government, to
recognize Kurdish autonomy.

"Before the revolution they
sent an emissary to see me to
ask whether I would support
the revolution," he said. "I re-

sponded, 'Yes, if you will recognize
our rights.' And they agreed to
that."

Asked to define his concept
of autonomy, the general said:
"It means our right to be safe—
that we should not be in danger
of sudden blows."

Did that mean that Kurds
should have an armed force of
their own, he was asked?

"Of course," he replied.

Asked what role he felt the
United States could play at his
critical stage in the Kurdish
drive for independence, Mullah
Mustafa replied reflectively. "If
a person has been blind all his
life, how should one expect him
to see now?"

He meant thereby that the
appeal for help he had made
to the United States last August
had gone unheeded, so how
could he expect anything now.

He added, however, that he
was sure that if the United
States desired it could, through
diplomatic channels, still contribute
to the success of negotiations
with the Iraqi Government.
The Kurds, he said, would
gladly receive help from any
country.

"We asked help of every
honorable man in the whole
world, every one willing to help
another in need," he said. "But
unfortunately we never got
any."

Continued on Page 3, Column 2



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CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

173/21
Memo No. 511

15th March, 1963

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Iraqi-Kurdish Negotiations

The following is text of telegram No. 273, dated 12th March, from Baghdad to the Foreign Office:

"Reports from reliable sources indicate that critical stage of negotiations has not yet been reached but both sides have at least agreed on a 6 point basis of negotiation and Kurdish time limits seem for the moment to have been allowed to lapse.

The points are:

- (a) the release of Kurdish prisoners of war
- (b) the raising of the economic blockade
- (c) a general pardon
- (d) a purge of civil servants in Kurdistan
- (e) the release of confiscated property
- (f) the withdrawal of Iraqi military forces from Kurdistan.

(c) has already been announced. Remainder except (a) and (f) should not present insuperable difficulties. The difficulty in the case of (a) is the large number of Kurds held as alleged Communists, many of whom were arrested after February 8.

The formula for decentralisation rather than autonomy in the statement of March 9 was apparently conceded by the Kurds on the understanding that the meaning was identical.

No specific mention is made of cultural autonomy or a fair share of the oil revenues because of an understanding that these points will be included in the arrangements for decentralisation."

2. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Cairo and Tel Aviv.

R.N. Hamilton
(R.N. Hamilton)
for Senior External Affairs Representative.

Mr Birch:
to see

12.4.63

Name of Paper NEW YORK TIMES.

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Date

173/2/1
20-2-61

Kurds and Iraqis Meet on Peace; Baghdad Talks Called Friendly

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT

Special to The New York Times.

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Feb. 19.—A Kurdish delegation representing Mullah Mustafa al-Barazani, commander of the Kurdish forces and head of the Kurdish Democratic party, arrived in Baghdad today to open peace talks with the revolutionary Government of Iraq.

President Abdel-Salam-Arif, head of Iraq's National Revolutionary Council, received Jela Talabani, heading the Kurdish delegation. Sources close to both sides said later that the first contacts had been "satisfactory."

Mr. Talabani, who is 29 years old and was formerly the editor of a Kurdistan newspaper, has been in command of the southern Kurdish sector around Sulaimaniya. This is one of the three main Kurdish commands.

Iraq authorities had sent a helicopter to the mountains to pick up the Kurds in a response to a proposal made by General Barazani. He had ordered a complete cease-fire the day after Iraq's Feb. 8 revolution.

The first talks were understood to deal with efforts of both sides to create a "friendly atmosphere" for the talks. To this end the Kurds have expressed a willingness to "keep order" in Kurdish areas, which under the present circumstances means to combat the Communists who are trying by radio appeals and leaflets to stir opposition to the new regime. The Kurds also have proposed that

the Iraqi army in the north should return to the position it occupied 17 months ago before the beginning of hostilities between the Kurds and the Iraqi forces.

The Kurds are seeking autonomy within the Iraqi republic for the Kurdish area occupying the northeastern third of country, populated by about 1,500,000 Kurds. The towns with preponderant Kurdish populations are Sulaimaniya, Arbil and Kirkuk. While the Kurds also claim Mosul, its population is a mixture of Arabs, Turkomen and Kurds.

The Kurds are not asking any autonomous political institution in their territory. But they want a Kurdish-manned administration and a Kurdish-manned police force. They ask the withdrawal of the Iraqi Army, as now constituted from Kurdish territory and its replacement by a Kurdish division. They also ask for a "fair share" of state revenues, the greater part of which is derived from oil production within or on the fringes of Kurdish territory.

Meanwhile, the revolutionary Government of Iraq has given both Egypt and Syria to understand that it is not interested at present in discussing union or federation with any other Arab country.

But Baghdad's response to outright overtures from Damascus on the one hand and flat-

Continued on Page 2, Column 3

Kurdish Delegation Opens Peace Talks With Iraq Regime

Continued From Page 1, Col. 4

tery from Cairo on the other distinctly favors the latter.

For instance, it was announced this evening that the Iraqi Government had decided to re-establish trade and economic agreements with Egypt that were signed after the July, 1958, revolution but suspended by Premier Abdul Karim Kassim in July, 1959. The agreements were meant to promote trade and the exchange of technicians between Egypt and Iraq.

Syria eagerly began overtures immediately after Iraq's coup by sending a three-man delegation to Baghdad. It returned to Damascus silently a few days later. In Baghdad the new Foreign Minister said he knew nothing about the group.

On Feb. 14 the Syrian Foreign Minister Asad Mahasen, offered federation to Iraq and on the 15th the Minister of Defense, Abdel Kerim Zahreddin, declared he was "confident the day is near when Syrian and Iraqi armies will together defend the Arab nation." But in Baghdad the Minister of State, Hazem Jawad, when asked about the Syrian Foreign Minister's offer, said merely that he had not yet received the official text.

Protests by Soviet

MOSCOW, Feb. 19 (AP)—Soviet groups campaigned today in an effort to build up world opinion against the anti-Communist drive in Iraq, which it calls bloody repression.

The killings and arrests of Iraqi Reds by the revolutionary Government, which the Soviet Union recognized quickly after the fall of Premier Kassim 10 days ago, were widely denounced. The Soviet Red Cross telegraphed to the International Red Cross Committee an appeal that it "use its prestige and authority to stop the blood bath."

A Geneva spokesman for the all-Swiss Red Cross Committee said, however, it was not clear what action could be taken. The committee has had no representative in Iraq since the early days of Premier Kassim's dictatorship, which ended in his death Feb. 9 at the hands of his captors.

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Kurd Chiefs Leaving Mountains For Peace Meetings in Baghdad

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT

Special to The New York Times.

BAGHDAD, Iraq, Feb. 17—Omar (the Tank) Mustafa, who is General Barzani's chief of staff, Iraq's revolutionary government has sent a helicopter to the mountains in the north to bring representatives of Gen. Mustafa Barzani to Baghdad for peace negotiations.

The helicopter was sent at General Barzani's request and after he had announced a "complete cease-fire on all fronts."

An Iraqi Air Force plane on Wednesday flew from Baghdad to Sulaimaniya with Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Asem, commander of the Iraqi second division, which has borne the brunt of the fighting with the Kurds, Abdullah Saleh Yusefi, head of the Kurdish Democratic party in Baghdad, and General Barzani's eldest son, Lokman, who with the help of the Baghdad Kurds broke out of prison on the day of revolution, Feb. 8. They were to pick up the helicopter in Sulaimaniya for the flight to an undisclosed destination in the mountains of Kurdistan.

An authoritative source said the Kurds would send as their chief negotiator Jelal Talabani, who has been in command of the Kurdish revolutionary forces on the southern front around Sulaimaniya. A lawyer and a member of the politburo of the Kurdish Democratic party, he commanded forces mainly recruited by the party. With him the Kurds were to send

Omar (the Tank) Mustafa, who is General Barzani's chief of staff.

The Kurds will be negotiating from strength. They had reached a peak of military success when Premier Abdel Karim Kassim declared an amnesty on Jan. 10. Premier Kassim's move was a concession of weakness. The Kurds claim that they could at that time have occupied the towns of Kirkuk, Ramleh and Amadiya and possibly Mosul. They also claim that they could at any time have halted the flow from the Iraqi oil fields.

The group headed north to pick up the Kurds for negotiations after the Governor of Sulaimaniya had telegraphed the Minister of the Interior that Jelal Talabani had visited army headquarters at Qala Dize to announce General Barzani's cease-fire order and to request a helicopter. This was last Sunday, two days after the revolution.

Another telegram was sent the same day to President Abdel-Salem Arif and the Premier, Maj. Gen. Ahmed Hassan Bakr, by the politburo of the Kurdish Democratic party with General Barzani's approval. It is understood that the main suggestion was that the Iraqi Army should

Continued on Page 6, Column 4.

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ME

TIMES INTERNATIONAL EDITION, MONDAY,

IRAQ SETTING UP KURDISH MEETING

Continued From Page 1, Col. 4

withdraw to the positions it occupied before Sept. 19, 1961, when the Kurdish revolution began.

While this might seem difficult for the Iraqi Army to accept, it would have the advantage of relieving some thousands of troops who are now cut off in the Rewanduz area, in Ranieh, in Amadiya and elsewhere.

The Kurds argued that since there had been casualties on both sides it would be difficult to negotiate in a friendly manner as long as the Kurdish area was threatened by Iraqi forces.

Authoritative Kurdish sources here said the Kurds would go into the negotiations with three basic demands: autonomy for the Kurdish area within the Iraqi Republic; a fair division of state revenues, including oil revenues, among Iraqi, Kurdistan and Arabian Iraq, and withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kurdistan.

The Kurds' attitude is that "we are willing to do everything possible to preserve order and support this Government but we will at all costs maintain our claim to autonomy."

A Kurdish source explained

that autonomy as the Kurds define it at present means a Kurdish administration to operate in Kurdish areas, the Kurdish language to be taught in Kurdish schools, newspapers and other publications in Kurdish to circulate freely, a Kurdish local security force and a Kurdish division of the Iraqi Army to be stationed in Kurdish territory. For some time past the predominantly Kurdish units have been sent as matter of policy south of Baghdad, especially to Basra.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

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persons who attach so much value to their own national culture, language and traditions must understand that the Kurds feel similarly.

The revolutionary government of Iraq made it known yesterday that it was fighting the Communist party of Iraq and not the Soviet Union. This stand was taken by Minister of State Shehadeh Jawad and the newspaper Al Jamahir. Mr. Jawad is the official spokesman of the Government and is believed to be a member of the National Revolutionary Council. Al Jamahir is a special newspaper being published by the Government because almost all the editors and publishers of the old publications are in jail.

"We intend to crush absolutely the Communist party in Iraq," Mr. Jawad declared, "not because it is Communist but because it took up arms against us."

While the old agreements with the Soviet bloc would need revising, he declared that "we hope to continue friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other friendly Socialist countries and even with Communist parties in other parts of the world."

Meanwhile the nightly battle of army forces and National Guardsmen with the Communists continued in flurries of shooting yesterday. The Government continued to haul off Communists to concentration camps by the truckload. Some

were sent directly from the ministries that had been particularly infiltrated by Communists — National Guidance, Education, Industry, Agriculture and Land Reform. The estimated total of persons in custody was about 4,000.

The Communists have been circulating pamphlets and handbills in Baghdad urging the people to rise against the Government. A new clandestine radio station called the National Iraq Station is at the same time concentrating on appeals to soldiers of the army to rise against their officers.

Meanwhile, diplomats noted the departure for Moscow of two senior members of the Soviet Embassy. Diplomats watching for signs of whether the struggle between the new Iraqi Government and the Communist party would be reflected on the Government level noted also that an article attacking the Iraqi Government in the Paris Communist paper, L'Humanite, had been reprinted by Pravda.

Both the Soviet and Iraqi Governments may be anxious to protect the considerable Soviet investment in Iraq in the shape of military equipment and economic aid. Except for the Second Division, which has been fighting the Kurds, almost all of the Iraqi Army now uses Soviet equipment including tanks, tactical missiles and vehicles of all kinds.

Economic aid has at the same

time enabled the Russians to introduce about 1,500 technicians into the country and rotate these several times, so that thousands of Russians now have an intimate knowledge of Iraq.

Meanwhile, the revolutionary regime of Iraq proudly displayed its prize political prisoners at the Rashid camp on the outskirts of the capital.

The object of the exercise was to show how well the 18 captive Cabinet Ministers and other high-ranking officials were being treated.

Major Hassem Sabagh, the camp commandant, who was one of the officers whose forced retirement sparked the revolution, said several interrogation teams were already at work questioning 800 persons gathered behind barbed wire in this camp since Feb. 8. Some who could show they had nothing to do with the Communist organization had already been released. Those remaining wandered about in the huge compound behind rolls of barbed wire while relatives lined up outside with packages of food, clothes and bedding.

Peace Pressures Strong

The demand for autonomy will probably be the main stumbling block in the negotiations. Yet some persons close to the problem are optimistic because the revolutionary government cannot afford to fight the Kurds and the Communists at the same time. Having become embroiled in a bitter struggle with the Communists, it is under great pressure to make peace with the Kurds.

The philosophy of the Baath Socialist Renaissance party, which dominates the revolutionary Government, with its emphasis on the value of Arab nationality, does not favor an understanding with the Kurds. In fact, the most emotional of Arab nationalists among the revolutionaries are likely to be the most hostile to the Kurds.

However, at this stage the Kurds are willing to put the best possible face on Baath philosophy. They argue that

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October 11th, 1962.

Foreign Report

CONTENTS

Beyond the Kurdish Deadlock

Spain's Labour Triangle

Mali's Dark Trial

Red Lines for Latins

Beyond the Kurdish Deadlock

The Kurdish rebels in Iraq are less alone than they have appeared to be; we learn that they are receiving help from Kurds in Persia and Turkey. Thus:

(i) *Persia.* For some months the Persian authorities have been keeping a sympathetic eye on the Kurdish revolt, and great quantities of arms and food have been supplied by Persian Kurds to their Iraqi brothers with the knowledge, if not the formal approval, of the Persian government. Moreover, Iraqi Kurds have found ready hospitality and help across the border whenever they have been pressed too hard by General Qassim's troops.

(ii) *Turkey.* Aid and hospitality have also been forthcoming from the Turkish side, but on a rather smaller scale. The Turkish authorities, though doubtless in sympathy with the general rebel aim of overthrowing General Qassim, have held themselves aloof. But though they do not actively help the efforts of their own Kurds, neither do they hinder them.

Traditionally, both the Turkish and the Persian governments have always been sensitive about nationalist and separatist movements among the Kurds. The fact that they are allowing their own Kurds to help the Iraqi Kurds is therefore a clear sign that they attach greater importance, at least for the time being, to bringing General Qassim down than to keeping Kurdish aspirations under control. A major element in current thinking in Ankara and Teheran is the belief, revived during the past few months, that Soviet influence is again on the increase in Iraq. The French report late last month that Soviet technicians were working on missile launching sites in Iraq heightened Turkish and Persian apprehensions.

The Kurdish leader, Mullah Mustapha Barzani, is in a difficult position on the one hand, his guerrillas have fought General Qassim's forces to a standstill; on the other hand, he seems to have little prospect of victory without outside help on a larger scale than that which he has been getting from Kurdish friends across the borders; and (c) both the Russians and the Americans have turned down his appeals (see page 1,113 of *The Economist* of September 22nd). The attitude of the great powers is, to some extent, conditioned by a common desire not to get themselves drawn too deeply in the Iraqi Kurdish crisis. But Barzani's life history is another factor, especially in American thinking. Thus:

A.—*The Americans.* Though the time may be past when Barzani was simply labelled "communist," the Americans cannot forget that:

1. Barzani was proclaimed chief of the general staff in the first Kurdish republic set up by the Soviet Union in Persia in January, 1946, and suppressed a year later by the Persian army with the help of the United States and Britain.
2. During his years as a refugee in the Soviet Union, between 1947 and 1958 (when he returned to Iraq following the July revolution), he kept the title of general.
3. Since then, he has made a number of visits to the Soviet Union and on each occasion has publicly attacked Britain and the United States.
4. In 1960, when he applied to the Qassim government for his Democratic Party of Kurdistan to be licensed, its published programme expressed a belief in marxism.

BARZANI'S DISAPPOINTMENT

B.—*The Russians,* on the other hand, though they harboured Barzani for years, clearly attach more importance to keeping Qassim in power than to helping the Kurds, at least for the present. Barzani would not have turned to the Americans (as he did, through a correspondent of the *New York Times*) unless the Russians had disappointed him. By doing so, however, he:

1. Angered all the communists or marxists in his own party, including Mr. Ibrahim Ahmed, the able and popular Kurdish lawyer who was secretary-general of the Mullah's party and his right hand man.
2. Gave General Qassim an opportunity to say he had been right all the time about Barzani's being a "stooge of the imperialists."

Faced with this situation, Barzani and his supporters have been giving fresh attention to their relations with Iraq's Arab majority. The Mullah has never, in his public speeches and writings, asked for independence for the Kurds, but merely for autonomy of some kind within the Iraqi state. It is clear, therefore, that even if General Qassim were overthrown, Barzani's aims would not automatically be achieved. Bearing this in mind, the Mullah is now working on the following lines:

- (i) Secret talks with the non-Kurdish people of Iraq. These are still going on.



Apart from the Baathist nationalists—a declining force—the majority of the Arabs, both Shia and Sunni, are not in principle against autonomy for the Kurds; nor, for that matter, are the Christians. Barzani's approaches have therefore been favourably received. What he is trying to do is to create a united front of Kurds and anti-Qassim Arabs to overthrow the present government and set up a new one which would recognise the Kurds as equal partners of the Arabs in Iraq.

(ii) "Diplomatic" initiatives by Kurds abroad, especially in the Middle East, Europe and the United States. Badr Khan and other young Kurdish leaders are now in New York, for example, trying: (a) to muster support for Kurdish autonomy; and (b) obtain material help for 100,000 Kurds who are now homeless as a result of General Qassim's ruthless bombing expeditions against their villages.

General Qassim's own position is difficult, for:

1. He has failed to crush the Kurdish rebels.
2. Casualties are heavy among his troops and these are said to be deserting at the rate of 100 a day.
3. The sabotage of Iraq Petroleum Company oil pipelines near Kirkuk in August was a body blow. General Qassim's budget is in deficit on current account, and without the oil revenues he could not run his present army and civil service.

Since neither Barzani nor Qassim seems to have any immediate prospect of outright victory, the logical thing for them to do would be to negotiate a settlement. But of this there is, so far, no sign.

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FM ANKARA FEB11/63 CONFD

TO TT EXTERNAL 37 PRIORITY FM GENEVA

INFO TT LDN WASHDC NATOPARIS FM GENEVA

BAG CAIRO BEIRUT TAVIV TEHRAN FM LDN

TURKISH RECOGNITION OF IRAQI REVOLUTIONARY REGIME

TURKISH GOVT ANNOUNCED ON FEB11 ITS RECOGNITION OF IRAQI REVOL-
UTIONARY REGIME. FOREIGN MINISTER ERKIN TOLD NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
HE HAD JUST RECEIVED ASSURANCES THAT NEW GOVT WOULD RESPECT
IRAQ'S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND WOULD SEEK STRONGER RELATIONS
WITH FRIENDLY MUSLIM STATES. ERKIN BELIEVED NEW REGIME WAS IN
EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF COUNTRY. ITS LEADERSHIP WAS LARGELY BAATHIST
AND WOULD BE EXPECTED TO FIGHT COMMUNISM AND PRESERVE IRAQ'S
INDEPENDENCE. FOREIGN MINISTER ASCRIBED TO QASIM PERSONALLY DE-
TERIORATION IN TURKISH-IRAQI RELATIONS OVER LAST SIX MONTHS AND
EXPRESSED HOPE FOR A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH NEW REGIME.

2. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD BEEN MORE CANDID ON FEB9 IN ASSEMBLY
WHEN HE DID NOT RPT NOT QUITE CONCEAL HIS CONCERN OVER PRO-NASSER
AND PRO-UNION ANTECEDENTS TO REBEL LEADERS. HE HAD CONSOLED THE
ASSEMBLY WITH THOUGHT OF NEW GOVT WOULD BE NOT RPT NOT ONLY ANTI-
COMMUNIST BUT ALSO ABLE TO CONCILIATE THE NATIONAL MINORITY IN
IRAQ (IE KURDS).

3. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD BEEN VERY EAGER TO GIVE EARLY
RECOGNITION IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH CORDIAL RELATIONS FROM THE
START. IN IMMEDIATE TERMS OUR TURKISH SOURCES DO NOT RPT NOT APPEAR
TOO WORRIED BY TRIUMPH OF A PRO-NASSER GROUP IN IRAQ AND EFFECT
THIS MIGHT HAVE ON SYRIA. THE TURKISH POLICY OF NEW REGIME WILL
REMAIN A MAJOR PREOCCUPATION OF TURKISH AUTHORITIES WHO WOULD
WELCOME A PEACEFUL END TO KURDISH REBELLION AS LONG AS CONCESSIONS
TO KURDISH NATIONAL FEELING IN IRAQ ARE NOT RPT NOT TOO SWEEPING
IN CHARACTER.

*Canada
Report
Forwarded under GND's Official Memo 97
of 19 Feb 63.*

(F) 209/11/30

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ME 173/2/1
**AMNESTY FOR KURDS
EXTENDED**

GEN. KASSIM'S OFFER

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

BAGHDAD, JAN. 20

General Kassim, the Prime Minister of Iraq, has extended until the end of the month the time limit for the amnesty offer he made to the Kurdish rebels on January 10.

He said that he now realized that the original time limit of 10 days was not long enough "for those coming across the frontier". He added: "Many of our brothers have returned to us". Others were on their way. He cleared the rebels of blame for the revolt saying: "If they have revolted it is not their fault but the fault of imperialists, the dividers".

Baghdad newspapers have lately claimed that large numbers of Kurds have surrendered to officials. Alahd Aljadidd (New Era) said that a rebel called Abbas Mamenda, described as a right hand man of Mulla Mustapha Barzani, had laid down his arms and was on his way to surrender.

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14th Oct 1962

Iraq and the Kurds —a Needless War

By C. J. Edmonds

Four years ago last month the Hashemite monarchy of Iraq was overthrown and a military junta under General Kassim seized power. A temporary constitution was promulgated making specific reference to the Kurds as equal partners with the Arabs, and the theme of "Arab-Kurdish brotherhood" was unwaveringly plugged by the official guidance. The Kurds of Iraq had, of course, already been officially recognized as a minority having certain rights in Iraq, and when Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations in 1932 the Government had been required to confirm them by a declaration which was to rank as part of the constitution and a matter of international concern. The people had, however, always complained that in practice these guarantees were being largely evaded or at least grudgingly implemented. It is probable that when he came to power General Kassim genuinely wished to win over by a more liberal policy an important section of the population with no deep-seated emotional loyalty to an Arab dynasty. This, then, is perhaps an appropriate moment to pause to ask what went wrong and why, and to take stock of the present state of relations between the Kurds and the central Government.

Immediately after the revolution the communists were found to be unexpectedly well organized in all parts of the country. To justify themselves the new rulers were in any case bound to represent everything that had gone before as thoroughly evil, and ostensibly to reverse previous policies, especially in the realm of foreign relations.

IDYLL WITH MOSCOW

Mulla Mustafa of Barzan was brought back from exile in the Soviet Union and built up into an all-Iraq figure, a champion of the struggle against the "imperialists" and "stooges". The self-appointed spokesman of the Kurds, the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (which elected Mustafa its president), much of the press, and certain Kurdish organizations in Europe, followed the official line with enthusiasm, some perhaps with conviction, others because they thought it the best way to forward their patriotic aims. To the familiar clichés of communist propaganda was added the promise of the liberation of their kinsmen still

Such was the situation which General Kassim presumably sought to remedy when, in July last year, he ordered the troop movements that sparked off the fighting. Little was heard of this outside Iraq until the middle of September, when an official communiqué announced that a Kurdish rebellion had been crushed. The main facts are now well known. The ground troops having come off second best in encounters at several points in the arc of mountains extending from Zakho in the north-west to the Darbandikhan dam, Kassim fell back on a policy of massive retaliation from the air. Waves of Ilyushin bombers using rockets and incendiaries attacked the small market towns and larger villages, destroying houses, burning food stocks, and inflicting severe casualties on the non-combatant population, while MiG fighters shot up livestock and road traffic. The fighting nevertheless continued into the early winter, one large column of troops and police was severely mauled on the road between Dihok and Amadiyah as late as January, and recent advices from Iraq indicate that since the melting of the snows the whole grisly business has started again.

BITTER REVULSION

The extent and persistence of the insurrection reflects the bitter revulsion of feeling that has followed the dashing of hopes; there is no evidence to suggest that it is Soviet-inspired. The brutal operations have tended to unite all shades of Kurdish opinion and to give the revolt the character of a national uprising. This is not to say that the Kurdish front has been absolutely solid: tribal alliances and feuds are still there, and if rifleman from across the borders have come over to help their friends some irregulars recruited from their hereditary enemies inside the country have cooperated with Government forces.

Historically the town of Sulaymaniyah has always been the focal point of Kurdish unrest, for the principal reason that the Turks maintained there a military primary school, cadets from which went on to the academy and the staff college at Istanbul, often rising to the highest offices in the Ottoman Empire, and that after 1918 many of these officers returned to their native town to form the intellectual nucleus of the nationalist movement within Iraq. Thanks to this long and high

Union and built up into an all-Iraqi figure, a champion of the struggle against the "imperialists" and "their stooges". The self-appointed spokesman of the Kurds, the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (which elected Mustafa as president), much of the press, and certain Kurdish organizations in Europe, followed the official line with enthusiasm, some perhaps with conviction, others because they thought that in the prevailing climate this was the best way to forward their patriotic aims. To the familiar clichés of communist propaganda was added clamour for the liberation of their kinsmen still groaning under the tyranny of the other members of the Baghdad Pact, Turkey, and Persia.

At home it had been confidently assumed by all classes that the new equality would mean a measure of administrative devolution, a fairer share of development projects and social services, particularly education, and enhanced status for the Kurdish language. As none of these hopes were realized a mounting spirit of disillusion was reflected even in the servile press; but the complaints were carefully diluted with sycophantic adulation of the "Sole Leader", and for two years journalists enjoyed a licence to vociferate about Kurdish rights which would have been quite unthinkable under the monarchy.

All this was changed in the autumn of 1960, when General Kassim decided that he must curb the activities of the communists in the whole of Iraq. The Democratic Party was declared illegal, a number of its office-holders were arrested, and several newspapers were suppressed; shortly afterwards Mulla Mustafa came back from a visit to Russia to find the house, the car and the salary allotted to him at the time of his triumphal return withdrawn. But these repressive measures were not confined to the fellow-travellers. Inspired articles began to appear in the Baghdad press (perhaps as a sop to the pan-Arabs, always hostile to any concession to the Kurds) denying the right of the Kurds to any special recognition at all.

PRESTIGE UNDERMINED

At the best of times the rural Kurd is inclined to be impatient of the restraints of orderly administration. Since the revolution the prestige of the Government had been gravely undermined by its own rabble-rousing activities, exercised through typical communist front organizations such as Partisans of Peace, Democratic Youth, and the rest. In many of the remoter areas a semblance of central authority subsisted only by the grace and favour of local chiefs unwilling to precipitate an open breach.

recruited from their hereditary enemies inside the country have cooperated with the Government forces.

Hitherto the town of Sulaymaniyah had always been the focal point of Kurdish unrest, for the principal reason that the Turks maintained there a military primary school, cadets from which went on to the academy and the staff college at Istanbul, often rising to the highest offices in the Ottoman Empire, and that after 1918 many of these officers returned to their native town to form the intellectual nucleus of the nationalist movement within Iraq. Thanks to this start a high proportion of the Kurdish civil servants, schoolmasters, journalists, lawyers and other professional men today practising in the provinces or in Baghdad itself are from Sulaymaniyah. It is therefore interesting to note that the main centre of activity has now shifted northwards to the *liwa* of Mosul, where until 20 years ago Kurdish nationalism in its modern form had made little impact, and that even the moderates among the southern intellectuals, who from the first deprecated the antics of the Democratic Party and the press in the early days of the republic, now seem prepared to accept Mustafa as their leader; this they certainly would not do if they thought he really was a "red Mulla".

TIRED OF BLOODSHED

There are signs that the general public, and particularly the people of Mosul, are sick and tired of the Kurdish war. Mustafa himself, in a dignified manifesto dated April 20, 1962, has reiterated that his sole object is to secure "the legitimate political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Kurdish people within a constitutionally governed Iraq". The manifesto, which is addressed to the United Nations, the International Red Cross and other international organizations, and also to the journalists of the world, appeals to them to send representatives or come themselves to see the devastation, and to intervene, each in the appropriate sphere, to put a stop to the bombardment with napalm bombs, to relieve the suffering, and to "solve the Kurdish question in Iraqi Kurdistan".

This is not one of those intractable problems that defy solution. The basis is already there in the declaration of 1932 and in Kassim's own temporary constitution of 1958. The details of their application, which this time would have to be magnanimous and not grudging, could be worked out with representative Kurdish leaders, many of them known for their moderation and realistic good sense, perhaps with the help of a mediator of international repute.

Name of Paper.

The Economist

File No.

173/2/1

Published at

London

Date

22-9-62

THE ECONOMIST, SEPTEMBER 22, 1962

THE WORLD OVERSEAS

some months. Mr Pearson has left no doubt that his tactics will be to attack hard and try to bring on an election as soon as possible. But it now seems unlikely that the two small parties will support his opening motion of no confidence. The government therefore not only has to present a programme which could serve as the basis of a new election appeal, but must also be prepared to go ahead and enact it in the present Parliament.

Kurdistan's Hot and Cold War

WHILE the *New York Times*, in a recent series of articles on the Kurdish revolt in northern Iraq, has been giving publicity to the Kurdish leaders' urgent appeal for western help, the August issue of *World Marxist Review* (the English edition of a periodical published in Prague) has put into tolerably plain words the slide of communist opinion in favour of the Kurdish revolutionaries. The Kurds, who have been fighting a resolute guerrilla war against the Iraqi government for more than a year, would probably accept outside help from where they can get it. So far they claim to have received none at all, and their leaders speak bitterly of the world's indifference to their struggle. The odds are still heavily stacked against their getting any assistance from the West; the question now is whether they stand a chance of getting material, as well as moral, support from the East.

struggle to establish a national identity is seen as one of the many rocks in the way of Arab unity. The revolt has engendered new bitterness between Arabs and Kurds (the Kurds claim to have killed 4,000 Iraqi soldiers); anger against the Kurds still lives on for the part they took in the murderous fighting at Mosul in March, 1959. The effect on Arab opinion might be enough by itself to dissuade any western country from giving material help to the Kurds; there is also the fear of political repercussions in Turkey and Persia, where three million Kurds live as potentially dissident minorities.

Here is one vital difference between American and Russian interests. The Russians, faced with some of the same embarrassing diplomatic calculations as the West, have in the past been cool towards the Kurds in Iraq; in Turkey or in Persia, they would welcome a Kurdish revolt as a knock against the Central Treaty Organisation. Without treading on any toes that matter, the Russians can proclaim as a statement of general principle that the ultimate solution of the Kurdish question is tied up with the struggle to end imperialist domination in the Middle East. (But what about the fragment of Kurdistan that is part of the Soviet Union?)

The much more difficult question for both Moscow and the Iraqi Communist party has been to take up an attitude to the fighting in north Iraq. The scales, at first, were heavily weighted against the Kurds. From the Russian point of view, General Qasim's anti-imperialist foreign policy is fine; the Iraqi Communist party has as much, or as little, influence as any other political group in present-day Iraq; moreover, Mullah Mustapha Barzani has not helped his cause with the communists by weeding his Kurdish party clear of extreme left-wing elements. The *World Marxist Review* gives his party faint praise:

The Democratic party of Kurdistan, headed by Mustapha Barzani, is a party of the national bourgeoisie and the small liberal landowners. It also includes part of the petty urban bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. It pursues an anti-imperialist policy.

But General Qasim has become a lonely, feudal figure. If the Russians are to retain their reputation of being in step with revolutionary movements among the Arabs, the time has come to move on. And so, in Iraq, as in Turkey or in Persia, the communist line links the Kurdish national struggle with the Arab struggle against the oppressions of a dictatorial regime. The Iraqi Communist party has gone a stage further: at its congress in March it agreed that "in the present situation" the solution of the Kurdish problem would mean the establishment of self-government in Iraqi Kurdistan within the Iraqi Republic.

But the line taken by the *World Marxist Review* (which usually reflects Soviet thinking) is that self-government for the Kurds can be achieved only by means of a "peaceful mass struggle on a broad national front." Except by joining such a national front, runs the argument, the Kurds would be incapable of finding a solution that would be in the popular interest. This invitation to take part in a peaceful struggle, carrying, as it does, no suggestion of help in the shape of arms or money, is unlikely to inspire the fighting Kurds. For the time being, it seems, Mullah Mustapha and his men will fight on alone. The campaign that will decide Iraq's political orientation when General Qasim finally departs is being fought "peacefully" in the towns, not defiantly in the mountains.

Jordan's Nine Lives

FROM OUR MIDDLE EAST CORRESPONDENT

IN April, 1957, when the tide of Nasserism was flowing strongly, few would have staked much money on King Hussein's chances of survival. Refuting the experts, he is still on Jordan's throne, no more and no less secure than he was five years ago. The deepening divisions in the Arab world preclude any inter-



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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND.
LONDON, W.C.2.

Memo No. 2126

13th December, 1962

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRAUnrest in IraqThe following messages are from Baghdad to the
Foreign Office:1st December

"I have received a letter dated November 5 purporting to come from the 'National Groups of Companions in Kurdistan' stating that they intend to extend their hostilities against Qasim, and that in order to prevent any unpleasant incidents and unintended harm they asked me to issue advice to British subjects to leave the zones of fighting in Kurdistan extending from north of Zakho to south of Khanaqin and to refrain from entering them without permission from the Kurds. Furthermore, the Kurds will not bear any material or moral responsibility for any harm which may occur to British subjects in the event of their ignoring this warning.

This letter, with one addressed to the United States Ambassador, was delivered at the private house of a member of the staff of the United States Embassy. It is believed that similar letters are to be sent to other Embassies.

There has been no publicity so far. The United States Embassy is reporting the matter to Washington. It is for consideration, however, whether I should for the record, inform the Iraqi authorities.

I have informed IPC informally but do not intend at present to issue any general warning."

6th December

"Any estimate of Kurdish intentions must be largely speculation. We are, however, in a better position to assess their capabilities. The present situation in the Kirkuk area, where most expatriates are, is that no movement outside the town takes place after dark. Not even the army or police patrol at night. There is no army patrolling even by daylight near the further outlying IPC installations, which nevertheless have to be serviced from time to time by IPC staff. At night armed Kurds come down into the villages quite close to Kirkuk. The army cannot always provide escorts for IPC employees visiting outlying installations by day, and even the army reserve in Kirkuk itself is probably inadequate to protect the town against local raids. In short, it seems likely that the Kurds could stage a major raid on the industrial area of Kirkuk at any time, they could attack outlying oil installations more or less with impunity since

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- 2 -

the police are useless, or they could intercept from time to time IPC employees going about their business.

Many of the IPC installations are vulnerable, and damage to the water supply plant about twenty miles north of Kirkuk, or to the process plant on the outskirts of Kirkuk, the effect might be serious. Equally a series of attacks, or one major attack, on the IPC employees, especially if it caused casualties, might result in an exodus from the Kirkuk area which could at worst bring oil production to a standstill.

If it is indeed Mulla Mustafa's intention, as he has stated, to bring about Qasim's downfall, it would seem logical for him to undertake major operations of this kind. A serious and prolonged interruption of oil production is one means, and perhaps the only effective means, open to him which might seriously affect Qasim's position. On the other hand, it is rather curious that Kurdish efforts do not so far seem to have been directed to secure a major interruption of the oil flow. It may be that Mulla Mustafa does not know exactly what targets to aim at, or how to attack them. Alternatively he may hitherto have hesitated to take a step which would risk alienating the sympathy of the Iraqi Arabs, or of the Western Powers. It may be that he does not judge that the political situation is yet ripe for a major effort against Qasim. At any rate he has so far refrained from causing damage on the scale which lies within his power.

I do not think that this recent warning, purporting to have come from Mulla Mustafa, really changes the situation which has existed for some time. I am inclined to think that this warning is intended to draw attention to the seriousness of the Kurdish uprising and also perhaps to safeguard the Kurdish position in the event of casualties or damage being caused in the future. While all IPC employees in the area, both expatriate and Iraqi, are obviously exposed to certain risks, they are already aware of the dangers. I do not consider, therefore, that we should be justified, by any new development of which I am aware, in issuing a general warning which, if taken seriously, might result in a large-scale exodus. Limited restrictions on movement, over and above what have already been issued, are not really practicable. It seems to me, therefore, that for the time being the risks must be accepted.

I have discussed the situation with Stewart, who is in general agreement with this assessment."

2. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Washington, Cairo and Tel Aviv.



(R.N. Hamilton)
for Senior External Affairs Representative.

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FORUM SERVICE

File 173/41
p. 102
BACKGROUND FEATURES
INFORMATION and ANALYSIS

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MANAGING EDITOR: M. MINDLIN

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FS/535

Week of October 13, 1962

AMONG THE KURDISH REBELS IN IRAQ

First Journalist Reaches Rebel Headquarters

By RICHARD ANDEREGG

Note:- This is an exclusive account of a correspondent who penetrated to the north Iraq area held by the Kurds, who have been carrying out a large-scale revolt against Gen. Kassem's government for the last year. Richard Anderegg is the Middle East correspondent of the Swiss radio and television service. Together with a fellow Swiss television cameraman, he reached the headquarters of the Kurdish rebels and interviewed their leader, Mustafa Barzani.

- Ed.

FOR more than a year now, northern Iraq has been closed to the world. The Kurds are fighting against the government of General Kassem, who has announced several times over that the revolt has been crushed. No other news has been available, for there are Kurdish minorities who demand their rights in all the neighbouring countries - in Syria, Turkey and Iran. These Kurds are discussing the rebellion of their cousins in Iraq with passionate interest. Thus not only Baghdad but also Damascus, and above all Ankara and Teheran are worried by the situation. Whether or not they sympathise with the Iraqi dictator, these governments have tacitly agreed to maintain a zone of silence all along the Iraqi frontier.

But two events have just lifted this curtain of mystery. One is that journalists have at last managed to make illegal contacts with the Kurdish partisans. The other is that the official communist international magazine, "The World Marxist Review", has just published an indictment against General Kassem and is supporting the demand for Kurdish autonomy.

Having been the first journalist, together with a television cameraman, to visit Kurdistan in revolt, I can throw some light upon this new development of Soviet policy from what I have actually seen.

These background articles constitute a service for friends, editors, and writers who follow the world-wide issues of cultural freedom. Except when otherwise indicated, you are free to publish and translate each Forum feature—they are all copyright-cleared. Please send us two copies of your press cutting. We welcome comment, criticism and discussion from our readers and subscribers. Forum Service is affiliated to the Congress for Cultural Freedom, but the various views expressed by its feature writers are not necessarily those of the Congress or the Service.

The rising of the Kurds is a national insurrection, more extensive and better organised than any of their rebellions in the past. The collapse of General Kassem's authority in the mountains of Kurdistan is complete. But for the moment the Kurds are receiving no assistance from abroad. After covering well over 300 miles of their country on foot or on mule-back, and having seen some 1,500 partisans and two of their headquarters, one being that of the commander-in-chief of the revolt, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, I can affirm that the Kurds began their insurrection with the personal armament that everybody in the Middle East - and the Kurd above all - keeps near to hand. Now, however, they have equipment which they have taken from the police and from the army in a series of engagements. The importance and the dates of these engagements tally with the information that has, despite the censorship, leaked out as far as Beirut during the past few months.

LOYALTY UNDERMINED

Two things have worked in their favour: first, the Government's bloody act of repression in bombarding hundreds of villages even before the revolt had spread to much of the country subjected to these attacks. This destroyed what little remained of Kurdish loyalty; and this spring, when the revolt which broke out last year spread more widely, most of the police of Kurdish origin, and some elements in the army, deserted and joined the partisans. Secondly - a factor essential to Kurdish success - the Kurdish Democratic Party, which has a rather 'leftish' tendency and was already illegal in Baghdad, took the revolt in hand. Until then this party had been mainly an organisation of Kurdish intellectuals in the towns, more or less detached from their homelands, and above all 'detrified'. They demanded not only autonomous rights for the Kurds, but social and anti-feudal reforms in Kurdistan itself, which brought them into conflict with Kassem as much as with their feudal lords and landed proprietors, who in Kurdistan were leading the opposition.

COMMON CAUSE

Never until now have the Kurdish intellectuals of the towns made common cause with the proprietors and gentry of the north, and the consequences have been extraordinary. The Kurdish movement, which had hitherto been tribal, has suddenly become national, rational and vigorously led upon different fronts: in the north, in the east (Sulemanieh) and in the Arab south, where the Kurds are providing money and information. Above all, the party's political action last winter produced a coalition of Kurdish tribes larger than has ever been attained before.

CHIEFTAINS ELIMINATED

Peasants of a wild, primitive mountain country, the Kurds are divided into numberless tribes whose rivalries had always enabled the government to find allies for the suppression of revolts. The Iraqi army has no troops for mountain warfare. That 'dirty war' was waged by the loyal tribes, whom the rebels call by the traditional name of djash ('little donkeys'). The army, deployed along the roads, lent them support with artillery, aviation and communications and provided them with ammunition.

But this time, the number of djash, small from the start, has not only

diminished. The partisans, following a plan of campaign in which one senses the long experience of their leader, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, but also the influence of the party leaders, have eliminated the chieftains who were loyal to the Government, one after another.

BEATEN AT EVERY ENCOUNTER

The remaining djash, demoralised, are following the army with their wives and baggage, exiled from their territory. The army itself, lacking protection on its flanks, but driven on into the mountains by the pitiless orders of the military camarilla which has linked its fate to Kassem's, is being beaten at every encounter. It is in a state of general discontent and the troops manoeuvre clumsily. Moreover, the training and efficiency level of the Iraqi army has declined during the four years of the Kassem régime - years passed in distrust of the most capable officers, and in transferring officers and technicians from one end of the country to the other in order to prevent the formation of revolutionary cells. The Kassem who came to power by a military coup has ruined the army for fear that it might repeat his coup against himself.

TEMPORARY ALLIANCE

It is certain that the alliance between the Kurdish Democratic Party and the feudal elements will last no longer than the fighting. This party, like all minority parties in the Middle East, has a past that is checkered with alliances both to left and right. In its own case, however, mostly with the left: the Kurds, accustomed to neighbourhood with the Russians but generally under Persian or Ottoman domination, have always regarded the Russians as friends in power who have maltreated, one after another, governments by which they themselves were maltreated.

This is a natural geopolitical phenomenon. The fact that the Russians have now become the Soviets does nothing to alter it. Besides, did they not offer Mullah Mustafa Barzani 12 years asylum in Russia after his revolt of 1945 and the dissolution of the little Kurdish republic of Mahabad in Iran, which the Soviets had created, but abandoned in 1946?

SYMPATHY STRAINED

However, in consequence of the present hostilities, the ranks of the party have been swollen by Kurds who are more nationalist than leftist. For the last three years Moscow has been supporting Kassem - because of his denunciation of the Baghdad Pact, his attitude to Kuwait and his conflict with the Iraq Petroleum Company - as a useful pawn in its game of undermining Western influence in the Middle East. And in Kurdistan itself Moscow's prestige is very low. In every village they showed me bomb débris and shell-cases from naval guns - "That is the aid we got from the Russians!".

If this situation persists, and if the West should at last send aid to the Kurds, Moscow will be in danger of a double loss. Its pawn Kassem is on the way to getting himself eliminated, and the sympathy of the Kurds is dangerously strained.

Above all, the Kurdish Democratic Party, a good ally in several ways (and at one time thoroughly infiltrated with communists), may well transform itself into a national movement and perhaps even an anti-communist one.

BARZANI'S POSITION

Mullah Mustafa Barzani, with whom I spent fourteen days, said to me bitterly: "We are alone, and we shall get nothing but what we conquer by our own strength. But we are also realists. We cannot do without help. We shall take the first hand that is held out to us."

RICHARD ANDEREGG

Please send us two press cuttings of this article.



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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND.

LONDON, W.C.2.

Memo No. 1685

15 OCT 1962
173/2/1

9th October, 1962

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Review of the Kuwaiti Press for the period
16th-30th September

Kuwait reported to the Foreign Office in the following terms on 1st October:

"The visit of the Minister of Finance and Economy, Shaikh Jabir al Ahmad, to New York was the leading feature for most of the period. The meetings of the IMF and IBRD received wide coverage, as did the question of Kuwait's membership of the United Nations. During the latter part of the period, the events in the Yemen were the chief subject of interest. The Palestine problem was prominent particularly in view of the forthcoming United Nations debate. Other topics were Algeria, the Arab League, the Syrian cabinet, Nasser's speech, rockets for Israel, and, internally, the meetings of the Constituent Assembly and Al-Raudhatain water project. Attacks on Qasim and British policy in Aden continued.

Internal

As the Constituent Assembly continued its debate on the Constitution, interest increased and verbatim reports of the proceedings appeared in several papers.

The inauguration of the Al-Raudhatain water project was given wide coverage.

New York

Shaikh Jabir's activities in the United States were widely reported, and his part in the meetings of the IMF and IBRD given prominence. The meetings of the General Assembly were also covered as well as the question of Kuwait's membership of United Nations.

Yemen

The death of the Imam of the Yemen, and subsequent events there have occasioned much interest, and met with widespread approval.

Algeria

The election of Ben Bella, and his choice of ministers was approved by all sections of the press.

Arab League

Hassouna's re-election was welcomed, but the financial difficulties faced by the League were stressed. Kuwait's contribution towards the building

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- 2 -

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of a new headquarters for its Arab Institute was praised.

Syria

The formation of the new cabinet aroused much interest but little comment.

U.A.R.

Nasser's speech was reported, but rather less attention paid to it than might have been expected.

Israel

The United States decision to sell guided missiles to Israel was deplored, though rather overshadowed by events in Yemen.


Aden

There were daily reports of disturbances in Aden and the press remained unanimous in its disapproval of British policy there.

Iraq

There was the usual quota of attacks on Qasim and reports of discontent in Baghdad."

2. We are sending copies of this memorandum to Cairo and Tel Aviv.



(R.N. Hamilton)
Acting Senior External Affairs Representative.



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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
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- 2 -

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(R.N. Hamilton)
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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 1390

12th September, 1962

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Kurds

Ankara reported to the Foreign Office in the following terms on 5th September:

"At the opening session of the Assembly on September 3, after the summer recess, the Foreign Minister made a long statement on the Turco-Iraqi border incidents.

M. Erkin gave a detailed account of the events summarised in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements of August 20 and 24. He repeatedly stressed the efforts the Turkish Government had made to deal with the series of frontier violations in a manner compatible with good relations between Turkey and Iraq and spoke with indignation of the later hostile response by the Iraqi authorities, who had earlier received Turkish representations in a spirit of apparent understanding and cooperation. The Turkish proposal to submit the dispute to an impartial commission had produced no response from the Iraqis. (This proposal, it appears, has only been made in the statement of August 24 and has not been communicated to the Iraqis through official channels.)

The tone of the statement throughout was firm but not provocative.

The statement was fully reported in the press; but there has been little or no press comment."

2. We are sending a copy of this memorandum to Cairo.

(R.N. Hamilton)
for Senior External Affairs Representative.

Name of Paper NEW YORK TIMES.

File No.

Published at PARIS.

Date

173/2/1

9-9-62

Kurdish Rebels Confident of Victory in Iraq

Warn U. S. to Give Them Aid or They Will Ask Soviet

This is the first of four articles by a correspondent of The New York Times who spent several weeks in the Kurdish-held area of Iraq.

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT
Special to The New York Times.

KURDS' HEADQUARTERS. Somewhere in Northern Iraq, Aug. 28 (Delayed)—Gen. Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani, leader of the Kurdish rebellion in the mountains of northern Iraq, is asking, urgently and insistently, for American aid.

He is offering, in return, to overthrow the Government of Premier Abdul Karim Kassim and transform Iraq into the West's strongest ally in the Middle East.

Again and again, the rebel leader made such statements in conversations with this correspondent during ten days at his headquarters.

It took forty-two days to reach the ever-moving headquarters of Mullah Mustafa. Most of those days were spent riding mules and horses or scrambling up and down trails too steep for riding, although thirteen days were passed waiting in a hideout for fighting to subside.

The 59-year-old general, who often has been in revolt, has for the last year been leading the greatest Kurdish rebellion of recent times. He estimates that his forces have killed 4,000 Iraqi soldiers and have taken another 4,000 prisoners in the year's fighting.

The revolt was undertaken to

achieve autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan. The region known as Kurdistan is an indefinitely defined area covering parts of Iraq, Turkey, Iran and the Soviet Union. The Kurds, a seminomadic people, trace their history back thousands of years.

Mullah Mustafa, grave in demeanor, hard and lean, coupled his appeals for aid with warnings. If the Americans do not find a way to help the Kurds, he said, the consequences could be "nefarious."

"If the Americans go on thinking only of the interests of Turkey and Iran, who do not want us to get help, if the Americans never ask after our interests," he said "there is a danger."

"The danger is that we will be obliged by necessity to accept aid from the Communists," he went on. "Then it will not be our fault."

Mullah Mustafa blames the indifference of both the Soviet


Union and the United States for the plight of the Kurds and the Soviet Union in particular for its specific acts in supplying Premier Kassim.

Appealing to the United States for help, he said:

"We are winning. You cannot afford to remain indifferent to us any longer.

"Helping us will be to your advantage, for the Kurds are

Continued on Page 4, Column 1



Members of a Kurdish revolutionary unit, waging guerrilla warfare against Government of Iraq, march to a new position in mountainous terrain of northwestern part of country.

Kurdish Rebels Ask for U. S. Aid to Overthrow K

GUERRILLAS HOLD EXTENSIVE AREAS

Visitor Finds Them Certain of Victory—12,000 Iraqi Troops Believed Circled

Continued From Page 1, Col. 6

the people of the future in the Middle East.

"In time of war you will need us. Look at our strategic location on the flank of any possible Soviet advance into the Middle East through the Caucasus and remember that, whether as guerrillas or as regulars, we are the best soldiers in the Middle East.

"We could be useful to the United States. As the Communist party serves the interests of the Soviet Union, we would serve the United States."

Military Sneecesses Reported by Kurds

Other claims made by the Kurds during the weeks in Kurdistan were these:

¶Kurdish guerrillas have climaxed a series of military successes by encircling about 12,000 Iraqi troops divided among five garrisons in the Rewandiz area of northeastern Iraq.

¶The Iraqi Army is moving reinforcements northward and major engagements are likely before winter.

¶Kurdish guerrillas control about half of the roughly 25,000 square miles of Iraqi Kurdistan.

¶The Kurds have from time to time blown up minor pipelines of the Iraq Petroleum Company. While this has had little effect on the Iraqi economy it has demonstrated the potential harm the Kurds could do by blowing up pumping stations, as the Syrians did in 1938 in the conflict over the nationalization of the Suez Canal.

¶Mullah Mustafa has defeated all major Kurdish tribal leaders opposed to him and has gathered the others under his leadership.

¶His forces have not received arms from any foreign country, but have taken them from the Iraqi Army.

¶The rebels' greatest weaknesses are a lack of means of defending their villages from aerial attack and their limitations in ways to put their case before the world.



¶The Communist parties of the Middle East and clandestine broadcasts from Communist territory have ended their earlier hostility toward Mullah Mustafa's rebellion and are now wooing the Kurds. Their line is that with Communist help the Kurds could take over Iraq.

The meaning of all this assumes significance in light of the military situation prevailing in Iraq.

In the last ten days Mullah Mustafa has extended an area around Rewandiz into a circle by taking the village of Hiran in the Hushnaou valley and sending his men into the Selaheh range and the Safin mountains.

As the traveler moved through the mountains above Rewandiz, he could look down at night at the lights of five surrounded Iraqi garrisons.

The five garrisons, with their strength as estimated by the rebels, are situated in the following areas:



GUERRILLA STONGHOLD: Kurdish rebels fighting to establish an autonomous state of Kurdistan in Iraq control an extensive area in the northern part of the country. They are reported to have 12,000 Iraqi troops surrounded in villages in the Rewandiz area (cross on detail map). The Kurds inhabit a vaguely defined region overlapping four nations shown by the diagonal shading on the inset map.)

Revolt in Iraq Is Latest Chapter In the Long History of the Kurds

Struggle Against Domination Has Lasted Thousands of Years—Autonomy Was Promised in Unratified 1920 Treaty

Special to The New York Times

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Sept. 9.—The rebellion of the Kurds in Iraq, who seek to establish an autonomous state of Kurdistan, is the latest chapter in a story thousands of years old.

The Kurds never tire of hearing accounts of their past and its evidence of their unflagging will to survive and to establish their national identity.

They trace their history back to nearly 2000 B. C. In that long time they have come into conflict with many peoples, absorbing some and being absorbed by others, yet never losing their identity. One of the groups with whom they merged was the Median people, who, under the Persian King Darius, unsuccessfully fought Alexander the Great.

The Kurdish language derives in part from the Indo-European tongue of the Medes. It bears similarities to English, as shown by the Kurdish words: star for star, river for river, live for lips, brow for brow, hek for egg and drop for drop, among others.

Arab Rule Resisted

In the seventh century the Arabs began their occupation of the territory of the Kurds.

ment of Turkey, an ally of Germany. The treaty provided for an Independent Kurdistan between Iraq and Armenia.

However, the treaty was never ratified and was replaced in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne. This pact was between the Allies and the new Turkish Government of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who had taken over from the dying Ottoman regime and had just defeated an Allied-supported invasion by Greece. This treaty, to the lasting dismay of the Kurds, omitted the provision for an Independent Kurdistan.

Since then the Kurds have regularly pressed for autonomy and revolts have been numerous throughout Kurdistan.

This vaguely defined region overlaps parts of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and the Soviet Union and some Kurds live in Syria. Estimates of the total Kurdish population in this region vary widely, ranging from less than 3,000,000 to more than 15,000,000.

Barzanis Rebel in Iraq

In Iraq, the Barzani family took the lead in a rebellion against the Ottoman Empire between 1932 and 1943. Mullah Mustafa and two of his brothers

borders were blocked by the Iraqi Army in the south and by border guards on the frontiers of other countries.

None of the surrounding countries would give permission to enter the rebel territory nor would any other country help.

Turkey, Iran and Syria have Kurdish minorities of their own. The United States and Britain are committed to Turkey and Iran in the Central Treaty Organization. The Soviet Union, despite the covert activities of the Middle East Communists, is committed to support Premier Kassin.

Finally a rendezvous was arranged with a man who carried a newspaper in his left hand and said "Bonjour." Then followed a series of comic errors, whose absurdity ended the cloak and dagger atmosphere.

The man whose house was the first stop was not home. The driver of a truck, the third vehicle used, lost his way.

A result of the delay was that a guard of fifty men who had waited five days in Iraqi Kurdistan, departed a day before the visitors arrived.

The man who led the expedition was Ahmed Tofik, whose unquenchable enthusiasm, inexhaustible energy and fearlessness overcame all errors and obstacles. He mixed public relations with speechmaking as he went.

Vast resources of humor and medical advice were provided by Apo Jomart, an incredible, 72-year-old revolutionary, whose strength exceeded men half his age. Apart from acting as interpreter, he was a Frenchman, a Kurd, a Turk, a Persian, a Soviet, a British, a German, a Russian, a Chinese, a Japanese, a Korean, a Vietnamese, a Cambodian, a Laotian, a Thai, a Siamese, a Burmese, a Malayan, a Singaporean, a Bornean, a Sumatran, a Javanese, a Balinese, a Sundaese, a Celebesese, a Moluccan, a Macanese, a Portuguese, a Spanish, a French, a British, a German, a Russian, a Chinese, a Japanese, a Korean, a Vietnamese, a Cambodian, a Laotian, a Thai, a Siamese, a Burmese, a Malayan, a Singaporean, a Bornean, a Sumatran, a Javanese, a Balinese, a Sundaese, a Celebesese, a Moluccan, a Macanese, a Portuguese, a Spanish, a French, a British, a German, a Russian, a Chinese, a Japanese, a Korean, a Vietnamese, a Cambodian, a Laotian, a Thai, a Siamese, a Burmese, a Malayan, a Singaporean, a Bornean, a Sumatran, a Javanese, a Balinese, a Sundaese, a Celebesese, a Moluccan, a Macanese, a Portuguese, a Spanish, a French, a British, a German, a Russian, a 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by taking the village of Hiran in the Hushnaou valley and sending his men into the Sela-beddin range and the Safin mountains.

As the traveler moved through the mountains above Rewandiz, he could look down at night at the lights of five surrounded Iraqi garrisons.

The five garrisons, with their strength as estimated by the rebels, are situated in the following places:

Bafistian, a tented area with 3,000 men; Zewa, "a village of five houses," 2,000 men; Diana, a village of 1,200 population, 3,000 men; Khalifan, a village of seven houses, 2,000 men; and Shaqlawa, a town of 10,000 held by 2,000 troops and 500 "Josh," the term used for Kurdish auxiliaries employed by the Iraqi Army.

The administrative center of Rewandiz, a town of 10,000, is held by a small unit of Josh and policemen.

Routes of Escape Blocked by Rebels

All routes south to Erbil and Baghdad have been closed to the encircled garrisons. The road through the narrow pass of Gali Ali Begh, which connects Rewandiz to Shaqlawa, has been blocked with huge rocks.

In this mountainous terrain, the Iraqi tanks and armored cars are of little value. The trapped garrisons must either fight their way out or settle down to a long siege, depending on helicopters for supplies, while waiting for reinforcements from the south.

In this situation it seems possible that some decisive turn in the military picture may take place before winter. The main point of pressure for the next four or five weeks will be Shaqlawa.

Describing his present strategy, Mullah Mustafa said:

"Now we are attacking. The enemy has lost the power to attack and when a military force loses the power to attack it is finished."

In saying this, however, the rebel general made it clear he did not mean to suggest that his forces were departing from their traditional guerrilla tactics. He said that by using guerrilla tactics his army had lost only one man for every forty lost by the enemy.

He estimated that the rebels had killed 4,000 enemy soldiers in the last year and had taken 4,000 prisoners.

Except for a few officers, almost all of the prisoners have been released. The prospect of release increases the tendency of the demoralized Iraqi forces to surrender, the Kurds said.

The Kurds in the Iraqi Army, who at one time made up more than a quarter of the Iraqi troops operating in the north, are reported to be filtering out of the army and joining the

unsuccessfully against Alexander the Great.

The Kurdish language derives in part from the Indo-European tongue of the Medes. It bears similarities to English, as shown by the Kurdish words *star* for star, *ribar* for river, *live* for lips, *brow* for brow, *hek* for egg and *dlop* for drop, among others.

Arab Rule Resisted

In the seventh century the Arabs began their occupation of the territory of the Kurds. While the Zoroastrian Kurds accepted the Moslem religion, they continued sporadic resistance to the Arabs for centuries.

In the Middle Ages there were twenty-eight Kurdish territories ruled by princes. Their castles, the ruins of which may still be seen, were centers of wealth and, in some cases, of learning.

In the twelfth century, a Kurd, Saladin, led Moslem armies against the Christian Crusaders.

At that time Turkoman Seljuks were invading what is now Turkey and successive waves of Turkomans devastated Kurdistan.

In the thirteenth century, Ottoman Turks subjugated the Kurdish princes. Under the Ottomans Kurdish national life disintegrated, but there were national voices, such as that of the poet Ahmeda Khane, who wrote a love story symbolizing the love of Kurdistan.

Nationalism Encouraged

Beginning with the founding of the National Kurdish School and the Kurdish League in Constantinople about 1910 Kurdish nationalism spread much as Arab nationalism did at the same time.

The Kurds' nationalist aspirations were encouraged by the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, dictated by the victorious Allies of World War I on the Ottoman Govern-

throughout Kurdistan. This vaguely defined region overlaps parts of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and the Soviet Union and some Kurds live in Syria. Estimates of the total Kurdish population in this region vary widely, ranging from less than 3,000,000 to more than 15,000,000.

Barzanis Rebel in Iraq

In Iraq, the Barzani family took the lead in a rebellion against the Ottoman Turks. Between 1932 and 1943 Mullah Mustafa and two of his brothers were exiled. In 1943 Mullah Mustafa returned to take up arms against the Government. This rebellion was followed in 1946 by the formation of the Mehabad Republic in Iran with Mullah Mustafa as army Chief of Staff.

Unable to get support from either the West or the Soviet Union, the Republic succumbed to the Iranian Army the next year and Mullah Mustafa and 496 of his men fought their way back to Iraq. But the opposition they met there forced them to flee to the Soviet Union for refuge.

In July, 1958, King Faisal of Iraq and his Premier, Nuri as-Said, were killed in a revolution that brought Gen. Abdul Karim Kassim to power. Shortly thereafter, Mullah Mustafa and his men returned to Iraq.

At first the new Iraqi Government was friendly to the Kurdish leader, but relations soon became strained and in August, 1961, Mullah Mustafa resumed his rebellion, beginning in the western sector of Iraqi Kurdistan.

He said Premier Kassim had gone back on promises of equality for the Kurds and was "worse than Nuri Said."

Demanding autonomy for the Kurds in Iraq, he set out to overthrow Premier Kassim by means of a precaution against shattering the Iraqi Army, which is the basis of Premier Kassim's power.

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Vast resources of humor and medical advice were provided by Apo Jomart, an incredible, 72-year-old revolutionary, whose strength exceeded men half his age. Apart from acting as interpreter in French, he prescribed medicines for soldiers, babies and even cows.

Then there was Jamil, a toothless, graying warrior, who was in exile with Mullah Mustafa in the Soviet Union in the ten years after 1947. Jamil's special talent was barbecuing chicken.

Visitor Supplied With Kurdish Garb

There was also Moustafa, who loaded the mules and regaled us with Kurdish songs that appeared to be a cross between a Gregorian chant and a Swiss yodel. There was Anwar, a former accountant with the Iraq Petroleum Company, who aspired to become a Kurdish pilot. He did his best as an English-language interpreter.

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At an outdoor tailoring three sewing machines were turning out Kurdish uniforms for soldiers. A small army was seen, where recruits were in old hunting rifle new semi-automatic weapons recently captured from the Army.

In these warlike scenes was also laughter. Kurds laughed and boasted and up and down mountains, big grapes, melons, figs, and peaches.

Kurds Generous With Hospitality

At night an old village man told fairy tales as herders drank tea. There were alcoholic beverages. Kurds rarely drink, even beer.

Village boys could be seen swimming in rivers and travelers joined them to find the water icy cold.

Hospitality for the visitor American knew no limits. Goats, chickens and lambs were slaughtered to supplement the basic diet of rice, yoghurt and skimmed fermented milk. The best bedding, and even mosquito nets, were provided.

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region overlapping four nations shown by the diagonal shading on the inset map.)

Revolt in Iraq Is Latest Chapter In the Long History of the Kurds

Struggle Against Domination Has Lasted Thousands of Years—Autonomy Was Promised in Unratified 1920 Treaty

Special to The New York Times.

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Sept. 9.—The rebellion of the Kurds in Iraq, who seek to establish an autonomous state of Kurdistan, is the latest chapter in a story thousands of years old.

The Kurds never tire of hearing accounts of their past and its evidence of their unflagging will to survive and to establish their national identity.

They trace their history back to nearly 2000 B. C. in that long time they have come into conflict with many peoples, absorbing some and being absorbed by others, yet never losing their identity. One of the groups with whom they merged was the Median people, who, under the Persian King Darius, unsuccessfully fought Alexander the Great.

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The Kurds' nationalist aspirations were encouraged by the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, dictated by the victorious Allies of World War I on the Ottoman Govern-

ment of Turkey, an ally of Germany. The treaty provided for an independent Kurdistan between Iraq and Armenia.

However, the treaty was never ratified and was replaced in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne. This pact was between the Allies and the new Turkish Government of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who had taken over from the dying Ottoman regime and had just defeated an Allied-supported invasion by Greece. This treaty, to the lasting dismay of the Kurds, omitted the provision for an independent Kurdistan.

Since then the Kurds have regularly pressed for autonomy and revolts have been numerous throughout Kurdistan.

This vaguely defined region overlaps parts of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and the Soviet Union and some Kurds live in Syria. Estimates of the total Kurdish population in this region vary widely, ranging from less than 3,000,000 to more than 15,000,000.

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Demanding autonomy for the Kurds in Iraq, he set out to overthrow Premier Kassim by assailing the Iraqi Army, which is the basis of Premier Kassim's power.

borders were blocked by the Iraqi Army in the south and by border guards on the frontiers of other countries.

None of the surrounding countries would give permission to enter the rebel territory nor would any other country help.

Turkey, Iran and Syria have Kurdish minorities of their own. The United States and Britain are committed to Turkey and Iran in the Central Treaty Organization. The Soviet Union, despite the covert activities of the Middle East Communists, is committed to support Premier Kassim.

Finally a rendezvous was arranged with a man who carried a newspaper in his left hand and said "Bonjour." Then followed a series of comic errors, whose absurdity ended the cloak and dagger atmosphere.

The man whose house was the first stop was not home. The driver of a truck, the third vehicle used, lost his way.

A result of the delay was that a guard of fifty men who had waited five days in Iraqi Kurdistan, departed a day before the visitors arrived.

The man who led the expedition was Ahmed Tofik, whose unquenchable enthusiasm, inexhaustible energy and fearlessness overcame all errors and obstacles. He mixed public relations with speechmaking as he went.

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The army was alert to the possibility that the Iraqi Government might attempt to apprehend it. When a former mullah, what seemed to be undoubtedly a visit to the American Embassy in the western sector of the Kurdish territory, he was thrown under arrest for five days as a precaution against the possibility that he might be a spy for the Baghdad authorities.

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At times Ahmed inspired wel-

haunting by
This meant enemy airplanes and
was the signal for sliding off
the mule and into a ditch. The
planes were Soviet-made MIG's
and Ilyushins or British-made
Furies flown by Iraqi pilots.

One day incendiary bullets from a MIG set fire to a field above the dry creek bed in which the party was making itself as small as possible. Another day cannon and machine-gun fire from a Fury killed a small girl and a soldier and wounded two villagers and two soldiers. The smoke of burning fields and villages often blackened the sky.

The heat and planes were largely avoided by moving mainly at night. The group moved from commander to commander, village to village, sometimes observing fighting. The sound of mortars could occasionally be heard. Later, wounded soldiers and prisoners would appear.

At a hospital high in the mountains patients lay on pallets under the trees. No physician was available and a former hospital medical assistant was in charge.

Two prisoner-of-war camps were passed. One held about thirty captured officers, fifty middle grade Iraqi officials and ninety political prisoners, mostly police spies accused of having abused Kurds.

At an outdoor tailoring shop three sewing machines were in the turning out Kurdish clothing for the soldiers. A small arsenal was seen, where recruits might turn in old hunting rifles for new semi-automatic weapons, recently captured from the Iraqi Army.

In these warlike scenes there was also laughter. Kurdish soldiers, elated by victories, laughed and boasted and raced up and down mountains, gleefully grapes, melons, figs, apples and peaches.

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**OPERATIONS AGAINST
KURDISH REBELS**

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

ANKARA, JULY 10

A Turkish gendarmerie post on the Iraq frontier was bombed last night by MiG fighters of the Iraq Air Force, according to reports reaching Ankara from Hakkari in south-east Turkey. The Turks manning the post put out the Turkish flag, and when the fighters came on fired back. No casualties or damage have been reported.

The reports say the incident took place at Gerur, about 20 miles on the Turkish side of the frontier. It is thought that the aircraft may be operating against the leader of the Kurdish revolt in northern Iraq, the Mullah Mustafa Barzani.

The Turkish Cabinet is believed yesterday to have considered measures for reestablishing order in mountainous south-east Turkey, where Kurdish smugglers and brigands have recently increased their operations. Some of them are believed to be supplying arms to the Barzani revolt against Baghdad.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL TIMES. File No. 173/2/1 83.

Published at SYDNEY.

Date 17 - 8 - 62

100 more
**Rebel Kurds Said to Gain
Control in Northern Iraq**

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Aug. 16 (AP) — Kurdish tribal warriors, fighting for self-rule were reported today to have won effective control of northern Iraq.

Dick Anderegg, a correspondent for the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation, spent forty days with the Kurdish partisans in remote mountains along the Turkish-Iranian frontier. He lived two weeks in the secret headquarters camp of Mullah Mustafal-Barani, leader of the revolt.

ME He said two regiments of Premier Abdul Karim Kassim's Iraqi troops appeared to be surrounded in northern Iraq. Mr. Anderegg discounted allegations that the Kurds were being aided by the Soviet Union and said the forces, which may total more than 4,000 men, had received no help from abroad.

Name of Paper TIMES.

Published at LONDON.

File No. 209/11/30

Date 21-8-62

MORE IRAQ AIR ATTACKS ON TURKEY

BORDER VILLAGES EVACUATED

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

ANKARA, AUG. 20

The Turkish Government today released the text of a Note to the Government of Iraq stating the Turkish case on the recent frontier incidents, in which, Turkish sources claim, Iraq aircraft have in the past few days repeatedly attacked Turkish frontier posts and villages. The Note is moderately worded and is couched in reproachful rather than indignant language. It repeatedly emphasizes the need for preserving the historical ties of friendship.

Turkey claims that the sending up of Turkish fighter patrols in the frontier region and the shooting down of an attacking Iraq aircraft were among measures of legitimate defence taken because the Iraq authorities were clearly taking no serious measures to prevent such occurrences.

The Note claims that an Iraq aircraft which fell 50 miles inside Iraq territory is unlikely to be the same one which was shot down by Turkish fighters; the two events occurred at different times, so the Iraq charge that Turkish aircraft had entered Iraq to shoot the Iraq aircraft down was misdirected. The Note does not specifically deny that Turkish aircraft ever entered Iraq.

KURDISH REVOLT

The Turkish Government denies charges by Baghdad Radio that Turkey and "other imperialist powers" are supporting the Barzani Kurdish revolt in north Iraq.

The Turkish press reports today that after a further attack by Iraq aircraft on the south-east corner of Turkey yesterday seven Turkish border villages have been evacuated. Whether this measure is to protect the inhabitants or to prevent the Kurdish population in the area from aiding their fellow Kurds across the border in Iraq is uncertain.

It has been known for some time that Kurds in south-east Turkey, in particular active bands of Kurdish brigands in the mountains, have been smuggling arms and material to Barzani, but Baghdad Radio has only now for the first time attempted to implicate the Turkish Government in this affair.

Turkish governments are not usually enthusiastic about Kurdish revolts in their own or any other territory, and it has been presumed here that Ankara, though it has never made any open statement about the Barzani revolt in Iraq, has no reason for wishing its success.



OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2.

Memo No. 1390

12th September, 1962

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Kurds

Ankara reported to the Foreign Office in the following terms on 5th September:

"At the opening session of the Assembly on September 3, after the summer recess, the Foreign Minister made a long statement on the Turco-Iraqi border incidents.

M. Erkin gave a detailed account of the events summarised in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements of August 20 and 24. He repeatedly stressed the efforts the Turkish Government had made to deal with the series of frontier violations in a manner compatible with good relations between Turkey and Iraq and spoke with indignation of the later hostile response by the Iraqi authorities, who had earlier received Turkish representations in a spirit of apparent understanding and cooperation. The Turkish proposal to submit the dispute to an impartial commission had produced no response from the Iraqis. (This proposal, it appears, has only been made in the statement of August 24 and has not been communicated to the Iraqis through official channels.)

The tone of the statement throughout was firm but not provocative.

The statement was fully reported in the press; but there has been little or no press comment."

2. We are sending a copy of this memorandum to Cairo.

R. N. Hamilton

(R.N. Hamilton)

for Senior External Affairs Representative.

14/11
See
18-12-62



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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

3/12/76

Memo No. 1324

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

29th August, 1962

Kurds

The following telegrams have been received by
the Foreign Office:

From Ankara - 24th August

"Yesterday's papers reported Kassem's statement to Baghdad paper Es Savr including sentence 'I feel certain that when our friend and ally, the Turkish nation, learns that its own Government has violated our air space and becomes aware of the crime that the Turkish Government has committed, it will not approve of such a situation and will bring pressure to bear on its Government'.

Answering questions by journalists on reports that Turkish Ambassador, who had returned to Baghdad from leave following incidents on August 15 and 16, had been refused an interview with Kassem, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman said, 'When the aggression on the Turco-Iraqi borders, important in the light of the relations which exist between the two countries, occurred, the Turkish Ambassador to Baghdad, Mr. Seyfettin Turagay, returned to Baghdad from Ankara where he was on leave. Mr. Turagay discussed the events in question with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Mr. Hashim Cevad. He did not, however, ask for an interview with General Kassem. In view of the announcement issued by the Iraqi Government, the planned demonstrations and the continuous unfriendly publications and broadcasts by the Iraqi press and radio station, which demonstrated clearly the negative attitude which the Iraqi Government has adopted in this situation, and this, despite the dignified attitude of our Government, our Ambassador has been recalled to Turkey to complete that part of his leave which he had not used'.

With reference to Baghdad telegram No. 569 Turkish Ministry of National Defence official statement on August 20 referring to press reports of attack said two Iraqi aircraft had been seen on August 19 over Mengelo and had opened fire on Iraqi territory. There was no (repeat no) incident on Turkish soil and no (repeat no) attack aimed at Turkish borders."

From Ankara - 24th August

"Ministry of Foreign Affairs consider that Kassem's statement, appealing to Turkish people over head of Government, bears out their theory of Communist influence reported in my telegram 1023.

Terms of announcement of return of Turkish Ambassador from Baghdad and fact that it was made in

reply to journalists' questions, seem to reflect continued anxiety to keep tension down, but at the same time to appear to be reacting firmly to Iraqi attacks. One or two opposition newspapers have been accusing the Minister for Foreign Affairs of weakness in dealing with Kassem's attitude."

From Baghdad - 24th August

"I know of only one official Iraqi statement (Ankara's paragraph 2), namely that reported in my telegram 562. On August 21 press published details 'from an authoritative source' of the 'strongly worded official Note' sent to the Turks about their 'savage aggression'.

Only other statements have been by non-official bodies as reported in my telegram No. 569; these have been extremely hostile, and their only 'reasonable' touches have been the usual Communist ones suggesting that the Turkish people will dissociate themselves from the acts of their Government.

The anti-Turkish press campaign has been violent. However the subject has entirely disappeared from today's press and radio."

From Ankara - 25th August

"The following statement was issued yesterday by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

'On the 20th of August 1962, the Turkish Government published a communique describing the numerous violations of Turkish air space by Iraqi aircraft. This communique, after enumerating the Iraqi attacks on the Turkish border, made note of the fact that an Iraqi aircraft had come down at Shaklava and stated that the crash was not due to Turkish action nor, as had been alleged, to the action of Turkish aircraft over Iraqi territory.

Furthermore, the importance accorded by the Turkish Government to Turco-Iraqi relations was once more emphasised and it was stated that, instead of taking severe measures in face of Iraqi attacks, the Turkish Government was only taking certain justifiable defensive measures.

In response to the calm attitude, aimed at preserving Turco-Iraqi friendship, adopted by the Turkish Government, the Iraqi leaders unfortunately took action which gave rise to the impression that they wished to damage the friendship existing between the two countries.

Instead of trying to find a reasonable solution to the dispute, the Government of Iraq preferred to adopt an attitude contrary to the facts and endangering the relations between the two countries.

The official Baghdad Radio has broadcast daily in several languages assertions that the Turkish Government is assisting the rebel tribes and, in league with Imperialists and Colonialists, is attempting to destroy Iraq. Drawing on well known sources in these groundless allegations, Baghdad Radio has tried to incite the Turkish nation against its Government. The Government controlled Iraqi press has carried articles of the

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
- 3 -

same nature and street demonstrations against Turkey have also taken place.

Finally the Iraqi Prime Minister, General Kassem, in a statement made to a Baghdad newspaper said 'I believe that the Turkish nation will bring pressure to bear on its Government to change its hostile attitude'. He went on to accuse Turkey, in the usual terms, of cooperation with the Imperialists and Colonialists against Iraq. This statement alone should be sufficient proof of the mistaken line adopted by the Government of Iraq.

In disputed cases, such as the continual violation of the Turkish border and the crash of the Iraqi aircraft, it is the usual and peaceful practice to resort to impartial investigation Commission. Confident of the complete justice of its own case, the Turkish Government is ready to adopt such a course. Will the Government of Iraq have the courage to accept this course, which will bring the whole truth to light.' "

2. We are sending a copy of this memorandum to Cairo.


(R.N. Hamilton)

for Senior External Affairs Representative.



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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 1215

3 SEP 1962

209/1130
27th August, 1962The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRAKurdsThe following telegrams have been received by
the Foreign Office:From Ankara - 23rd August

"Ministry of Foreign Affairs have informed us that the communication received by them from Iraqis was in similar terms to statement published in Baghdad press on August 19. It did not contain accusation of Turkish support of Kurdish rebels or admission of Iraqi attack on Turkish territory made earlier in Baghdad radio statement broadcast on the afternoon of August 18.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Iraqis had subsequently published a further statement in more reasonable terms, with references to Turco-Iraqi friendship. They were unable however to produce text or details (Baghdad may be able to confirm). Turks hope therefore that their efforts to keep tension down may be having some effect.

The Ministry have been considering background to these incidents. Because the second Iraqi attack on Baskan on August 16 came after clear warning given by them to Iraqis immediately following incidents on August 15. The Turks now consider possibility of genuine error unlikely and think that Kassem himself may have been responsible, inspired by Communist influenced advisers. They point out that Turkey is now Iraq's only link with the West and that these incidents may be a Communist attempt to break this last link. The Turks are concerned about growing Communist influence in Iraq and anxious to prevent the latter's complete isolation from the West and are therefore doing their utmost to limit the repercussions of the recent incidents. They also of course have a strong interest in seeing unrest curbed in Iraqi Kurdistan and, as Kassem knows, they have no intention of encouraging Kurdish nationalists anywhere."

From Baghdad - 23rd August

"There is continued silence about Iraqi apologies for attacks, and no mention of the third attack reported by B.B.C. on August 20 (I should be glad to have confirmation of this). There is also no reference to the Turkish official statement.

Instead there have been continued press attacks on Turkey, an organised demonstration by peasants who clearly had little idea what it was all about, and

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
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
TURKEY

CONFIDENTIAL 76

- 2 -

statements by the General Federation of Students and by the Permanent Bureau of the National Peace Council (both Communist-front organisations) condemning Turkey. The students' statement concentrated on CENCO, the Peace Council's on Imperialism."

2. We are sending a copy of this memorandum to Cairo.



(R.N. Hamilton)

for Senior External Affairs Representative.



OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND.

LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 1306

23rd August, 1962

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Kurds

Ankara reported to the Foreign Office in the following terms on 21st August:

"On August 19 the Turkish Foreign Minister, M. Erkin, told reporters that there had been no further developments along the Turkey-Iraqi border. He said that the incidents could have occurred because of the over zealous action against the Barz Amis by the Iraqi Government. He also said that the Iraqi Government had sent a Note to the Turkish Government protesting against the shooting down of an Iraqi aircraft.

The Turkish press reported on August 20 that although no official announcement had been made of the contents of the Iraqi Note, it mentioned the fact that the Iraqi aircraft crashed 70 kms within Iraq, and claimed that Turkish aircraft crossed into Iraqi territory. The press stated that the Note demanded an apology and compensation from the Turkish Government for the loss of the aircraft and the pilot.

On August 21 the press carried an official communique issued on the evening of August 20 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the full text of which is contained in my immediately following telegram. The Turkish communique refuted the allegations of the Iraqi Government that Turkish planes had penetrated into Iraqi territory. It also set out the facts about the bombing and machine gunning of villages on the Turkish side of the border by Iraqi aircraft. The communique stated that for its part the Turkish Government had made great efforts in order not to harm the traditionally friendly relations which existed between the two countries, and refuted categorically Iraqi suggestion that Turkey was cooperating with the Kurdish rebels in Iraq."

"The following is the full text of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs communique, issued on August 20:

'The violation of Turkish air space by Iraqi aircraft, a common practice by these aircraft for some time, on June 16, started to become more frequent, and at times took on aggressive characteristics, at a time when the Turkish Government approaching the Iraqi Government, was in the process of negotiations intended to request the prevention of such incidents, and the punishment of those who were responsible, further similar aggressive incidents occurred, which, as was stressed at every opportunity, would most

definitely have a negative influence on the relations existing between the two countries.

Those aggressions which occurred on August 15 and 16, 1962, particularly, because they resulted in the loss of lives and because they indicated that, despite the negotiations by the Turkish Republic Government, the Iraqi Government had taken no serious measure, brought the situation to an unfortunately critical stage.

From 0700 hours on August 15, 1962, Iraqi aircraft, for a whole hour, attacked our Rubaruk frontier post with bombs and machine guns, causing the death of two of our soldiers, and wounding one other on the afternoon of the same day. From 1400 hours, the village of Biskan was attacked and damage was caused to property. While this attack was under way, the Iraqi Ambassador to Ankara was warned that unless the aircraft were immediately withdrawn Turkey would retaliate.

Owing to the fact that the incidents became continuous within the Turkish borders and that they took on the aspect of being more than violation of Turkish air space by mistake and caused loss of life and property, the Turkish Government, in an effort to ensure a minimum and legitimate measure of protection decided to have Turkish aircraft patrol within its own boundary. The Turkish Air Force in conformity with these instructions have carried out their duties within Turkish air space.

The Iraqi Government was immediately informed that such patrol flights by our aircraft had been started, and that we would retaliate against any new attacks. In response, it was seen that on the morning of August 16, 1962, Iraqi aircraft not only violated Turkish air space but once again bombed and set ablaze the village of Biskan. This bore witness to the fact that the Iraqi authorities, despite the reasonable attitude adopted by us, and the repeated warnings, had taken no serious preventive measures in this connection.

One of the Iraqi aircraft which participated in this last attack between the hour of 0600 and 0630 on August 16, 1962, was seen by the Turkish patrol planes at the moment that it was climbing away from the village of Biskan, which it had attacked, and as it was about to leave the vicinity. This aircraft was hit by fire from Turkish aircraft which were flying at a higher altitude, following which it was seen slowly to enter Iraqi territory, with all the signs that it would have to make a forced landing. All of the Turkish patrol aircraft returned following this incident, and had already landed at their base at 7 o'clock. Except for this stated incident, the Turkish aircraft have at no time met in combat any Iraqi aircraft.

The Iraqi Government attempted to claim that an aircraft had been shot down by the Turkish Air Force, between 1100 and 1130 of the same day, south east of Saklava, at a distance of some 70 kms from the Turkish frontier. If the crash of an Iraqi aircraft was not the result of some other incident which took place within the Iraqi borders, then it would seem possible that an aircraft which was damaged by Turkish planes after having bombed the village of Biskan was forced


to descend at Saklava. But in this case the hours mentioned by the Iraqis do not conform with the pattern of events. In either of these possibilities, it is impossible to attribute the shooting down of the Iraqi plane, either to Turkey, or as had been claimed, to an action by Turkish aircraft which had allegedly penetrated into Iraq.

Meanwhile, at a time when the Turkish Government is in a constructive manner striving to preserve Turco-Iraqi friendship, Baghdad Radio broadcast an announcement after having claimed that on various occasions, the earliest being on March 12, 1959, Turkish aircraft had entered Iraqi air space, it was alleged that the Turkish Government was in cooperation with Britain and America supporting the brigands in northern Iraq, and it was admitted that Iraqi aircraft had, in order to prevent the provisioning of those taking part in the clashes in northern Iraq, attacked Turkish territory.

The fact that the Turkish Government had with the aim of preserving Turco-Iraqi friendship, contented itself with warnings in the face of the violations of Turkish territory which had taken place to date, had been received with satisfaction by the Iraqi leaders themselves. Even if it were possible that Turkish aircraft had, in error, crossed the Iraqi borders, it is accepted even in the announcement mentioned above, that they had not participated in any premeditated incidents, such as attacks on Iraqi villages with bombs and machine gun fire. However, in all of the border violations by Iraqi aircraft, Turkish villages and frontier posts were subjected to attacks by bombs and machine gun fire in a manner which does not admit of the possibility of error, and for which this time the Iraqi Government has admitted responsibility. Despite all the loss of life and property which had resulted, the Turkish Government, because of the importance which it attaches to Turco-Iraqi friendship, had never resorted to the stern measures which were called for, and contented itself with the taking of some legitimate defensive measure.

Despite this wide difference in the attitude of the two Governments, the Turkish Government, concerned over the possibility of the historic ties of friendship between the Turkish and Iraqi nations being damaged, preferred to adopt a positive attitude in the face of these latest incidents. Again prompted by this thought, and bearing in mind that there had been no further incidents of border violations since August 16, the Turkish Government has, for the present, stopped the patrol flights along the borders. The Iraqi Government and leaders, who until recently had always warmly praised Turkey's friendly and correct attitude towards Iraq, now suddenly appear to have forgotten all this and are trying to accuse Turkey of cooperating with insurgent bands in Iraq. Naturally these accusations cannot be reconciled with reality. "

2. We are sending a copy of this memorandum to Cairo.


(R.N. Hamilton)
for Senior External Affairs Representative.



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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND.

LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 1305

23rd August, 1962

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs
CANBERRAKurds

Ankara reported to the Foreign Office in the following terms on 17th August:

"The following is the text of an official announcement issued on August 16 by the Turkish Ministry of Defence.

'At seven o'clock this morning Iraqi planes once again attacked the village of Biskan. During this time Turkish planes on patrol duty opened fire forcing down one of the Iraqi planes. There were no casualties at the village of Biskan.'

The following announcement was also issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the late evening of August 16.

'As announced in connection with the incident of the attack by Iraqi planes on our southern borders, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday took the necessary steps with the Iraqi Government via the Turkish Ambassador in Baghdad and the Iraqi Ambassador in Ankara. In the reply sent by the Iraqi Government to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through both these channels, it was stated that Iraq attaches value and importance to Turkey's friendship and that she hopes that these incidents, which were not intentional, will not adversely affect Turko-Iraqi friendship. Those responsible will be found and punished, and compensation will be given for damage caused in Turkey.'

All papers report that Mr. Inonu yesterday called a meeting attended by the Deputy Prime Ministers, Mr. Alican and Mr. Dincer, General Sunay, Chief of the General Staff, and Mr. Yolga, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They all report that General Tansel, C-in-C Turkish Air Force, left for Diyarbakir, which is an Air Force base."

2. We are sending a copy of this memorandum to Cairo.

(R.N. Hamilton)

for Senior External Affairs Representative.

*McPhilligan
to Sec
H.A. Gammis
3.18.62*

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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 1315

27th August, 1962

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Kurds

The following telegrams have been received by
the Foreign Office:

From Ankara - 23rd August

"Ministry of Foreign Affairs have informed us that the communication received by them from Iraqis was in similar terms to statement published in Baghdad press on August 19. It did not contain accusation of Turkish support of Kurdish rebels or admission of Iraqi attack on Turkish territory made earlier in Baghdad radio statement broadcast on the afternoon of August 18.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Iraqis had subsequently published a further statement in more reasonable terms, with references to Turco-Iraqi friendship. They were unable however to produce text or details (Baghdad may be able to confirm). Turks hope therefore that their efforts to keep tension down may be having some effect.

The Ministry have been considering background to these incidents. Because the second Iraqi attack on Biskan on August 16 came after clear warning given by them to Iraqis immediately following incidents on August 15. The Turks now consider possibility of genuine error unlikely and think that Kassem himself may have been responsible, inspired by Communist influenced advisers. They point out that Turkey is now Iraq's only link with the West and that these incidents may be a Communist attempt to break this last link. The Turks are concerned about growing Communist influence in Iraq and anxious to prevent the latter's complete isolation from the West and are therefore doing their utmost to limit the repercussions of the recent incidents. They also of course have a strong interest in seeing unrest curbed in Iraqi Kurdistan and, as Kassem knows, they have no intention of encouraging Kurdish nationalists anywhere."

From Baghdad - 23rd August

"There is continued silence about Iraqi apologies for attacks, and no mention of the third attack reported by B.B.C. on August 20 (I should be glad to have confirmation of this). There is also no reference to the Turkish official statement.

Instead there have been continued press attacks on Turkey, an organised demonstration by peasants who clearly had little idea what it was all about, and

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- 2 -

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statements by the General Federation of Students and by the Permanent Bureau of the National Peace Council (both Communist-front organisations) condemning Turkey. The students' statement concentrated on CENCO, the Peace Council's on Imperialism."

2. We are sending a copy of this memorandum to Cairo.

(R.N. Hamilton)
for Senior External Affairs Representative.

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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 1306

209/11/50

23rd August, 1962

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRAKurds

Ankara reported to the Foreign Office in the following terms on 21st August:

"On August 19 the Turkish Foreign Minister, M. Erkin, told reporters that there had been no further developments along the Turkey-Iraqi border. He said that the incidents could have occurred because of the over zealous action against the Barz Amis by the Iraqi Government. He also said that the Iraqi Government had sent a Note to the Turkish Government protesting against the shooting down of an Iraqi aircraft.

The Turkish press reported on August 20 that although no official announcement had been made of the contents of the Iraqi Note, it mentioned the fact that the Iraqi aircraft crashed 70 kms within Iraq, and claimed that Turkish aircraft crossed into Iraqi territory. The press stated that the Note demanded an apology and compensation from the Turkish Government for the loss of the aircraft and the pilot.

On August 21 the press carried an official communique issued on the evening of August 20 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the full text of which is contained in my immediately following telegram. The Turkish communique refuted the allegations of the Iraqi Government that Turkish planes had penetrated into Iraqi territory. It also set out the facts about the bombing and machine gunning of villages on the Turkish side of the border by Iraqi aircraft. The communique stated that for its part the Turkish Government had made great efforts in order not to harm the traditionally friendly relations which existed between the two countries, and refuted categorically Iraqi suggestion that Turkey was cooperating with the Kurdish rebels in Iraq."

"The following is the full text of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs communique, issued on August 20:

'The violation of Turkish air space by Iraqi aircraft, a common practice by these aircraft for some time, on June 16, started to become more frequent, and at times took on aggressive characteristics, at a time when the Turkish Government approaching the Iraqi Government, was in the process of negotiations intended to request the prevention of such incidents, and the punishment of those who were responsible, further similar aggressive incidents occurred, which, as was stressed at every opportunity, would most

definitely have a negative influence on the relations existing between the two countries.

Those aggressions which occurred on August 15 and 16, 1962, particularly, because they resulted in the loss of lives and because they indicated that, despite the negotiations by the Turkish Republic Government, the Iraqi Government had taken no serious measure, brought the situation to an unfortunately critical stage.

From 0700 hours on August 15, 1962, Iraqi aircraft, for a whole hour, attacked our Rubaruk frontier post with bombs and machine guns, causing the death of two of our soldiers, and wounding one other on the afternoon of the same day. From 1400 hours, the village of Biskan was attacked and damage was caused to property. While this attack was under way, the Iraqi Ambassador to Ankara was warned that unless the aircraft were immediately withdrawn Turkey would retaliate.

Owing to the fact that the incidents became continuous within the Turkish borders and that they took on the aspect of being more than violation of Turkish air space by mistake and caused loss of life and property, the Turkish Government, in an effort to ensure a minimum and legitimate measure of protection decided to have Turkish aircraft patrol within its own boundary. The Turkish Air Force in conformity with these instructions have carried out their duties within Turkish air space.

The Iraqi Government was immediately informed that such patrol flights by our aircraft had been started, and that we would retaliate against any new attacks. In response, it was seen that on the morning of August 16, 1962, Iraqi aircraft not only violated Turkish air space but once again bombed and set ablaze the village of Biskan. This bore witness to the fact that the Iraqi authorities, despite the reasonable attitude adopted by us, and the repeated warnings, had taken no serious preventive measures in this connection.

One of the Iraqi aircraft which participated in this last attack between the hour of 0600 and 0630 on August 16, 1962, was seen by the Turkish patrol planes at the moment that it was climbing away from the village of Biskan, which it had attacked, and as it was about to leave the vicinity. This aircraft was hit by fire from Turkish aircraft which were flying at a higher altitude, following which it was seen slowly to enter Iraqi territory, with all the signs that it would have to make a forced landing. All of the Turkish patrol aircraft returned following this incident, and had already landed at their base at 7 o'clock. Except for this stated incident, the Turkish aircraft have at no time met in combat any Iraqi aircraft.

The Iraqi Government attempted to claim that an aircraft had been shot down by the Turkish Air Force, between 1100 and 1130 of the same day, south east of Saklava, at a distance of some 70 kms from the Turkish frontier. If the crash of an Iraqi aircraft was not the result of some other incident which took place within the Iraqi borders, then it would seem possible that an aircraft which was damaged by Turkish planes after having bombed the village of Biskan was forced

to descend at Saklava. But in this case the hours mentioned by the Iraqis do not conform with the pattern of events. In either of these possibilities, it is impossible to attribute the shooting down of the Iraqi plane, either to Turkey, or as had been claimed, to an action by Turkish aircraft which had allegedly penetrated into Iraq.

Meanwhile, at a time when the Turkish Government is in a constructive manner striving to preserve Turco-Iraqi friendship, Baghdad Radio broadcast an announcement after having claimed that on various occasions, the earliest being on March 12, 1959, Turkish aircraft had entered Iraqi air space, it was alleged that the Turkish Government was in cooperation with Britain and America supporting the brigands in northern Iraq, and it was admitted that Iraqi aircraft had, in order to prevent the provisioning of those taking part in the clashes in northern Iraq, attacked Turkish territory.

The fact that the Turkish Government had with the aim of preserving Turco-Iraqi friendship, contented itself with warnings in the face of the violations of Turkish territory which had taken place to date, had been received with satisfaction by the Iraqi leaders themselves. Even if it were possible that Turkish aircraft had, in error, crossed the Iraqi borders, it is accepted even in the announcement mentioned above, that they had not participated in any premeditated incidents, such as attacks on Iraqi villages with bombs and machine gun fire. However, in all of the border violations by Iraqi aircraft, Turkish villages and frontier posts were subjected to attacks by bombs and machine gun fire in a manner which does not admit of the possibility of error, and for which this time the Iraqi Government has admitted responsibility. Despite all the loss of life and property which had resulted, the Turkish Government, because of the importance which it attaches to Turco-Iraqi friendship, had never resorted to the stern measures which were called for, and contented itself with the taking of some legitimate defensive measure.

Despite this wide difference in the attitude of the two Governments, the Turkish Government, concerned over the possibility of the historic ties of friendship between the Turkish and Iraqi nations being damaged, preferred to adopt a positive attitude in the face of these latest incidents. Again prompted by this thought, and bearing in mind that there had been no further incidents of border violations since August 16, the Turkish Government has, for the present, stopped the patrol flights along the borders. The Iraqi Government and leaders, who until recently had always warmly praised Turkey's friendly and correct attitude towards Iraq, now suddenly appear to have forgotten all this and are trying to accuse Turkey of cooperating with insurgent bands in Iraq. Naturally these accusations cannot be reconciled with reality."

2. We are sending a copy of this memorandum to Cairo.

(R.N. Hamilton)
For Senior External Affairs Representative.



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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND.

LONDON, W.C.2.

29/11/30

Memo No. 1305

23rd August, 1962

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs
CANBERRA

Kurds

Ankara reported to the Foreign Office in the following terms on 17th August:

"The following is the text of an official announcement issued on August 16 by the Turkish Ministry of Defence.

'At seven o'clock this morning Iraqi planes once again attacked the village of Biskan. During this time Turkish planes on patrol duty opened fire forcing down one of the Iraqi planes. There were no casualties at the village of Biskan.'

The following announcement was also issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the late evening of August 16.

'As announced in connection with the incident of the attack by Iraqi planes on our southern borders, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday took the necessary steps with the Iraqi Government via the Turkish Ambassador in Baghdad and the Iraqi Ambassador in Ankara. In the reply sent by the Iraqi Government to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through both these channels, it was stated that Iraq attaches value and importance to Turkey's friendship and that she hopes that these incidents, which were not intentional, will not adversely affect Turko-Iraqi friendship. Those responsible will be found and punished, and compensation will be given for damage caused in Turkey.'

All papers report that Mr. Inonu yesterday called a meeting attended by the Deputy Prime Ministers, Mr. Alican and Mr. Dincer, General Sunay, Chief of the General Staff, and Mr. Yolga, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They all report that General Tansel, C-in-C Turkish Air Force, left for Diyarbakir, which is an Air Force base."

2. We are sending a copy of this memorandum to Cairo.

(R.N. Hamilton)
for Senior External Affairs Representative.

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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND.

LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

3/12/76

Memo No. /324

29th August, 1962

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Kurds

The following telegrams have been received by
the Foreign Office:

From Ankara - 24th August

"Yesterday's papers reported Kassem's statement to Baghdad paper Es Savr including sentence 'I feel certain that when our friend and ally, the Turkish nation, learns that its own Government has violated our air space and becomes aware of the crime that the Turkish Government has committed, it will not approve of such a situation and will bring pressure to bear on its Government'.

Answering questions by journalists on reports that Turkish Ambassador, who had returned to Baghdad from leave following incidents on August 15 and 16, had been refused an interview with Kassem, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman said, 'When the aggression on the Turco-Iraqi borders, important in the light of the relations which exist between the two countries, occurred, the Turkish Ambassador to Baghdad, Mr. Seyfettin Turagay, returned to Baghdad from Ankara where he was on leave. Mr. Turagay discussed the events in question with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Mr. Hashim Cevad. He did not, however, ask for an interview with General Kassem. In view of the announcement issued by the Iraqi Government, the planned demonstrations and the continuous unfriendly publications and broadcasts by the Iraqi press and radio station, which demonstrated clearly the negative attitude which the Iraqi Government has adopted in this situation, and this, despite the dignified attitude of our Government, our Ambassador has been recalled to Turkey to complete that part of his leave which he had not used'.

With reference to Baghdad telegram No. 569 Turkish Ministry of National Defence official statement on August 20 referring to press reports of attack said two Iraqi aircraft had been seen on August 19 over Mengelo and had opened fire on Iraqi territory. There was no (repeat no) incident on Turkish soil and no (repeat no) attack aimed at Turkish borders."

From Ankara - 24th August

"Ministry of Foreign Affairs consider that Kassem's statement, appealing to Turkish people over head of Government, bears out their theory of Communist influence reported in my telegram 1023.

Terms of announcement of return of Turkish
Ambassador from Baghdad and fact that it was made in

reply to journalists' questions, seem to reflect continued anxiety to keep tension down, but at the same time to appear to be reacting firmly to Iraqi attacks. One or two opposition newspapers have been accusing the Minister for Foreign Affairs of weakness in dealing with Kassem's attitude."

From Baghdad - 24th August

"I know of only one official Iraqi statement (Ankara's paragraph 2), namely that reported in my telegram 562. On August 21 press published details 'from an authoritative source' of the 'strongly worded official Note' sent to the Turks about their 'savage aggression'.

Only other statements have been by non-official bodies as reported in my telegram No. 569; these have been extremely hostile, and their only 'reasonable' touches have been the usual Communist ones suggesting that the Turkish people will dissociate themselves from the acts of their Government.

The anti-Turkish press campaign has been violent. However the subject has entirely disappeared from today's press and radio."

From Ankara - 25th August

"The following statement was issued yesterday by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

'On the 20th of August 1962, the Turkish Government published a communique describing the numerous violations of Turkish air space by Iraqi aircraft. This communique, after enumerating the Iraqi attacks on the Turkish border, made note of the fact that an Iraqi aircraft had come down at Shaklava and stated that the crash was not due to Turkish action nor, as had been alleged, to the action of Turkish aircraft over Iraqi territory.

Furthermore, the importance accorded by the Turkish Government to Turco-Iraqi relations was once more emphasised and it was stated that, instead of taking severe measures in face of Iraqi attacks, the Turkish Government was only taking certain justifiable defensive measures.

In response to the calm attitude, aimed at preserving Turco-Iraqi friendship, adopted by the Turkish Government, the Iraqi leaders unfortunately took action which gave rise to the impression that they wished to damage the friendship existing between the two countries.

Instead of trying to find a reasonable solution to the dispute, the Government of Iraq preferred to adopt an attitude contrary to the facts and endangering the relations between the two countries.

The official Baghdad Radio has broadcast daily in several languages assertions that the Turkish Government is assisting the rebel tribes and, in league with Imperialists and Colonialists, is attempting to destroy Iraq. Drawing on well known sources in these groundless allegations, Baghdad Radio has tried to incite the Turkish nation against its Government. The Government controlled Iraqi press has carried articles of the

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same nature and street demonstrations against Turkey have also taken place.

Finally the Iraqi Prime Minister, General Kassem, in a statement made to a Baghdad newspaper said 'I believe that the Turkish nation will bring pressure to bear on its Government to change its hostile attitude'. He went on to accuse Turkey, in the usual terms, of cooperation with the Imperialists and Colonialists against Iraq. This statement alone should be sufficient proof of the mistaken line adopted by the Government of Iraq.

In disputed cases, such as the continual violation of the Turkish border and the crash of the Iraqi aircraft, it is the usual and peaceful practice to resort to impartial Investigation Commission. Confident of the complete justice of its own case, the Turkish Government is ready to adopt such a course. Will the Government of Iraq have the courage to accept this course, which will bring the whole truth to light.' "

2. We are sending a copy of this memorandum to Cairo.

(R.N. Hamilton)
for Senior External Affairs Representative.



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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

Memo No. 1295

22nd August, 1962

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Kurds

The following reports are from Ankara to the
Foreign Office:

16th August:

"The following communique was issued yesterday
by the Turkish Ministry of National Defence.

'Two Iraqi planes this morning bombed the
Rubaruk Gendarmerie unit stationed south west of
Semdinli, opening machine-gun fire as well. Two
soldiers were killed and one wounded as a result of
this. In the afternoon, a similar attack was made
on the village of Biskan and damage caused to the
village. No lives were lost. The necessary steps
have been taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
both with the Iraqi Embassy in Ankara and the Iraqi
Government in Baghdad. Aircraft attached to our Air
Force are carrying out patrol duty over the Turco-
Iraqi border.' (Semdinli is in extreme south east
corner of Turkey.)

These incidents were front page headline news in
all this morning's papers. Headlines in Justice
Party (Opposition) papers include references to
rumours that relations with Iraq may be suspended and
National Assembly convened, and to 'this treacherous
attack by the Arabs'. Another headline says 'two
Turkish soldiers who tried waving flags to warn the
planes now dead'.

Most reports give facts as announced by Ministry
of Defence. One adds following details. The first
attack lasted for an hour and the aircraft continually
swooping down over the buildings, dropped several
bombs and directed machine-gun fire at the Gendarmerie
units. Following the attack, Gendarmerie Group
Commander at Rubaruk radioed an S.O.S. to all units
in the vicinity followed by a radio message giving
an account of the attack, stressing that the target
had quite obviously been the group itself and that
the aircraft flew directly over the buildings several
times. In the second attack, at Biskan, there was
considerable damage but no casualties."

18th August:

"The Head of the 2nd Department at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs informed the Head of Chancery on
August 18 that the Turkish authorities did not yet
know whether the Iraqi aircraft, which was shot down

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by Turkish jet fighters (F.100's based on Diyarbakir) was a MIG fighter or an Ilyushin bomber. He thought that it probably was the latter, an IL 21 (repeat 21). He added that the shot down aircraft had not yet been found and might well be in Iraqi territory, and that to the best of his knowledge only one Iraqi plane had been shot down. The United States Embassy have informed us that their contacts with Turkish Air Force state that it was an IL 28 (repeat 28) and probably fell in Iraqi territory, though the Turkish General Staff think it may have fallen on the Turkish side of the border. External Affairs.

General Tansel, Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Air Force, is quoted in the press as saying that the Turkish jet fighters intercepted and caused much damage to the two-engined Iraqi jet bombers, one of which, full of bullet holes, started to lose height and attempted to get away. The press reports that the Turkish Air Force have been instructed to continue to patrol the frontier, but to keep strictly on the Turkish side of it.

The press report that talks are to take place at an official level, in the near future, between Turkey and Iraq to decide upon the arrangements for paying for the damage caused to Turkey by the attacks of the Iraqi aircraft.

The Head of the 2nd Department confirmed that there had been no further incidents, and that the Iraqi aircraft now seemed to be keeping well clear of the Turkish frontier."

2. We are sending a copy of this memorandum to Cairo.

R. N. Hamilton

(R.N. Hamilton)

for Senior External Affairs Representative.

Most reports give facts as announced by Ministry of Defence. The main following details. The first attack lasted for an hour and the aircraft continually swooping down over the battlefield, dropping several bombs and shelling the line of the Turkish units. Following the attack, the Turkish Group Commander at Diyarbakir ordered all units to all units in the vicinity to follow by a night command sitting at positions of the whole, and that the target had been destroyed with the group leader and that the aircraft then landed. This is followed several times. In the second attack, at Diyarbakir there was considerable damage but no casualties."

The Head of the 2nd Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Head of Chancery on August 15 that the Turkish authorities did not yet know whether the Iraqi aircraft, which was shot down

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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND

LONDON, W.C.2

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper ECONOMIST.

File No.

Published at LONDON.

Date

KURDISTAN

No Help for Highwaymen

GENERAL QASIM'S unavailing attempts to bomb the life out of the continuing Kurdish revolution in northern Iraq have now entangled him with his Turkish neighbours. Several times in the past two months, Iraqi military aircraft hunting for Kurdish guerrillas in the mountainous frontier region have crossed the line and dropped their

ME
THE ECONOMIST AUGUST 25, 1962

bombs on Kurdish villages in Turkish, instead of Iraqi, territory. The Turkish government, displaying remarkable restraint, was inclined at first to pass these incidents off as regrettable mistakes. But the "mistakes" persisted until, on August 16th, Turkish fighter aircraft patrolling the frontier shot down an Iraqi intruder. Since then, there have been no further violations and the Turkish government, still apparently anxious to believe the best of Baghdad, on Monday called off its patrol flights.

Turkish restraint has not been reflected in Baghdad. In dudgeon, the Iraqis have accused Turkey, in turn, of violating Iraqi air space and have demanded both apologies and compensation. The Turkish government is charged with allowing or perhaps encouraging (in collusion with Britain and the United States) the "mutineers and highwaymen" who use Turkish soil to hatch up aggression against Iraq. This charge is among the wildest of General Qasim's aberrations. However much the Turkish



government may shrink from Baghdad's leftward-leaning policies, it is unlikely to lift a finger to help the Iraqi Kurds in a revolt that is bound to be having repercussions among Turkey's own Kurdish population, known, euphemistically, as "mountain Turks." Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the leader of the year-old revolt, is fighting for autonomy for the Kurds within Iraq; he is reported as saying that the traditional idea of an independent Kurdistan embracing the tribesmen in Turkey, Syria and Persia is "impractical." All the same, the Turkish government's tolerance of the Iraqi intrusions may have had behind it a more solid consideration than diplomatic good manners.

Name of Paper FINANCIAL TIMES.

File No.

Published at LONDON.

Date 23rd June 1962

KURDS CUT OFF IRAQ ARMY UNIT

DIFFICULTIES OF RELIEF FORCE

From Our Middle East
Correspondent

BAGHDAD, JUNE 22

A battalion of the Iraq Army has been cut off by Kurds near Zakho in the extreme north of Iraq close to the Turkish border, and Government forces are struggling in the hills to relieve it. This is the latest grim episode in the Kurdish war, which has been continuing spasmodically for some 10 months, but in which the world is showing a languid interest.

The Kurds seem to be in five bands of unknown strength strung in a wide arc. Government forces of General Kassim have tried to get between them and the frontiers, but only on the easternmost flank near Sulaimaniya do they seem to have had success.

Now the central Government is using artillery while the Kurds lie low in hills and caves. When they see the chance they raid, sniping particularly at Army officers made conspicuous by their badges and unfamiliarity with hill warfare. Officer casualties have been extremely unsettling for the Army's morale and effectiveness.

RECRUITS FOR REBELS

Roughly two divisions are said to be now in the north, but they have no backbone of men who know the country. General Kassim has persuaded or paid one or two Kurdish tribes to fight for him, but it is difficult to get Kurdish Army units to fight Kurds consistently. For over a year General Kassim has had to move such units south, replacing them by men from the desert south.

Last autumn General Kassim ordered the Iraq Air Force into action, making ruthless use of incendiary bombs and rockets against rebel villages and machine-gunning, it is said, flocks and roads. The Air Force is still called up when targets can be pinpointed, but it has not smashed the uprising. On the contrary, stories of civilian losses have drawn Army and civilian recruits to the cause of Mulla Mustafa, the rebel leader.

PARLEYS FAIL

The Mustafa is thought to be with a group near Aqra, some distance north-east of Mosul. There is no regular contact between the groups, who have had arms for some time, nor do the Kurds across the Iranian, Turkish and Syrian frontiers show sympathetic restiveness. The Iraq Kurds can, however, fall back over the borders for food and rest.

Arab nationalists of Iraq say the Kurds are better off in Iraq than elsewhere and have more freedom after the 1958 revolution than before. But one parley after another with the central Government has come to nothing, partly because the Mustafa raises his demands. It is now uncertain whether he dreams only of relative autonomy within Iraq or of a more ambitious independent Kurdistan.

MOSCOW SANCTUARY

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MOSCOW SANCTUARY

The Mustafa sheltered in Moscow after the Kurdistan concept collapsed in Iran 16 years ago, but Moscow today does not appear to give him much thought. Within Iraq the communists value him only because he is a costly nuisance, and there are no signs that he values them. The Kurds now apparently want the ear of the United Nations more than of any particular country.

Whispers of what they are doing and what is being done to them are all over the Middle East. The information in this dispatch has been gathered primarily outside Iraq. If the uprising is less swollen and dangerous than it is described, then Iraq is losing because official secrecy and bankrupt accusations that the whole thing is a western imperialist plot shut out those who could see and tell the truth.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper. *Foreign Report*

File No. *173/2/1*

Published at *London*

Date *3-5-62*

The West, quite apart from the policy of non-interference in Middle Eastern affairs that it has followed since 1958, is highly unlikely to support a movement that might lead to unrest among the Kurds both in Turkey and in Persia.

Barzani's early attempts to negotiate a peace with the government came against General Qasim's inflexible demand for unconditional surrender. Since then the rebels' terms have stiffened. To begin with they were asking for a fairer deal for the Kurdish people under Article 3 of the Iraqi revolutionary constitution; now, they are demanding a form of autonomy for the Iraqi Kurds.

The Kurds' secessionary demand meets with little outside support. The Kurds are variously reported to be receiving help from the Soviet Union or, according to the charges levelled by the Iraqi government, from the western powers. But:

1. Tactically, Moscow's interest is still to support General Qasim and other nationalist leaders in other Arab countries. Strategically, on the other hand, it has long been arguable that the Russians would welcome the establishment of a Kurdish republic that might come under Communist control and provide a bridge to the Middle Eastern oil regions (see Foreign Report of May 7th, 1959, and January 19th, 1961). Barzani himself, though doubtless a nationalist (as was Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam) has often been described as a Communist. He attended the anniversary celebrations of the Russian Revolution in Moscow in November, 1960, and stayed on for two months; while in Moscow, he was reported to have provided anti-Qasim material for Moscow Radio's Arabic service.

2. The West, quite apart from the policy of non-interference in Middle Eastern affairs that it has followed since 1958, is highly unlikely to support a movement that might lead to unrest among the Kurds both in Turkey and in Persia.

Nor are the Kurdish rebels getting wholehearted backing from any of the Iraqi underground sections that oppose General Qasim. Qualified support of these parties is on the following lines:

1. The Communists (the main party and not the weak breakaway group licensed by General Qasim) have recently given some support to the Kurdish Democratic party's demand for a federal system in Iraq. But the Kurds' nationalist aims are at the moment being ruled by decree, i.e., by personal warrants.
2. The Kurds' secessionary demand meets with little outside support. The Kurds are variously reported to be receiving help from the Soviet Union or, according to the charges levelled by the Iraqi government, from the western powers. But:

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Iraq's Kurdish Cross

As the Kurdish insurrection in northern Iraq awakens from its winter hibernation, General Qasim faces what may be the gravest crisis of the four unstable years of his leadership. During March, the Kurdish partisans who had spent the winter months sheltering in mountain strongholds near the Iraqi-Turkish frontier started moving down towards the plains. They trapped and wiped out a battalion of the Iraqi army in a narrow mountain pass. The effect of this defeat on the rest of General Qasim's army has yet to be measured.

Kurdish leaders claim that the present insurrection differs from all the many earlier revolts of Kurdish tribes against their Arab, Turkish or Persian rulers in that it has now developed into a "national revolution." The revolt started last September under the inspiration of Mullah Mustapha Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish Democratic party. The Kurds resented the government's attempt to curtail teaching in Kurdish in primary schools and the replacement of Kurdish officials by Arabs. The Iraqi government countered the Kurdish revolt in two ways:

1. The air force set out to bomb Kurdish villages and, when it could find them, guerrilla concentrations.
2. Rival tribes, loyal to the government, were armed and formed into an irregular army.

Most of the fighting last autumn was between the partisans and these irregular forces called *chatta*. The Kurdish villages in the north of Iraq were bombed without previous warning, pillaged and ransacked by one or other of the Kurdish military factions and cut off from all their normal sources of supply. But the result, according to the revolutionary leaders, was the almost complete defeat of the *chatta*. Mullah Mustapha Barzani, who started with a rebel army of about 1,000 men, is now believed

to command a force of around 10,000 and to control the frontiers and most of the countryside.

According to Kurdish estimates, about a third of the Iraqi infantry is composed of Kurds. There are however very few Kurdish officers in the army, and only a limited number of Kurdish non-commissioned officers. In order to reduce the risk of mutiny and defection, General Qasim last year despatched the First Division (mostly Kurdish) to southern Iraq and replaced it in the north by the Second Division (mostly Arab). Even so, the rebels report that their ranks are continually being swollen by Kurdish deserters from the army.

Barzani's early attempts to negotiate a peace with the government came against General Qasim's inflexible demand for unconditional surrender. Since then the rebels' terms have stiffened. To begin with they were asking for a fairer deal for the Kurdish people under Article 3 of the Iraqi revolutionary constitution; now, they are demanding a form of autonomy for the Iraqi Kurds.

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Nor are the Kurdish rebels getting wholehearted backing from any of the Iraqi underground factions that oppose General Qasim. Qualified support of these parties is on the following lines:

A.—The Communists (the main party and not the weak breakaway group licensed by General Qasim) have recently given some support to the Kurdish Democratic party's demand for autonomy. This has led to reports that the Kurdish nationalists are following the communist line. But the Kurdish leaders, fighting for their own ends, accept support from whom they can get it. They distrust the promises of the local Communist Party, and are not in line with the policy still being pursued by Moscow. The reason for this is that the Communist party is not interested in Kurdish autonomy only to maintain its influence in Iraq.

B.—Mr. Kamel Chadirchi, the leader of the *As-Sad* (the *Free*) party, has privately told Kurdish leaders that he is in favour of their determination for the Kurds. Again, promises made while in underground opposition might not stand up in other circumstances.

contradict and provide a forum in which the communists
Turkish Republic of May 7th, 1960, and the...
himself, though doubtful...
has often been the...
celebration of the Russian Revolution...
and stayed on for two...
to have provided anti-air...
service.

2. The West, upon whom a policy of non-interference in Middle Eastern affairs that is based on the... is highly unlikely to support a movement that might... among the Kurds both in Turkey and in Persia.

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THE LAND REFORM PUZZLE

B.—Mr. Kamel Ghadarchi, the leader of the former National Democratic party, has privately told Kurdish leaders that he is in favour of self-determination for the Kurds. Again, promises made while in underground opposition might not stand up in other circumstances.

C.—The Progressive Democratic party (the group led by Mr. Mohammed Hadid which broke away from the National Democratic party in order to give its support to General Qasim) has shown greater understanding than the Nationalist opposition of the immediate issues for Iraq. (The Nationalists incline towards Arab chauvinism.) Mr. Hadid is one of the few responsible people able publicly to criticise the government. Last week, his newspaper *Al Bayan* called upon "all sincere men" to co-operate in ending the war and upon the Kurds to lay down their arms; it went on to insist that Arab-Kurdish bonds should be based on recognition of the Kurdish nationality. The statement, signed by several well-known citizens, continued: "We will resist any attempt to merge the Kurdish nationality with Arab nationality." This is a considerable step beyond General Qasim's demand for unconditional surrender, and might, if the government seizes its chance, be used as the basis for negotiation. Otherwise there seems no alternative to the continuance of civil war in the north.

Name of Paper NEW YORK TIMES.

File No.

Published at PARIS.

Date

100 Iraq Towns Reported in Ruins In Kurds' Revolt Against Kassim

By United Press International

BEIRUT, Lebanon, April 23

A widespread rebellion by Kurdish tribesmen against the armed forces of Premier Abdul Karim Kassim is raging in the mountains of northern Iraq and threatening to topple Iraq's four-year-old military regime.

Information concerning the revolt and Government measures aimed at crushing it has been suppressed in Iraq. Reliable detailed reports are difficult to obtain but this much is clear:

—The uprising began in late March and is on a larger scale than the revolt Premier Kassim said he quashed last September.

—Casualties among Iraqi troops and civilians number in the hundreds and more than 100 villages—some say many more—have been destroyed by aerial bombardment, sacking and burning.

—The rebel Kurds are led by

a Soviet-trained tribal leader, Mullah Mustafa Barzani.

A manifesto distributed in Baghdad said Mullah Mustafa demanded the establishment of an "autonomous Kurdistan within the Iraqi Republic" and the withdrawal of Arab army forces from the north. Another of his eleven specific demands calls for improved economic conditions throughout Iraq by ending "Kassim's incompetent dictatorship."

Diplomatic observers said the manifesto was so worded that Premier Kassim could not accept it. His immediate answer was to send reinforcements into the north.

Observers in Baghdad regard the uprising as the most serious threat to Premier Kassim since his military regime gained power.

Continued on Page 2, Column 7

Kurdish Rebellion In Northern Iraq Is Said to Spread

Continued From Page 1, Col. 8

er by an army revolt July 14, 1958.

The latest reports indicate the Kurds have gained control across the north from the major northwestern city of Mosul to the mountainous territory facing the Turkish-Iranian borders and along the northeastern region south of Sulaimaniya, the traditional stronghold of the Iraqi Kurdistan.

Foreigners cannot travel in the north except on essential Government business.

The rebels are said to control the area surrounding the Dambandikhan dam, south of Sulaimaniya, where a number of Americans and Europeans are employed. The Americans and Europeans have not been molested. The rebels seized the dam site last September until Arab troops drove them off.

Rebels Raid Villages

Rebel activity so far has been confined chiefly to guerrilla raids on villages. Against these tactics in unfamiliar terrain the government forces have been generally ineffective.

The rebels frequently descend upon villages, demanding food, arms and money. Government planes arrived to destroy the villages with bombs, rockets and strafing, but only after the rebels have fled.

The result is heavy civilian casualties, among them many women and children, reports in Baghdad said. Other reports tell of the army arriving on the heels of escaping Kurds to sack shops and homes in reprisal for aid given to the rebels.

One report told of a defeat for Iraqi forces when rebels ambushed a brigade early this month between the northeastern towns of Dihok and Zakho, near the Turkish border. Conservative estimates said fifty Iraqi troops died, 150 were wounded and a number captured.

Besides the problem of combating guerrilla warfare, Premier Kassim is hampered because a fourth to a third of his army and police are composed of Kurds. Numerous defections and refusals to fight the rebels are reported.

Mullah Mustafa is a Communist who fled to the Soviet Union in 1946. He returned to Iraq with 1,500 Kurdish refugees upon Premier Kassim's invitation after the 1958 revolt. He later broke with the Premier.

General Kassim outlawed Mullah Mustafa's Marxist-style Kurdish democratic party after the tribes revolted in September.

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Diplomatic observers in Baghdad view the situation as serious. The army and the police are said to be dissatisfied because Premier Kassim allowed the revolt to spread. Morale is low because of losses.

The Kurds, a nomadic pastoral and agricultural people known for their fierce independence, trace their history to at least 2,000 B. C.

They have traditionally inhabited a sweeping mountainous plateau region extending across what is today Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria, as well as the Armenian and Azerbaidzhain sectors of the Soviet Caucasus.

This area, broadly described as Kurdistan, is about 600 miles long and 120 to 150 miles wide.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *TIMES*.

Published at LONDON.

File No. *173/2/1*

Date *17*

4

62

33

**APPEAL TO KURDISH
REBELS**

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

BAGHDAD, APRIL 16

Al Bayan, the National Progressive Party newspaper, in a leading article today invited the Government to enlighten public opinion about the present military operations to quell renewed disturbances in some areas of northern Iraq—a reference to Mulla Mustafa Barazani's abortive Kurdish insurrection last September which was crushed in seven days.

The article said the disturbances affected Iraq's territorial integrity and called for wisdom and understanding. The use of force would in no way serve Arab-Kurdish amity. *Al Bayan* went on, and appealed to "sincere elements" to discontinue such acts of aggression. If those who started the disturbances threw down their arms, the article added, complaints could be dealt with, and brotherly relations reestablished between the Kurds and Arabs.

(F) 173/2/1 32

S E C R E T

Holders of this document should note that it has been made available to the Department of External Affairs by the United States authorities on the following conditions:

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- (b) That the Australian Government will afford to this intelligence substantially the same degree of security protection as that afforded to it by the United States Government.
- (c) That the Australian Government will not exploit this intelligence for other than national security purposes.

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Should distribution to other interested Government Departments be considered essential it may be sent to such a Department on a see-and-return basis under cover of a memorandum embodying the conditions (a) to (c) above.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper NEW YORK TIMES.

File No. 173/2/1

Published at PARIS.

Date 3 4 62

IRAQI REPORTS VICTORY

Kassim Is Said to Declare
Tribal Revolt Crushed

ME
3/4/62
BAGHDAD, Iraq, April 2
(AP) — Premier Abdel Karim
Kassim was quoted yesterday
as having reported that Gov-
ernment forces had crushed a
Kurdish tribal revolt in north-
ern Iraq after a campaign last-
ing only a week.

The Baghdad newspaper Al
Thawra published an interview
of Premier Kassim with the
paper's owner, Yunis Altayi.
Premier Kassim, according to
the newspaper, charged that
the revolt had been backed by
the Western-oriented Central
Treaty Organization in an at-
tempt to prevent Iraq from
developing the area. But, the
Iraqi leader added, Government
forces took only seven days to
end the mutiny, "which the im-
perialists had expected to last
for seven years."

Premier Kassim, the paper
said, contended there was a
small pocket of resistance, just
north of Mosul, where the rebels
were surrounded.

Name of Paper TIMES.

File No.

173/2/1

Published at LONDON.

seriously impairing the
industrial policies.

Date

1-11-61

The Kurdish Revolt

At the beginning of last month GENERAL KASSIM announced that mopping-up operations against the Kurdish insurgents in the Barzan region, the centre of the revolt, had been completed. There is no reason to doubt that in fact the revolt is over. Disturbing reports have, however, been reaching the outside world of the way in which it was put down. Naturally, it is difficult to check the accuracy of these reports. The remoteness of the area and censorship inside Iraq blur the line between fact and rumour.

The leading figure on the Kurdish side was MULLA MUSTAFA BARZANI, who had been a thorn in the flesh of many Iraq Governments for more than a generation. He returned to Iraq from exile in Russia after the revolution of 1958 and at first lived in Baghdad as a privileged pensioner. On return from another visit to Russia early this year he found his privileges withdrawn and returned to his native heath among the mountains where the frontiers of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey converge. In the late summer he rejected a call to come down to Baghdad and Army units were sent against him. He was quickly joined by the neighbouring Akko tribe, and by degrees unrest appears to have spread to the whole Kurdish semi-circle, from Zakho on the Turkish border in the north to the Diyala river east of Baghdad. At some stage the Iraq authorities decided to switch from ground to air operations, and it is these latter which are said to have inflicted great damage. There are stories of Ilyushin bombers using rockets and incendiaries, and of machine-gunning by Migs. The small town of Dohuk is said to have been the worst hit, and others, including Zakho, Amadiya, Aqra, Rowanduz, and Koi Sanjak, to have been badly damaged. Figures given for loss of life are probably exaggerated, but may run into thousands. Destruction of food-stuffs and flocks must cause grave hardship to villagers and tribesmen in the winter now coming on.

There is, of course, nothing new in an insurrection by the Kurds of Iraq or in its suppression by the authorities. It was the R.A.F. in the days of the mandate which first policed the turbulent mountaineers from the air. But in the days when light aircraft were used and warnings were first dropped the loss of life and property was small. New techniques and new weapons have enormously increased authority's power of retaliation.

As was to be expected the Iraq Government has blamed "imperialism" for what happened. A simpler and more probable explanation is Kurdish disappointment. The temporary constitution of the Iraq Republic persuaded the Kurds that this time they really were to be treated as fully equal citizens, and not as a minority to be in turn cajoled, bribed or punished. At first their hopes seemed to be justified. They were certainly given more freedom to express their aims, through parties and newspapers. A year ago this freedom began to be curtailed. Several Kurdish periodicals were suppressed, and prosecutions followed. Certainly GENERAL KASSIM's Government, like its pre-

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P.A.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Economist

File No. 173/2/1

Published at LONDON

Date 23.9.61

IRAQ

23/9/61 ECON

Smouldering Kurds

SPORADICALLY, the aversion that most Kurds feel for being governed by somebody else erupts into boisterous protest. This is now happening in northern Iraq. The large Kurdish minority, disillusioned by the broken pledges of the government in Baghdad, and banking, perhaps, on its frailty, have roughly patched up their inter-tribal bickering and asserted their formidable, if unorganised, power. For the past three or four weeks, Kurdish tribesmen have been challenging the central authority by setting up road blocks and causing general disarray. General Qasim, faced for the first time by a major Kurdish upheaval, has dispatched ground and air forces to the north. But the army, working over a mountainous terrain, is seriously hampered by the road blocks, and the bombing of a few Kurdish villages is unlikely to dampen the smouldering rebel spirit.

The Kurdish leaders had high hopes of General Qasim's "Arab and Kurdish republic." But there has been a long series of disappointments, arising mainly from the procrastination and tactlessness of the central government. The Kurds were irritated by the inefficiency of the land reform scheme, by the order to stop tobacco growing in the area, by new tax laws and by the transfer of Kurdish officials to other parts of Iraq. Their gradually increasing discontent showed itself, at first, in inter-tribal jealousies and warfare. Skirmishes, mainly started by the Barazani tribe, grew serious during July and August. The Barazaris were probably trying to impose their will on tribes less anti-government than themselves.

Because of the years that Mullah Mustafa Barazani, the tribe's most dynamic leader, spent in Moscow, he is sometimes thought to be a communist; if so, the brand is unique. The Soviet Union, which puts out a regular Kurdish broadcast, has been discreetly silent about the Iraqi revolt; it is probably not in Moscow's interest at the moment to help in the overthrow of General Qasim. Outside interference of any kind

is unlikely; the Kurds, who are a tough, gay and courageous people, are capable on their own of giving the Iraqi army a very hard time indeed. Their exiguous unity is almost certain to collapse once the battle is over, and the pipedream of an independent Kurdistan—uniting the Kurds of Iraq, Persia, Syria and Turkey—is nowhere taken very seriously. The Iraqi Kurds are not fighting mainly for secession; they are fighting for a fairer deal.

Name of Paper SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS. File No. 173/2/1

Published at B.B.C.

Date 30 10 61

EE/731/A4/1

4. MIDDLE EAST

The Kurdish ProblemBerlin (GDR) in Persian ("Payk-e Iran") 17.00 GMT 21.10.61

Excerpts from anonymous commentary entitled "Imperialist Machinations in Iraq and in Iranian Kurdistan":

For some time events have been taking place in the neighbouring country, Iraq, which the Anglo-American imperialists with the connivance of the Shah of Iran have been trying to exploit for their colonialist plans. It is some time since the democratic parties and organisations, including the Democratic Party of Iraqi Kurdistan, requested the Government: (1) to put an end to the despotic one-man Government; to restore democratic freedoms which are likely to strengthen the foundations of the Iraqi Republic; to create a parliament by means of free elections, and with a view to getting a permanent Constitution for Iraq; (2) to honour the third Article of the provisional Constitution of Iraq - which says that the Iraq Republic is the common homeland of Arabs and Kurds - by granting Kurds living in Iraq national freedoms and thus to strengthen the fraternal ties between Arabs and Kurds which alone can guarantee the integrity of the Republic.

Yet, regrettably, the Iraqi Government not only has not accepted these just and legitimate demands, but resorted to measures in no way compatible with democracy... To put a stop to the movement of the Kurds, the Iraqi Government, by supplying money and arms, instigated the treacherous tribal chieftains, such as those of Zibar and Lulan, against the freedom-loving people. As a result, many of the villages of Iraqi Kurdistan have been razed to the ground in attacks carried out by Government forces, and large numbers of the unarmed and peaceful inhabitants of that region were killed... These events, which have seriously jeopardised the very existence of the Iraqi Republic, are deplored by all fighters against colonialism and the friends of Iraq. It is generally desired that the establishment of democratic rights should put an end to the fratricidal war in the country of our neighbours... The Anglo-American imperialists and their stooges such as Mohammad Reza Shah ... [want] the secession of Kurdistan from Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria, and the creation of a Kurdish Government under the aegis of Mohammad Reza Shah ... they wish to annex Iraqi, Turkish and Syrian Kurdistan to this so-called paradise - as if Mohammad Reza Shah, whose claws and talons are stained with the blood of free men like Ghazi Mohammad, had now been drastically transformed through the miracle of the pound and the dollar into a mother of the Kurds...

The Shuresh police Party ... because of its unpopularity, was disbanded some time ago, but following recent events in Iraq it has again begun functioning. These stooges issue circulars under the name of the Kurds and Iranian nationalism, inviting all Kurds to rally to the dollar rule of Mohammad Reza Shah. This Party without members is now one of the subversive elements inside Iraq. Some time ago, Davud Beg Jah and Hasan Manguri, together with reactionary Kurdish officers in Iran, held meetings in Reza'iyeh, Sananda and Qasr-e Shirin, organised by the US Ambassador to Iran. At the Ambassador's behest it was decided at those meetings to exploit the differences between the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi Kurds under the pretence of protecting the Barzanis... Accordingly Abbas Lamandi and Hasan Manguri - both colonialist agents - started their activities in Iraq. Hasan Manguri ... had to leave Iraq ... but Abbas Lamandi remained in Iraq in order to fulfil the plot. He poses as a supporter of the Barzanis, but really wants to stab them and all Iraqi democratic forces in the back. Moreover, an Iranian officer, formerly the secretary of Teymur Bakhtiyar, was appointed assistant military attache in Iraq and instructed to promote the machinations of the Shah and colonialism in Iraq... The national persecution practised by the reactionary ruling circles against the Kurdish people, however harsh and distasteful, cannot divert the Kurdish nation from its correct path and divide it, against its own interests, from the brother nationalities bound by the same fetters and fighting in the same trenches with them. The true freedom the Iranian Kurds can only be achieved when Iran in its entirety is free from the very of reaction and imperialism... The overthrow of the despotic Government of the

Shah is the sacred common duty of all the Iranian peoples. We should safeguard, with all our strength, the unity of the peoples in the country which constitutes the greatest factor for victory. Similar considerations apply to Turkey and Iraq...

The question of Kurdistan should be solved through peaceful coexistence and on the basis of accepting the legitimate and natural demands of the Kurdish people... The Iranian people express their anger and indignation at the subversive interference of the Shah and colonialism in Iraq, and strongly demand that an end should be put to these machinations.

In Brief

IOJ on press freedom in Greece The International Organisation of Journalists issued a statement condemning infringements of the freedom of the press and of speech in Greece during the election campaign. (CTK in English 15.18 GMT 27.10.61)

WFTU protest to Aden The World Federation of Trade Unions sent a telegram to the Governor of Aden, protesting against repressive measures taken against 5,000 strikers. (CTK in English 18.32 GMT 27.10.61)

Name of Paper

London Times

File No.

173/2/1

Published at

Date

1.11.61

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The leading figure on the Kurdish side was MULLA MUSTAFA BARZANI, who had been a thorn in the flesh of many Iraq Governments for more than a generation. He returned to Iraq from exile in Russia after the revolution of 1958 and at first lived in Baghdad as a privileged pensioner. On return from another visit to Russia early this year he found his privileges withdrawn and returned to his native heath among the mountains where the frontiers of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey converge. In the late summer he rejected a call to come down to Baghdad and Army units were sent against him. He was quickly joined by the neighbouring Ako tribe, and by degrees unrest appears to have spread to the whole Kurdish semi-circle, from Zakho on the Turkish border in the north to the Diyala river east of Baghdad. At some stage the Iraq authorities decided to switch from ground to air operations, and it is these latter which are said to have inflicted great damage. There are stories of Ilyushin bombers using rockets and incendiaries, and of machine-gunning by Migs. The small town of Dohuk is said to have been the worst hit, and others, including Zakho, Amadiya, Aqra, Rowanduz, and Koi Sanjak, to have been badly damaged. Figures given for loss of life are probably exaggerated, but may run into thousands. Destruction of food-stuffs and flocks must cause grave hardship to villagers and tribesmen in the winter now coming on.

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times

1/11/61

WEDNESDAY NOVEMBER

decessors, found that there was no easy solution for the Kurdish problem. What a minority considers equality may look like rank separatism in the capital. Many of the Kurds most active politically were communists or fellow-travellers. The Government had also reason to be disappointed at the way the new "Republic of Arabs and Kurds" was shaping. On the other hand the consequence of ruthless suppression is always to breed fresh difficulties. A Kurdish Minister has resigned from the Government. The perennial problems of raising the standard of living and improving the social services in Iraq Kurdistan remain unsolved and harder of solution.

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CONFIDENTIAL 11

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2.

3/12/38

Memo No. 1668

2nd October, 1961

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Iraq - Alleged British Support of Kurds

Reference our memorandum 1627 of 22nd September on Iraq and in particular the parenthetical reference in paragraph 6 of Iraqi suggestions that the British Government is backing the Kurdish revolt.

2. There has since been quite a bit of traffic, between the Foreign Office and Baghdad mainly, on the Iraqi accusations. For example the U.K. Ambassador (Trevelyan) on 23rd gave the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs an informal memorandum on the following lines in the hope that he might make use of it with Qasim:

"A number of Iraqi newspapers have recently made comments implying that the British Government have been supporting dissident Kurds against the Iraqi Government. There is absolutely no truth in such suggestions. There has been no British encouragement of or contact with any such persons. It is the policy of the British Government to refrain from any form of interference in the internal affairs of Iraq.

Unfounded allegations of this nature in the Iraqi press can only harm the good relations which the British Government wish to maintain and develop with the Iraqi Government; and the British Embassy earnestly hopes that the Iraqi authorities, sharing this wish, will ensure that such allegations are not repeated."

3. The Ambassador reported that the B.B.C. Arabic Service had already denied allegations of U.K. complicity in the Kurd rising, and suggested it might be worth while for them to make further comment on the absurdity of suggestions in the Iraqi press of this nature, which were wholly contrary to the U.K. policy of non-interference and desire to see peace and stability in Iraq.

4. However, reporting Qasim's press references on 24th September (to "Daily Express" correspondent), the Ambassador indicated that Qasim had accused the Embassy of being behind the Kurdish rising, and of having spent between £400,000 and £500,000 for this purpose. He was also said to have threatened to close the Embassy if not given an undertaking of good behaviour but Trevelyan had not been able to confirm this. Trevelyan suggested to the Foreign Office that Qasim was probably chiefly concerned to refute any suggestion that it was an internal rising against him caused by his own policy while taking the opportunity to get his own back on the U.K. for action in Kuwait. In line with general policy, and in view of the imminence of the oil talks, he recommended that any statement issued in London should be in moderate terms without a personal attack on Qasim. It was better

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to do what could be done to keep the temperature down. Trevelyan for the present did not propose to ask to see Qasim.

5. Trevelyan further reported on 25th September that he had strongly protested to the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs who was personally very friendly and had said that he had had no idea beforehand what Qasim was going to say and that he had no more details than anybody else of the alleged U.K. misdeeds. The Ambassador added that a practical reason for treating this matter with moderation was that Qasim had his hands on the three British soldiers and two British engineers and the main concern at the moment was to get him to release them. Trevelyan's first impression was that Qasim's allegations have not yet had much effect in Baghdad.

6. Trevelyan reported on 26th that he had been informed that Qasim had rejected his protest.

7. Teheran has also reported to the Foreign Office on prominence given there to Qasim's allegations of U.K. complicity in the Kurd troubles in Iraq. The reaction in Teheran, however, was considerably sceptical.

8. For further information Rose in Bonn told the Foreign Office on 21st September of his talk on Kurdistan with Voigt, head of Middle East Division in Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rose had said that accounts of rumours in Baghdad about British and American support to the Kurdish rebels had come to Foreign Office attention, but they were nonsense, and the Foreign Office trusted that no credence would be given to them by Federal authorities or any other Western Powers. Voigt had said that their Ministry of Foreign Affairs had heard these rumours, but certainly did not believe them; they were thought to emanate from General Qasim himself. The Ministry were well aware that armed support for the Kurds was coming from the Soviet Union. He had added that the Iranian Counsellor had called on him on 20th September and had remarked that the Soviet Union had attempted to distribute arms to the Kurds in South West Iran and that this had been stopped.

9. Copy of this memorandum is being sent to Washington, Moscow and Bonn for information.

H. Marshall

(H. Marshall)

for Senior External Affairs Representative.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *Summary of World Broadcasts* File No. *209/11/30* 7
Published at *Part IV Second Series* Date *17-3-61*

Turkish statement on Kirkuk clashes (Text) Ankara: Hasan Istinyeli, director-general of the information department of the Foreign Ministry, held a press conference today and made the following statement about the events which took place in Kirkuk: According to information we received from our Ambassador in Baghdad, on 6th March a Kirkuk factory owner of Turkish descent was shot dead while passing through a sector of the town inhabited by Kurds. A large number of Turks attended the funeral held next day, and while they were returning from the ceremony clashes occurred between Turks and Kurds. People from both sides were killed and injured as a result of the incident. Three Turks were killed. The Iraqi Government has taken the necessary measures to restore order. The event, which is being followed by our Government, is not of such proportions as Cairo has reported. (Ankara 15.3.61)

P.A.
[Signature]

Name of Paper Foreign Report -File No. 173/2/1Published at LondonDate 19. 1. 61

CONFIDENTIAL

ME

Qasim's Kurdish Switch

General Qasim's break with the Kurdish communist leader, Mustafa Barzani—now in Moscow—must now be considered complete. This view, which carries disturbing implications for the future of northern Iraq, is based on the following recent developments:

(i) In a speech on New Year's day, the Iraqi prime minister attacked Barzani as an "agent of imperialism." Although Barzani was not mentioned by name, General Qasim's listeners were left in no doubt that he was referring to Barzani. General Qasim mentioned six British subjects by name, describing them as intelligence officers who had served in Iraq before and during the second world war; he said certain documents had come into his hands which proved that these men had contact with the "traitors" who plotted against the Iraqi army. It was clear from the context that Barzani was included among the "traitors."

(ii) Two days earlier, Barzani's son, on presenting himself to the *Mutassarif* (governor) of Baghdad to draw the monthly allowance of £500 his father is supposed to receive from that source, was told that the money could only be paid to his father in person. When Barzani's son said that his father was in Moscow, he was told: "Sorry, we must wait until he returns." (Barzani has been receiving an official allowance of £1,000 a month since he returned to Iraq from the Soviet Union in 1958 after General Qasim's *coup d'état*; of this sum, £500 has been paid by the governor of Baghdad, and the other half by the ministry of defence. In addition, the government put at his disposal the large and well-appointed houses that had at one time been used by Nuri es-Said.)

General Qasim has always, of course, considered himself the "sole leader" of the Iraqis, whether Arabs or Kurds, and has therefore been unwilling to share the leadership of the Kurds with Barzani. Despite the honours showered on Barzani after his return—when he was often called a "national hero"—relations between the two men have been deteriorating for some time. Barzani, aware of the drop in the temperature, took the opportunity of the Russian Revolution celebrations in Moscow last November to leave Iraq for his own safety.

MATERIAL FOR MOSCOW

Now, according to reliable Iraqis lately in Moscow, Barzani:

1. Is making statements against General Qasim and supplying Moscow radio with anti-Qasim material.
2. Does not intend to return to Iraq.

The Kurdish chieftains of Iraq, many of whom are opposed to Barzani, have naturally exploited the present coolness between him and the "sole leader" for their own ends. During the past few weeks, a number of them have gone to Baghdad from northern Iraq to meet General Qasim and express their loyalty to him and their readiness to do whatever he may require of them to put an end to Barzani's influence in the north. General Qasim welcomed their offer and supplied them with arms, ammunition and money.

CONFIDENTIAL

PTO

173/2/1
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM.

CONFIDENTIAL 4

I. 10026.

:MP

Dated: 2nd June, 1959.

Rec'd: 9th June, 1959.

FROM:

External Affairs Office,
LONDON.

SAVING EX 251. CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Washington EX 355.

KURDISTAN.

You will have seen various reports of unrest among Kurdish minorities in Iran and Iraq. Following Foreign Office comments sent to United Kingdom Missions in Ankara, Tehran and Baghdad on 28th May are of interest in giving up-to-date estimate of situation:-

"Though accurate information is not easy to obtain we think that the present unrest among the Iraqi Kurds is attributable principally to a relaxation in the control exercised by Baghdad since the revolution together with the stimulus of Communist and Kurdish nationalist ideas imported by Mulla Mustafa Barzani and his friends and played on by Moscow radio, rather than to any concerted opposition to the Iraqi Government. Indeed, Kassen has gone out of his way to emphasise the "Iraqi-ness" of the Kurds, and the latter supported the Government forces against the rebels in Mosul. The recent operation by the Government forces in Northern Iraq seems to be more an operation to restore discipline and to put down inter-tribal disorder than the suppression of a revolt.

"No doubt the Russians would be happy to play on Kurdish nationalist aspirations to the embarrassment of the Turks and Iranians to the greatest possible consistent with their support for Kassen. Since, however, Kurdish nationalist aspirations, if carried to their logical conclusion (i.e. the establishment of an independent Kurdistan), would be likely to lead to the dismemberment of Iraq to an even greater extent than of Iran and Turkey. They are unlikely to play this card for its full value so long as they are still backing Kassen in Iraq. The danger of Kurdish nationalism is therefore potential rather than actual. It constitutes a powerful weapon in the hands of the Russians if they should ever be in a position and wish to embarrass all three Governments concerned at the same time.

"From this it follows that all three Governments have a very strong common interest in damping down the present unrest in Kurdistan. The Turks realise this and are taking steps to keep in touch with the Iraqis. We are sorry to hear that the Iranian approaches to the Iraqis have been less successful. Please urge on Iranians the desirability of keeping in the closest possible touch with the Iraqis and Turks.

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS **CONFIDENTIAL**³
INWARD SAVINGRAM.

I. 10026.

2.

"We are disturbed to learn from Sir Bernard Burrows' that the Iranians may think that in certain circumstances they may be able to "exploit the potentialities" of the Kurdish situation. This seems to us to be a dangerously unreal and over optimistic attitude. It may well tie in with Afshar's unresponsiveness. We cannot help suspecting that Iranian Policy is ambivalent, and that Sadr may have been trying to enlist our support for the more cautious view. Please try to investigate what exactly the Iranians are really up to and to bring home to them that in our view the only policy in Kurdistan consistent with their interests in present circumstances is to do their utmost to maintain the tranquility of the area, while at the same time trying to improve economic and social conditions in Iranian Kurdistan".

MIN.&DEPT. E.A.
MIN.&DEPT. DEFENCE

9th June, 1959.

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

2
SECRET

File No. 173/2/1

Date. 10th March, 1959.

SUBJECT

IRAQ - LATEST DISTURBANCE.

FOR Asst. Secretary,
Division 4. ✓Copies : Mr. Hill
Actg. Asst.
Secretary,
Division 2.
Asst. Secretary
Division 3.

It will be recalled that since the revolution in Iraq of the 14th July, 1958, the country has been in a state of unrest.

2. The policy of the United Kingdom Government has been to support the Government of Major-General Kassem which has attempted to carry out a programme of social and economic reform at home and neutralism abroad. Two forces have appeared to prevent this policy from being put into effect :-

- (a) the Kurds who inhabit the north and - in whose Territory the oil wells lie, and
- (b) those elements who favour a closer association with the United Arab Republic.

3. It will be noted that Iraq was absent from the meeting of the Baghdad Powers which met at Karachi on 26th January last, and that six anti-Communist members of the Kassem Cabinet resigned on 6th February - but that they were not replaced by Communists.

4. The latest unrest in Iraq has arisen mainly in the north where a Colonel Shawwaf headed by insurgent elements in the Army has seized the oil wells surrounding Mosul. The Kurds have always been somewhat contemptuous of the Arabs who form the remainder of the population of Iraq.

5. Conflicting reports have emanated regarding the fighting that has taken place between Major-General Kassem's Government troops and the insurgents led by Colonel Shawwaf. It is probable that the U.S.S.R. which borders the northern portion of Iraq has made use of the Kurds in this latest trouble, and it is also not unlikely that unconfirmed reports may be accurate that the civil leader of the rebels Mulla Mustafa, who returned to Iraq in 1958, after 12 years exile to Moscow and Prague, is taking a leading part in the agitation.

6. After he took over last year General Kassem looked to the Kurds for support against those elements in the country who sought union with the United Arab Republic, but of late the Kurdish Nationalists have maintained their traditional policy of seeking an independent Kurdistan, a policy which, of course, would suit the U.S.S.R., as having a separate Kurdistan which would be a Russian satellite possessing the oil wells from which Iraq draws its main wealth.

7. It would be unwise to hazard what will finally result from this latest uprising, but it should not be overlooked that the majority of the inhabitants of the country would not wish to be under the rule of a Kurdish minority. On the other hand, it is not beyond the possibility that the Kurds may succeed in establishing a separate Kurdistan but they would first have to find an outlet for the oil from the Mosul wells.

2/...

SECRET

8. Once again, therefore, Iraq is in a state of revolt in contrast to the ordered and progressive regime under the late King Faisal II, the principal figure then being the veteran Prime Minister Nuri al Said. Though the King, together with his Prime Minister and the Crown Prince derived much profit from the country, at least they gave Iraq order and progress which has ceased with their "liquidation" last July. But one cannot turn the clock back.

J. Oldham

(J.E. Oldham),
Commonwealth Relations Officer.

SECRET



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File No.

POLITICAL - STATES

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DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE

STATEMENT OF REASONS UNDER SECTION 40 OF THE ARCHIVES ACT 1983

Series: A1838/272

Item: 173/2/6/1 Pt 2

Title: Iraq - Political - States - Kurds

DECISION: The folios listed below are wholly/partially exempt under sub-section 33(1)(a) and (b) of the Archives Act 1983

9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 22, 35, 38, 39, 71, 102, 118, 119, 120-121, 123-127, 152, 172-178, 199-200, 204-206, 208.

FACTS ON WHICH THESE DECISIONS ARE BASED:

The exempted folios contain one or more of the following:

- intelligence/information the release of which could cause damage to Australia's security and international relations.
- information provided in confidence by a foreign government, the disclosure of which would constitute a breach of that confidence
- the identity of an overseas intelligence agency/agent. The country concerned has requested that the Australian Government not release this identity in this context.
- intelligence/information the release of which could cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth.

RELEVANT SECTIONS OF THE ACT:

33(1)(a) '...a Commonwealth record is an exempt record if it contains information or matter... the disclosure of which under this Act could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the Commonwealth'.

33(1)(b) '...a Commonwealth record is an exempt record if it contains information or matter...communicated in confidence by...a foreign Government...to the Government of the Commonwealth...being information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act would constitute a breach of that confidence'.

REASONS FOR THESE DECISIONS:

International relations are dependent upon the adequate flow of information between one country and another. If disclosure would lessen the confidence of another country in the Government of Australia, that is sufficient ground for a finding that disclosure could

reasonably be expected to damage international relations under s33(1)(a) of the Archives Act.

The foreign government has asked that the information not be released to the public. The release of this information would therefore constitute a breach of confidence owed to that foreign government within the meaning of s33(1)(b) of the Archives Act.

The release of this information would be likely to result in restriction of intelligence provided to Australia. This would cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth within the meaning of s33(1)(a) of the Archives Act.

This information is still afforded security protection by a foreign government. The release of this information would therefore constitute a breach of confidence owed to that foreign government within the meaning of s33(1)(b) of the Archives Act.

The folios contain information which reveals the capability, methods, objectives, sources, areas of interest, or operations of an Australian intelligence agency, the release of which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth within the meaning of s33(1)(a) of the Archives Act.

Australian Archives

Decision maker: Gay Hogan
Position number: 30921
Date: 20.5.1999

7173/2/6/1

Wash
Werga

"PREPARED TO DIE"

THE STORY OF THE KURDISH REVOLUTION IN IRAQI KURDISTAN

Published by the General Representation of the Revolution of Iraqi Kurdistan.

We

*the suicide fighters,
heroes of the nation,
lions of black times*

*We shall sacrifice our
lives and our property
for the sake
of liberated Kurdistan.*

*If the enemy shall set
foot upon our land*

*We shall make a burning
pyre of the spot
upon which he treads*

*And shall drive him out
soon enough*

*Across our frontiers —
we, the suicide fighters.*

*We shall wreak vengeance
upon our enemy,
the vengeance
of the Kurds
and of Kurdistan.*

*We shall wreak vengeance
upon the many
guilty hands
which sought
to destroy the Kurds*

*We shall plough the soil
of Kurdistan with shells*

*That shall lob down from
these mountain ridges*

*And that shall serve
as a lesson for the
generations to follow.*

Hymn of the Kurdish fighters

مەستانە

ئۆزىگە

Kurdistan Ya Xuman
Kurdistan Oye Death!
(Motto of the Kurds)

The Kurds call their partisans “Pesh Merga”. It means “Prepared to Die”. Prepared to die? Why is it that in the nineteen-sixties, in a world seeking to

settle conflicts peacefully, a people should proclaim their preparedness to die? The answer lies in the harsh reality imposed on the Kurds in Iraq: condemned to an-

nihilation, they are prepared to die rather than yield. Far from the big centres of this world, far from the conflicts of great powers, a relentless war, a war of annihilation is in progress, waged by the Government of Iraq against a nation it wishes out of existence. The aim of the Government of Iraq is the de-Kurdisation of two million Kurds of Iraqi Kurdistan; if necessary even by genocide, leading thereby to the destruction of the Kurdish national liberation movement. In pursuit of this aim a colonial war is being conducted by the Baghdad Government, backed up by the might of the Iraqi Armed Forces and equipped with modern arms both Western and Communist. Isolated from the world, ignored equally by colonial powers and by enemies of colonialism, two million Kurds are fighting for self-preservation. Eighteen thousand Kurdish men, women and children killed, two thousand Kurdish villages destroyed, two hundred thousand Kurdish refugees, this is but part of the suffering inflicted upon the Kurds, in a war which, now in its fifth year, shows no sign of abating. Why? Why is it that the Kurds, comparatively ill-equipped and untrained in the arts of modern war-

fare, are prepared to pit themselves against the heavy guns, tanks and planes of the Iraqi regular forces? What transforms these shepherds, farmers, clerks, intellectuals and artisans, young and old, into an indestructible force, ready for every sacrifice? Paradoxically and tragically, the real drama of the heroic struggle of the people of Iraqi Kurdistan is not widely known. This may be explained in part by the geographic isolation of the mountainous region they inhabit. Certainly, the strict censorship of the Baghdad regime concerning everything that affects the Kurdish revolt has prevented the full measure of truth from penetrating to the outside world. To relate the full story—political, human and military—would require far more space than the modest size of this booklet allows. All that is intended here is to provide an insight, no more, into the story of the Kurdish struggle, its background, its motivation and its aspirations. Perhaps, after having perused its contents, there will be readers who will be moved to enquire deeper into the conflict and ultimately speak out in support of the Kurdish cause. This is the prayer of the people of Iraqi Kurdistan.



Funeral of a
Pesh-Merger soldier
killed in the defence
of the village

We begin our story by spelling out what we are determined to achieve in having taken up arms against the Central Government of Iraq. We ask the reader to bear these aims in mind as he turns the pages that follow, and to judge their legitimacy in the light of our case. The essential aims of the Kurdish Revolution as they have evolved over the years of bloodshed and struggle, and as they are today commonly accepted by the people of Iraqi Kurdistan are:

1 THE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE KURDS AS A PEOPLE
MUST BE RECOGNIZED AND GUARANTEED.

2 THE NAME, "KURDISTAN", MUST BE RECOGNIZED
AND ITS BOUNDARIES WITHIN IRAQ DELINEATED IN
KEEPING WITH HISTORICAL, GEOGRAPHICAL AND ETHNIC REALITIES.

3 KURDISTAN MUST BE GRANTED THE FULLEST
AUTONOMY WITHIN THE IRAQI REPUBLIC.

4 THE KURDISH LANGUAGE MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS
THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF IRAQI KURDISTAN.

5 KURDISH CULTURE MUST BE ALLOWED TO DEVELOP
AND THE RIGHT OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE RECOGNIZED TO
EDUCATE THEIR CHILDREN IN THEIR OWN
LANGUAGE AND BRING THEM UP IN THEIR OWN CULTURE.

6 THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE KURDS MUST BE
RAISED AND THEY MUST BE GIVEN EQUAL AND JUST
OPPORTUNITY FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
OIL ROYALTIES ACCRUING FROM OIL PRODUCTION
IN KURDISH TERRITORY MUST BE DIVERTED
FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE KURDISH NATION, IN A
JUST PROPORTION AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE
SIZE OF THE KURDISH POPULATION IN IRAQ.

7 THE KURDS MUST BE ALLOWED TO MAINTAIN THEIR
OWN DISTINCT POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES WHICH
WILL REMAIN IN KURDISTAN AS GUARANTEE OF ANY PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

8 THE IRAQI CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MUST BE SO
COMPOSED AS TO GIVE AUTHENTIC REPRESENTATION
TO BOTH THE ARAB AND KURDISH NATIONALITIES.
MILITARY DICTATORSHIP MUST BE ABANDONED AND
DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES MUST BE RESPECTED.

9 SHOULD THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT REFUSE TO ACCEPT
THE ABOVE DEMANDS, THE KURDISH PEOPLE WILL
STRIVE TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION,
UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

A NATION THAT REFUSES TO DIE

Pesh Merga freedom fighters with children



Ask a Kurdish mountain peasant why he fights and he will give you his brief succinct answer: for the freedom of Kurdistan. He will, perhaps, say that he has taken up arms because officials from Baghdad want to educate his children as Arabs when they are Kurds; perhaps because he sees no benefits from the vast oil wealth with which his country is blessed; perhaps because he is treated as a second class citizen; perhaps because . . .

Whatever his reply, it expresses, in essence, what statesmen call "the right of self-determination". The Kurdish mountain peasant and with him the Kurdish urban dweller, wants nothing more than to be himself, among his own kinsfolk. He wants to be a Kurd and not an Arab. He wants his nation to be free and equal with the rest of Iraq.



Victim of war, a child refugee guards what is left of family belongings in mountain refuge.

had selected five hundred girls as graceful and sweet as the full moon in May. But before they came flying back with the young virgins to the Royal Palace, King Solomon had gone the way of all flesh. And because the virgins had found favour in the eyes of the jinn, the jinn took them unto themselves as their wives. And they begat many beautiful children, and those children bore even more children . . . and that is the way the nation of the Kurds came into being".

Legend aside, the Kurds are one of the most ancient peoples of the Middle East. Of Medo-Scythic origin, the first recorded mention of them dates back to 401 BC, in Xenophon's famous "Anabasis". This Hellenic historian refers to the Kurds and even describes them within the confines of present-day Kurdistan.

Ethnologically, the Kurds are related to the Persians and Afghans within the Iranian family of peoples, as the Poles and Russians are related within the Slav family.

DEFINING NATIONHOOD

The term "nation" is a complex notion, a delicate intermixture of physical and spiritual attributes. The dictionary defines it as a "distinct race or people having common descent, language, history and political institutions".

The Kurds are a nation embodying all the attributes of legitimate nationhood. They enjoy a long and unbroken history going back 25 centuries. They have their own distinct language. They inhabit their own distinct territory. They are characterized by an indigenous national culture. They have evolved their own institutions of self-government and administration. And, for almost fifty years, they have been conducting a struggle for freedom rooted in a reality as strong and as just as that of any other national liberation movement.

THE ORIGINS OF THE KURDISH NATION


Like so many other ancient peoples, the origins of the Kurdish nation are steeped deep in myth and legend. This is how the Kurdish mountain folk relate the story of the birth of their people:

"That day King Solomon called five hundred young jinn and ordered them to fly after the sun towards the west and not to return until they had found the five hundred most beautiful virgins in far-distant Europe. The jinn went about their search for a long, long time, appraised and compared for a long, long time until they

NATIONAL TERRITORY AND POPULATION

What is sententiously termed in Baghdad official usage as "Northern Iraq", is, in fact, Iraqi Kurdistan. Situated in the north and north-east of the Iraqi State, its 80,000 square kilometres make up almost one third of the country's inhabited area. The Hamrin ranges divide Kurdistan from the rest of Iraq. North of these ranges Iraqi Kurdistan unfolds with a climate, fauna and flora, customs and national characteristics strikingly different from those of the south. It is a mountainous territory, rich in mineral resources and

IRAQI KURDISTAN




intersected by fertile green valleys and plains. Here the Kurds have lived from time immemorial, ardently attached to their land. Throughout the ages, they have constituted a compact and continuous national community in the self-same territory they inhabit to this day.

Two million Kurds — nearly one third of Iraq's entire population—inhabit the towns and villages of Iraqi Kurdistan. They are a sedentary people, composed mostly of robust hard-working peasantry, interspersed with bustling urban communities in which an old bourgeoisie lives alongside artisans, practising customary trades and handicrafts, and a newly emerging working class. They enjoy ties of kinship with the large, compact Kurdish communities in the neighbouring states: Iran, Turkey, Syria and, to a lesser degree, in the three Trans-Caucasian Republics in the Soviet Union.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

Philologists trace the Kurdish language as far back as the fifth century BC. For an uninterrupted 2,500 years it has been a living tongue to the inhabitants of Kurdistan who, to this day, employ it almost exclusively in their daily speech and writing. With roots nurtured by founts of ancient wisdom and a rich historical past, contemporary literary Kurdish has evolved into a modern form since the beginning of the twentieth century.

From the time of antiquity, the Kurdish language has been the spoken or Iranian family language of the Persian being much influenced by the Spanish in the Latin family of languages.



Kurdish is an expressive language, as the country's folklore, poetry and prose so poignantly demonstrate. As one becomes familiar with its rich resonance, whether be expressed in the bazaar of Sulamaniya, or as it is enshrined in the great works of the Kurdish writers, one understands how absurd are the attempts of tyrants and oppressors, ancient and modern, in seeking to degenerate and even destroy Kurdish national culture.

A culture is indestructible so long as those who seek to uphold it live by it. The continuous existence of Kurdish culture is a living proof that it has done more than survive; it has created, is creating. It has produced great writers treasured by the nation today — poets like Ali Tirmoki (10th century), Ali Hariri (11th century), Mulla Jezri (14th century) and Ahmedî Khani (17th century).

Understand Kurdish culture and you have the key to the miracle and riddle of Kurdish survival during the last 500 years; survival accomplished in the teeth of every conceivable form of persecution; survival despite the encroachment of other seemingly more sophisticated cultures. Open the cultural flood gates of these people, which have been barred for so long, and the effervescence of their creative being cascades forth in an almost torrential flow. It was seen to happen briefly in 1938 and 1939, during the first two years of the Iraqi Republic, when the Kurds were permitted freedom of cultural expression. Overnight almost, hundreds of books appeared in the Kurdish language — original writings, classical translations and works covering a multitude of cultural and scientific subjects. The Kurdish political press, hitherto driven underground, flourished into many daily publications.

1. "Mamagana the Hero" — ancient Kurdish epic.
2. Book in the Kurdish language recounting the history of the Kurds of Shiela Mamma.


After this brief and remarkable interval, the Iraqi dictatorship, taken aback perhaps by the intensity of cultural self-expression decided to put an end to Kurdish cultural freedom and completely suppressed the rights previously granted. This became one of the major causes for the outbreak of the Kurdish Revolution.

NATIONAL ECONOMY

A country with vast and varied natural resources, Kurdistan is capable of self-support, with abundant water resources and forests which cover wide areas of its mountains. Though agriculture, for the present, remains the backbone of the Kurdish economy, Kurdistan has all the potentialities for industrialization and for substantial exports.

Iraqi Kurdistan is rich in some of the world's oldest oil-fields, such as Kirkuk, Ain-Zaleh and Khanakin. Proven oil reserves, as yet unexploited, remain vast. Yet the Kurds themselves derive no benefits from their natural wealth. The tremendous oil revenues, which in 1965 alone reached \$400 million, have been and are being entirely spent by the Baghdad Government in the Southern part of Iraq and on the war of repression against the Kurds.

Besides its oil, Kurdistan is extremely rich in coal, iron and chrome. It also possesses considerable resources of natural gas, all awaiting exploitation. Great hydroelectric plants could be established by harnessing the current of the country's swift-flowing rivers, thus providing new sources of power to promote industrialization.



Handwritten Kurdish characters from pre-Islamic epoch, and Arabic characters from Islamic epoch.

THE KURDISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT

For an understanding of the emergence and growth of the Kurdish National Movement one must go back to the Middle Ages when Kurdistan still enjoyed independence. The country at that time was divided among 40 independent principalities or small states of feudal structure, governed by hereditary dynasties, as were the majority of European nations at the time.* Independent but divided, Kurdistan progressively found itself subject to the pressures of its two powerful neighbours—in the East, imperial Iran, and in the West, the Ottoman Empire. Kurdish sovereignty suffered a process of erosion under the weight of the pressures from without. From 1514 onwards, the western and northern principalities became protectorates of the Ottoman Empire; the eastern areas fell under the sway of Persia.

* The military, political, economic and social life in Medieval Kurdistan is fully treated in two famous historical works – "Annals of the Kurdish Nation" by Prince Cheref Khan of Bitlis (1596), and in treatise by the 17th Cent. Turkish geographer, Evliya Çelebi.



In the protracted clash between these two powers, Kurdistan, which geographically separated them, became a field of battle. The country was ruined and the population decimated. The situation remained in flux until 1639 when a Turkish-Persian treaty finally fixed the frontiers between the two empires, almost identical to those existing today. With that, Kurdish independence went into its long eclipse.

With the decline of independence, the Kurdish national idea of regeneration was inevitably born. It became eternally enshrined in the 17th century epic poem "Memozin", by the renowned Kurdish poet and author Elmedî Khani, the prophet of Kurdish national rebirth.

NATIONALIST MOVEMENT TAKES SHAPE

Three centuries were to pass, however, before Kurdish nationalism was to become a coherent movement. It began to take on definite shape at the turn of the present century under the guidance of far-seeing nationalist thinkers. Slowly but surely, their vision of a revived nationhood after more than 500 years of subjugation spread throughout Kurdistan. Political organizations, parties, clubs, newspapers and revolutionary committees sprang up in the towns and villages.

By the time the last shot of World War I was fired, the Kurdish National Movement had become a decisive, all-embracing force. From the ashes of that War new nations emerged and older dependent peoples regained their freedom. The Kurds, too, sought to retrieve their ancient

patrimony. In 1919, they officially presented their demands for independence to the Paris Peace Conference.

INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION

For a brief moment, it appeared that the Kurdish cause was on the threshold of fruition. In its articles 62, 63 and 64, entitled "Kurdistan", the 1920 Treaty of Sévres provided for the creation of an Independent Kurdistan by the Council of the League of Nations.

But the Treaty of Sévres, although officially signed by all the parties concerned, was never ratified. The Kurds were betrayed and abandoned by the Great Powers who had their own interests to play.

Sévres, nevertheless, marks a turning point in the Kurdish national struggle. Here, for the first time, the national existence of the Kurdish nation and its right to independence won international recognition.

BROKEN PROMISES AND UPRISINGS

For some time after Sévres there still appeared a glimmer of hope that the Kurds might yet salvage something of their national rights. Southern Kurdistan (the ancient Ottoman Vilayet of Mosul), was still under occupation by British military forces — its fate undecided. In December



Oil in Iraqi Kurdistan: — 400 million dollars annual royalties in which the Kurds have no share

1922, the British Government issued, with the newly created Government of Iraq, a Joint Declaration officially recognizing the rights of the Kurds to establish self-government within the framework of the new State. But again, although this Declaration of policy was communicated by its authors to the Council of the League of Nations, it was never put into effect. In 1925, under British pressure, Southern Kurdistan was annexed to the newly constituted Kingdom of Iraq. This act of blatant opportunism was perpetrated against the express wishes of the Kurds and in face of their active resistance.


The determination of the Kurds to survive as a nation grew in direct proportion to the spread of the oppressive measures against them. The Kurdish regions were absorbed into the centralized Iraqi administrative system. Kurdish was no longer recognized as the official language of Kurdistan and the civil servants, the system of justice and education, all became Iraqi. As for the name "Kurdistan", it was banished from official usage and became "Northern Iraq".

The broken promises, the selling out of the Kurds by the British to the rule of the Baghdad Government, and the continued exploitation of their natural resources for the benefit of others, sparked off a series of national uprisings.

In 1923 (in the Sulaimani region), in 1930 (in Sulaimani), in 1933 (in the Barzan region) and in 1943 and 1945 (again in the Barzan region), Kurdish freedom fighters rose up in arms. Those revolts were crushed by the cruelest measures, but always the will to live was too overwhelming to permit the obstinate Kurds to remain undaunted. The culmination of their struggle occurred in the present decade with the Kurdish Revolution.



1. Typical Kurdish mountain village; 2. Bishop Harti, representative of the Christian Kurds in the Command Council of the Revolution; 3. Every mountain — a natural fortress: view of Kurdish held territory in the vicinity of Gallala (moor-capped Mt. Rost in background).



THE KURDISH REVOLUTION

Kurdish wireless post on rugged hillside



To the Kurds of Iraq, the overthrow of the Iraqi Monarchy in 1958 looked like the harbinger of a new and happier era. The Kurds had long been in the forefront of the opposition to the Royal Government which had consistently been antagonistic toward Kurdish nationalist aspirations. When General Abdul Karim Kassem seized the reins of power on 14 July 1958, he gave public recognition to the important role the Kurdish national movement had played in overthrowing the old regime and called upon Kurdish support in his struggle against his adversaries. This support was willingly given in return for promises of national rights. Article III of the Interim National Constitution gave the Kurds full national equality with the Arabs. A Kurd was appointed to the three-man Sovereignty Council and four Kurdish Ministers were included in the Government. The new State emblem symbolized the new era of equality, depicting as it did the Arab sword crossed with the Kurdish sabre. General Mustapha Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish nationalists who, since 1946 had lived in exile, returned to Iraq where he was hailed as a national hero. The Kurdistan Democratic Party was officially recognized and, within a short period, fifteen newspapers, four of them dailies, made their appearance in the Kurdish language.

آزاد بھو راہی، نیشنل پبلیکیشنز

پوښتونکي مجلې کورنۍ له
کورډیناټي عراقا مافي
بدلو اېښتې دمت کورنۍ پېښه
خواړه لي خوځکي ډالۍ .
پهغو لارو وړاندي نه ټکو ښار.

三

کورسیائی پارٹی دیموکریٹک
گورنمنٹ

217

له چاپخانه‌ی عدالت چاپ کر

Car

گول عاشق داری ژوندومونه

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ٲككردى ٲى روٲىران كٲشك مسمهائى.

موسسین کی مدد، مقررہ پوزیشنوں پر لکھی گئی تھی۔

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"Khabat" — the organ of the Korlatian Democratic Party — appeared since 1958 as a daily newspaper in Soleimaniya and has since 1961 been published as a monthly in Korlatan

NAA: A1838. 173/2/6/1 PART 2

National Archives of Australia

حکمی عارف به کیستی نیشتمانی
به به کجاری لهر به ک هلدو و شینی

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موسسین کی مدد، مقررہ پوزیشنوں پر لکھی گئی تھی۔

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NAA: A1838. 173/2/6/1 PART 2

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We have no choice but to continue our struggle to assure justice, freedom and dignity for our people. We will relentlessly carry on.

National Archives of Australia

the fight for peace for our ravaged and beloved land of Kurdistan.

Only their arms

NAA: A1838 17312/6/1 PART 2

MORE BROKEN PROMISES

But this happy era was tragically short-lived. The provisions of Article III were never translated into political reality. The highly centralized Iraqi administration remained largely unchanged in its application towards Kurdistan, and, as before, the very name, "Kurdistan", remained officially ignored.

As students of the Kassem regime have noted, the Iraqi dictator managed to maintain himself in power only by playing upon political dissensions and exploiting traditional rivalries. Before long he discarded all pretence of democratic rule by abolishing the political liberties which the July 1958 Revolution had gained.

It turned out that Kassem had no intention whatever of implementing Article III of the Provisional Constitution. He merely used it as a means to neutralize the Kurds while he dealt with dissensions among the Arab population of Iraq. Once he had overcome his opponents, he turned to the persecution of Kurdish patriots. He closed the centres of the Kurdish Democratic Party and ordered the arrest of its members.

In October 1960, the Kurdish daily "Khabat" published an editorial openly attacking General Kassem for failing to implement Article III of the Constitution and for his refusal to further democratic liberties. Commenting on Article II of the

Constitution, which declared Iraq to be "a part of the Arab nation", the editorial exclaimed, "If Iraq is part of the Arab nation, then Iraqi Kurdistan is a part of the Kurdish nation".

This editorial marked the final parting of the ways. The privileges still enjoyed by the Kurdish national movement were withdrawn. "Khabat" was closed down and its editors arrested. All the Kurdish newspapers were eventually confiscated; many of the Kurdish leaders, threatened with arrest, went underground or travelled northwards to join Barzani and his followers.

THE RESULTS

Kassem's reaction followed a predictable pattern: he attempted to buy off a number of Kurdish landowners to win them over to his campaign against the nationalists. It was a crude blunder, for it only served to consolidate the large majority of the embittered Kurdish population behind their leaders.

With that, the die was cast. The Iraqi dictator decided on a military solution by launching a full-scale attack on the Kurds. Kurdish partisans took to the hills, ill-equipped though they were, they fought back.

So began the Kurdish Revolution — the largest and best organized movement in the history of a sorely tried nation.



Kurdish artillery



Four men
standing
on a
mountain
ridge
near
the
border
of
Afghanistan
and
Pakistan

THE MILITARY CAMPAIGNS, 1961-1966

A national emblem of Kurdistan



Now in its fifth year, the Revolution has endured several campaigns launched against it by the Baghdad Government:

1. The Kassem Campaign

On first launching their operation, on 11 September 1961, the Iraqi authorities believed it would be short-lived and the collapse of Kurdish opposition imminent. By 23 September 1961, General Kassem was boasting that his Army already crushed "the rebels in the North". Clearly, he had failed to gauge correctly the depth of Kurdish capacity for resistance.

By the same token, he completely misjudged the effectiveness of the military and political organization improvised by the Kurdish leaders. In consequence, none of the military operations mounted by the Kassem forces achieved their goal. The Revolutionary movement meantime quickly grew in power, consolidating itself in every part of Iraqi Kurdistan. In February 1963 the Kassem campaign came to an end with the overthrow and death of the Iraqi military dictator. Ironically, it was the failure of his campaign against the Kurds which served as a principal political and military cause of his downfall.



Many of the positions held by the Pesh Merga can be reached only on foot and by mule transport

2. The Baathist Campaign

The leaders of the Baath Party and their allies had through General Taher Yehya, contacted the Kurdish Revolutionaries and promised to fulfil Kurdish demands, should the Baath succeed.

When the Baathists and General Aref succeeded Kassem, in February 1963, some of the Kurds were of the opinion that the hour of confusion should be exploited to attack Government army units. But, General Barzani opposed this, saying that the new regime should be given a chance to fulfil their promises. A Kurdish delegation was sent to Baghdad to negotiate a peaceful settlement.

The Baath regime, however, from the start adopted evasive tactics towards the delegation and practically ignored its presence in Baghdad. Soon enough, the Baath regime resumed the aggression against the Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Representing as they did an extreme chauvinist wing of Arab nationalism, the Baathists launched savage military operations of mass extermination against the Kurds. They were even assisted by Syria, which sent an expeditionary force to Kurdistan to participate in the war. But the Baathists, militarily speaking, fared no better than their predecessor. The Kurds fought back, improvising and consolidating their military forces.

3. The Cease-fire

On 8 November 1963, General Abd el Salem Aref took over full power in Baghdad and put an end to the Baath regime. He soon declared that the responsibility for the war against the Kurds lay upon his predecessors and that his intentions towards them were constructive.



Mourning the victims of unprovoked aggression

Unexploded bombs after Iraqi Air Force attack



Meantime, the war continued and the morale of Aref's forces reached a low ebb. In February 1964, General Barzani accepted a cease-fire agreement mainly to test Aref's declaration of good intent, and hoping for a just settlement. He did this despite the internal problems which the cease-fire created among the Kurds.

The Government, however, once more ignored Kurdish claims as soon as matters calmed down in the other regions of Iraq. Aref denied even the Third Article of the Provisional Constitution of 1958.

During the Cease-fire, missions and proposals were exchanged but the Government followed a singular line — successively reducing the number of concessions it was willing to make.

In the spring of 1965, the Cease-fire came to an end.

4. The Araf Campaign

In spring 1965 a strengthened Iraqi Army resumed the offensive with the declared objective of finally crushing the Revolution. The war took a turn of unparalleled cruelty and ferocity. Vastly superior enemy forces struck out in an attempt to overwhelm the major Kurdish strongholds. The Kurdish Revolutionary Army faced the onslaught with defiance. Napalm bombings, atrocities against civilians, slaughter of hostages, burning of villages — all failed to turn the tide of battle in favour of the Government forces.

Certain areas of Kurdish territory — it must be admitted — were lost, at a high price, to the enemy. But some parts were regained as the Iraqi troops fell back in face of skillfully executed counterattacks.

The winter of 1966, far from putting an end to the fighting enabled the Kurdish forces to launch numerous attacks against Iraqi positions and Iraqi garrisons.



MAY 1966 CAMPAIGN

- 10 — Rawanduz-Haji Umrin Road
- ↑ — Kurdish Defence Positions
- ↑ — Main Attacks by Units of the 1st & 2nd Iraqi Divisions
- ↑ — Retreat of Iraqi troops
- P — Iraqi Field Headquarters
- ↑ — Kurdish Counter-Attack in which the 4th Brigade of the Iraqi Army was destroyed

The Iraqi Spring Offensive in the Rawanduz region — May 1966

THE WAR — ITS VICTIMS AND HEROES



Woman caught in for after Iraqi Air Force used her village with Napalm bombs



General
Mustafa Barzani,
President of the
Command of the
Council of the
Revolution

During these years of merciless warfare, Kurdish forces have succeeded in liberating and holding onto the greater part of Iraqi Kurdistan. They now control most of the mountainous regions. Here a Kurdish war-time administration has been set up. In the plains, the Iraqi Army controls only the urban centres and some of the main lines of communication. Virtually all the countryside is in Kurdish hands, and Kurdish forces circulate there freely. The Kurdish revolutionary forces are also active behind enemy lines enjoying the assistance and support of the local population.

ATROCITIES AGAINST CIVILIAN POPULATION

In the attempt to break Kurdish resistance and to take revenge for their military setbacks, the Iraqi Government forces have throughout adopted barbarian methods of war, against partisan fighters and defenceless civilian population, and through acts bordering on genocide.

Kurdish towns and villages have been systematically attacked from the air with incendiary and napalm bombs. Thousands of innocent women, children and elderly people, who had nothing to do with the war, were killed. During November and December of 1965 alone, 303 villages were razed to the ground and the villagers either massacred or driven off their lands. Altogether, more than two thousand Kurdish villages have so far been deliberately destroyed. Crops and domestic animals have also been systematically and intentionally destroyed, with the purpose of starving the entire Kurdish population. Kurdish peasants have been evicted from 240 villages in the oil producing region of Kirkuk and in the region of Irbil. Arab tribes have been settled in their place, taking illegal possession of Kurdish lands, houses and property.

In the Kirkuk suburbs 40,000 civilian Kurds were terrorized and driven out by force, and their houses bulldozered. Thousands of Kurds are held as political prisoners in concentration camps in Southern Iraq. The few Kurdish soldiers who were taken prisoners were executed, sometimes crushed alive under Iraqi tanks. Kurdish civilians in occupied zones are at the mercy of local Government garrisons.



COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL
DE LA
CROIX-ROUGE

Gandev, le 9 septembre 1965.
202 (70) 29/242

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

Vous avez l'honneur de nous adresser à votre lettre du 13 août, nous transmettant un message de la part du Général Mustafa Barzani, de même qu'à notre entretien du 3 septembre, à Genève.

Par ses deux communications, vous avez attiré notre attention sur l'insécurité d'une utilisation de cet de guerre par l'armée irakienne, dans ses opérations militaires contre les Kurdes.

A ce propos, nous vous remercions ici ce que nous vous avons exprimé précédemment, à savoir que la prohibition de l'utilisation de cet de guerre par les armées des Conventions de Genève, mais du protocole de Genève, conclu en 1925 avec les puissances de la Société des Nations, l'Irak y est parti, l'ayant signé en 1971. Aux termes de ce protocole, les parties ne sont pas tenues de ne pas utiliser cet de guerre.

Le protocole de Genève, dont il est question ici, est donc une convention internationale qui a été élaborée par les Conventions de Genève de 1949, déjà déclinant les possibilités d'action de la Croix-Rouge au temps de conflit.

En ce qui concerne les envois de secours déjà confirmés ici que nous nous efforçons de poursuivre, nous vous en remercions de tout cœur, et les circonstances favorisent certainement une mise en œuvre en faveur des victimes du conflit du Kurdistan.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, l'assurance de notre considération très distinguée.

[Signature]
M. GALLIEN
Directeur Adjoint



COMITÉ INTERNATIONAL
DE LA
CROIX-ROUGE

Gandev, le 8 novembre 1965.
202/223 X (70) 34/242

Cher Monsieur,

Comme suite à notre conversation de ce jour, nous vous adressons ci-joint, pour votre information, une lettre de la Croix-Rouge suisse, datée du 13 octobre, concernant le cas de la Croix-Rouge suisse. Il est entendu que les médicaments, couvertures et vêtements inclus dans cet envoi sont destinés aux victimes des événements, dans le Kurdistan irakien.

Ainsi que V. Amman vous l'a demandé, nous vous serons reconnaissants de nous faire parvenir toutes les informations possibles sur la réception et l'utilisation de ces médicaments, afin que nous puissions, à notre tour, renseigner la Croix-Rouge suisse.

D'après nous vous en remercions et vous prions d'agréer, cher Monsieur, l'assurance de nos sentiments les meilleurs.

Pour le Comité International
de la Croix-Rouge

[Signature]
F. Baillard

Annexe 1 2. bordereau en 3 ex.

International Red Cross letters regarding supply of medicines to the Kurds and the prohibition of the use of gas in war

Reports are received almost day by day of unprovoked murder, rape, loot and arbitrary imprisonment.

In face of this organized terror, more than 200,000 Kurdish civilians have fled from their homes and now live shelterless in forests and mountains under conditions bordering on starvation. Anyone familiar with the bitter and snowbound Kurdish winter, will have some inkling of their ordeal.

THE KURDISH NATIONAL ARMY


How strong are the Kurdish forces? If weapons be the criterion, their strength is modest; if spirit and dedication are the yardstick, they enjoy a superiority over the enemy in every sector. And naturally so, for the Kurdish partisans fight for a cause in which they passionately believe, on territory which is their own and which they know intimately, and amidst a population which identifies itself with the revolutionary struggle.

The Kurdish Revolutionary Army is made up of all segments of the Kurdish population — peasants, urban workers, middle class and intelligentsia. Among its ranks are hundreds of Kurdish officers, NCO's, soldiers and policemen who, out of loyalty to the Kurdish cause, have gone over from the Government forces to join the Pesh Merga.

ARMY ORGANIZATION

The Revolutionary Army is a permanent and regular force practising modern guer-

ORGANIZATION OF THE REVOLUTION OF IRAQI KURDISTAN



rilla warfare. It is composed of ten autonomous brigades called "Hez". Each brigade, composed of three to five battalions, operates in a well-defined region. Four of the brigades are currently under the command of a divisional headquarters. The "brigade commands" cover the entire territory of Iraqi Kurdistan. Elements of these brigades operate constantly behind enemy lines. An eleventh brigade is now in formation.

The brigades are under the orders of the Kurdish High Command. Contact between the Command, the brigades and their units is effected through an efficient wireless network and through messengers operating along country roads. The Revolutionary Army has its own medical, logistics, transport and intelligence services, as well as several training centres. Rifles and light automatic weapons make up the bulk of the equipment, and a mobile artillery force has recently been organized.

THE IRAQI FORCES

Facing the Kurdish Army are practically the entire armed forces of the Iraqi Government. These consist of four infantry divisions, one armoured division, several independent brigades and the entire Iraqi Air Force. These forces are supplemented by a well-equipped Police Force and irregular mercenaries in the pay of the Baghdad Government. All Iraqi forces are equipped with modern weapons of a wide range and variety, including jet aircraft, tanks and heavy artillery. These weapons are being supplied in equal measure by both the Western and Commu-



Villagers coming out after bombardment



Iraqi Ilyushin-28 bomber shot down by Kurdish anti-aircraft artillery



Iraqi Hunter aircraft destroyed in attack

nist powers. Lately, the Iraqi Government has also added gas to its inventory of weapons, but has so far refrained from its use out of fear of world opinion.

INSTITUTIONS OF THE REVOLUTION*

During these years of revolt, the Kurds have developed a comprehensive national, political, military and social administration.

The supreme directing body of the Revolution is the Command Council of the Revolution. It is composed of elected representatives of the people, members of the Central Committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (K. D. P.) and, the principal commanders of the revolutionary forces. An Executive Bureau acting as a war-time directorate has been set up by the Command Council. The Bureau includes a representative of the Christian Kurds. The Command Council also appoints the Kurdish representative bodies operating abroad.

Iraqi Kurdistan has been divided by the Kurds into five administrative regions. Each has its own Kurdish civil organization for such matters as taxation, justice and general administration. The regions are: Dahuk, Al-Suleimaniya, Irbil, Kirkuk and Khanakin.

General Mustafa Barzani, who has for many years led the Kurdish national struggle for liberation, is President of the Command Council. He also serves as Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Army and is President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

* See also chart on page 42

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Villagers coming out after bombardment



Iraqi T-28 tank shot down by Kurdish anti-aircraft artillery



Iraqi Hunter aircraft being shot down

EPILOGUE

A COLONIAL WAR WAGED BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT

In this era of self-determination, when country after country in Africa and Asia has won freedom and sovereignty after generations of foreign rule, the colonial and genocidal war conducted by the Government of Iraq against the Kurdish people is a monstrous phenomenon. The undisguised aim of this war is to destroy a nation of its natural identity, to forcibly impose upon it a new culture, to rob it of its natural riches, and thus to annihilate the very existence of the Kurdish race within Iraq.

The Government of Iraq seeks to perpetuate the oppression and persecution of the Kurds by foreign imperialist interests. The Kurds were sacrificed upon the altar of the desire of some few Arab States. The implementation of the Arab League's plan to divide the Arab world into Arab States would deny the Kurds their right to self-determination. In ignoring this claim, the Iraqi authorities have ridden roughshod over every Kurdish demand to a degree that has driven the Kurds to despair.

ate measures to ensure their very survival. The people of Iraqi Kurdistan are now demonstrating to the world that they will never resign themselves to the fate designed by Baghdad — regardless of cost, sacrifice, and suffering. No matter how long the Iraqi Government seeks to perpetrate this criminal warfare, the will of the Kurdish nation to live in Iraq as an autonomous entity will never be broken. However long the present Iraqi regime seeks to persist in its bloody adventures, it can only meet with the fate of its predecessors. For the great irony of this war is that it has undermined and eventually toppled every political regime in Iraq since the Revolution began in 1961. Kassem is dead. The Baath regime is dead and Abdel Salam Aref is also dead. Their successors, if they wish to continue the war, will fare no better.

For all these reasons, we call upon the Government of Iraq to allow us to live in peace as Kurds, albeit part of the Iraqi State, yet autonomous and free to give expression to our heritage as a people.

For all these reasons, we call upon men of goodwill everywhere to hearken to our cry and join the ranks of those many people the world over who are already lending us their support, confident that the counsels of sanity will yet prevail.

To date, these demands have fallen on deaf ears. The Baghdad Government has repeatedly refused to countenance our justified claims, preferring a "solution" to the Kurdish national question based upon the use of force. A colonial war is the result—outright aggression rather than a negotiated settlement designed to guarantee peace based upon mutual respect.

Confident though we are by brazen coercion and determined as we are to resist colonial enslavement, with our very lives, we, the people of Iraq, have not relinquished the hope of a peaceful solution to this problem. We believe the United Nations can and must bring its influence to bear in ending the bloodshed and in promoting a peace. Thus we are taking measures to bring the conflict before the Security Assembly, with the help of all friendly and peace-loving nations. We trust that wise statesmanship supported by the conscience of mankind will yet achieve a peaceful solution. We have no choice but to continue our struggle to ensure the peace and dignity for our people. We will resolutely carry out our basic demands are satisfied. Only then can peace be achieved in this sacred and beloved land of Kurdistan.





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NAS 1061 (APRIL 1996)

Series no: A1838/272

Item no: 173/2/6/1 PART 2



file 173/2/6/1/29



President al Bakr

SOON after General Ahmad Hassan al Bakr came to power as President of Iraq following the overthrow of the Arif regime last July, he proclaimed his intention of bringing an official end to the seven-year-old civil war with the Kurds through a peaceful solution on the basis of the so-called Declaration of 1966, the provisions of which would give greater recognition to the Kurds.

But the situation still remains precarious because the main provisions have not yet been carried out, and Iraq's Kurdish problem is a contributory factor — it is suggested — in the civil war which they are little prospect that they will be in the near future.

The Declaration of 1966 was formulated by the

then Prime Minister, Abd al-Rahman Arif. It provides for the recognition of the Kurdish nationality within a permanent constitution; for decentralisation and the transfer of wide powers to local councils; the administrative and regional legislative powers; and the representation of Kurds in the National Assembly and in all branches of public service in proportion to their population; an appointment of Kurds to all posts in the national government; and the permission for



Mustafa, who has at times received support from Moscow, became President of the left-wing Democratic Party, and his distant after being brought back from exile by the Qasim regime which followed the overthrow of the monarchy in July, 1958.

As this regime did nothing to improve the status of the Kurds, Mustafa defected to Baghdad and joined the Ba'athist movement with the result that the Democratic Party was declared illegal and Mustafa retired to Iraq from where he was expelled the Ba'athists held the reins of power which broke out in July, 1961.

Grudge

For seven years Mustafa organised the Kurds against four regimes and three, uneasy periods of

The recent public hangings in Iraq of alleged spies — including several Jewish Iraqis — bear witness to the instability, as well as to the savage impulses, of the current Baathist regime.

Contributing to this instability is the continuing Kurdish insurrection; and in turn the weakness and unpopularity of the government diminish the prospects of a settlement of the Kurdish country.

KURDS STILL UNHAPPY IN IRAQ

From a special correspondent.

pertant to many Kurds than political nationalism. Auxiliaries have been known to go over to the government side, and Muslim forces have actually recognised as a separate entity from the disident Dimsocrads.

Apart from the objection to being politically divided, representing a community, the Kurds are a homogeneous nation, pronounced as a middle No doubt President

the class developed in the past, and more areas were created up.

The signs are that no settlement will be forthcoming until an Iraq government is prepared to negotiate with the Kurds on equal terms. The Kurds are equal and that the prospect of reaching a settlement



Former President Arif

ing a final settlement was the main reason for the fragmentation of Iraqi unity. Any concessions to the Kurds could cause a clash between the military and civilian wage of the ruling Baath Party or even a clash between the military leaders themselves. And the Kurds are likely to be completely home rule too unpopular to risk such a split.



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From a special correspondent

SOON after General Ahmad Hasan al Bakr came to power as President of Iraq following the overthrow of the Arif regime last July, he proclaimed his intention of bringing an official end to the seven-year-old civil war with the Kurds through a peaceful solution on the basis of the so-called Declaration of 1966, the provisions of which would give greater recognition to the Kurds.

But the situation still remains precarious because the main provisions have not yet been carried out, and Iraq's present instability — in which the Kurdish problem is a contributing factor — suggests that there is little prospect that they will be in the near future.

The Declaration of 1966 was formulated by the

then Prime Minister, Abd ar-Rahman Arif.

It provides for the recognition of the Kurdish nationality within a permanent constitution; for decentralisation and the transfer of wide powers to local councils; the use of Kurdish for regional administration; early parliamentary elections and the representation of Kurds in the National Assembly and in all branches of public service in proportion to their population; the appointment of Kurdish officials to Kurdish regions; permission for

various Kurdish districts; the resettlement of persons evicted from their homes, or compensation in lieu; and a general amnesty, including the release of prisoners and the reappointment of dismissed civil servants.

So far the present regime has only established a Kurdish Cultural Academy and applied the provision on general amnesty. Mulla Mustafa, the Kurdish rebel leader, has made it clear that he cannot negotiate with the government until the more important provisions are implemented.

Mustafa, who has at times received support from Moscow, became president of the left-wing Democratic Party of Kurdistan after being brought back from exile by the Qasim regime which followed the overthrow of the monarchy in July, 1958.

As this regime did nothing to improve the status of the Kurds, Mustafa developed Kurdish nationalism into a more forcible element with the result that the Democratic Party was declared illegal and Mustafa retired to Barzan from where he was undoubtedly the brains behind the civil war which broke out in July, 1961.

Grudge

For seven years Mustafa organised the Kurds against four regimes and had fruitless negotiations with three of them during three uneasy periods of ceasefire.

He would probably have reached a settlement with President Abd al-Salam Arif in the autumn of 1965 had not Jalal Talabani and other leading members defected from the Democratic Party and placed the then government in a more powerful bargaining position.

Although the most prominent leader of the Kurdish cause, Mustafa has failed firmly to unite the Kurds because tribal and personal alliances and feuds are still more im-

portant to many Kurds than political nationalism.

Auxiliaries of dissident tribesmen have been known to go over to the government side, and Mustafa's forces have actually clashed with those belonging to the dissident Democrats.

Apart from the objection to being politically

subordinated to the Arabs, the main grudge of the Kurds is that the Kurdish regions have not been having their fair share of social services and development projects, and are not recognised as a separate nationality from other Iraqis.

They are a homogeneous community, representing about 20 per cent of the total Iraqi population. Their main grievance is in the region of the known as Iraq, although many professional men and servants are from other parts of the Kurdish nationalism pronounced as



Mulla Mustafa

political association and for literary and political publications; the establishment of a Kurdish Cultural Academy to further Kurdish university education; a special Ministry to supervise and to co-ordinate administration in the

"Candessa Times"
23rd Jan 69
FILE

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PAGE 15

Kurds again give trouble in Iraq

From a correspondent in Tehran

THAT Iraq has been having trouble with the Kurds again was all too apparent to visitors to that country recently especially if one travelled a bit to the north.

The outbreak of fighting, about the middle of November, has been denied by Baghdad, but reports in Tehran, later suppressed for reasons of diplomacy, gave some vivid details of the fighting.

The strategic villages of Parviz Khan and Qader Agha reportedly fell to the Kurdish tribesmen after severe fighting. Action was reported also in Erbil,

Qara Dag, Bemu and Maidan.

At Parviz Khan 70 Iraqi troops were said to have been killed. The Iraqis were reported to have retreated in company strength from Maidan, leaving behind two jeeps, an army truck, and thousands of rounds of bullets to the rebels.

Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the Kurdish leader, has been suspicious of General

Ahmed Hassan Bakr's Baathist regime since the day it came to power last summer.

The Baath has not precisely had a record of perfect harmony with the Kurds, but the new regime's patronage of the anti-Barzani splinter group led by Jalal Talabani probably intensified suspicions.

Suspicious

Barzani is also suspicious of Lieutenant-General Saleh Mahdi Ammash, Deputy Premier and Interior Minister, whom he has described as a "butcher". Ammash's record of tough dealing with the Kurds has not endeared them to him.

But the immediate causes of the flare-up, observers believe, were the rumours that Baghdad was planning to transplant thousands of Kurds to central and south Iraq, replacing them by Arab settlers from other regions. The rumours also spoke of a "liquidation plan" for hard-core rebels prepared by Ammash.

The last time Bakr and Ammash were in power together under President Abdul Salem Aref in 1963, an "Arabisation" plan actually was put into operation in Kurdistan, when some 3,000 farmers mainly from the south were settled in Kurdish villages around Erbil.

Bakr's regime, however, stoutly denies that any such plan exists, and puts the rumours down as lies spread by "imperialism".

A message to the Kurdish people towards the beginning of November said: "We hereby proclaim that such propaganda claims (to Arabise the area) are without ground

... The eviction lie too is without foundation."

The pro-Barzani Baghdad newspaper Al Taakhi was closed down because it had published the rumours. (An official statement said it had been closed because of its "negative attitude" towards Baghdad's efforts at reconciliation).

But another Kurdish newspaper, Al Nour, which supports the anti-Barzani faction, was allowed to continue publishing.

The fighting erupted soon after the closure of Al Taakhi, battles reportedly taking place on a "wide front". Barzani replied to the closure of Al Taakhi by re-opening his clandestine radio station, asking his followers to "fight until our legitimate demands are met".


The radio station has been closed since 1966, when the second Araf regime agreed to allow the Kurds to begin publishing Al Taakhi as the Kurdish mouthpiece.

Rights

Strangely enough, neither the Kurds nor the Baghdad junta appear anxious for renewed strife, though the Kurds have blamed the junta for starting the present row after about two years of quiet.

The "message to the Kurdish people" went so far as to "proclaim that the enjoyment by the Kurdish people of their nationalist rights is not something of a favour we bestow on them. Rather, this is a right which they are entitled to and which we must concede; and concede we did".

Observers believe the hostilities may be connected with the power struggle in Bakr's cabinet, in which Ammash and Defence Minister Harden Takriti are reportedly feuding on almost all major issues. The Kurds in the past have tried to profit from divisions at the centre of power in Baghdad.



Mullah Mustafa Barzani, foreground, with two of his followers.

File 173/2/6/1

UPIX-111

IRAQ 4/14

BEIRUT, LEBANON (UPI)--FIGHTING HAS BROKEN OUT IN NORTHERN IRAQ BETWEEN KURDISH INSURGENTS AND GOVERNMENT FORCES, SHATTERING A FRAGILE 22-MONTH TRUCE, THE IRAQI DEFENSE MINISTRY SAID TODAY.

A COMMUNIQUE BROADCAST BY BAGHDAD RADIO AND HEARD HERE SAID 10 PERSONS, INCLUDING FOUR SOLDIERS, WERE KILLED BY REBELS WHO AMBUSHED A CIVILIAN CAR CONVOY FRIDAY.

THERE WAS NO INDICATION WHETHER THE ATTACKS WERE CARRIED OUT ON THE ORDERS OF KURDISH REBEL LEADER MULLAH MUSTAPHA BARZANI OR WHETHER THE REBELS WERE ACTING ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE.

THERE HAS BEEN GROWING UNREST IN THE KURDISH NORTH OVER THE FAILURE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT TERMS OF THE JUNE 1966 TRUCE UNDER WHICH THE KURDS WERE PROMISED A CERTAIN DEGREE OF AUTONOMY.

-TP/753AM/152W-

Handwritten signature

ADDRESS
NEW YORK
TELEPHONE
YUKON 6-7676



117
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

File No. 606/3

23rd March 1967

Memo. No. 330

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA A.C.T.

IRAQI KURDISTAN

On 21st March we received a call at the Mission from Dr Mohammed Ali Osman, member of the Political Bureau of the Democratic Party of Iraqi Kurdistan and member of the Executive Bureau of the Command Council of the Kurdish Revolution, who carried a letter of introduction from General Mustafa Barzani, President of the Democratic Party of Iraqi Kurdistan and President of the Command Council of the Kurdish Revolution.

2. We saw Dr Osman under a misapprehension that he had come from the Mission of Iraq. I subsequently informed the Permanent Representative of Iraq about the visit. He said that he knew of the activities of this group in New York and had already reported on the matter to Baghdad. He remarked that Dr Osman had spoken to Ambassador Adebo of Nigeria. Subsequently the Counsellor of the Italian Mission, Mr Ludovico Carducci, said that he had had a long talk with Dr Osman who had described to him the atrocities inflicted on the Kurdistan people by the armed forces and government of Iraq.

3. In his meeting with us, Dr Osman spoke about the plight of the Kurdish people in Iraq. He said that of the two million Kurds in Iraq, more than one million lived outside Iraqi Government control. He related the failure of the Iraqi Government to give proper rights to the Kurdish people and continuing conflict with Iraq. He said that the Kurds were blockaded in the northern part of Iraq with insufficient food and economic supplies. They are not seeking an independent Iraqi Kurdistan but only better conditions within the Iraqi state. Dr Osman said that his movement was not aimed at a nation state containing all Kurds. Those Kurds living in Iran were better treated than those in Iraq but Kurds in Syria and Turkey also suffered disabilities.

4. Dr Osman said that the United Nations Secretary-General had not answered appeals from the Iraqi Kurds for economic and other assistance. Only a very little medical and economic aid was entering Iraqi Kurdistan from Iran.

5. Dr Osman left copy of a memorandum from General Barzani to the President of the Iraqi Republic dated December 11th, 1966, copy of a memorandum dated January 9th, 1967, and a booklet entitled "Prepared to Die", all of which are enclosed for your information.

Patrick Shaw
(Patrick Shaw)
Permanent Representative

Mr G. H. [illegible]
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IF NOT REQUIRED

CHECKED
[initials]

MEMORANDUM FROM BARZANI TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT

His Excellency the President of the Iraqi Republic,
General Abdul-Rahman N. Arif

His Excellency the Prime Minister, Brigadier General Najib Talib

Warm Greetings:

To your Excellencies we are presenting this memorandum in an attempt to throw some light on the present situation; on the spirit of inaction that has characterized the negotiations; and on the obstacles which have been placed in the way of a solution to the Kurdish question since June 29, 1966.

Your Excellencies are well aware of the fact that the June 29 Plan with both its announced and unannounced provisions, did not reflect the national rights of the Kurds in the form which the Kurds have insisted upon and for which they have fought a war, the tragedy and sufferings of which have surpassed those of World War II.

Yet in our desire for the safety of the Country's national interests; in order to spare the blood of Arab and Kurdish brothers; and to safeguard the national unity, we agreed to the June 29 Plan. We had high hopes that the provisions of the plan would be implemented with a spirit of confidence and good intentions and that they would reflect that which was accepted as minimum by the Kurdish people. We are sad to say that in spite of the five-month period which has expired since the announcement of the plan, the plan still remains a dead letter. What has aggravated the situation even further is that certain government officials have taken steps which could only disturb the peace and security of the region and create provocations. This fact clearly manifests itself in the creation and arming of a new form of cavalry which has been stationed at government camps to assault the freedom and life of the citizens. What has already taken place in Sulaimania, Penjween and Qaladiza are irrefutable evidences to this effect.

In the light of what we have mentioned one can say that the fighting ever really stopped and since June 29 many have been killed and wounded. The continuation of this could lead to a grave situation, for no matter how small these engagements, they could develop into what could have disastrous consequences, something which no one faithful to the country would sanction.

On the other hand there are some government officials -- who by now and after five years of catastrophe should have acquainted themselves with all aspects of the Kurdish question -- are trying to narrow the whole issue down to the question of "reconstruction of the north", something which in itself has not been accomplished.

In addition to all this some high officials of the government have begun releasing statements which contain false and far-fetched accusations. We whose aspirations stem from this soil and who are guided by the spirit of Arab-Kurdish brotherhood will not be influenced by any amount of pressure no matter what its source may be.

It is evident that there are, along with old and new mercenaries, officials who thrive on the fighting of brothers; who play a disgraceful role in the creation of provocations and the straining of relations in order to repeat the tragedies of the past and to further exhaust the resources of this patient and resolute nation.

We had in fact pinned our hopes on the President's visit to the North and our meeting with him in addition to his own close examination of the problems. The people were of the opinion that His Excellency the President was, upon his visit to the north, carrying the key to the whole question. Thus they hopefully looked forward to the visit which was also welcomed by all friends of Iraq. In spite of the importance of that visit, and the favorable impression it had on the people, it looks as if there are destructive elements occupying high and sensitive positions in the government, who are trying to prevent the promises which were made from being put into action; and are trying to destroy all constructive efforts. We cannot find any explanation to the continuing deterioration in the situation other than the notion that those elements stand against the consolidation of brotherhood between Kurds and Arabs; against the strengthening of national unity; and that they are bent on throwing the country back into the civil war.

In an atmosphere filled with tension and far from inspiring any faith and assurance, we have tried our best and have to the best of our abilities carried out the following:

1. We released all of the prisoners all at one time.
2. We opened all public roads and highways.
3. We stopped our radio broadcasts.
4. In compliance with the cease-fire agreements, we agreed to the return of local administration.
5. The bulk of the government's heavy weapons were returned to the authorities.

In fact we did everything in our power to bring back normalcy to the region. Now let us take a look at what the government has implemented from its plan which stated in its introduction that "this government, in its willingness to put an end to the unnatural situation in parts of the north of the homeland, . . . and in emphasizing the strong existing ties between the Arabs and the Kurds which calls them for sincere and diligent work for the good of their shared homeland, the government

announces the following program and declares its unshaken intention in standing by it and implementing it in letter and spirit and as soon as possible". Here we find it appropriate to discuss chronologically the provisions of the plan.

1. The emergency situation (interim period) continues and the authorities wish to prolong it. There is a group of extremists who are demanding the reformation of the abolished Command Council of the Revolution which could only mean the consolidation of the emergency situation, something from which the people have suffered badly in the last eight years. This will certainly prevent the drafting of the permanent constitution, which is supposed to "... emphasize the national rights of the Kurds in such a way as to make clear the recognition of Kurdish nationality and Kurdish national rights within the Iraqi homeland which includes the two principal nationalities of Arabs and Kurds, and in a way that Arabs and Kurds will both enjoy equal rights and responsibilities.

2. The law of provinces which article 2 of the plan described as "in the process of being legislated", has not seen light yet. This is in spite of the fact that this law was one of the basic points mentioned in the letter of the formation of General Qaji Talib's cabinet. Application of the decentralization system and the citizens' participation in the local and municipal administrations of their areas are both connected with this law. In other words, the exercise by the Kurds of much of their rights which were recognized by the government in its announcement, is dependent on this law of provinces, which the higher authorities in the government are now trying to abandon.

3. The government's recognition that Kurdish be the official language of administration and teaching in the areas that are predominantly Kurdish, has not been given any legal status and therefore it has as far as its implementation is concerned, meant nothing.

4. If there was any real intention in holding general elections within the time prescribed by the interim constitution -- something on which the people insist and which will give back to them the legal right of ruling themselves -- it would be customary to prepare for such elections by allowing the basic freedoms of press, assembly, etc., in order to allow the elections to take its natural course. But since everything remains as it was before, the people's hope of having elections at the prescribed time is constantly diminishing. This of course widens the gap between the people and the government and it is bound to compound the people's dissatisfaction and their lack of confidence in the future.

5. In what would be proportionate to their percentage of the total population or even less, the Kurds have not been given the chance to participate along with their Arab brothers in government positions, whether these be the ministries or in administrative, legal, diplomatic or military positions. Those who occupied simple jobs and were

expelled because of the Kurdish problem have not been returned to their positions, let alone those in high and sensitive jobs. It has also been noticed that the list of those admitted into the colleges of military, the air force, and the police, contained a very small percentage of Kurds. No student who had had connection with the revolution has been accepted. How can, then, the Kurds enjoy equality even in the future?

6. Not even by one iota has the Baghdad University increased its interest in or attention to Kurdish language and culture. It seems indifferent to the idea of opening a branch of the university in the north. As to those students who were deprived of education due to their sympathy for their people's question, such laws of the Ministry of Education that are applicable only in normal times, have been applied to those students and consequently most of them have been prevented from going back to their studies.

7. The great majority of the administrative officials, judges, chiefs of security and police and others in the Kurdish provinces, districts and sub-districts are still non-Kurds.

8. No Kurdish political or literary press has been allowed to function, while this is not true of the Arabic press.

9. The law of amnesty along with its amendments is incomplete and limited in such a way that it is applicable only to a small percent of those who have participated in "the events of the north". Therefore, there are still hundreds of those who were either arrested or imprisoned who have not yet been released. Active and retired officials who have had connections with the revolution have, neither according to this law nor according to the Law of Fair Treatment of Officials, been justly treated. Expelled Kurdish officials, workers and employees have not been admitted back into their jobs and as such are suffering much poverty. The best example of this is the case of the workers in the Kirkuk oil fields.

10. The government's refusal to carry out its commitments, its creation of "a new type" of cavalry with the status of a second authority in the area and enjoying the right of being judge and jury at the same time, and the government's refusal to sustain part of the Pesh Merga, which it promised to provide for, have all resulted in a lack of desire on the part of those members of the Pesh Merga who were previously in the Army and police, for returning to their positions. Neither have these acts encouraged us to urge them to return.

11. According to article 11 of the plan there was supposed to be created "a special committee which will be set up for the purpose of the reconstruction of the Kurdish area of Iraq, to which will be allocated money in accordance with the economic plan for reconstruction and to initiate new development projects in the area. This will be connected with a minister whose ministry will be given the responsibility of administering the summer resorts of the north and the affairs of tobacco and forestry, and it will also supervise the affairs of the

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administrative units, the population of which are predominantly Kurdish, and affairs that are the essence of Kurdish nationality such as attention to Kurdish education and programs for teaching in the Kurdish language " The above-mentioned ministry has not come into existence, neither have the other provisions of the article been implemented. As to the existing Ministry of the Reconstruction of the North, its limited authority prevents it from doing anything of importance.

The government has excluded the area into which government troops have not entered, from medical care and primary education facilities, in spite of our repeated demands for them. We see no reason why hundreds of thousands of citizens should be deprived of the necessary medical care and why school doors should be closed in the face of children who have committed no wrong, all this at a time when nations are exploring outer space.

Those whose homes were burned, whose belongings were looted and whose only providers have become victims of works of violence have not been compensated. As to the widows and orphans who are afflicted with disease and physical disabilities, they have been left without protection from the severity of the winter and the misery of poverty and want. None of the nationalistic and humanitarian considerations expressed in article 11 of the plan seem to have moved the government to come to their rescue.

12. It is true that some of the Kurdish villages in the Kirkuk region have been evacuated from Arabic tribes, but this has not taken place in the other regions. Even to those areas which have already been evacuated, the Kurds have not been allowed to return.

As to the implementation of the unannounced article of the plan, such as a general amnesty in stages, the creation of the Dihok province and the licensing of our party when parliamentary rule is established, they have fared even less than the announced articles.

Mr. President, we are placing before you these distressing facts in the hope that you will use your great authority and resourceful efforts to find a successful solution to these problems; to restore justice; and to meet the government's obligations which were mentioned in the June 29th plan. We feel that the best way for doing this will be to form a joint committee representing both sides and enjoying the power of the Council of Ministers and authorized to implement the provisions of the plan. As to the Higher Committee, it has been left without power and as a result, it has failed in carrying out the purposes for which it was created. You will find in us, in other Iraqi men of devotion, and in the loyal citizens of this country the best support for every step which will consolidate security and the rule of law and which will promote the happiness and welfare of the people.

May God guide us all to the right path.

Peace be on you, with God's mercy and blessing.

Sincerely,

Mustafa Barzani

December 11, 1966

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The following memorandum was presented to the Iraqi President, General Abdul Rahman Arif, on January 9, 1967, by two Kurdish personalities, Mr. Fuad Arif and Mr. Baba Ali Sheikh Mahmud.

MEMORANDUM FROM TWO KURDISH PERSONALITIES

TO THE PRESIDENT OF IRAQ

There is no doubt that the question of the north occupies everyone's mind, and its horrible tragedies cut deep into the hearts of the loyal and the honorable. With intentions which seek only the good and the right, we are placing before Your Excellency the conditions and circumstances surrounding the Kurdish question, in the hope that they will meet with Your Excellency's wise and discerning attention; that the question will be given the consideration that its importance demands; and that it will be made possible for the Kurds to enjoy the fruit of the positive measures which we hope will follow.

Everyone's hope was pinned on the June 29, 1966 plan as a formula for the solution of the problem. Your Excellency's visit (to the north) inspired much pleasure and hope for the return of serenity to the area. However, we are sad to say that the Kurds are becoming more and more doubtful and distressed over the noticed retardation in the implementation of the provisions of the plan. The present wave of self-questioning and doubt among the Kurds is the result of the following developments:

1. The law of provinces in its amended form has thus far not been legislated.
2. Election laws have not been legislated. Such laws should, in conformity with the law of provinces and provisions of the June 29 announcement, make stipulations for the creation of election units on the basis of sub-district (Nahiya) and district (Qedha).
3. Except for very few of them, Arab tribes remain in occupation of villages from which the Kurds were forcibly driven out.
4. The ministry for Kurdish affairs has not been created.
5. Kurdish national rights are still in the form of generalizations and their confirmation through legislation has not been effectuated.
6. Provisions of the plan concerning the Kurds' participation in the government have not been implemented. Here we do not mean by participation the determination of positions and salaries, but true participation in the planning of the country's policies and the administration of its affairs to a degree proportionate to the position and importance of the Kurds in this country. There are still no Kurds in positions of true responsibility in the ministries, the central administration or in other public institutions such as the national oil company and the bureau of planning.

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7. The article which stipulates that only Kurds will be appointed to positions in the Kurdish area has not been put into effect.

8. The provisions concerning the recognition of the Kurdish language as the official language of the administration and education in the area have not been implemented.

9. In spite of the promulgation of the law of amnesty for the Kurds who participated in the military operations of the north, the formalities in its execution, along with some of the provisions of the law itself, constitute great barriers in the face of granting amnesty to those in detention and in prisons.

10. After the announcement of the June 29 plan, it was expected that Kurdish officials and employees will be reinstated in their jobs. The fact that no Kurd who previously occupied an important position has gone back to his post, and that most of the lesser officials who have been returned to their positions still do not have any work to do, is evidence that this article has also been neglected.

11. As far as education is concerned and in spite of the plan's acceptance and inclusion of the principles of equality and equal opportunity, the doors of the colleges, especially those of military, the police and the air force, remain closed to Kurdish students. This happens in spite of the authorities' admission that Kurdish students have for many years been subjected to great hardships and that their problems need to be looked upon in a friendly and understanding manner. If the Kurds are barred from getting higher education, how can they contribute to the future direction of the country's affairs and how will they be able to receive a fair share of the positions and responsibilities in the government?

12. We have noticed recently that important issues that have great bearing on the present and future of the country are under study and discussion in special meetings. No Kurdish personality has been given the chance to participate in these meetings in spite of the uncontested fact that the Kurds are one of the important elements in the country and that the problems and issues which touch upon the country's conditions in general are of great concern to them as well as to others. Excluding the Kurds from participation in such important matters will no doubt leave them with an unfavorable impression.

13. The question of the reconstruction of the north is a most important issue since it deeply affects the life of hundreds of thousands of Kurds. Yet in spite of this importance and of the existence, for more than five months, of a ministry called the Ministry for the Reconstruction of the North, no practical steps have been taken which will bring hope to the hearts of the people of the north who have for so long been subjected to destruction and destitution. The Ministry remains inactive since it does not possess the necessary legal authority, the administrative and technical organizations, and the necessary financial authorization which will enable it to carry out its work. Thus the

area remains deprived of the economic development and growth which the other regions of the country enjoy. All this happens at a time when the subject of the Ministry remains the favorite talk of the newspapers and radio broadcasts.

Your Excellency, the tragedies of the problem are well known to everyone and we do not intend to arouse any more feelings nor do we want to cause any further apprehension. But we are hoping that earnest and sincere joint efforts will be spent by all parties concerned for the removal of the causes of those tragedies which continue to bring disaster and deprivation to the great majority of the Kurds. For there are those who live without shelter, others without food or work. Public institutions are inactivated; schools are closed and sanitation facilities and medical care lacking. In spite of all this we keep hoping that the provisions of the plan be implemented, so that life will once again take its normal course and harmony and fraternity will again prevail.

It is known to all that the above mentioned plan is a reform program to which two successive cabinets have committed themselves and it has the approval and blessings of Your Excellency. Thus it has become a permanent and official plan of the government which ought to be carried out under all circumstances and by any government that takes upon itself the management of the country's affairs. The plan and its implementation should not be made dependent on conditions that are dictated by this or that government.



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
OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE
STRAND,
LONDON. W.C.2

In reply quote No. 3/12/38

Memo. No. 847



1st July, 1966.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.IRAQ

We spoke 1st July to Montgomery (Desk Officer, Foreign Office) about the recent developments in Iraq. His comments on the abortive coup of 30th June have been reported by telegram.

2. He said that the main development in the past two months had been the launching of the spring offensive against the Kurds and its subsequent collapse. Montgomery recalled that at the beginning of May Prime Minister Bazzaz was engaged in talks with Baba Ali, a former Minister in the central government and the leading Kurdish civilian. However, in the middle of these talks (on the night of the 3rd/4th May) orders were given to the Iraqi Army to march on Kurdish strongpoints. The object was to seal off the Iranian frontier and thus deny the Kurdish guerrilla's the help and sustenance provided by their brethren living in Persia.
3. On 11th and 12th May the Army made contact with the Kurds just outside of Rawanduz, located on the road leading to the main pass into Iran. But, in the subsequent engagement, the Iraqis "had the daylights beaten out of them". Iraqi casualties totalled well over 1,000 (at least one Iraqi battalion was completely annihilated) and the Kurds succeeded in capturing vast quantities of ammunition and equipment. Montgomery commented that Barzani's forces took so many prisoners that they had to ask the Iraqi Army to come and take them away. Harsher treatment was meted out to captured members of the Saladin force (pro-Government Kurdish irregulars). They were summarily shot as traitors.
4. Montgomery said that the Iraqi Army never recovered from the humiliating defeat at Rawanduz. It was true that sporadic clashes occurred throughout the following fortnight to three weeks. But by the end of May the much-vaunted spring offensive had ground to a complete halt.
5. Meanwhile, Bazzaz, who opposed the decision to go ahead with the offensive in the first place, had been canvassing support for renewed negotiations with the Kurds. And, on 10th June he duly obtained the agreement of the National Defence Council, meeting at Kirkuk, to authorise him to try to salvage a peaceful settlement with the Kurds on the basis of the twelve points submitted by Barzani in April. (These incidentally represented a substantial watering down of previous demands. In particular instead of demands for full local autonomy, the burden of the Kurdish case was now "equality with the Arabs" and "a fair share" of Government appointments and oil revenues.)

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6. From this point things developed quickly. On June 12th Bazzaz despatched a four-man peace mission to make contact with Barzani in the north. The mission's talks with the Kurdish leader resulted in the latter agreeing to receive a larger delegation. This he did on June 18th. Meantime, three days earlier, Bazzaz in a radio and T.V. broadcast had said that he hoped to announce "within a matter of weeks" a definite plan to settle the Kurdish dispute. (A copy of the Foreign Office savingram recording the main points made by Bazzaz is attached.)

7. The next step was the despatch by Barzani of a four-man negotiating team to Baghdad. It was these talks which culminated in the announcement by Bazzaz on 29th June of an agreed "programme" for ending the five-year rebellion of the Kurds. Montgomery said that the programme provided for re-construction and development in Kurdish areas and for a new constitution recognising "Kurdish nationalism" and the Kurdish tongue as an official language in the north. Kurdish districts would have their own elected councils to run educational, health, and municipal matters. Civil servants in Kurdish districts would be Kurds, while the Kurds would also have "in proportion to their numbers" positions in Parliament, the Judiciary, and the civil, diplomatic, and military services. As an article of his good faith Bazzaz released some 30 Kurdish prisoners. Montgomery thought that the Kurds would be reasonably happy with this programme since many of their original twelve points were conceded in principle.

8. Yet, Montgomery observed, newspaper reports that Kurdish acceptance of Bazzaz's proposals had heralded in a new and welcome era of tranquility was putting it a bit high. The programme announced was more a "blueprint" for an eventual settlement than a settlement itself. Its phraseology was in many instances vague and ambiguous, and in particular it was silent on the question of whether the Kurds had agreed to give up their rifles. "Solutions" in the past had foundered on this point. Montgomery added that there was no mention of a formal cease-fire, nor of any change in the Army's dispositions. Finally, a general amnesty was conditional on "the ending of violence".

Internal Political Situation

9. Montgomery confirmed that rumours had been circulating in Baghdad early last month that Bazzaz was about to be replaced as Prime Minister. Bazzaz did in fact submit his resignation to President Aref. But there was no reason to doubt the credibility of the reason given, deterioration in health. In the event, the President asked Bazzaz to stay on.

10. Differences, however, continued between Bazzaz and some of the more militant army leaders. They resented the tactless aspersions on Military rule that Bazzaz was apt to make in his public speeches. The Prime Minister made a particularly scathing speech on 22nd April when he referred to the "incompetents" amongst the Army who he said were responsible for the economic mess that he had inherited last year. It was interesting, Montgomery observed, that in his radio and T.V. broadcast of 15th June Bazzaz went some way towards conciliating the Military. It was almost as if he realised he had gone too far. In reply to a question, Montgomery said that it was still Bazzaz's intention to press ahead with parliamentary elections before the end of the year. Elections indeed were an important part of the strategy he had evolved to outmanoeuvre the Military. It was his calculation that with a popular mandate under his belt he would be in a much stronger position to resist Military pressures.

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11. From the West's point of view Bazzaz was far and away the best Prime Minister that Iraq could have. Of course, he stood firmly among the more radical, left-wing Arab group. But at the same time his approach to Iraq's problems, was based on commonsense and reality rather than meaningless revolutionary slogans. On the Kurdish issue, he had done well to get Barzani's general support for his programme. As long as Bazzaz remained in office, there at least seemed a chance of progress being made on the lines laid down.

12. Montgomery added that reaction among the civilian population to the prospect of a truce with the Kurds was very favourable. In the armed forces, however, opinion seemed to be divided: junior officers tended to be relieved at the prospect of a continuing de facto cease-fire, but among the more senior ranks there was a determination to go slow towards a final settlement. Montgomery noted that, one of the hard-liners, Baghdad garrison commander Brigadier Said Sulaibi had left for medical treatment in the U.K. on 29th June. He was to have been leaving in mid-July. It seemed that Bazzaz might have wished him out of the country during his own absence in Turkey (1st - 10th July) and the Soviet Union (27th July - 3rd August).

External Relations

13. During his visit to Moscow Bazzaz would probably tie up the details of the recent Soviet arms offer. Discussions would doubtless also take place on the Iraq Euphrates dam project. The Russians had told Damascus that their offer of aid for the Syrian dam was conditional on Syria reaching a water sharing agreement with the other riparian states, Turkey and Iraq.

14. Montgomery said that there had been no substantial developments on the Iraqi/Iran front though at the time of the Army offensive against the Kurds Tehran did make strong protests that I.A.F. jet fighters had strafed and bombed Iranian border villages. From all accounts the Iraqi Kurds continued to receive weapons and supplies, lugged in by donkey caravan across the Iranian mountains.

15. As regards Iraqi-U.A.R. relations, these were, at least up until yesterday's attempted coup, fairly friendly. But Bazzaz's move to the right (albeit still within a Socialist framework), his "consorting with imperialism", and his obvious dislike of Egyptian business had made for a slightly less cordial atmosphere. Bazzaz had also lost some credit in Cairo because of his ending of a number of joint economic arrangements whereby the Egyptian economy had been able to benefit at Iraq's expense. For instance he recently put a stop to the practice whereby Egypt bought Iraqi cement for the ludicrously low price of £3 a ton. He similarly had cut back on Iraqi expenditure of hard currency on Egyptian manufactures.


16. Montgomery thought that the intriguing question at present was what Nasser felt about yesterday's revolt, and what part, if any, he played in encouraging the revolutionaries. What ~~was~~ thought could be said without fear of contradiction was that in the matter of union with Egypt, Brigadier Razzak was much more Nasserist than Nasser himself. Thus, if the Egyptians did have a hand in the attempted coup, it was likely that they had had more modest objectives than the coup leaders.

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17. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to the Australian Embassy, Cairo.


(Lance Joseph)

for Senior External Affairs Representative

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105
INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

By Bag

Mr. Bailey

No. 15 Saving

17 June 1966

R. 20 June 1966

Address to Foreign Office telegram No. 15 SAVING of 17 June, repeated for information Saving to High Commissioner, Aden (Personal) (1), Amman (18), Ankara (14), Bahrain (Residency) (18), Beirut (22), Damascus (16), Cairo (19), Kuwait (18), Tehran (11) and Washington (26).

Dr. Bazzaz, the Prime Minister, made the following points during a Radio and Television broadcast on 15 June:

Resignation Rumours

- (a) "Rumours and secret pamphlets circulating which allege that there is a ministerial crisis involving resignations or a reshuffle are completely baseless. It is true that for health reasons I asked to be relieved of my duties but the President of the Republic insisted on keeping me at his side".
- (b) "There have also been rumours about differences between the Government and the Army. This is a lie. All such rumours are only meant to split the ranks and make it easy for those who have waited too long to get to the magic chair."

2. Kurds

"We are ready to recognize Kurdish nationalism, and the national rights of our Kurdish brothers. I cannot say that we have reached the final phase of complete success, but I can say that we have at least covered half the road to our goal. Our programme is based on full recognition of Kurdish national rights: a decentralized system of administration in all Kurdish Nahiyas, Qadhas and Liwas, with full acknowledgment of their language and heritage; an amnesty for all those who lay down their arms; continuous efforts towards the rehabilitation of every village, city, town, and farm damaged in the war; plus the fulfilment of other demands, details of which we shall soon announce. Iraq does not belong to the Arabs alone; it is Iraq of the Arabs and the Kurds. When no reason for violence exists the Army does not believe in violence; when the doors of peace are flung open and it is desired by all parties, the Army wants peace just as much as we do. I know there are some people, perhaps among the Iraqi Arabs, who disapprove of this policy, thinking it spineless and weak, and believing solely in the need to root out the last insurgent. To those people, I say frankly and sincerely, that unless a reasonable settlement is achieved through consent and the reciprocal recognition of rights, the situation in the North will never be resolved. If we leave unsatisfied some 1500 or even 50 Kurds, they could play havoc in the area, particularly when we consider that there exist across the borders persons who do not wish security and stability to come to this country I will soon broadcast in detail items and clear-cut principles that will leave no room for ambiguity nor for disagreement. We have had enough blood-shed, and tears, enough bombs and killings. I shall be the happiest of men when I announce, I hope after a week or a few weeks at the maximum the accord we have reached".

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3. Return to constitutional life

"At our meetings in the Presidential Palace /with Army officers and various civilians/, I am sorry to say, nobody present tried to raise for discussion any of the country's problems, nor the problems of the North. Many were just thinking of changing the cabinet and replacing this minister by that and so on. As to the political content of these meetings, frank views and ideas were expressed, but although we respect these views we are not bound to abide by what was said. However unanimity was reached on the necessity to hold parliamentary elections. We hope to tackle this subject immediately after disposing of the problem of the North. In spite of opposition from some distinguished former statesmen, we believe that popular organization can be worked out primarily on the basis of the Arab Socialist Union."

4. Foreign Policy

- (a) "Our policy has not changed; we have fought and are still fighting against foreign bases. We have therefore strongly protested against the transfer of the base from Aden to Bahrain. We have resisted, and are still resisting, the existence of British forces in, and the British occupation of Aden and the Yemenite South."
- (b) "We shall continue supporting Arab liberation movements. We shall remain forever in line with Cairo despite the wishes of the envious. I know that a group of Iraqis, and non-Iraqis, want to separate us from Cairo. We know for sure that the essence of our Arab policy is based on full agreement with Cairo, since it is the base of Arab liberation."
- (c) "As to our policy with neighbouring states, you are fully aware that our relations with Turkey have improved to our great pleasure. Shortly I shall travel to Ankara at the invitation of the Turkish Government. But relations and friendship with a neighbouring state who is on good terms with us, and with whom we co-operate faithfully within known, clear and advantageous limits, does not mean we want to revert to alliances."
- (d) "I would have liked to say the same about our policy with Iran to say that our policy has been fruitful and our efforts have achieved results. But it pains me to say that we have not yet reached the desired goal ... goodwill is one thing and capitulation to Iranian demands is another. Neither we, nor any Iraqi, can surrender a basic right, particularly if it is a matter of sovereignty. However we remain ready to settle differences between us."

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INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM
FROM BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By Bag

FO/CRO/WH DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Bailey

No. 16 Saving

17 June 1966

R. 20 June 1966

RESTRICTED

Address to Foreign Office telegram No. 16 SAVING of 17 June, repeated for information Saving to High Commissioner, Aden (Personal) (2), Amman (19), Ankara (15), Bahrain (Residency) (19), Damascus (17), Beirut (23), Cairo (Canadian Embassy) (17), Kuwait (19), Tehran (12) and Washington (27).

My immediately preceding telegram: Bazzaz' speech.

This was a competent performance, which most sections of opinion see as marking Bazzaz' return to the centre of the political stage after the patching up of his latest quarrel with the military. For his part, Bazzaz goes out of his way to praise the serving Army and their heroic role in Kurdistan, while also criticising some retired officers posing as politicians.

2. Kurds and Shias with whom we have spoken are pleased with Bazzaz' language on the Kurdish issue, pointing out that he has gone further in publicly acknowledging Kurdish "national rights" than any Iraqi leader since Qasim in 1958/59. Sunnis tend to point to the lack of detail (e.g. over timing) in Bazzaz' remarks and indeed he ends on a vague note, saying he hopes to announce a settlement "after a week or weeks".

3. The tilting at pamphleteers is a direct reference to anti-Bazzaz literature put out recently by the Iraqi Nasserites and other minority groups. The return to constitutional life is now to be left over until the Kurdish problem is settled, the implication being that elections as early as this winter can by no means be guaranteed. Bazzaz' determination to continue the ban on parties and hold elections "on the basis of" the Arab Socialist Union has aroused general criticism, but is of course nothing new.

4. On foreign policy, the references to the "transfer" of the base from Aden to Bahrain are in line with Pachachi's policy on South Arabia and the Gulf. The lip-service to Cairo has pleased no-one because

- (a) neither the Egyptians here nor the Iraqi Nasserites believe that Bazzaz is sincere; and
- (b) the Iraqi Nationalists find such references particularly distasteful after their experiences during the 1964 Iraq/U.A.R. rapprochement, and because they think the Nasserites here will be unduly encouraged by them.

5. A noticeable omission is any reference to his forthcoming visit to Moscow, or of relations with the U.S.S.R. generally.

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**LE CHEF DU GOUVERNEMENT
IRAKIEN OFFRE AUX KURDES
UNE FORME
DE DÉCENTRALISATION
PROVINCIALE**

Bagdad, 25 avril (A.F.P.). —
« Tous les Kurdes sont nos frères. Ils ont une existence nationale distincte et ils ont le droit de tenir à leur nationalisme, à leur patrimoine et à leur langue », a déclaré M. Abdel Rahman Al-Bazzaz, chef du gouvernement irakien, au cours d'une conférence de presse radiotélévisée.

« Il est temps que la paix et la sécurité reviennent sur tout le territoire, a-t-il poursuivi. C'est maintenant que, tous ensemble, nous devons élaborer la loi sur les gouvernorats, qui garantira à chacune des provinces de vastes pouvoirs dans les domaines de la culture, de l'enseignement et des affaires municipales. Les Kurdes du Nord ne doivent pas croire que notre appel est un signe de faiblesse. Nous sommes forts et nous avons des frères qui nous fournissent tout ce dont nous avons besoin. Nous avons aussi une armée puissante. Qu'on le comprenne bien : il est une chose que nous n'accepterons jamais, c'est le séparatisme. A l'exception de cela, tous les droits légitimes sont admis. »

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UPI-217

ADD KURDS, BEIRUT X X X KURDS.

THE NEW ARRIVALS ARE FROM THE REPUTEDLY PRO-GOVERNMENT TRIBES KNOWN AS THE +SALLADIN KNIGHTS.+ THEY HAVE M

DE THE CITY'S
PREDOMINANTLY ARAB POPULATION NERVOUS, HOWEVER, BECAUSE THEY ARE WELL ARMED AND BECAUSE OF RECENT DISCLOSURES IN BAGHDAD THAT SUPPOSEDLY PRO-GOVERNMENT KURDS HAVE BEEN CONTRIBUTING FUNDS TO THE REBEL CAUSE.

A WAVE OF LAND BUYING IN MOSUL BY NEWLY ARRIVED KURDS HAS BEEN HALTED UNDER A NEW LAW REQUIRING THAT SALES BE APPROVED BY THE MILITARY GOVERNOR.

IRAQ'S DEFENSE MINISTER, ABDUL AZIZ AL-UQEILI, WHO IS A NATIVE OF MOSUL, REPORTEDLY HAS URGED THE DISBANDING OF THE +SALLADIN KNIGHTS,+ CONSIDERING THEM A POTENTIAL THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT. HIS FEAR APPARENTLY IS THAT THESE GROUPS MIGHT CHANGE SIDES IF THE REBELS SUDDENLY LOOKED LIKE WINNING THE WAR.

MOSUL'S NORMAL POPULATION OF ABOUT 150,000, IS MOSTLY ARAB, BUT SURROUNDING VILLAGE ARE MAINLY KURDISH. EARLIER THIS MONTH THE GOVERNMENT WAS REPORTED TO HAVE BEGUN A MAJOR ROUNDUP OF KURDS IN BAGHDAD, MOSUL AND ELSEWHERE FOLLOWING A WAVE OF ASSASSINATIONS AND ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATIONS OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORTERS BY REBEL GROUPS. THE ARRESTS REPORTEDLY ARE CONTINUING.

THROUGHOUT THE WAR THE KURDISH REBELS HAVE NEVER SERIOUSLY TRIED TO CAPTURE POPULATION CENTERS, WHICH COULD PROVE INDEFENSIBLE. THEIR STRENGTH HAS BEEN IN THE MOUNTAINS WHERE THEIR GUERRILLA TACTICS HAVE PROVED HIGHLY EFFECTIVE AGAINST THE DESERT-TRAINED GOVERNMENT FORCES.

UPI-216

BEIRUT, FEB. 28 (UPI)—THE FOUR-YEAR-OLD KURDISH REBELLION IN MOUNTAINOUS NORTHERN IRAQ IS BECOMING A GROWING THREAT TO THE COUNTRY'S CITIES AND TOWNS, ACCORDING TO REPORTS REACHING HERE.

IRAQI ARMED FORCES AND TANKS RECENTLY MOVED IN FORCE INTO THE STRATEGIC OIL TOWN OF KHANAQIN ON THE IRANIAN BORDER FOLLOWING AN ATTACK BY AREBEL +ASSASSINATION SQUAD+ ON THE CITY'S CLUB FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, ACCORDING TO THE REPORTS. THEY SAID A NUMBER OF ARMY OFFICERS AND TOWN OFFICIALS WERE KILLED.

THE REPORTS SAID ACTIVITY IN THE TOWN WAS AT A STANDTILL AND MOST RESIDENTS WERE KEEPING TO THEIR HOUSES BECAUSE OF FEAR. THE SOUND OF SPORADIC AUTOMATIC RIFLE FIRE, DAY AND NIGHT, HAS ADDED TO THE UNREST, THEY SAID.

KHANAQIN IS AT THE FAR SOUTHEASTERN END OF THE REBEL-HELD CRESCENT OF MOUNTAINS THAT CURVES ALONG THE IRANIAN AND TURKISH BORDERS TOWARD SYRIA IN THE NORTHWEST.

THE REBELS, LED BY MULLAH MUSTAFA BARZANI, REPORTEDLY HAVE FOUR-FIFTHS OF IRAQ'S 70,000-MAN ARMY TIED DOWN IN THE WAR. THIS WINTER, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE ARMY HAS REMAINED IN THE SNOW-COVERED MOUNTAINS INSTEAD OF RETIRING TO THE SOUTH.


IRAQI INTERIOR MINISTER MAJ. GEN. ABDUL LATIF WAS QUOTED IN A BAGHDAD NEWSPAPER MONDAY AS SAYING THE ARMY COULD END THE REBELLION +THIS SPRING OR SHORTLY BEFORE THEN+ BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT WAS DETERMINED TO HOLD ON TO THE INTEGRITY OF IRAQI SOIL.

HE CLAIMED TOWNS AND VILLAGES IN NORTHERN IRAQ NOW WERE COMPLETELY UNDER GOVERNMENT FORCES' CONTROL.

SUCH STATEMENTS TEND TO BE AUTOMATICALLY DISCOUNTED ELSEWHERE IN THE MIDDLE EAST BECAUSE THEY REPEATEDLY HAVE PROVED UNTRUE. IT WAS ONLY LATE LAST YEAR THAT THE GOVERNMENT PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE WAR EXISTED.

AT THE OTHER END OF THE CRESCENT IN THE MAJOR NORTHERN CITY OF MOSUL, AUTHORITIES REPORTEDLY HAVE IMPOSED MILITARY RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL DURING THE DAY AND ARE CLOSING SURROUNDING ROADS AT NIGHT FOLLOWING THE INFUX OF SOME 5,000

Memo No. 68
File 221.5.1.4



AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
CAIRO

9th February, 1966

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

Illicit Arms Cargo at Beirut

On January 29th a Bulgarian vessel, the "Velico Dironova", put into Beirut to discharge a cargo including seventy-five cases marked "sewing machines". One of these fell on the dock and broke open, spilling out twenty Swiss automatic rifles. The authorities then investigated and found there were 1500 rifles in all. The captain of the vessel said that as the cargo was manifested as "in transit" (although he did not say where to) he had had no reason to examine the contents of these particular cases. However, he, some members of his crew, and the ship's agents, are being held for questioning and a fine has been levied on the company of £Stg.600,000.


2. It seems that the arms were destined for the Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. This is confirmed to me by the Bulgarian ambassador here who dismisses the whole affair as an honest cash and carry transaction with no questions asked. As you probably know the clandestine anti-Aref radio station is also housed in Bulgaria and it could well be that the shipment was in fact arranged under Soviet auspices as part of the discreet help which the Soviet Union has traditionally given the Kurds against the Iraqi government from the beginning of the insurrection.

3. There is a semi-comic element in these accidental discoveries of traffic in arms through Beirut. Last year a case being unloaded from a freighter broke open in the process and a quantity of bazookas fell into the harbour. No-one knows where they were bound. It is of course inconceivable that these Swiss arms could have passed through Bulgaria on their way to being loaded on the Velico Dironova without the Bulgarian authorities being aware.

Francis Stuart
(Francis Stuart)
Ambassador

City to DL

Mr Harding to see



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UPI-35

TEHRAN, JAN. 15 (UPI)--THE GOVERNMENT WAS REPORTED TODAY TO HAVE INSTRUCTED IRANIAN FORCES TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS TO PREVENT INCIDENTS WHICH COULD ESCALATE THE PRESENT BORDER TENSION WITH IRAQ.

THE MOVE FOLLOWED THE LATEST BORDER INCIDENT IN THE DETERIORATING SITUATION BETWEEN BOTH COUNTRIES.

ACCORDING TO THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE NEWSPAPER +KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL,+ IRANIAN TRIBESMEN DROVE BACK ACROSS THE BORDER 50 IRAQI MILITIAMEN WHO WERE ATTEMPTING TO RUSTLE HEAD OF CATTLE.

MEANWHILE INTENSE FIGHTING WAS REPORTED CONTINUING BETWEEN KURDISH REBELS AND IRAQI GOVERNMENT TROOPS IN SULEIMANIEH AND KIRKUK IN IRAQ WHERE THE KURDS ARE ON THE OFFENSIVE. CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED HIGH ON BOTH SIDES.

A TEHRAN JOURNAL REPORTER BACK FROM THE IRAQ-IRAN BORDER ALLEGED THE IRAQ AIR FORCE USED +POISON GAS+ IN A BID TO CRUSH THE REBELLION.

THE KURDS WERE REPORTED TO BE THREATENING THE STRATEGIC ERBIL AREA AND TO HAVE CAPTURED 100 GOVERNMENT TROOPS WITH ALL THEIR ARMS.

MORE THAN 1,000 IRAQI ARMY OFFICERS AND MEN WERE SAID TO HAVE BEEN KILLED BY THE REBELS DURING THE PAST MONTH.

IRAQI MORALE WAS LOW AND IRAQI MILITIAMEN WERE SAID TO BE DESERTING AND JOINING THE REBELS, ACCORDING TO IRANIAN REPORTS.

THE TEHRAN JOURNAL SAID IRAQ HAD THROWN IN TWO MORE DIVISIONS OF ITS REGULAR ARMY IN ITS FIGHT TO CRUSH THE REBELLION.

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
UPI-240

TEHRAN, JAN. 13 (UPI)--MORE THAN 45,000 KURDISH REBELS WERE INFLECTING HEAVY CASUALTIES ON IRAQI TROOPS AT FIVE IRAQI POINTS, LOCAL PRESS REPORTS SAID TODAY.

THE KURDISH REBELS--ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC RIFLES, MACHINE GUNS, ARMORED CARS AND FIELDARTILLERY--WERE REPORTED ENGAGED IN FIERCE FIGHTING AT KIRKURK, MOUSSEL, YAGHOUBIEH, SHAHRBAN AND ALAFCHEH.

OTHER KURDISH TRIBESMEN WERE REPORTED TO HAVE OCCUPIED PARTS OF THE TWO OF SULEIMANIEH AND DESTROYED AND SET AFIRE 50 IRAQI ARMY JEEPS AND FIVE ARMORED CARS NEAR KIRKURK AND MOUSSEL.

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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE.

STRAND.

LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

3/12/38

3/12/67

Memo No. 18

6th January, 1966.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.

IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

Despite the efforts of the new Bazzaz government in Iraq to reduce differences with Iran, relations between the two countries have deteriorated sharply within the past month as a result of border clashes in the area east of Sulymanieh where the Iranians are alleged to be supplying and providing asylum for the hard-pressed Kurdish rebels in Iraq. According to the Press, units of the Iranian army have taken up positions all along the Iraqi frontier, Persian naval patrols have been strengthened in the Gulf, and the Persian Air Force has been placed on the alert against the possibility of an Iraqi surprise attack. Other reports speak of strafing by Iraqi Migs of Persian border villages, of shells and mortar bombs falling on Persian territory, and of intrusions into Iran by Iraqi army patrols, presumably in pursuit of the Kurdish insurgents. Recent allegations that the Iranians are supplying the Kurdish rebels with heavy military equipment and that Iranian border guards have accompanied "Kurdish infiltrators" into Iraq, have met with Iranian warnings that Iraq must cease her violations of Iranian territory. Clearly a dangerous situation is developing, with the Kurdish war threatening to spill across the frontier into Persia.

2. We today asked Craddock (Assistant Head of the Foreign Office Eastern Department) to comment. He recalled that since April the Iraqis had been prosecuting their campaign against the Kurds. Normally the campaign ended when Winter commenced. This year, however, the Iraqi offensive had been carried on well into the Winter, reportedly at the insistence of the Minister of Defence, Abdul al-Uqaili. Frontier clashes with Iran were thought to be a by-product of the determination of the Iraqis to crush the Kurdish rebels once and for all. In the past the insurgents had been able to retire to the sanctuary of Iran whenever the going got too hard. Now local Iraqi commanders were tending to order their troops across the border in hot pursuit of the rebels.

3. On the Iranian side covert assistance to the Kurds continued. The Shah maintained that he could not afford to drop what he chose to call his "Kurdish card", and indeed in the past year Iranian assistance had been stepped up. It included the provision not only of money and supplies but also heavy arms, including mortars, anti-tank mines, and machine guns. Craddock said that the change in government in Iraq, when Bazzaz took over, had not affected Iranian policy. It was true that when last October Iran's Foreign Minister Aram was in London for hospital treatment, he agreed to meet Bazzaz (the latter was on his way back from New York). ^{however, not that he could not afford to drop what he chose to call his "Kurdish card"} Aram had steadfastly denied that the Persian Government was giving any assistance to the Kurds. He had conceded that Barzani might be getting clandestine help from his Kurdish brethren residing in Iran, but this, he said, was inevitable as long as the Kurds straddled the border. If Iraq wished to check insurgent traffic across the common frontier

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she would be well advised to increase the number of police posts on the Iraqi side. In fact, Craddock observed, Aram knew as well as anyone the futility of trying to police the remote mountainous frontier.

4. Craddock observed that the normal Iranian policy would be to help the Iraq Government contain its Kurds so as to prevent the possible troublesome growth of Kurdish national feeling inside Persia. But with the extension of Egyptian influence in Iraq this policy had been reversed. Instead of containing the Kurds the Iranians sought to use them to harass and embarrass the Iraq Government. Iranians suspicions had not been allayed by recent evidence that Baghdad was drifting away from Nasser's orbit, nor by Bazzaz's friendly overtures. The Iranian view was that Bazzaz was no more than a front for the Iraqi military junta whose ties with Cairo were still strong. The Shah had told the British that he could never breathe freely while people such as Aref were still in charge in Baghdad. He had turned a deaf ear to Western arguments that his policy of helping the Kurds risked driving the Iraqis further into the arms of Nasser.

5. Craddock said that the border incidents between the two countries had taken various forms. On December 5th an Iraqi force, pursuing a band of Kurdish insurgents, crossed into Iranian territory where they were engaged by an Iranian police patrol. They were beaten off, but returned in strength two days later to demolish the Iranian police post, killing in the process two of the Iranian gendarmes. In mid-December trouble erupted in the Pengwin area when the Kurdish rebels launched an attack against an Iraqi Army post. That the rebels used mortar and artillery was clear evidence of Iranian involvement. Moreover, the trajectory of the shells indicated clearly that they had been loosed off from positions inside Iran. In more recent days, Craddock said, there had been several cases of violation of Iranian air space by Iraqi Jets. The British were not sure how far these intrusions had been deliberate. The Foreign Office had received no confirmation of Press reports that Iraqi planes had strafed Persian villages, and it might be that the intrusions had been merely a case of Iraqi pilots overshooting the mark when attacking Kurdish positions inside Iraqi territory.

6. The Iraqi Government, Craddock observed, while complaining bitterly about the support Iran was giving to the Kurds, were showing a good deal of restraint. They had called for the maintenance of friendly neighbourly relations and had signified their willingness to commence talks with the Iranians to take some of the heat out of the present situation. The Iranians, however, showed no disposition to respond to Iraqi overtures. Indeed there had been an inclination on the Iranians' part to play up the dispute and whip up their own public opinion. The Teheran Press was in a state of high excitement and Iranian criticism of Iraq had now extended to the latter's treatment of their Shia population. The Shias, Craddock explained, were co-religionists of the Iranians. Though a majority in Iraq, they had never succeeded in securing equal status with the Sunni Arabs in the running of the State.

7. Craddock noted that the Iranians had also taken the opportunity of the current crisis to resurrect another long-standing dispute between the two countries over the Shatt-al-Arab River, the boundary between the two countries from the head of the Persian Gulf to just below the Iraqi port of Basra. The Iranians, Craddock explained, were not happy with the present arrangements for navigation, which were controlled entirely by the Basra Port Authority. The international boundary ran along the low waterline on the Iranian side of the Shatt, thus leaving the navigation channel in Iraqi hands. In 1937 a modification of this boundary was agreed to between Iraq and Iran by which a rectangular area of water opposite the Abadan jetties was

ceded by Iraq to Iran. But Iran wanted more extensive facilities to free her shipping in the Shatt from dependence on Iraqi pilots. The Iranians argued that the treaty of 1937 had been imposed on them during a time of Persian weakness by Britain.

8. Craddock said that the Iranian Foreign Minister had virtually denounced the 1937 treaty in the course of a statement on the border incidents to the Iranian Parliament on December 27th. Nevertheless, the British did not expect the quarrel over the Shatt to escalate. Both sides had too much to lose to allow the dispute to interfere with shipping traffic on the river. Craddock added that the Iraqis had made it clear that they were not prepared to re-negotiate the 1937 treaty. It would, in fact, require a much stronger and more confident Iraqi government than Baghdad had seen for many years to negotiate on the Shatt, since the result would almost certainly mean giving away Iraqi territory.

9. Craddock said that, while the British had an interest in reducing tension between Iraq and Iran, they were loathe to become involved in the dispute. It was true that the Iranians had asked for British diplomatic assistance in urging restraint on the Iraqis, and that the British had agreed to give their Ambassador in Baghdad discretion to talk to the Iraqis if he thought this could help. Equally the U.K. had urged restraint in Teheran, arguing strongly that it was in Iran's interests to get on good terms with her neighbours. However, the British had made it clear that they had no intention of taking on the rôle of mediator. Iraq and Iran were in diplomatic relations and it was up to them to solve their common problems. Craddock commented that it was the Iranians, Britain's demanding Allies, who gave most cause for concern. There was no reason to believe that either American or British pleas for restraint had made any impression on the Shah. The bogey of Nasserism clearly dominated the latter's thinking on Arab affairs. The first objective of the Shah's Arab policy was to roll Egyptian influence back out of Iraq and from the shores of the Persian Gulf. He believed this could best be done by precipitating the downfall of the Aref regime. Hence his refusal to pass up his "Kurdish card" or to call off Iranian subversion amongst Iraqi Shias.

10. Asked about the present state of the Kurdish war, Craddock said that the rebels had not been doing quite so well against the Iraqi army as on previous occasions. There was, of course, no question of the Kurds being beaten into submission. But the Iraqis had clearly made inroads into Kurdish positions while Kurdish counter-offensives had in the main been unsuccessful, despite the material assistance they were receiving from the Iranians. Craddock added that Bazarni was reported to be showing some disposition to throw in his hand and retire to Iran.

11. Copies of this memo have been sent to Cairo and Washington.

Lance Joseph,
for Acting Senior External Affairs Representative.

173/2/6/1

94

UPI-211

TEHRAN, IRAN, JAN. 11 (UPI)--AT LEAST 200 IRAQI SOLDIERS WERE KILLED IN AN AMBUSH YESTERDAY BY KURDISH TRIBESMEN NEAR THE TOWN OF PANJEVIN, NOT FAR FROM THE IRANIAN BORDER, IT WAS REPORTED HERE TODAY.

THE TEHRAN JOURNAL, AN ENGLISH-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPER, WHICH SAID ABOUT 50 KURDS WERE BELIEVED DEAD, CALLED THE BATTLE ONE OF THE BIGGEST IN THE SIX YEARS OF FIGHTING BETWEEN THE IRAQI FORCES AND KURDISH REBELS.

THE AMBUSH CAME AS NEW DEMONSTRATIONS WERE STAGED IN BAGHDAD IRAQ, AGAINST IRAN, DESPITE A MINISTRY OF INTERIOR BAN AGAINST THEM.

THE NEWSPAPER SAID SEVERAL THOUSAND PERSONS MARCHED IN THE PROTEST THROUGH THE MAIN STREET TO WHERE THE HEAVILY GUARDED IRANIAN EMBASSY IS LOCATED. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF INJURIES OR DAMAGE. IT WAS THE SECOND DAY OF DEMONSTRATIONS.

IR714P

173/2/6/1 97
UPI-26

TEHRAN, JAN. 9 (UPI)--HEAVY FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAQI TROOPS AND KURDISH REBELS IS CONTINUING IN NORTHEASTERN IRAQ, NEAR THE IRANIAN FRONTIER, THE TEHRAN PRESS REPORTED TODAY.

THE THUNDER OF ARTILLERY FIRE WAS HEARD CLEARLY IN IRANIAN BORDER VILLAGES. IN SEVERAL PLACES IRAQI AIR FORCE PLANES WERE REPORTED BOMBING THE MOUNTAIN STRONGHOLDS OF THE KURDISH REBELS LED BY THE MULLAH MUSTAFA BARZANI.

BARZAN WAS REPORTED TO BE LEADING KURDISH REBELS WHO CAPTURED THE VILLAGE OF PICHVIN FROM IRAQI GOVERNMENT TROOPS. THIS WAS ONE OF THE PLACES BOMBED BY GOVERNMENT PLANES.

BATTLES WERE REPORTED IN PROGRESS AT SEVERAL SMALL VILLAGES IN THE REION OF KHANAQIN, A CENTER OF RICH OIL FIELDS 90 MILES NORTHEAST OF BAGHDAD.

(MORE)

DU2:A

UPI-27

ADD KURDS TEHRAN XXX BAGHDAD.

THE MASSIVE DRIVE BY IRAQI ARMED FORCES TO CRUSH THE KURDISH REBELS, WHO WANT TO SET UP AN AUTONOMOUS STATE, HAS CAUSED A SEVERE STRAIN IN IRAQI-IRANIAN RELATIONS IN RECENT WEEKS.

THE IRANIANS HAVE PROTESTED AGAINST INCURSIONS OF IRAQI TROOPS INTO IRANIAN TERRITORY WHILE CHASING THE REBELS, WHOSE TRIBESMEN POPULATE BOTH SIDES OF THE FRONTIER.

AT NOUDCHEH, SOME 15 MILES INSIDE THE IRAQI BORDER, THE KURDS WERE REPORTED TO HAVE KILLED 23 GOVERNMENT WARRANT OFFICERS AND MEN AND WOUNDED 24. AT ANOTHER POINT THEY WERE REPORTED TO HAVE AMBUSHED FIVE JEEPS, KILLING 20 SOLDIERS PATROLLING IN THEM.

AT TANJOVIN REBEL RIFLE FIRE BROUGHT DOWN ONE OF THE IRAQI AIR FORCE PLANES WHICH WERE BOMBING THEM.

IN THE ASKARIEH REGION THE REBELS DROVE BACK A FORCE OF 200 GOVERNMENT TROOPS AND CAPTURED TWO VILLAGES.

(MORE)

DU2:2A

UPI-28

THIRD KURDS TEHRAN XXX VILLAGES.

AS THE FIGHTING CONTINUED, IRAN WAS STRENGTHENING ITS FORCES ON THE FRONTIER. THE 19TH ARMORED BRIGADE ALREADY WAS ON THE SCENE AND MORE TROOPS WERE EARMARKED TO BE SENT THERE.

IN PERSIAN GULF, IRANIAN NAVAL SHIPS WERE PATROLLING CONSTANTLY, CHECKING ALL VESSELS ENTERING THE SHATELARAB RIVER. CONSTANTLY, CHECKING ALL VESSELS ENTERING THE SHATELARAB RIVER.

THE TEHRAN PRESS REPORTED THOUSANDS OF IRANIANS WERE SENDING LETTERS TO THE GOVERNMENT OFFERING +OUR LIVES AND OUR LAST DROP OF BLOOD TO PREVENT IRAQI AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR HOLY SOIL.+

SO FAR THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT PERMITTED ANY ANTI-IRAQ DEMONSTRATIONS.

FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF A LETTER FROM THE IRANIAN PREMIER, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT STOPPED PROPAGANDA ATTACKS ON IRAN BROADCAST IN ARABIC OVER BAGHDAD RADIO.

TONIGHT A SPECIAL ENVOY FROM MOROCCAN KING HASSAN HAS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE WITH A MESSAGE FROM THE KING TO THE SHAH OF IRAN. KING HASSAN WAS REPORTED TO BE TRYING TO MEDIATE THE DISPUTE BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.

DU2:6A

173/2/6/1 92

UPI-3

M.E.

DETROIT, JAN. 3 (UPI)--KURDISH REBELS AND THE IRAQI ARMY HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN HEAVY FIGHTING NEAR THE IRANIAN BORDER IN THE PAST TWO DAYS, DEFENSE MINISTER ABDEL AZIZ UJEILI SAID TODAY.

HE CLAIMED THE ARMY HAD CRUSHED THE REBEL OFFENSIVE AND CORNERED THEM IN A SMALL AREA NEAR THE BORDER WITH IRAN. THE MINISTER'S STATEMENT WAS PUBLISHED TODAY IN THE BAGHDAD DAILY, AL-MANAR, AND BROADCAST BY RADIO BAGHDAD.

IRAQI EFFORTS TO CRUSH THE FOUR-YEAR-OLD KURDISH REVOLT HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATED RECENTLY NEAR IRAQ'S NORTHEASTERN BORDER WITH IRAN. IRAN HAS CHARGED IRAQ WITH INCURSIONS ON HER TERRITORY.

UJEILI SAID HE HOPED IRAN WOULD CLOSE HER BORDER TO THE REBELS BECAUSE "IT CONSTITUTES THEIR MAIN SUPPLY VOTE."

IRAN HAS A LARGE KURDISH MINORITY, SYMPATHETIC TO THE IRAQI KURDISH REBELS ON HER SIDE OF THE BORDER.

"WE WOULD LIKE TO MAINTAIN GOOD AND NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH OUR NEIGHBOR IRAN BUT OUR PATIENCE HAS A LIMIT," UJEILI SAID.

APPARENTLY REFERRING TO TEHRAN REPORTS THAT LARGE IRANIAN TROOP CONCENTRATIONS HAD BEEN MOVED TO THE IRAQI BORDER AREA THE MINISTER SAID, "IRAQ WON'T TOLERATE ANY INFRINGEMENT ON ITS SOVEREIGNTY IRRESPECTIVE OF THE SOURCE."

UJEILI SAID THE HEAVY FIGHTING CAME WHEN REBELS TRIED TO SEIZE POSITIONS NORTH OF PENJWIN, A KURDISH TOWN EAST OF SULAYMANIYA AND NEAR THE IRANIAN BORDER. HE DENIED REPORTS THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD OFFERED A TRUCE TO THE REBELS AND SAID IT WOULD NO LONGER ACCEPT ANY TRUCE ON BEHALF OF THE INSURGENTS.

212:154

173/2/6/1, 91.

STORAGE

TEHRAN, DEC. 30 (UPI)--IRA
REBELS WAGED A DAY-LONG BATT

VERNMENT TROOPS AND KURDISH
STERDAY AND BOTH SIDES

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FERED HEAVY CASUALTIES IN HEAVY FIGHTING, PRESS REPORTS
SAID TODAY.

THE REPORTS, FROM IRAN'S NORTHWEST BORDER WITH IRAQ, SAID
THE SOUND OF MORTAR AND GUN-FIRE COULD BE HEARD EVEN IN TOWNS SEVERAL
MILES INSIDE IRANIAN TERRITORY.

IRAQI GOVERNMENT FORCES SEEMED TO BE IN PURSUIT OF THE REBELS,
THE REPORTS SAID.

STRONG IRANIAN MILITARY FORCES HAVE BEEN STATIONED
ALL ALONG THE BORDER WITH IRAQ'S KURDISH AREAS BECAUSE THE
REBELS' ONLY ESCAPE ROUTE IS ACROSS THE BORDER. THE FORCES ARE
UNDER 24-HOUR ALERT.

IRANIAN FORCES ARE PARTICULARLY CONCENTRATED NEAR THE PORT OF
KHORRAMSHAHR AND ABADAN, SITE OF ONE OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST
REFINERIES.

DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER HAMSHID GHARIB TOLD THE LOWER HOUSE
OF PARLIAMENT TODAY THAT IRAN WOULD STEM AGGRESSION FROM IRAQ BY
ALL MEANS IN ITS POWER.

MEMBERS ON BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION SIDES CALLED
ON THE GOVERNMENT TO TAKE ACTION INSTEAD OF MERE WORDS.
THEY TABLED A MOTION CALLED FOR THE IMMEDIATE STRENGTHENING OF
IRAN'S LAND AND NAVAL FORCES TO WARD OFF ANY THREAT OR
ATTEMPT AT AGGRESSION, BY EITHER FLEEING KURDS OR PURSUING IRAQI
TROOPS.

BU1:20A

173/2/6/1 90

UPI-127

PARIS, DEC. 1 (UPI)—THE LEADER OF THE KURDISH REBELLION IN IRAQ TODAY ISSUED AN APPEAL TO IRAQI PRESIDENT ABDUL SALEM AREF TO +RECOGNIZE THE FULL NATIONAL RIGHTS+ OF THE KURDISH MINORITY IF A CEASE-FIRE IS TO BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE REBELS AND THE IRAQI REGULAR ARMED FORCES.

GEN. MUSTAFA BARZANI COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE REBELLION, SENT HIS MESSAGE FROM THE REMOTE MOUNTAINS OF IRAQI KURDISTAN THROUGH HIS REPRESENTATIVE ABROAD, COL. ISMET SHERIF VANLY. COL. VANLY ARRIVED IN PARIS RECENTLY AFTER A CLANDESTINE TWO-MONTH STAY IN IRAQ.

THE STATEMENT, DRAFTED IN FRENCH, RECALLED THAT MARSHAL AREF LAST SEPTEMBER ASKED THE KURDISH REBELS TO SURRENDER, PROMISING THEM A +PARDON+ FROM THE GOVERNMENT.

+THIS OFFER,+ THE NINTH OF ITS SORT SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE COLONIALIST WAR AGAINST KUDRISTAN IN 1961, +IS STUPID AND DOES NOT CORRESPOND AT ALL TO THE MILITARY SITUATION,+ BARZANI SAID IN HIS STATEMENT.

BARZANI DISMISSED THE BAGHDAD GOVERNMENT'S +OFFER+ AS EVIDENCE OF THE +MAGNITUDE+ OF THE REBELLION.

MORE

RH1115A

UPI-130

ADD KURDS PARIS X X X REBELLION.

AFTER REJECTING ANOTHER GOVERNMENTAL OFFER OF LOCAL AUTONOMY IN EXCHANGE FOR A PRIOR +RESTORATION OR ORDER,+ BARZANI SAID:

+OUR PEOPLE UNDERSTAND WHAT THIS MEANS AND OUR SOLDIERS DESPISE THESE OFFERS.

+I TELL AREF, (PRIME MINISTER) BAZZA AND OTHERS: THE ONLY WAY TO CONCLUDE PEACE IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF BAGHDAD FIRST SOLEMNLY RECOGNIZE THE AUTONOMY OF KURDISTAN. ONLY THEN WILL A CEASE FIRE BE MADE POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO ENGAGE IN OFFICIAL NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE DEFINITION OF THIS AUTONOMY FOR THE JOINT DELINEATION OF KURDISTAN'S BORDERS WITHIN THE IRAQI FRAMEWORK, AND THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE GUARANTIES THAT THE KURDISH PEOPLE, ENLIGHTENED BY SO MANY EXPERIENCES, CAN RIGHTFULLY DEMAND FOR ANY SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT.+

BARZANI'S APPEAL SAID THAT IF THE BAGDAD GOVERNMENT DID NOT ACCEPT THE KURDISH DEMANDS, THE REBELS +WOULD PURSUE THE REVOLUTION 10 OR 20 YEARS IF NECESSARY UNTIL THE KURDISH PEOPLE OF IRAQ OBTAIN THEIR FULL NATIONAL RIGHTS.+

RH1115A

file

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper

Mid-east Mirror

File No.

173/2/6/1

Published at

Beirut

Date

20/11/65

89

OVER 300 CHARGED WITH
PLANNING COUPProgress Against Kurds

BAGHDAD -- A total of 268 military men and civilians appeared before the first state security court here on November 14 facing trial on a charge of "forming a secret organisation with the aim of planning a coup against the regime."

Fifty-one others are being tried in absentia. Among these in the dock on November 14 was a cashiered lieutenant-colonel, Salim Al-Fakhri, who was the director of Baghdad Radio and Television in 1959.

The indictment said the accused, who formed the "revolutionary committee" contacted the Kurdish rebel leader Mulla Mustafa Al-Barzani seeking his collaboration to topple the regime. But the organisation was uncovered last year "and the plotters were arrested before they had chance to carry out their plot."

It was announced in court that ex-colonel Fakhri was arrested when he arrived in Baghdad from the north with forged identity papers.

After procedural measures including the division of the accused into categories, the court adjourned until further notice.

Mopping-up Operations

Iraqi army units fighting the rebel Kurds in Northern Iraq have seized weapons from them bearing the Israeli star insignia, Major-General Abdel-Rahman Aref, acting chief of staff of the armed forces, was quoted as saying in the English-language paper, the Baghdad News, on November 16.

He said, during a fierce battle in Bafestian, Iraqi army units had inflicted heavy casualties on the rebels and the Kurds had left a large number of dead behind them and a considerable quantity of weapons and equipment. The weapons included some of Israeli manufacture General Aref said, according to the paper.

This confirmed the existence of contacts between Barzani and Israel, the acting chief of staff added.

He said the army was now in complete control of north Iraq with the exception of two small areas -- namely Raniyah, in the Suleimaniyah Liwa and north Rawanduz, in the Erbil liwa. Army units were now closing in on these areas to mop them up completely. General Aref emphasised many of Barzani's followers had deserted him and his present followers were less than one tenth the total he had some months ago.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper MIDDLEAST MIRROR

ME
28
File No. 173/2/6/1

Published at LEBANON

Date 30-10-1965

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

KURDISH REPRESENTATIVE
ASKED TO LEAVE

CAIRO — The Kurdish representative here, Mr. Shawkat Akrawi, said on October 26 that he had been asked to leave the country by the Egyptian authorities. He said he would leave for an unspecified European country within the next 15 days.

Mr. Akrawi - who will leave his wife and five children behind - said he appreciated the attitude of the U.A.R. authorities. "Their action is entirely due to pressure from Iraq", he said.

Asked if he would try to return here, Mr. Akrawi said: "I really do not know. It is up to the leadership of the Kurdish revolution." There was no comment from Egyptian and Iraqi officials.

File

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Middle East

Name of Paper *Observer*

File No.

173/2/6/187

Published at *London*

Date *7-11-65*

New Kurd battle flares

from our Correspondent: Teheran, November 6

A MAJOR battle is being fought in the Ruanduz area of Northern Iraq according to Kurdish sources here.

The sources say that the battle began on Wednesday when the Iraqi army tried to seize the mountain pass which dominates the Iraqi-held town of Ruanduz.

The attempt is seen as an effort to gain a decisive victory over Kurdish rebels before the army is forced to retreat to its winter quarters on the plain by snow which is expected later this month.

If successful, the battle will strengthen the hands of the new Iraqi Government of Dral Bazzaz during negotiations which it is rumoured will take place in December.

Previous reports indicated that the Kurds boosted by a series of minor successes last month, had hardened their demands.

The sources claim that the 70-year-old Kurdish leader, Mulla Mustafa Berzani, is personally commanding the Kurdish side of the fighting.

The Kurds have always succeeded in holding the pass during repeated attacks over the last four years.

Abd ar-Rahman al-Bazzaz on the Kurdish SituationBaghdad home service in Arabic 21.00 GMT 28.10.65

Excerpts of recording of address by Abd ar-Rahman al-Bazzaz at a meeting with staff of Baghdad University:

We believe that the problem of the Kurds, as it concerns Iraq, is this. The Kurds are part of the Iraqi people. They have full freedom and the right to express themselves, their nationalism, and ideological heritage. What is more [words indistinct] share this opinion. I have written in my books that I believe that the Kurds are courageous people and believers, who have the right to be proud of their nationalism and to work for it... Many of our sincere, and even insincere, brother Kurds have said that they do not demand secession but autonomy. But if we come down to reality, those who are carrying out acts of violence and mutiny in the north submit on most occasions demands which go as far as secession, which is sometimes masked by the expression "self-rule". I spoke to certain leaders of the rebels when they went to Egypt, before the crisis intensified. I asked one of them what he meant by "self-rule", and his answer was: "The truth is that this is a slogan..."

As for us, we believe, as I have said, that the Kurds share our citizenship. We and they are one people. If they are Arabs, we are Kurds. We are bound together by heritage, history, land, creed, and vital common interests. Furthermore, we have protected and will continue to protect these rights, including language and heritage. We have confirmed this in an amendment to the provisional constitution, because they believed that the constitution did not safeguard them sufficiently... We have, among other things, added the article which stresses Kurdish national rights in the formula they demand. We have also declared and shall declare in the cabinet's programme that we shall set up a local administration.

The trend of the modern age is toward decentralised government. Thus not all matters should be centred in Baghdad, the capital. To activate and enable units to express their existence is a lawful matter. If the violence in the north ends, we shall sincerely implement the pledges of reform and redress the errors occasionally committed by one person or another... We shall also redress the harm which has been done. We shall try to ensure justice for everyone, and restore matters and end the tragedy, which is harming us as Arabs and the Kurds as our brothers. We hope reason and harmony will prevail. This is our policy.

During my trip... I protested about the states which interfere in our internal affairs and the affairs of the sons of our people and brother citizens. There is one state, at least, which, through the responsible statement of its Foreign Minister, admitted indirectly that, under the pretext of the existence of Kurds on both sides of the border, it tolerates the transport of equipment and arms and [word indistinct] the problem. The discussion with this official and the states connected with him dealt with the fact that they interfere in our affairs. When foreign aid stops, we shall talk like citizens and solve the problem...

On this occasion one of the responsible leaders of the state concerned said: "We assure you that we do not want the Kurds in the north of Iraq to achieve autonomy." I told him: "I do not want this reassurance from you, because I am sure of it. You want to smash the strength of the Kurds and some of our strength."

We shall then achieve for Iraq [word indistinct]. But I also say with full frankness that we shall not tolerate the continued existence of disorder. We shall not tolerate the secession of any part of our homeland. We shall not tolerate the continued existence of anarchist Kurds and Arabs, there are Arabs fighting with the Kurds, who have sinned against the people and committed atrocities in Mosul, Kirkuk and Baghdad. They are the most dangerous elements of disorder in that area. Justice will take its course...

Page of Paper *Observer*

Published at London

File No.

173/2/6/1

Date 10-10-65

Iraq seeks clamp on gun runners

by our Diplomatic Staff

IRAQ'S Prime Minister, Dr Abd ar-Rahman al-Bazzaz, suggested to Mr Wilson in London last week that Britain and the United States should use their influence in Iran and Turkey if they want to help to bring about Baghdad's agreement to a new oil treaty.

Dr Bazzaz, appointed three weeks ago by President Arif, told Mr Wilson that Iraq's immediate needs were economic development and the creation of internal stability.

The major source of instability is the four-year-old Kurdish rebellion led by Mulla Mustafa Barzani. Dr Bazzaz asked Mr Wilson to use Britain's "good offices" to persuade Iran and Turkey to stop arms and other supplies crossing their frontiers to the Iraqi Kurds. He said that British and American arms, reaching the Kurds from Iran, had been captured.

Dr Bazzaz told THE OBSERVER he explained to Mr Wilson that Iraq's final agreement to the treaty negotiated four months ago with the Iraq Petroleum Company (the British shareholding is about 40 per cent) had been delayed. The Iraq Government had hardly had time to study it because of the internal situation.

Once the treaty had been studied and found satisfactory "we will confirm it," Dr Bazzaz told Mr Wilson. He also tied agreement to resolution of the Kurdish problem. "All interested parties must help to restore

peace to all parts of Iraq to enable us to act with a sense of responsibility and without fear of internal dissension and schism," he said.

According to informed Western sources, the Iraqi views on the arms smuggling were passed on to Tehran and Ankara by Britain and the N.N. in August, but with no attempt to exert pressure.

Dr Bazzaz, who left London on Wednesday to attend the United Nations General Assembly, was expected to discuss the matter with the American Secretary of State, Mr Dean Rusk.

The Iraqi Premier, who described Barzani and his forces as a minority among the Kurds, said that his Government would not ignore legitimate Kurdish aspirations. A political solution to the Kurdish problem would be helped by the Government's plans for decentralisation.

During his three-day private visit to London, the Iraqi Prime Minister also told the British Government he was dissatisfied with delays in armament deliveries, attributed by Britain to technical difficulties. Iraqi sources said there had been delays of many months in deliveries under contracts looked after here by the Iraqi Air Attaché. The contracts, covering a wide variety of goods, were 80 per cent paid, the sources said.

Dr Bazzaz, who was Ambassador in London until last month, left for New York in a dark mood. The Arab Socialists who rule in Baghdad are more aggrieved than ever by the Labour Party's Middle East policy.

INWARD SAVINGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL

I.46459

Dated: 9th October, 1965.

To External

Rec'd: 19th October, 1965.
1435From External,
Australian High Commission,
London.

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Savingram No. Ex 112

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VISIT TO LONDON BY IRAQ PRIME MINISTER


During brief stop-over in London en route to General Assembly, Prime Minister Bazzaz met Mr. Wilson on October 5th. In giving us account of conversation, Brant (Iraq Desk, Foreign Office) said that while no matters of great moment were discussed British were rather pleased that Bazzaz had gone out of his way to call here so soon after becoming Prime Minister.

2. Much of his talk with Mr. Wilson was devoted to expression in predictable terms of Iraqi irritation with British policy in Persian Gulf area and in South Arabia. Message which Bazzaz was really concerned to get across however related to Iraqis' relations with Iran especially as this affected his Government's difficulties with Kurds. He stressed liberal outlook of present regime on Kurdish problem but pointed out that there was little hope of resolving it satisfactorily while large scale support for rebellious Kurdish elements continued to flow across Iranian frontier.

3. Bazzaz appealed for use of British "good offices" with the Shah to bring about more cooperative Iranian attitude. In what was apparently intended as inducement rather than threat he indicated that progress toward conclusion of agreement with IPC would be facilitated if British were able to influence Shah in desired direction. Apparently Bazzaz left no doubt that thorough re-examination of draft IPC agreement must be expected before it is signed.

4. We asked Brant about possibility of Ministerial visit to Baghdad which has been mooted as logical completion of recent round of visits to Middle East by Minister of State Thomson. He said current auguries were fairly favourable but Foreign Office considered that Bazzaz should be given some time to settle down as Prime Minister and thought no attempt should be made to organize Ministerial visit before at least late December.

Distribution: H.C.
A/D.H.C.
A/O.S.
E.A.



MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE


20th October, 1965.

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NAA: A1838, 173/2/6/1 PART 2

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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

3/12/38

Memo. No. 1333

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 SEP 1965
173/2/6/1
FILE NO.
HOM. INDEX

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.
27th August, 1965

IRAQ : KURDISH SITUATION

Commenting 25th August on the Kurdish situation, Craddock (Foreign Office) said that the reconstituted Iraqi Government seemed as determined as ever to batter the Kurds into submission and were having as little success as ever in achieving their object. Though two-thirds of the Iraqi Army and the bulk of the Air Force had been committed to the war, there was absolutely no prospect of a decisive victory, nor - with only about two months left of campaigning weather - of even of a victory in battle.

2. Craddock said that ^{the} Kurds, for their part, believed they could outlast this Iraqi Government as they had previous governments. Morale in the Kurdish camp was said to be high and it was likely they would use the respite brought by winter to consolidate their position. The Kurds claimed to have some 25,000 men under arms, though, in practice, the figure might be rather less. But, in addition, there was a fluctuating force of villagers and tribesmen who took up arms for a particular operation and then went back to their fields or flocks.

3. The Kurds, Craddock added, were reportedly well-equipped with rifles, machine-guns, mortars, and mines. Much of this material had been bought on international second-hand markets, much more captured from the Iraqi Army. In addition, the Kurds were receiving a limited amount of material aid and arms from the Iranians, as well as from the Israelis who were channelling their supplies through Iran.

4. Craddock said that the Iraqis had recently made representations to the US, Iran, and Britain about alleged foreign assistance to the Kurds, pointing out, so far as the UK was concerned, that they had captured from the Kurds arms of British manufacture. Craddock said that, in reply, the British had (a) reiterated assurances that their policy was one of non-intervention in the Kurdish dispute and (b) observed that, as for British arms, they were common coin in the Middle East over which the British Government had virtually no control.

5. The British and Americans, Craddock added, had also been asked to use their influence with the Iranians to persuade the latter to cease their support for the Kurds. In reply, the Iraqis were told that the US and UK would be willing to pass on Iraqi representations but that they most certainly could not enter into the merits of Iraq's allegations on which, in any case (so the Iraqis were told) they had no corroboratory information. Even so, Craddock added, the Shah had regarded this Western "intervention" as unwelcome and had given the British and American ambassadors in Tehran "pretty dust".

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
2.

There was in fact little prospect of the Iranians giving up their "Kurdish card".

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7.

A copy of this memorandum is being sent to Cairo.



(Lance Joseph)

for Senior External Affairs Representative

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL 81

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

3/12/38

27th August, 1965

Memo. No. 1333

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

IRAQ : KURDISH SITUATION

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A copy of this memorandum is being sent to Cairo.

(Lance Joseph)
for Senior External Affairs Representative

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79

CABLE ADDRESS
AUSTUNAT, NEW YORK

TELEPHONE
YUKON 6-7676

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

File No. 11 AUG 1965
209/11/30/1

4th August 1965

File No. 606/3

Memorandum No. 907/65

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

Kurds in Iraq

....

We attach a copy of a letter on this question
received from a Kurdish organization in revolt against
the Iraqi Government. The letter was post-marked New
York.

f A.C. Wilson
Permanent Representative

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Lee

Mr.

Mr. W. S. Berry

RECEIVED
d

ANNO 8-10-19
19-10-1965
19-10-1965

(TRANSLATION)

78
Iraq
July, 1965

His Excellency, Permanent Representative of Australia to the U.N.
Australian Mission to the United Nations
750 Third Avenue, 22nd floor
New York 17, N.Y.

Greetings:

We have the honor to present to Your Excellency the latest developments of the Kurdish Question in Iraq, and the new crisis created by the Iraqi Government concerning it.

As Your Excellency may know, we had ceased fire on February 10, 1964, so as to provide the Iraqi Government ample opportunity to resolve the Kurdish Question through peaceful negotiations and to respond to the national and justified demands of the Kurdish people, which do not exceed an autonomy within the framework of the Iraqi Republic. Such a demand is the least that any nation may accept in this century in order to secure its national rights. But to our great disappointment the government refused to respond to any of our national demands, even the simplest. On the contrary, the government disregarded even those national rights previously recognized in the Temporary Iraqi Constitution of 1958. Instead, the Iraqi government, pursuing the path of a chauvinistic military dictatorship, in order to entrench itself, demanded that we demobilize the Kurdish Army of Liberation. This, in effect, meant unconditional surrender, which is unjustified and wholly unacceptable to any loyal Kurd.

In March, 1965 the government again initiated actual war against us. More than 80 percent of the Iraqi armed forces have been sent to carry out the aggression and they have resumed the bombardment of peaceful Kurdish towns and villages with artillery and planes, using napalm bombs, destroying our beautiful country and killing its innocent inhabitants.

Ever since March, 1965 there have been continual clashes between the aggressive Iraqi Army and the Kurdish Army of Liberation. We also know definitely that the Iraqi government has purchased large quantities of toxic gases for use against civilian Kurdish



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SCANNING THIS ITEM AT A HIGHER RESOLUTION WILL NOT IMPROVE ITS LEGIBILITY.

inhabitants so as to terrorize them. This is against the Geneva Convention and international law. Furthermore, this continual fighting in Kurdistan endangers the security and peace of the Middle East which may lead to dangerous consequences on world peace.

We therefore beg of Your Excellency that you support the wronged Kurdish nation, that you stand against the sale of arms to the Iraqi Government during this crisis and that you use your wide influence and appreciated efforts to prevent injustice and atrocity against our nation. Our people are looking forward to your support and are appreciative of any moral and material help that can be offered.

Please accept our sincere regards and appreciation.

Respectfully,

(Signed) Mustafa Barzani,
President of the Command Council
of the Revolution of
Iraqi-Kurdistan,
President of the Democratic Party
of Iraqi-Kurdistan,
Commander-in-Chief of the
Revolution.



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تحية واحتراما

نتشرف باطلا عكم على آخر تطورات القضية الكردية في العراق والازمة الجديدة التي خلقتها الحكومة العراقية حولها . لا يخفى على سيادتكم باننا اوقفنا القتال منذ ١٠ / ٢ / ١٩٦٤ وفسحنا فرصة واسعة امام الحكومة العراقية لتحل المسألة الكردية عن طريق المفاوضات والطرق السلمية ولتستجيب لحقوق الشعب الكردي القومية العادلة التي لم تتجاوز الحكم الذاتي ضمن الجمهورية العراقية . وهو اقل مما ترضيه اية قومية في العصر الحديث . ولكن ومع مزيد الاسف لم تبتد الحكومة الاستعداد لتلبية اي حق من حقوق شعبنا مهما كان بسيطاً . بل صادرت ما كان لدينا من حقوق شكلية في الدستور العراقي الموقت لعام ١٩٥٨ وسارت في اتجاه تثبيت حكم دكتا توري عسكري شوفيني واخذت تلح علينا لحل فضايل الانصار اي ما معناه الاستسلام دون قيد او شرط وهذا ما لا يقبل به اي كردي مخلص وهو في ذات الوقت ليس من العدالة في شيء .

ومنذ اوائل آذار ١٩٦٥ باشرت الحكومة بالقتال الفعلي ضدنا وحشدت اكثر من اربعة اخماس الجيش العراقي في كردستان لهذا الغرض واخذت تطهر القرى والمدن الكردية الاضة بالدافع والطائرات وقنابل النبال المحرقة سزارعة الموت والدمار في بلادنا الجميلة . ومنذ ذلك الحين لا يكاد يمر يوم دون حدوث معركة بين الجيش العراقي وفضائل الانصار الكردية . هذا وقد توفرت لدينا معلومات اكيدة تفيد ان الحكومة العراقية قد اهتمت كميات كبيرة من الخازات السامة لاستعمالها ضد السكان المدنيين بقصد ارهاقهم الامر الذي يحرمه ميثاق جنيف وكافة الشرائع الدولية .

ولا يخفى على سيادتكم ما ينطوي عليه استئناف القتال في كردستان من اخلال بالامن والاستقرار وتعريض السلام في منطقة الشرق الاوسط لاشد الاخطار . لذا فاننا نرجو سيادتكم ان تقفوا الى جانب الشعب الكردي المظلوم وان - تتمتعوا عن بيع السلاح في هذه الظروف الى الحكومة العراقية وان تستخدموا نفوذكم الواسع وساعدكم الحميدة في رفع الظلم والمدوان عن شعبنا الذي يتطلع اليكم وهو بقدر اجمل التقدير اية ساعدة مادية او معنوية تسد له . وتفضلوا بقبول فائق احتراسنا وتقديرنا .

البارزاني مصطفى



٩٦٥ / ٧ / ٢٧



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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No. 3/12/38

Memo No. 1075

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra.

14th July, 1965.

IRAQ — N.R.

In memorandum No. 1066 we reported the comments of the assistant head of the Foreign Office Eastern Department on the recent cabinet reshuffle in Iraq. Craddock also reviewed the Kurdish situation. He said that the Iraqis had now admitted to the fact that fighting was going on - predictably the admission had come in the course of a speech by Aref to troops in the North when he blamed "imperialists" for the revolt. Prior to this speech, the Government had consistently denied that any military operations were taking place. The regime had referred merely to the activities of "highway robbers and brigands". Craddock commented that suppression of all news of the fighting had closely resembled UAR policy in the Yemen. This supported the theory that it had been done on the advice of President Nasser. It seemed he had counselled the Iraqis against military action but had said if they had to do it, to keep it quiet. As the Iraqis would have seen it, a news blackout had the advantage of the Government's prestige not being thrown publicly into the balance. The disadvantage, however, is that rumours spread and multiply as fighting is prolonged, with a bad effect on public morale. Apparently, Baghdad had come to calculate that the latter outweighed the advantages.

2. Craddock said that the Kurds were thought to be getting minor supplies of arms from the Iranians, but hardly anything decisive. Teheran's attitude to the Kurds had, of course, traditionally been ambivalent. On the one hand, they considered that a continuance of Kurdish unrest had a useful weakening effect on the Arabs (and in any case the Iranians tended to think of themselves as protectors of the Kurds). On the other, they had doubts about the effects of Kurdish irredentism on their own Kurdish minority.

3. Craddock said that the Russians in the meantime continued to give propaganda support to the Kurdish cause and, as a gesture, had discontinued arms supplies to the Iraqi Government. However, the Russians were not thought to be extending any material aid to the Kurds.

4. As for the course of the war, Craddock said it was clear that the Government push in April and May did not penetrate very far into Kurdish territory. Rather it would seem merely to have exposed the Iraqi Army to effective counter-attack. At present most of the initiative seemed to be coming from the Kurds with night raids, ambushes, and attacks against Iraqi lines of communications. All in all the war appeared to be developing along predictable lines, and there seemed no reason why this particular Kurdish campaign should not drag on to the same indecisive conclusion that had been the fate of similar adventures by Iraqi governments in the past. The war


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for both sides was harder to win than not to lose. Craddock added that the onset of winter in November would bring a stop to all military operations in Kurdistan. 74

5. In reply to our query, Craddock said that the rift in the Kurdish movement between Barzani and the KDP was still there. Talabani had admitted this to Foreign Office officials on his recent visit to Britain. Talabani had come to the UK, incidentally, ostensibly to try to persuade the British Government to suspend British arms shipments to Iraq, but in actuality to gain publicity for the Kurdish cause. That he was successful in the latter was undoubted - so much so that the Iraqi Ambassador in London felt constrained to summon a press conference to protest at the British Government's action in allowing Talabani entry into the country.

6. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to Cairo.



(Lance Joseph)
for Senior External Affairs Representative

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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2.

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(Lance Joseph)
for Senior External Affairs Representative



70

CABLE ADDRESS
AUSTUNAT, NEW YORK

TELEPHONE
YUKON 6-7676

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

18th June 1965

File No. 9/4/1

Memorandum No. 698/65

20 JUN 1965
209/1/20/1

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

Committee for the Defence of the Kurdish
People's Rights

.....
Attached is a photo copy of a registered letter, addressed to the Ambassador, which has been received from the "Committee for the Defense of the Kurdish People's Rights", requesting an interview "in order to bring to the attention of your Delegation the facts concerning the new Iraqi military offensive against Kurdistan and the war of genocide which the Bagdad government is presently waging against the Kurdish people".

2. Subject to your views we do not propose to acknowledge receipt of the letter or to take any action on it.

*in witness
This letter paper
should be placed elsewhere
the spec. act. in addition that
on cratic - request
25/6*

Acting Permanent Representative

CHECKED
de

MR Lee

69

KOMÎTEY PARÊZGARÎ MAFÎ NETEWEY KURD
COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE'S RIGHTS
KOMITEE FÜR DIE VERTEIDIGUNG DER RECHTE DES KURDISCHEN VOLKES
COMITÉ POUR LA DÉFENSE DES DROITS DU PEUPLE KURDE

c/o Suite 1208
280 Madison Avenue, New York, New York, 10016

Jimara: _____ Net: _____ Rej: _____ Date: May 12, 1965

H. E. Mr. D. O. Hay, C.B.E., D.S.O.
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Australian Mission to the United Nations
750 Third Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10017

Your Excellency:

The Delegation of the Iraqi-Kurdistan Revolution, of which the undersigned is head and which also includes Mr. Saadi Dizayee, would be greatly honored to be granted an interview, in order to bring to the attention of your Delegation the facts concerning the new Iraqi military offensive against Kurdistan and the war of genocide which the Bagdad government is presently waging against the Kurdish people.

We are in the United States as the envoys of the Command Council of the Revolution and its President, General Mustafa Barzani. Our objective is to bring the Iraqi-Kurdistan situation to the attention of the various Member Nations of the United Nations, in the hope that one or more of these countries will address the Security Council or the next session of the General Assembly on our behalf.

We have already written to His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations; to Mr. Sory Coulibaly, President of the Committee of Twenty-Four; and to Mr. Salvador P. Lopez, President of the Commission on Human Rights. As of this writing, we have received no replies.

In General Barzani's letter of January 7, 1965 and in mine of April 20, 1965, to U Thant (copies of which are enclosed) we

requested the United Nations to take immediate, specific steps concerning this question, as follows:

- (1) Call for an immediate end to Iraqi military operations in Kurdistan and to the war of genocide against our Kurdish people.
- (2) Send an emergency international force to Iraqi-Kurdistan, pending a peaceful solution to the conflict.
- (3) Work out a peaceful solution to this conflict, on the following basis:
 - (a) Autonomy for Iraqi-Kurdistan, internationally guaranteed, within the framework of the Iraqi Republic - if Iraq remains independent.
 - (b) If, on the other hand, Iraq decides to become part of any Arab Union, the solution of the Kurdish national question should be that freely chosen by the people of Iraqi-Kurdistan through an act of self-determination, carried out under international control and with adequate international guarantees.

We wish to call to the attention of your Delegation that in our letter of April 20 to U Thant, as well as in the enclosed "Fact Sheet," we have listed the legal, historical and political facts which make our question of autonomy an international one, falling within the jurisdiction of the United Nations and not, as the Bagdad government insists without basis, an internal Iraqi problem.

In this connection we wish to recall how quickly the United Nations took steps in the Algerian-French conflict, while Algeria was considered by France a "French Province" and while France was a member of the international organization; and also to point out that the Iraqi-Kurdistan war is now in its fourth year.

We have for weeks denounced the new military campaign, not officially admitted by Bagdad, which the Iraqi government is nevertheless in process of waging in Kurdistan, using heavy artillery, tanks and aircraft. This campaign is a notorious fact today and has been reported in the world press, including the Lebanese-Arab press.

For the further information of your Delegation, we affirm that the Bagdad government is employing napalm bombs in its aerial bombings of the Kurdish civilian population; that the United Arab Command is involved, at least indirectly, in this war; that Bagdad has received from the United Arab Republic 15,000 gas masks and quantities of arms and toxic gas which, we fear, may be used against Kurdish civilians. There are already 5,000 Egyptian troops as well as 36 military aircraft in Iraq, some of them in Kurdistan. In this colonial type of war the experience acquired by Egyptian military technicians in Yemen could also be put to good use by the Iraqi command. We wish to note in this connection that during the Iraqi campaign in Kurdistan in 1963 a division of the Syrian army took part in the war against the Kurdish people.

Additional documents are enclosed, including a copy of my credentials, attesting that I am the representative abroad of the Revolution for Kurdish National Liberation and official spokesman for General Barzani.

Knowing the democratic tradition of your country and its support of oppressed peoples, we would be honored to have an audience with Your Excellency, so that we may submit further information to your Delegation, in the hope that your country might be willing to bring this question before the United Nations.

Respectfully,

Ismet Cheriff Vanly,
Envoy-at-Large of the Command
Council of the Revolution, and
Spokesman for General Mustafa
Barzani

Enclosures:

- Letter from General Barzani to His Excellency U Thant
- My Letter to His Excellency U Thant
- My Credentials
- Our Letter to His Excellency Mr. Coulibaly
- Our Letter to His Excellency Mr. Lopez
- "Fact Sheet"

66.
January 7, 1965

His Excellency U Thant
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York, New York

Your Excellency:

I have the honor to present to Your Excellency the following:

When our people in Iraqi-Kurdistan took up arms September 11, 1961, it was only to repel an aggression by force of arms by the preceeding dictator of Iraq, Mr. Abdul Karim Kassem. Our people had done nothing more than claim peaceably their legitimate national rights and first of all the autonomy of Kurdistan within the boundaries of the Iraqi Republic.

Autonomy is the only form that would permit us to run the business of our country, to exploit its economic resources for the benefit of our people, to develop a national culture and at the same time to maintain the good relations which link us to the Arab people. This system inside a federal system is the best solution of national problems in all states of multi-national peoples.

One may say that autonomy constitutes the minimum of what is comprised in the right of self-determination, a right recognized to all oppressed peoples and among them the Kurdish people. In Articles 62, 63 and 64, the Treaty of Sevres signed in 1920 internationally recognized the right of our people to achieve national independence. The British annexed this part of our Kurdish nation to the Iraqi Kingdom after the first World War only after official commitments in a joint declaration dated December 24, 1922, by the government of His British Majesty as Mandatory Power over Iraq and by the Government of Baghdad, recognizing formally the right of the Iraqi-Kurdish people to form an autonomous Kurdish government within the boundaries of the Iraqi state. These promises were never respected, despite the fact that they were officially communicated to the League of Nations.

Our people without any outside aid fought for their legitimate rights, resisted the aggression, and overthrew the government of dictator Kassem on February 8, 1963.

In our desire to solve peaceably the Kurdish national question we then entered into official negotiations with the Baathist Government which had just taken over power in Baghdad. We spelled out our demand in a memorandum April 27 of the same year presented by our delegation of negotiators, indicating

that a basis of negotiations was involved.

But even during the period of negotiations the aforesaid Baathist Government took us by surprise in a general military offensive against our defensive positions in Kurdistan and, in Baghdad, arrested most of our negotiators. In their attack they appealed to Syrian military forces who, contrary to international law, crossed the frontier to attack the Kurdish people. But the fact that we were successful in repelling the aggression plus the growing discontent of the Arab people in Iraq because of the decline of the Iraqi economy, and the sympathy that our just cause continues to arouse in world public opinion, all this culminated in the fall of the Baathist regime November 18, 1963.

A group of officers seized power in Baghdad directed by Marshal Abdul Salam Aref, who became President of the Republic.

Despite our distrust of all military dictatorial regimes coming to power against the will of the people, and not resting on a democratic base such as we believe in, but in accord with our sincere desire to solve the conflict peaceably, we concluded an agreement with the new Iraqi Government, February 10, 1964, for a cease-fire proclaimed simultaneously by the two parties. Our aim on the one hand was to spare our Kurdish people and the Arab people of Iraq the horrors of war and on the other hand to create an atmosphere of confidence which would permit our engaging in serious negotiations based on a clear recognition of the full national rights of our people, both on the constitutional and practical levels, and guaranteeing our rights.

We have since then, as far as we are concerned, respected our commitments notably in the terminating of military operations and in freeing all Iraqi prisoners-of-war. But the Iraqi Government, which in its declaration of February 10, 1964, recognized in principle Kurdish national rights -- and here is the catch in the cease-fire agreements -- has not been willing to engage in negotiations with a view to making these rights precise and concrete. On the contrary they have gone ahead in a series of provocations and in military operations against the revolutionary army of Kurdistan. Instead of indemnifying the thousands of Kurds who had losses during the war and building new dwellings for the tens of thousands of shelterless and displaced persons, for the most part women, children, and old people, they began to rout by force of arms, by terror and by pressure, the civilians of dozens of peaceable Kurdish villages in the oil areas of Kirkouk and of Erbil, thus extending the policy introduced by the Baathists of shifting the Kurdish people collectively by force.

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On the other hand the Aref regime made political agreements with the U.A.R. relative to the formation of an Arab union without consulting the Iraqis, and specifically the Kurdish people, and without resolving in advance the question of the Kurdish nation.

Confronted with this situation, our movement went ahead October 9, 1964, in forming a Command Council of the Revolution of Iraqi-Kurdistan of which the members were elected among the representatives of the people, of the Revolutionary Army, and of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan. The Executive Bureau appointed by the above Council at once became active in appointing responsible people as civil and military administrators to run the affairs of the liberated Kurdish areas, these comprising about three-fourths of Iraqi-Kurdistan. The autonomous Kurdish administration is thus becoming an effective organ.

We presented to the Iraqi Government a memorandum dated October 11, 1964 containing our national, economic and cultural claims, and demanding notably that they recognize the autonomy of Kurdistan and appoint a delegation with a view to undertaking serious negotiations with us.

In reply the Iraqi Government demanded on November 27, 1964, and again on December 3, 9 and 11, that we disband the Revolutionary Army of Kurdistan, put an end to the Kurdish administration and re-admit the central Iraqi administration in all areas of liberated Kurdistan, thus rejecting all of our demands--something that the Kurdish people can never accept.

Our revolutionary movement has entered its fourth year and it is impossible for us to renounce the gains made at such heavy cost and at such sacrifices.

If the Iraqi Government persists in continuing its present policy it will have to take the consequences of its act, of its ignoring the rights of our people and the interests of the Iraqi people in their hopes of normal living conditions.

As the situation is becoming very critical due to the completely negative attitude of the Baghdad Government; due to its open threats to resume the war in Kurdistan; due to its disregard of the most elementary rights of our people, and due to intolerable steps that it has taken in transferring by mass and by force the civilian population of certain Kurdish regions;

And, on another level, in order to keep peace in the region, and in conformity with the spirit and with the letter of the high principles enunciated by the United Nations in their Charter and in their conventions, we are addressing this urgent appeal to your Excellency requesting you graciously to proceed as follows:

1. To call the attention of the Iraqi Government in the present situation to recognize the necessity, and urgency in arriving at a peaceable and negotiated solution of the Kurdish problem, guaranteeing the full rights of our people,
2. To call an emergency meeting of the Security Council in event of a new Iraqi military aggression against our people and our defensive forces, and to do this in conformity with your functions as spelled out in Article 99 in the Charter, and to take the necessary measures to block the Iraqi aggression, to find a solution of the national question of Iraqi-Kurdistan, and to guarantee it internationally,
3. Finally, we ask you to receive our representatives accredited abroad. On our part we are ready at all times to receive any messenger or any investigative committee which you might choose to send to the liberated regions of Iraqi-Kurdistan.

In the hope that our small oppressed people can benefit by the understanding and the protection of the United Nations, I ask you, Mr. Secretary-General, to accept our highest consideration.

Respectfully,

(signed) Mustafa Barzani,
President of the Command Council
of the Revolution of Iraqi-
Kurdistan,
President of the Democratic Party
of Iraqi-Kurdistan,
Commander-in-Chief of the
Revolution.

62.
April 20, 1965

His Excellency U Thant
Secretary-General
United Nations
New York, New York

Your Excellency:

Enclosed I have the honor to present to you a letter dated January 7, 1965, that General Mustafa Barzani, President of the Command Council of the Revolution of Iraqi-Kurdistan, entrusted to me for your Excellency, dealing with the situation in Iraqi-Kurdistan.

I arrived in the United States at the head of the Kurd Delegation, and would like to add that since January 7, 1965, the fears of General Barzani have been proved exact, and a new Iraqi military aggression, not declared officially by the Baghdad government, is actually under way against the Iraqi-Kurdistan people, and against the defensive positions of our revolutionary army, supported by planes, artillery and tanks.

In these circumstances, and in conformity with the last instructions that we have received from the Command Council of the Kurdish revolution, and of its President, and in view of the extreme gravity of the situation, and the fact that it threatens the peace of the entire region, I am urgently addressing your Excellency and the United Nations, requesting you to consent to make use of the authority given you under Article 99 of the Charter on the following lines:

1. Call a quick meeting of the Security Council and inform it of the national issue of Iraqi-Kurdistan, and of the aggressive and semi-colonial war taking place since September 11, 1961.
2. Put the same question on the agenda of the next General Assembly of the United Nations.
3. We request the United Nations to intervene rapidly in the conflict and to take in this respect the following decisions:
 - a) Halt immediately the Iraqi military operations in Kurdistan, and stop without delay the war of genocide against the Kurdish people.

b) Send an international commission of inquiry and an international force to Kurdistan, pending the finding of a peaceable solution to the conflict.

c) Under the auspices of the United Nations, find a peaceful solution to the national question of Iraqi-Kurdistan on the following terms:

Autonomy of Iraqi-Kurdistan in the framework of the Iraqi Republic, with adequate international guarantees, provided Iraq remains independent.

On the other hand, if Iraq decides to join any sort of an Arab union, the solution to the question will be that freely chosen by the Kurdish people by an act of self-determination carried out under international control, and with adequate international guarantees.

4. I request you to kindly grant us a meeting so that we may discuss with your Excellency full details of the problem and the steps to be taken with regard to it.

May I also invite the attention of your Excellency to the fact that the national question of Iraqi-Kurdistan and the war which is getting under way is not an internal problem for Iraq as the government of Baghdad asserts without justification. It is an international problem for the following reasons:

a) The precedent of the Treaty of Sevres of August 10, 1920 which anticipated in Article 62, 63, and 64, the independence of Kurdistan, including southern Kurdistan, which is today called Iraqi.

b) The British, after the first World War, linked Southern Kurdistan to Iraq, the state created by them, and against the will of the Kurdish people.

c) The joint Anglo-Iraqi declaration of December 24, 1922, communicated to the League of Nations, formally recognized the rights of the Kurds so included within the frontiers of Iraq to establish an autonomous Kurd government.

d) The people of Southern Kurdistan have never agreed that their country could be annexed to Iraq against their will. Even the decision of December 16, 1925 of the Council of the League of Nations concerning the matter of the Mosul vilayet, confirming this annexation, charged the government of Baghdad with precise inter-

national obligations, having as its aim the setting up of a Kurd administrative and cultural autonomy, under international guarantees, covering the Kurd provinces within the frontiers of Iraq. However, none of this has been honored by the Iraq government.

e) The Iraqi government in waging war against Kurdistan is conspicuously violating the Convention for the Repression and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, without speaking of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, and of the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the right of peoples to self-determination.

f) Finally, there was a foreign military intervention in the war against the Kurdish people waged by the Syrian Army in the summer of 1963. Presently military forces of the UAR are stationed in Iraq and in certain areas of Iraqi-Kurdistan. The Kurd people demand their removal.

In expectation of having the honor of an interview with your Excellency, I express my highest consideration.

Respectfully,

Ismet Cheriff Vanly
Envoy at Large of the Command
Council of the Revolution, and
Spokesman for General Mustafa
Barzani

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القيادة العامة
لجيش كردستانى السورى

لكل من له الخصام معية

يهدى عطفي البازداني - رئيس الحزب الديمقراطي الكردستاني والقائد العام لجيش
كردستانى السورى ورئيس مجلس قيادة الثورة فى كردستان العراق - عنياته و يرجو
ان يوضح بانه قد تكون مجلس قيادة الثورة لكردستان العراق كقيادة موحدة مركزية لادارة
شؤون الثورة - و رغبة منا فى توضيح الموقف السياسى و اعلان اهداف الثورة لاهدافنا
فى الخارج والعمل على تحقيقها - فقد عينا السيد عصمت شريف و انلى ممثلا لثورتنا خارج
الوطن .

ان السيد و انلى هو عضو فى مجلس قيادة الثورة فى كردستان العراق و كسر
لجنة الدفاع عن حقوق الشعب الكردى و نحن نرى فيه الكفاءة والخلاص للقضية الكردية .

لقد حولنا السيد و انلى ان يتكلم باسم الثورة و ان يقوم بالاتصالات
اللازمة مع الجهات المعنية - لذا نرجو التفضل بالاعتماد عليه فى كل ما
يقوله او يفعله باسمنا و اسم الثورة .

نتقدم بهذه الفرصة لى نعبّر عن فائق شكرنا و تمنياتنا .



عطفي البازداني

كتب فى رانية العراق - فى اليوم
1992
الخامس والعشرين من شهر تشرين الاول سنة

رئيس الحزب الديمقراطي الكردستاني
القائد العام لجيش كردستان السورى
رئيس مجلس قيادة الثورة لكردستان العراق



58
The High Command of
the Revolutionary Army of Kurdistan

To whom it may concern :

Mustafa Barzani - President of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Army of Kurdistan and President of the Command Council of the Revolution of Iraqi-Kurdistan - sends you his greetings and would like to bring to your attention that a Command Council of the Revolution of Iraqi-Kurdistan has been set up as a unified and centralized command to conduct the affairs of the revolution. With the purpose to explain the political situation to our friends abroad, to make known the objectives of the revolution and to work for their realization, we have designated Mr. Ismet Cheriff Vanly as our representative of the revolution for the foreign countries.

Mr. Vanly is a Member of the Command Council of the Revolution of Iraqi-Kurdistan and the Secretary of the Committee for the Defense of the Kurdish People's Rights. We see him as a competent and devoted person to the cause of the Kurdish question.

We have granted to Mr. Vanly the power to speak on behalf of the Revolution and to establish any contacts with interested parties. We request you to recognize him in everything he says or everything he does in our name and in the name of the Revolution.

With the expression of our highest considerations,

signed :

Mustafa Barzani
President of the Democratic Party of
Kurdistan, Commander-in-Chief of the
Revolutionary Army of Kurdistan and
President of the Command Council of
the Revolution of Iraqi-Kurdistan

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April 22, 1965

His Excellency, Mr. Sory Goulibaly,
Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation
with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples,
The United Nations ,
New York, New York

Your Excellency :

I am in New York at the head of a delegation representing the
Command Council of the Revolution for national liberation of
Iraqi-Kurdistan. In view of the aggressive war of a colonial
type, not officially declared, but effectively undertaken against
the Kurdish people by the Iraqi government, I herewith take the
liberty of soliciting an audience with your Excellency, and the
Committee of Twenty-Four.

We are aware of the fact that Iraq is a member of the Committee,
and that this Committee is thus fully informed from the Iraqi
point of view.

What we would request from you is that the voice of the oppressed
Kurdish people also be heard, and that urgent steps be taken by
the Committee to remedy this situation, in order to enable the
Kurdish people to work out freely their own destiny.

I take the liberty of informing you that we have already addressed
ourselves regarding this matter to His Excellency U Thant,
Secretary-General of the United Nations, and that we shall also
address ourselves to the Commission on Human Rights.

Hoping that you will grant us an audience as soon as possible,
I remain,

Very respectfully yours,

Ismet Cheriff Vanly

Envoy at Large of the Command
Council of the Revolution, and
Spokesman for General Mustafa
Barzani

April 28, 1965

His Excellency, Salvador P. Lopez
Commission on Human Rights
United Nations
New York, New York

Your Excellency:

May I take the liberty of bringing the following facts to your attention:

- 1) The Genocide war instigated against the people of Iraqi-Kurdistan by the government of Baghdad in September, 1961, has now been resumed after a cease-fire agreed upon on February 10, 1964. This war has not been officially declared by the Iraqi government.
- 2) Nevertheless, military engagements have been taking place for several months now, and the Kurdish civilian population has been subjected to repeated bombings.
- 3) A number of times in the past we have addressed ourselves regarding this situation to the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations.
- 4) Being in New York as head of a Delegation officially representing the Command Council of the Revolution for the national liberation of Iraqi-Kurdistan, I am taking this opportunity of requesting an audience with Your Excellency and the Commission. The extreme seriousness of the situation in our country requires immediate action if further innocent blood is not to be shed. It is our hope that we will have an opportunity to present our case to you and the Commission, and that out of such discussions will emerge an understanding of the Kurdish position, as well as a solution to the problem.

We have addressed ourselves to His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations and also to the Committee of 24.

Hoping that you will grant us an audience as soon as possible, I remain,

Respectfully yours,

Ismet Cheriff Vanly
Envoy at Large of the Command
Council of the Revolution, and
Spokesman for General Mustafa
Barzani

IRAQI - KURDISTAN

(A FACT SHEET)

Iraqi or Southern Kurdistan is a part of the homeland of the Kurdish people. Kurdistan has a total area of about 500,000 sq.km. and a population of from 12 to 13 million. It covers the eastern provinces of Turkey, the western provinces of Iran, the northern and north-eastern provinces of Iraq as well as three regions in North Syria and some districts of the transcaucasian Soviet Union.

The Kurdish homeland is geographically contiguous but is divided by international frontiers, chiefly those of Turkey, Iraq and Iran. The Kurds belong to the Indo-European stock and speak an independent language of the Aryan or Iranian family of languages.

Alone, Iraqi-Kurdistan has a population of about 2 million, with an area of approximately 75,000 sq.km., out of the 6.6 million constituting the whole population of the Iraqi Republic. This means that the Kurdish people comprise some 30% of the Iraqi population, living in their geographically and ethnically well determined country.

Iraqi-Kurdistan is far the richest region of Iraq; about 90% of the Iraqi oil fields, all the tobacco grown in Iraq, much of its cereal, fruit and animal products, wood and the most important hydroelectrical plants are found in Kurdistan. But the unexploited mineral resources of Kurdistan are still more important.

Southern Kurdistan became Iraqi only after the First World War, chiefly because Great Britain forced it, and against the will of the Kurdish people. Before that war, it was a part of the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire and covered, roughly, the ancient vilayet (province of Mosul). At that time there was no Iraqi State and Arab Iraq was represented by the vilayets of Baghdad and Basrah, which also were parts of the Ottoman Empire.

The peace Treaty of Sevres, 1920, between the Allied Powers and Turkey, which lost the war and whose Empire was dismembered, provided, in Articles 62, 63 and 64 (Section III: KURDISTAN) for the creation of an independent (Ottoman) Kurdistan. This State was to cover the present Turkish and Iraqi Kurdistans, together with the present Kurdish regions in Syria. Iranian Kurdistan was excluded because Iran had not taken part in the war.

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The last paragraph of Article 64 of the Treaty of Sevres, signed on August 10, 1920, states :

" NO,OBJECTION WILL BE RAISED BY THE PRINCIPAL ALLIED POWERS TO THE VOLUNTARY ADHESION TO SUCH INDEPENDENT KURDISH STATE OF THE KURDS INHABITING THAT PART OF KURDISTAN WHICH HAS HITHERTO BEEN INCLUDED IN THE MOSUL VILAYET."

After the rise of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, the Sevres Treaty was not ratified and was replaced, in 1923, by the Treaty of Lausanne, which ignored the Kurdish national question. The Kurdish people were shamefully abandoned by the great Powers.

British troops occupied the Arab vilayets of Basrah and Baghdad during 1917, and Southern Kurdistan, only after the Moudros armistice, during 1918. The Arab name of Iraq, geographically equivalent to Lower or Desert Mesopotamia, was known to cover only the two first (Arab) provinces, excluding the Kurdish province of Mosul, which had never been "Iraqi".

But in order to exploit the Kurdish oil of Kirkuk and because of strategical and political considerations, the British Government decided to unite the three ancient Ottoman vilayets under the Arab name of Iraq.

The people of Southern Kurdistan first revolted against British occupation in 1919, under the leadership of Sheikh Mahmud Baraznji of Suleimani. This revolt was crushed by the British Army. The British then obtained a mandate over what was to be their puppet State of Iraq by the Treaty of San Remo, 1920. In 1921, they chose an Arab prince, Faisal First, as King of Iraq.

The Kurdish people of Southern Kurdistan, in 1922, once more revolted against the annexation to Iraq by the British and against the fact that the British were willing to submit them to the authority of an Arab king and of Baghdad. A Kurdish revolutionary government was constituted in the same year at Suleimani, and the same Sheikh Mahmud Baraznji was proclaimed King of Southern Kurdistan. For the second time, the British Army occupied Suleimani after a war that lasted several months. Sheikh Mahmud was made prisoner and then exiled. The "authority" of the Iraqi government was once more imposed on Kurdistan with the help of the British Royal Air Force. The Kurdish government had asked only for British protection but did not want to be put under the direct rule of Baghdad.

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The Kemalist Turkish Government was now demanding the return of the ancient vilayet of Mosul to Turkey. Therefore, the British and Iraqi Governments, in order to appease the Kurds and with the intention of justifying that annexation before world public opinion and against Turkey, published a joint DECLARATION, December 24, 1922. This was sent to the League of Nations, officially promising to establish a KURDISH SELF-GOVERNMENT within the boundaries of the Iraqi State. The Declaration stated:

"HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ RECOGNIZE THE RIGHTS OF THE KURDS LIVING WITHIN THE FRONTIERS OF IRAQ TO ESTABLISH A KURDISH GOVERNMENT INSIDE THESE FRONTIERS. THEY HOPE THAT THE DIFFERENT KURDISH ELEMENTS WILL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE REACH AN AGREEMENT AMONG THEMSELVES CONCERNING THE FORM THEY DESIRE THIS GOVERNMENT TO TAKE AND THE BOUNDARIES TO WHICH THEY WISH TO EXTEND. THE KURDS WILL SEND RESPONSIBLE DELEGATES TO DISCUSS THEIR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT".

This Declaration, like all those which preceded and followed it, was never honored. But it still binds the Government of Iraq and the ancient mandatory power and morally, at least, if not legally, the United Nations, after the League of Nations.

During the Anglo-Turkish conflict over the fate of the Mosul vilayet, new solemn promises concerning the autonomy of Southern Kurdistan within Iraq were officially made by Lord Curzon, head of the British delegation at the Conference of Lausanne, 1922 - 1923. But like the others, they were not kept.

The Conference of Lausanne failed in settling the problem, which was then placed on the agenda of the Council of the League of Nations, by a common agreement of the parties concerned, but in the absence of the most interested party - the inhabitants of the vilayet, the people of Southern Kurdistan.

By decision of September 30, 1924, the League of Nations sent an Inquiry Commission, headed by former Hungarian Premier Count Teleki, to investigate on the spot as to the desires of the population of the vilayet. In its official report to the Council, the Commission noticed that the feelings of the Kurds, constituting the overwhelming majority of the population, "were Kurdish and not Iraqi

nor Turkish", before suggesting that, "if ethnical arguments were to be taken into consideration, that would lead to recommend the creation of an independent State in Southern Kurdistan". The Commission suggested that Southern Kurdistan should be granted at least a very large autonomy with a Kurdish self-government and that this territory should be put under the international mandate of the League of Nations, and not of Great Britain.

But the Council of the League of Nations, under British pressure, and after sending to the Mosul vilayet another Inquiry Commission, headed by General Laidoner, decided, on December 16, 1925, that this territory should be annexed to Iraq, under British mandate, which were the wishes of London. That same decision specifies however, that the Kurds should be granted a cultural and administrative autonomy "in their country" within Iraq that Kurdish be the official language in the areas inhabited by the Kurds and that officials should be Kurds. The Council ruled:

"ACCOUNT SHOULD BE TAKEN OF THE WISHES EXPRESSED BY THE KURDS WHO DEMAND THAT OFFICIALS OF THEIR PEOPLE BE SELECTED FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR COUNTRY, FOR APPLYING THE LAW, FOR INSTRUCTION IN THE SCHOOLS AND THAT THE KURD LANGUAGE BE THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE IN THESE SERVICES,"

So after independence, the people of Southern Kurdistan were solemnly promised a Kurdish self-government, which in its turn was reduced to a cultural and administrative autonomy within Iraq. But even such an autonomy, although internationally guaranteed and once more confirmed when Iraq was admitted as member of the League of Nations in 1932, remained a dead letter and was never executed.

Instead of autonomy, the Iraqi government, with the approval of the British, established, since 1925, a very centralized system of administration for all Iraq, with no distinction between Arab and Kurdish regions. The very name of KURDISTAN was dropped from official use; Kurdish was not made the official language in the Kurdish areas and the officials and public servants were not Kurdish there. Kurdish was taught only in the primary schools in one of the four Kurdish provinces.

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The Kurds revolted again in 1930 in Suleimani, after the conclusion of a British-Iraqi Treaty which totally ignored their existence. Subsequently, revolts occurred in the region of Barzan, in 1932-33 and 1943-45. All these national revolts were crushed with the effective help of British forces and after extensive bombing by the R.A.F.

The Iraqi monarchy was abolished in July 14, 1958 and General Abdul Karim Kassem took over the government. His provisional constitution, Article 3 said that Arabs and Kurds were associated in the Republic and that their respective national rights would be respected.

That was very good, but the article did not say what form the Arab-Kurdish association would take. On the other hand, Article 2 of the same constitution was in evident contradiction with Article 3, because it said that Iraq was an integral part of the Arab nation. But it is clear that Iraqi-Kurdistan is Kurdish and cannot be a part of the Arab nation.

General Kassem recognized no Kurdish autonomy and deprived the Iraqi people of their democratic rights. The Iraqi dictator attacked the Kurdish people on September 11, 1961. That was the beginning of the largest Kurdish revolution ever known and brought his regime to an end on February 8, 1963. Kassem was succeeded by the Baathists, who also failed in their war in Kurdistan despite the Syrian military intervention against the Kurdish forces. This led to their fall on November 18, 1963. They were succeeded by a group of fanatic Arab officers headed by Marshal Abdul Salam Aref. The present regime which concluded with the Kurdish revolution a ceasefire agreement on February 10, 1964, is now waging a new military aggression on Kurdistan.

Organized by the Revolutionary Command Council and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and led by General Mustafa Barzani, the Kurdish Revolution, which is today in its fourth year, aims at achieving legal wide autonomy for Iraqi-Kurdistan, within the framework of a democratic Iraqi Republic.

If Iraq has to join an Arab union with another or other Arab States, the people of Iraqi-Kurdistan should exercise their imprescriptible right to self-determination.

Ismet Cheriff Vanly

New York, April 15, 1965

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Kurdistan: Back to Square One

While the Iraqi government still maintains the fiction that there is no war worth speaking of in Kurdistan, all available information points the other way. The descriptions we have obtained of current hostilities from sources on both sides—the government's and the Kurdish rebels—are more convincing through being almost identical. Thus:

(i) *Kurdish claims*: The young Kurdish nationalist leader, Mr. Jalal Talabani, who came to London last week to give a press conference on behalf of Mullah Mustapha Barazani, commander of the Kurdish forces, told us that: (a) the central government's big new offensive that started in April has everywhere been repulsed; (b) the Kurdish "regular" army has now joined the rebel commandos in an all-out effort to capture the central government's two major operational centres—Arbil and Sulaimaniyah; and (c) the Kurds have already managed to isolate these key Kurdish towns by dominating all the approaches to them.

(ii) *A government military comment*: Two weeks ago a senior Iraqi officer, who was so severely wounded when fighting the Kurds that he had gone to Europe for treatment, was seen by one of our correspondents. He told him that (a) the central government's spring offensive has been employing 45,000 men, supported by at least three Mig and Hunter jet squadrons; (b) after six weeks' fighting they have totally failed to gain their first objective—to control the Quli Ali gorge, cross the Zab river and recapture Raniah, Kui-Sanyak and the main road to Arbil from the rebels; (c) they carry out round-the-clock bombing of what they believe to be the rebel mountain hideouts, but the land forces, including tanks, that move in by day to occupy devastated areas, are usually forced out at night under heavy attacks from the rebels; (d) the central government has gained just a few ruined and deserted villages and killed some Kurds, but captured no wounded—"since the rebels never leave an injured man on the battlefield." It has suffered "heavy losses" in men and materials.

This Iraqi officer considered that the government would have been wiser to accept the "moderate" proposals for a settlement made by Barazani last July. It will be recalled that, at that time, Barazani dropped his far-fetched demands for a fully

autonomous Kurdistan, to include the oil-rich province of Kirkuk and have its own separate army. He would have accepted instead an all-Kurdish administration in Kurdistan, language concessions and a separate Kurdish gendarmerie. But, through lowering his price, he lost the support of (a) Mr. Talabani and his nationalists; (b) the communists; (c) several powerful tribes. So the government, seeing him thus weakened, rejected his proposals—against President Nasser's advice. When, in March, Barazani got wind of the government's preparations for a new offensive, he raised his price again—and, promptly Mr. Talabani and the other defectors flocked back to him. Mr. Talabani believes that the Kurds could win their war if the United States, Russia and Britain stop sending arms to Iraq and the Egyptian forces now in Iraq are not brought into play. But it is a war that is harder to win than not to lose. For the moment it looks as if the Kurds are back on square one again with demands that cannot be granted and a war that cannot be ended—unless there is some new political development in Baghdad.

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IRAQ

ALTHOUGH VARIOUS RECENT REPORTS OF IMPENDING MILITARY ACTION BY IRAQ GOVT AGAINST KURDS HAVE PROVEN TO BE GROUNDLESS IT IS FO IMPRESSION THAT NEW CAMPAIGN WILL BE LAUNCHED IN NEAR FUTURE. DURING DISCUSSION APR8 WITH CRADOCK OF EASTERN DEPT HE POINTED OUT THAT NET EFFECT OF RECENT IRAQI MILITARY MOVEMENTS (INVOLVING TRANSFER OF SOME UNITS FROM ASRA AREA TO H3 TO RELEASE UNITS FROM LATTER POSITION FOR SERVICE IN NORTH) HAD BEEN TO PERMIT CONCENTRATION OF SUBSTANTIAL FORCES AND EQPT FOR NEW OFFENSIVE AGAINST KURDS. LATEST DEPLOYMENTS HAD ALSO HAD EFFECT OF LEAVING SECURITY IN BAGHDAD AREA LARGELY DEPENDENT UPON EGYPTIAN FORCES BASED NEARBY WHICH SEEMED TO PLACE AREF REGIME IN RATHER EXPOSED POSITION.

2. CRADOCK SAID THAT ACCORDING TO BRIT INFO KURDS REMAINED DEEPLY DIVIDED ALTHOUGH IF NEW GOVT OFFENSIVE BEGAN THIS WOULD UNDOUSTEDLY TEND TO CAUSE THEM TO CLOSE RANKS. HE MENTIONED ATTEMPT BY BARZANI TO SECURE SUPPORT FROM SHIA RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN FORM OF PUBLIC DENUNCIATION OF GOVTS MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST KURDS. SUCH PRONOUNCEMENT UNDOUSTEDLY WOULD HAVE SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT ON SHIA RANK AND FILE OF IRAQI ARMY BUT BRITS DOUBTED THAT SHIA LEADERS WOULD EXPOSE THEMSELVES BY TAKING SUCH INITIATIVE.

3. IT WAS BRIT UNDERSTANDING THAT NASSER REMAINED OPPOSED TO

...2

PAGE TWO 1215

RENEWED MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST KURDS. IT SEEMED LIKELY THAT RECENT VISIT TO CAIRO OF IRAQI PM TAHIR YAHYA EITHER HAD INVOLVED ATTEMPT TO SECURE UAR ACQUIESCENCE IN NEW GOVT OFFENSIVE OR AT LEAST WAS DESIGNED TO CREATE IMPRESSION THAT NASSERS BLESSING HAD BEEN OBTAINED FOR MILITARY CAMPAIGN ABOUT TO BE INITIATED. HOWEVER NOTHING SEEMED TO HAVE COME OF VISIT, AT LEAST FOR MOMENT.

4. CRADOCK MENTIONED THAT PREPARATIONS FOR RENEWAL OF FIGHTING IN NORTH HAD TENDED TO EASE POTENTIAL IRAQI MILITARY THREAT TO KUWAIT. AS FAR AS BRITS HAD LEARNED NOTHING OF MUCH SIGNIFICANCE HAD EMERGED FROM RULER OF KUWAITS RECENT VISIT TO BAGHDAD ALTHOUGH FO HAD BEEN INTERESTED TO HEAR THAT FOR FIRST TIME SINCE ACHIEVEMENT OF ACCOMMODATION AFTER COLLAPSE OF QASIM REGIME IRAQIS HAD RAISED SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT IRAQ-KUWAIT BORDER.

WHICH SEEMED TO PLACE AREA REGIME IN RATHER EXPOSED POSITION. S. CRADOCK SAID THAT ACCORDING TO BRIT INFO KURDS REMAINED DEEPLY DIVIDED ALTHOUGH IF NEW GOVT OFFENSIVE BEGAN THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY TEND TO CAUSE THEM TO CLOSE RANKS. HE MENTIONED ATTEMPT BY BARZANI TO SECURE SUPPORT FROM SHIA RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN FORM OF PUBLIC DENUNCIATION OF GOVTS MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST KURDS. SUCH PROMISES WOULD HAVE SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT ON SHIA RANK AND FILE OF IRAQI ARMY BUT BRITS DOUBTED THAT SHIA LEADERS WOULD EXPOSE THEMSELVES BY TAKING SUCH INITIATIVE. S. IT WAS BRIT UNDERSTANDING THAT NASSER REMAINED OPPOSED TO

S...

UPI-226

BEIRUT, JUNE 15 (UPI)--THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO HAVE ABANDONED HOPE FOR A QUICK END TO THE KURDISH REBEL DRIVE FOR AUTONOMY IN NORTHERN IRAQ DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS AID. 173/2/1
48

THEY DREW THIS CONCLUSION FROM BAGHDAD RADIO REPORTS OF IRAQI PRESIDENT ABDUL SALAM AREF'S CURRENT VISIT TO IRAQI AND PRO-GOVERNMENT TROOPS IN THE NORTH.

IN A SERIES OF SPEECHES AREF CONGRATULATED THE TROOPS FOR +YOUR VICTORIES AGAINST THE MUTINEERS.+ THE OBSERVERS SAID IT WAS THE CLOSEST AREF HAS COME TO ACKNOWLEDGING IN PUBLIC THAT FIGHTING IS GOING ON.

PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS DENIED ANY FIGHTING AND MINIMIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MOVEMENT OF LARGE NUMBERS OF IRAQI FORCES INTO NORTHERN AREAS.

(MORE)

D0456P

UPI-227

ADD KURDS BEIRUT XXX NORTHERN AREAS.

DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS HERE SAID AREF'S TOUR AND SPEECHES AMOUNTED TO ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE KURDISH AUTONOMY DRIVE AND ABANDONMENT OF HOPES THAT IT COULD BE CRUSHED QUICKLY WITH MASSIVE MILITARY RETALIATION. THEY SAID EXTENSION OF THE FIGHTING NOW APPEARED TO BE AREF'S ONLY ALTERNATIVE.

ARAF BEGAN THE TOUR SATURDAY WITH VISITS TO THE SKLEIMANIYA AND KURKUK AREAS. BAGHDAD RADIO SAID HE VISITED ERBIL, BETWEEN THE TWO, TODAY. *Handwritten signature*

HE IS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS BROTHER, MAJ. GEN. ABDUL RAHMAN AREF, WHO IS ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF.

THE THREE CITIES VISITED BY AREF ARE CONTROLLED BY IRAQIS AND PRO-GOVERNMENT KURDS BUT ARE SURROUNDED BY VILLAGES OF KURDS LOYAL TO REBEL LEADER GEN. MULLAH MUSTAFA BARZANI.

AREF TRAVELED BY HELICOPTER, AS HE DID DURING ANOTHER TOUR OF THE NORTH IN APRIL.

AREF CHARGED IN HIS SPEECHES THAT THE KURDISH UPRISING WAS +INSPIRED BY IMPERIALISTS+ AND AIMED AT TIEING DOWN IRAQI ARMED FORCES TO KEEP THEM FROM FIGHTING ISRAEL. HE SAID ANOTHER REBEL AIM WAS TO OBSTRUCT GOVERNMENT PLANS FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THE KURDISH NORTH.

HEAVY FIGHTING BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND REBEL FORCES BEGAN EARLY IN APRIL AFTER TWO MONTHS OF PRELIMINARY SKIRMISHES. WESTERN OBSERVERS RECENTLY IN THE NORTH HAVE REPORTED BARZANI IS CONTINUING TO EXTEND HIS CONTROL OVER +IRAQI KURDISTAN+ AGAINST LARGELY INEFFECTUAL ATTEMPTS BY THE GOVERNMENT TO HALT HIM.

D05.P

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

MEMO. NO.

729

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

IRAQ

Please refer to our savingram No. 65 of 27th April.

2. Craddock (Assistant Head - Eastern Department) said 10th May that the internal situation in Baghdad was more unstable than for some time past, with the division between pro-Nasserites and Iraqi nationalists in the National Revolutionary Command Council being reflected in the armed forces. Aref himself appeared to have seen the writing on the wall and was now busily seeking to reinsure himself with the Taher Yahya nationalists, presumably in the hope that he himself might survive any coup which swept away the extreme Nasserites. The British were not inclined to be too sanguine about his prospects.

3. Craddock said that the atmosphere in Baghdad recalled that preceding the overthrow of the Kassem regime two years ago. The possibility of the government's downfall was now being openly discussed in the streets and coffee shops. Economic stagnation, anti-Egyptian resentment, and opposition from the Shia sect appeared to be bringing events to a climax. On April 25th a religious meeting in Baghdad attended by all the leading Shia notables took the form of a bitter attack on the regime, denunciation of the Kurdish war and a call for a jeihad (Holy war) to overthrow the government. Further meetings were planned in Baghdad and in the south, with the object, it was said, of provoking the arrest of leading Shia and stiffening Ayatullah Mohsin Al-Hakim, the head of the Shia, into pronouncing fatwas against the Kurdish war and the government's nationalisation programme. In the last few weeks, increasing resistance had been built up against attempts for closer union with the U.A.R., while further resentment was being engendered by the presence of 1,000 Egyptian troops north of Baghdad, who were living on liberal overseas allowances paid for by Iraq. The mass employment of Egyptian officials and experts in the Iraq bureaucracy was also unpopular and gave rise to further complaints about the favourable salary scales accorded to the Egyptians.

4. The greatest danger to the regime, however, was the risk of a crisis as casualties from the war against the Kurds began to fill up Baghdad hospitals, a crisis likely to boomerang because of the government's policy of suppressing all news of the fighting. Craddock said that the campaign against the Kurds began in early April. As on previous occasions, the Kurds had not sought to engage the government forces direct but rather had withdrawn to the mountains before the Iraqi advance, and then hit back in ambushes and night attacks. These tactics had met with a fair degree of success and Iraqi casualties and defections were mounting.

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
2.

46

5. Something like 40,000 troops, the bulk of the Iraqi Army, were committed in the north. This had involved a drastic depletion of the Baghdad garrison with the result that the only effective force in the capital, apart from elements of the Presidential Guard, was the three battallion Egyptian tank regiment stationed at Al Taji. In event of trouble, the Egyptians would be placed in an unenviable position of trying to decide whether to risk incurring the wrath of nationalist opinion by stepping in to support the Aref regime.

6. Craddock said that it was difficult to obtain an accurate position of progress in the fighting. Some reports had it that the fighting extended from the Zhakho area, near the Turkish and Syrian borders, to Sulaimaniya, 250 miles to the south-east near the Persian border. There was no evidence that the Iranians were providing other than minimal support for Barzani..

7. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to Washington and Cairo.



(Lance Joseph)
for Senior External Affairs Representative

CONFIDENTIAL

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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE.

STRAND.

LONDON, W.C.2.

In reply quote No.

MEMO. NO. 729

11th May, 1965

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

IRAQ

Please refer to our savingram No. 65 of 27th April.

2. Craddock (Assistant Head - Eastern Department) said 10th May that the internal situation in Baghdad was more unstable than for some time past, with the division between pro-Nasserites and Iraqi nationalists in the National Revolutionary Command Council being reflected in the armed forces. Aref himself appeared to have seen the writing on the wall and was now busily seeking to reinsure himself with the Taher Yahya nationalists, presumably in the hope that he himself might survive any coup which swept away the extreme Nasserites. The British were not inclined to be too sanguine about his prospects.

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7. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to Washington and Cairo.

(Lance Joseph)
for Senior External Affairs Representative

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *News and Mailgram*File No. *173/2/1*

Published at

Date *17-5-65*

CONFIDENTIAL

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Iraq

23. On 3rd April Prime Minister Yahya suddenly arrived in Cairo after a meeting with President Aref who had just returned from a tour of North Iraq including the Kurdish area. Yahya was immediately seen by Nasser and then returned to Baghdad. Whilst no reason was given for the visit it naturally caused some speculation. Reports since received from Beirut and Baghdad suggest that President Arafat's government is split over the proposals to deal with the Kurdish insurgents. According to these reports Arafat, who favours a strong line, sent Yahya to try to get Nasser's support. This was without success: Nasser not only refused to give assistance in the form of arms and equipment but expressed opposition to any large-scale campaign against the Kurds, and insisted that Iraq fulfil its commitments to the Arab Unified Command.

24. There are reports, denied by Baghdad that Iraqi troops have begun an all-out offensive against the Kurdish insurgents. Lebanese papers suggest that Iraq has approached the U.S. (see paragraph 16) for arms in view of the failure of Nasser to give support and in the face of Soviet equipment being made available to the Kurds.

25. At the same time as Yahya made his sudden visit to Cairo a delegation of the Iraqi A.S.U. also arrived at short notice to participate in talks taking place in Cairo between the A.S.U. (UAR) and a delegation from the F.L.N. Despite statements paying lip service to the decision made in October 1964 to establish a Unified Political Command no real steps appear to have been taken to establish closer links between Iraq and the UAR. Joint manoeuvres took place somewhere in Iraq at the end of April between the Iraqi 7th Armoured Brigade and UAR forces. Estimates of UAR forces stationed in Iraq range from one to seven thousand. Reports early in the month of friction between the two armies have not been confirmed.

26. There has been a steady deterioration in the economic situation as Iraq attempts to copy Egyptian socialist measures and because of continued political instability. There are reports of very good harvest prospects, based mainly on better rains.

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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS	
21 APR 1965	173/21

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,
AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND,
LONDON W.C.2.

MEMO. NO. 625

15th April, 1965

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA A.C.T.IRAQ

Craddock (Foreign Office) said on 14th April that various dates had been bandied about as the likely commencing date for the resumption of fighting against the Kurds. Certainly a renewed offensive seemed imminent. The Government had been reinforcing its Army in northern Iraq and, according to some reports, now had nearly 50,000 troops poised ready for an attack on Kurdish positions north of Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya. If these reports were true, then this would leave very few Iraqi troops for internal security duties in Baghdad and the Government's vulnerability to overthrow would be increased. Certainly, in the Foreign Office view, a renewal of operations against the Kurds was more likely than not to result eventually in Aref's own downfall. It was primarily for this reason that Nasser had (apparently unsuccessfully) been urging Aref not to start a new campaign against the Kurds.

2. Craddock confirmed that the U.A.R.-Iraq Unified Political Command was still to hold its first meeting. It had probably been to urge Nasser to hurry along that Prime Minister Yahya had been despatched to Cairo earlier this month. However, Nasser was unlikely to proceed, if indeed he proceeded at all, other than cautiously. He foresaw a union with Iraq being bedevilled by opposition from Iraqi minorities and from the Shias, and was not prepared to expose himself to another setback like that experienced in 1961 when Syria seceded from the U.A.R.

3. Asked about the progress of the IPC talks with the Iraqi Government, Craddock confirmed that prospects for a settlement in the near future were relatively bright. The British Embassy in Baghdad had reported that the framework of a settlement was near completion, but they had cautioned that the Oil Minister, who was really nothing more than a technician, still had the formidable task of selling any compromise package to his more political colleagues.

4. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to Cairo.

(Lance Joseph)

for Senior External Affairs Representative

CONFIDENTIAL

File Iraq 4/.

3/12/38

FO/CRO/WH. DISTRIBUTION

D. 09.38 13 March, 1965

R. 10.06 13 March, 1965

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R. 10.06 13 March, 1965

3/12/38

File Day

40

FROM BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE

In Clair

FO/CRO/WH
DISTRIBUTION

Sir Roger Allen

No. 220

13 March, 1965.

D. 0854 13 March, 1965.

R. 0952 13 March, 1965.

PRIORITY

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 220 of 13 March

Repeated for information to:-

Amman	Moscow
Ankara	Tehran
Bahrain	Tel Aviv
Beirut	Washington
Cairo	Nicosia (for Sec. J.I.G.)
Damascus	POMEK (Aden)
Kuwait	

Iraqi Minister of Interior issued statement last night denying "rumours put out by imperialist broadcasting stations recently that the Iraq Government had resumed fighting the Kurds. Iraqi troop movements anywhere in Iraq did not mean that the fighting had begun or was about to begin anywhere within the country."

Foreign Office please pass Washington as my telegram No. 20.

[Repeated as requested.]

SSSSS

UPI-63

BEIRUT, APRIL 7 (UPI)--UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (UAR) PRESIDENT GAMMEL ABDELSERER, BEIRUT, SOLICITING BRONASSERESBOWSPARBB SAID TODAY.

THE DAILY AL-ANWAR SAID THE KURDISH PROBLEM WAS THE SUBJECT SURPRISE WEEKEND TALKS BETWEEN NASSER AND IRAQI PREMIER TAHER YEHIA IN CAIRO.

THE NEWSPAPER DID NOT SPECIFY WHETHER A PEACEFUL OR A MILITARY SOLUTION WERE CONTEMPLATED.

+THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT, HAVING EXHAUSTED ALL MEANS FOR SETTLING THE PROBLEM, MAY HAVE FELT THE ONLY SOLUTION LIES IN A JOINT ARAB ENCOUNTER ON THE ISSUE.+ IT SAID.

+BUT THIS DOESN'T NECESSARILY MEAN A MILITARY ENCOUNTER, THERE ARE MANY WAYS THAT COULD BE RESORTED TO AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL, PARTICULARLY WHERE THE SOVIET UNION IS CONCERNED. BUT IF WAR CANNOT BE AVOIDED, THEN IT WOULD BE QUICK AND DECISIVE.+

THE KURDS, A TRIBAL NOMADIC PEOPLE, LIVE IN MOUNTAINOUS AREAS OF NORTHERN IRAQ, IRAN, TURKEY AND PARTS OF THE SOVIET UNION, KURDISH REBELS UNDER GEN. MULLAH MUSTAFA BARZANI HAVE BEEN WAGING AN INTERMITTENT BATTLE FOR AUTONOMY IN NORTHERN IRAQ SINCE SEPTEMBER, 1961.

MORE

DU4:42A

UPI-69

ADD KURDS, BEIRUT X X X SEPTEMBER, 1961.

RECENT REPORTS FROM BAGHDAD INDICATE THE IRAQI ARMY IS PREPARING A MAJOR OFFENSIVE TO END THE REBEL REVOLT. KURDISH TRIDSMEN ALREADY EXERCISE CONTROL OVER MUCH OF THE HILLY COUNTRY AND OCCASIONALLY EXERT PRESSURE ON SUCH OIL CENTERS AS MOSUL AND KIRKUK.

OBSERVERS HERE BELIEVE NASSER CANNOT AFFORD A MAJOR MILITARY EFFORT IN IRAQ WHILE THE BULK OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IS ENGAGED IN YEMEN.

ALSO POSSIBLE IS A CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL OVER ARAB PLANS TO DIVERT THE HEADWATERS OF THE RIVER JORDAN.

BUT ARAB DIPLOMATIC SOURCES SAY THE NUMBER OF EGYPTIAN TROOPS IN IRAQ HAS MORE THAN DOUBLED, FROM 600 TO 1500 MEN IN THE PAST MONTH. THEY REPORTEDLY ARE BEING USED FOR GARRISON DUTY IN BAGHDAD TO FREE REGULAR IRAQI TROOPS FOR DUTY IN THE NORTH.

PREMIER YEHIA FLEW TO CAIRO SATURDAY FOR A 24-HOUR VISIT. HE RETURNED SUNDAY, AND IMMEDIATELY CONFERRED WITH PRESIDENT ABDUL SALAM AREF, WHO HAD RETURNED TO THE CAPITAL AFTER A WEEKLONG TOUR OF THE TROUBLED NORTH.

DU4:45A

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173/2/1
37

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Handwritten signature

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper INWARD SAVINGS M 8

File No. 173/2/1

Published at CAIRO

Date 7-4-65

CONFIDENTIAL

11. The situation in the North, where there are reports of fighting between the Kurds and Iraqi troops, continues to be obscure. The Lebanese press reports that 40,000 Iraqi troops are now stationed in the North and that Iraq has been forced to recall forces promised to the Unified Arab Command for use against Israel. Joint manoeuvres in the UAR involving the use of Iraqi troops have been cancelled. On 26th March Aref began a tour of Northern areas.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper TIMES.

File No.

173/2/1

36

Published at LONDON.

Date

26-3-65

GAS MASKS SOLD TO IRAQ

PURCHASE OF 70,000

FROM OUR MIDDLE EAST CORRESPONDENT

BEIRUT, MARCH 25

Reports in the Middle East that large numbers of gas masks have been bought by the Iraq Government are now given full credence by travellers from Baghdad and are coupled with others that Egypt is also buying them. The belief is that these purchases may be connected with an imminent offensive by the Baghdad Government against the Kurds in northern Iraq, and with the indeterminate war by Egypt in Yemen. The reports began before the subject of gas in Vietnam came up this week.

The knowledge that South Vietnamese troops have used tear gas, and the disapproval or strong distaste felt by large sections of world opinion, may stifle any intended use of similar or other gases in the Middle East, or it could encourage it on the principle that if gas has been used in Vietnam then what right has anyone to complain if it is used elsewhere?

In Baghdad last September almost open inquiries were made of various countries on the possibility of some 60,000 gas masks being supplied. Finally about 70,000 are said to have arrived through Egypt, perhaps from Switzerland.

OIL DISCUSSIONS

In Yemen's case, Egypt was earlier accused of using gas, but it is fairly certain that "only" napalm or phosphorous incendiary bombs were used.

Meanwhile, the Ruler of Kuwait returned home today after his state visit to Iraq. While he was there it was suggested that Iraq development and investment deserved support by Kuwait capital.

One subject on which Kuwait and Iraq probably compared notes is relations with the oil companies. Iraq is still in the throes of negotiations with the partners in the Iraq Petroleum Company.

(F)



CONFIDENTIAL 39

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE.

STRAND.

LONDON, W.C.2.

Memo No. 431

16 MAR 1965
173/2/1
OM. INDEX
SUB. INDEXThe Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra.

11th March, 1965.

IRAQ

Miss Chevalier (Eastern Department) told us today that there had been a number of minor clashes between Kurds and Iraqi Army units in the past few weeks and that two battalion group operations with tank, artillery and air support had been mounted by the army against Kurdish irregulars in the Sulaimaniya and Kanaguin areas in north east Iraq. A military alert had been declared in some areas and certain elements of the Iraqi Air Force had been brought to an increased state of readiness. In addition preparations were being made to send north troops at present stationed at Kiwaniya and Mahawil, and at least one T-54 tank regiment from H₃ (a point on the Baghdad-Amman road about 70 miles from the Jordan frontier) had been moved into Kurdistan. Although neither side would probably wish to initiate full scale fighting intentionally before the spring, there was a real possibility, if the current state of tension continued, that fighting might become widespread despite the unfavourable weather conditions. Note: Today's 'Daily Express' reports that rebel Kurdish tribesmen have been attacked by Iraqi Government bombers because they defied a 24-hour ultimatum to surrender their arms.

2. Other points made by Miss Chevalier were:
(a) that the split between Mulla Mustapha and Jalal Talabani had to some extent been patched up - mainly because Mulla Mustapha had now swung round to the view that further talking with the Government was pointless; and
(b) the Kurds had since the middle of last year been improving their stockpiles of food and munitions - so that the Kurds would be able to weather a long campaign.

3. Asked about the progress of the IPC talks with the Iraqi Government, Miss Chevalier (who somehow despite considerable cultivation seems to find it difficult to grasp the fact that the writer is a representative of a friendly Commonwealth Government and not a journalist) showed no willingness to divulge details. She did however, confirm that some considerable progress had been made in the past few weeks and that, accordingly, a settlement might be in sight.

4. According to a recent item in the 'Financial Times' the settlement terms likely to be agreed upon are: Government agreement to the implementation of Article III of Law 80 - which provides for the doubling of the concession left to IPC by Kassem - to be linked with acceptance by IPC of joint participation of the state-owned Iraq National Oil Company in the exploitation of the surrendered concession area. Other elements in the package were said to include the raising of IPC's annual offtake from 58 million tons to 70 million tons and Iraq's ratification of the recent OPEC agreement on royalties.


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CONFIDENTIAL

33

For that 99% of the IPC's original concession area not returned, INOC would (according to the 'Financial Times') hope to exploit these as joint ventures in partnership with a number of American and French independent oil companies. The main sticking point at the moment is said to be doubts on the part of IPC as to the precedents such arrangements would set for other Middle Eastern countries. IPC's previous adamant refusal to accept the validity of Law 80 was based on the consideration that, if they let Iraq get away with unilateral abrogation of a concessionary agreement, then other producer states might be encouraged to act likewise.

5. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to Cairo.



(Lance Joseph)

for Senior External Affairs Representative

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper.....

File No. 173/2/1

Published at.....

Date.....

32

ST. DAVIDS
SECRET, TEBANE
IRAQI TROOPS -
THEY WENT INTO IRAQ IN AN APPARENT PREPARATION FOR A
MAJOR NEW OFFENSIVE AGAINST REBELLIOUS KURDISH TRIBESMEN,
DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS SAID TODAY.

THE ATTACK IS EXPECTED LATE THIS MONTH OR EARLY IN APRIL.
REPORTS OF A PLANNING SPRING OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE KURDS
HAVE BEEN DENIED IN BAGHDAD, BUT WITH SOME HESITATION, THE
OBSERVERS ADDED.

IRAQI INTERIOR MINISTER SOBHI ABDUL HAMID, QUOTED TODAY BY
THE SEMI-OFFICIAL UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC MIDDLE EAST NEWS
AGENCY, DENIED FIGHTING WITH THE KURDS HAD STARTED.

IMPROVEMENT OF THE IRAQI ARMY ANYWHERE IN IRAQ DOES NOT
MEAN FIGHTING HAS STARTED OR IS ABOUT TO BEGIN INSIDE IRAQ,
HAMID SAID.

[Handwritten signature]

(F)

UPI-177

(EDITORS NOTE: THE WORLD HARDLY NOTICES IT, BUT MEN ARE DYING EVERY DAY IN A WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH COULD BLAZE AT ANY MOMENT INTO A MAJOR CONFLAGRATION. THIS DISPATCH EXPLAINS THAT WAR.) 3/

BY DAVID L. DUGAS

BEIRUT, MAY (UPI)--FOR NEARLY FOUR YEARS A NASTY AND BLOODY WAR HAS BEEN UNDER WAY IN NORTHERN IRAQ. IT PROMISES VERY SOON TO GET BLOODIER.

IRAQ HAS 40,000 TO 50,000 TROOPS MASSED TO MOVE AGAINST THE KURDS, A NOMADIC AND MOSLEM PEOPLE, WHO FOR NEARLY THEIR ENTIRE 4,000 YEARS OF HISTORY HAVE FOUGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE.

THE TOUGH, MOUNTAIN-DWELLING KURDS HAVE RARELY SUBMITTED, FOR LONG TO THE RULE OF OTHERS. THEY FOUGHT THE HITTITES 1,300 YEARS BEFORE CHRIST WAS BORN. THEY FOUGHT THE GREAT MONGOL KHAN IN THE 13TH CENTURY AND SLAUGHTERED 20,000 OF HIS PEOPLE.

THEY FIGHT NOW FOR THE DAY WHEN AN INDEPENDENT KURDISTAN--THEIR OWN LAND--WILL FLY ITS FLAG OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS. THAT DAY STILL SEEMS REMOTE.

NEWS ABOUT THE WAR IN IRAQ IS ALWAYS SKETCHY. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT SELDOM MENTIONS THE CONFLICT EXCEPT TO DENY IT EXISTS. NEWSMEN ARE NOT PERMITTED TO VISIT THE AREA. VISITORS, WHO MUST MAKE THE TRIP ILLEGALLY AND ON FOOT OR DONKEY, ARE FEW.

THE WAR SEEMS LITTLE MORE THAN A QUEST FOR AUTONOMY WITHIN THE IRAQI REPUBLIC FOR THE KURDS, WHO MAKE UP ABOUT ONE FIFTH OF THE POPULATION.

MORE

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UPI-178

ADD WAR BEIRUT X X X POPULATION.

BUT THE DREAM OF +KURDISTAN+ -- EMBRACING FIVE TO SIX MILLION KURDS IN AN AREA INCLUDING PARTS OF TURKEY, IRAQ, IRAN AND SYRIA--REMAINS ALIVE. THE KURDISH REBELS DO NOT TALK PUBLICLY ABOUT INDEPENDENCE AND REFRAIN FROM INCLUDING TRIBES OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES IN THEIR DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY. BUT MANY THINK THIS IS THEIR ULTIMATE GOAL AND THEIR SILENCE IS MERELY DIPLOMATIC.

KURDISH ATTEMPTS TO PLAY OFF EAST-WEST DIFFERENCES TO THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE HAVE HAD LITTLE SUCCESS.

THE U.S. APPARENTLY IS ANXIOUS NOT TO ANTAGONIZE POTENTIALLY ANTI-COMMUNISTS KURDS ALONG THE SOVIET BORDERS. BUT IT IS ALSO TRYING TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. U.S. HELP FOR THE KURDS WOULD ALSO ANNOY TURKEY AND IRAN. RUSSIA'S POSITION IS SIMILAR. SHE WANTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, TURKEY AND IRAN. BUT RUSSIA HAS LONG PROFFESSED SUPPORT FOR KURDISH NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS--UP TO A POINT.

THE LEADER OF THE PRESENT REVOLT, MULLAH MUSTAFA BARZANI, AND HUNDREDS OF HIS FOLLOWERS WERE GIVEN REFUGE IN RUSSIA FOR 12 YEARS AFTER A KURDISH GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRAN FELL APART IN 1946. BARZANI WAS GIVEN THE RANK OF GENERAL IN THE SOVIET ARMY.

HE RETURNED TO IRAQ IN 1958 AFTER ITS PRO-WESTERN IRAQI GOVERNMENT WAS OVERTHROWN. BARZANI DENIES HE IS A COMMUNIST.

THE USSR SUPPORTED THE KURDS WHEN THEY FOUGHT IRAQ'S SHORT-LIVED AND ANTI-COMMUNIST BAATHIST REGIME IN 1963. WHEN THE BAATHIST WERE OVERTHROWN THAT FALL, THE SOVIETS FELL SILENT ON THE KURDISH QUESTION.

EARLY THIS MONTH, A CLANDESTINE COMMUNIST RADIO STATION CALLING ITSELF +THE VOICE OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE+ STARTED OPERATING, INDICATING RENEWED COMMUNIST INTERESTS IN THE KURDS. IT ATTACKED THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT FOR +RENEWING THE WAR AGAINST THE KURDS.+

MORE

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UPI-179

THIRD WAR BEIRUT X X X KURDS.+

A TOURING SPOKESMAN FOR BARZANI, ISMET CHERIFF VANLEY, WAS IN WASHINGTON ON APRIL 29. HE APPEALED FOR U.S. HELP IN +STOPPING THE GENOCIDE WAR+ AGAINST THE KURDS.

HE ALSO VISITED CAIRO AND A NUMBER OF EUROPEAN CAPITALS, SEEKING SUPPORT FOR THE KURDS. OBSERVERS HAVE NOTED HIS REFERENCES TO +SOUTHERN KURDISTAN+ INSTEAD OF IRAQUI KURDISTAN, IMPLYING THE REBELS HAVE THEIR SIGHTS SET ON MORE THAN IRAQUI TERRITORY.

THE REASON BEHIND THE PRESENT MASSIVE IRAQUI MILITARY BUILDUP IS THE FACT THAT BARZANI'S REBELS HAVE IN THE PAST YEAR ESTABLISHED VIRTUAL AUTONOMY OVER AN EXTENSIVE AREA. THE KURDS COLLECT TAXES, RUN COURTS AND CONTROL THEIR OWN VILLAGE AFFAIRS. A KURDISH PARLIAMENT HAS BEEN OPERATING FOR SIX MONTHS.

THE IRAQUI OFFENSIVE WAS EXPECTED TO BEGIN IN MARCH. KURDISH SOURCES SAY BAD WEATHER HAS DELAYED IT.

SOME VOICES IN IRAQ HAVE BEEN RAISED AGAINST RENEWED WARFARE. A NUMBER OF LEADERS OF IRAQ'S PREDOMINANT SHIA MOSLEM SECT REPORTEDLY HAVE URGED AGAINST A WAR WITH THE MOSTLY SUNI MOSLEM KURDS. AND POLITICAL ADVISORS ARE SAID TO HAVE ARGUED, UNSUCCESSFULLY, THAT BARZANI AT LEAST IS MORE MODERATE IN HIS DEMANDS THAN ARE HIS LIEUTENANTS. BUT IRAQUI PRESIDENT ABDUL SALAM AREF HAS IGNORED THEIR ARGUMENTS.

A NUMBER OF KURDISH ARMY OFFICERS AND TROOPS, AND POLICEMEN, ARE REPORTED TO HAVE DESERTED WITH THEIR ARMS TO THE REBEL SIDE.

BAGHDAD'S APPREHENSION IS HEIGHTENED BECAUSE THE AREA THE KURDS CLAIM INCLUDES THE OIL FIELDS WHICH PROVIDE MOST OF THE COUNTRY'S INCOME AND TWO MAJOR DAMS AS WELL. IN 1962, THE REBELS BLEW UP AN OIL PIPELINE.

BARZANI HAS DEMANDED THE +KURDS SHARE+ OF OIL REVENUES.

THE KURDS IN IRAQ NUMBER ABOUT 1.2 MILLION. MOST ARE EASILY RECOGNIZABLE IN THEIR NATIONAL DRESS--BAGGY TROUSERS FOR MEN, COLORFUL DRESSES AND JEWELRY FOR THEIR UNVEILED WOMEN.

IRAN HAS 1.4 MILLION KURDS. TURKEY HAS THE LARGEST KURDISH MINORITY--AND THE MOST REPRESESED. SYRIA HAS 250,000 KURDS AND BETWEEN 60,000 AND 100,000 LIVE IN THE SOVIET UNION.

IT IS IN IRAQ THAT THE KURDS HAVE HAD THE BIGGEST SAY IN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. KURDS HAVE HELD POSTS IN THE CENTRAL CABINET.

AFTER AREF TOOK OFFICE, HE ARRANGED A CEASEFIRE IN THE THREE-YEAR REBELLION. BARZANI USED THE TIME TO CONSOLIDATE HIS FORCES AND IT IS HIS PRESENT STRENGTH WHICH APPARENTLY HAS CONVINCED AREF HE MUST CRUSH THE REBELLION.

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UPT-241

PARIS, MARCH 10 (UPI)-- A REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ'S KURD REBELS TOOK ASKED YUGOSLAVIA TO CALL OFF ANY PLANNED ARMS DELIVERIES TO BAGHDAD.

ISMET SHERIF VANLY, REPRESENTING IRAQI KURD CHIEFTAIN MUSTAPHA BARZANI, REPEATED CHARGES HE MADE HERE LAST WEEK THAT IRAQI CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TROOPS HAD UNDERTAKEN MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST KURD REBELS IN NORTHEAST IRAQ DESPITE THE CURRENT CEASEFIRE.

+WE ASK THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT AND ALL OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO ABSTAIN FROM SENDING ARMS TO THE CURRENT BAGHDAD REGIME, A REGIME HATED BY THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND FOUGHT AGAINST BY KURD FORCES AND DESTINED, LIKE ITS PREDECESSORS, TO FALL,+ VANLY SAID.

THE IRAQI EMBASSY HERE MEANWHILE DENIED VANLY'S EARLIER CHARGES OF BAGHDAD MILITARY MOVES AGAINST THE REBELS.

THE EMBASSY STATEMENT SAID THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WAS PERFECTLY WILLING TO ALLOW THE KURDS TO RUN THEIR PART OF THE COUNTRY UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF +DECENTRALIZATION+, BUT WOULD NOT TOLERATE A +SEPARATIST MOVEMENT.+

WITHOUT NAMING VANLY, THE EMBASSY DESCRIBED HIS CURRENT TRIP HERE AND THEN CLAIMED THAT HE +IS NOT OF IRAQI NATIONALITY.+

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173/2/1

UPI-244

BEIRUT, MARCH 10 (UPI)-- IRAQI ARMED FORCES RESUMED THEIR FIGHTING AGAINST THE KURDS IN NORTHERN IRAQ MARCH 1, A SPOKESMAN FOR KURDISH REBEL LEADER GEN. MULLH MUSTAFA BARZANI SAID HERE TODAY.

THE SPOKESMAN SAID THE BAGHDAD GOVERNMENT SENT A 24-HOUR ULTIMATUM TO THE KURDS FEB. 28, DEMANDING THAT THEY SURRENDER THEIR ARMS. THE ULTIMATUM WAS REJECTED AND THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES BEGAN AIR AND ARTILLERY RAIDS THE FOLLOWING DAY, HE ADDED.

THE FIGHTING +SO FAR IS NOT WIDESPREAD,+ THE SPOKESMAN SAID, ADDING THAT IRAQI RAIDS ARE NOW MAINLY CONCENTRATED IN THE DAHOK AREA NORTH OF MOSUL.

THE SPOKESMAN SAID A LETTER SIGNED BY +FRIENDS OF KURDISH PEOPLE IN ARAB COUNTRIES+ HAD BEEN GIVEN TO TUNISIAN PRESIDENT HABIB BOURGUIBA DURING HIS STATE VISIT TO LEBANON. HE SAID IT REVIEWED THE KURDISH QUESTION AND URGED THAT WHEN BOURGUIBA VISITS BAGHDAD HE REMINDED IRAQI OFFICIALS THAT +VIOLENCE WILL SOLVE NOTHING ON MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE DESTINY OF A WHOLE PEOPLE.+

RH245P

(17)

UPI-186

PARIS, MARCH PR (UPI)—THE STUBBORN KURDISH REBELS IN NORTHEAST IRAQ ARE PREPARING FOR EXPECTED BLOODY CLASHES WITH THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN THE SPRING, AN IRAQI KURD SPOKESMAN SAID TODAY.

THE TWO MILLION KURDS, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF MUSTAFA EL BARZANI, HAVE BEEN DEMANDING AUTONOMY AND STRUGGLING WITH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TROOPS FOR FOUR YEARS.

ISMET SHERIF VANLY, A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF BARZANI, SAID A CEASE-FIRE HAS BEEN BROKEN, AND CHARGED THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WITH STALLING ON HOLDING NEGOTIATIONS FOR KURDISH SELF-RULE.

THE REBELS HAVE SET UP THEIR OWN STATE, VANLY SAID, WITH INDEPENDENT JURIDICAL, CUSTOMS, FISCAL AND MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.

WHEN THE WEATHER IMPROVES ENOUGH TO ALLOW STEPPED UP MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE KURDS EXPECT INTENSIFIED GOVERNMENT ASSAULTS TO QUASH THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT, HE SAID.

JB236P

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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,


AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2.

TEMPLE BAR 243*

In reply quote No.



Memo No. 180

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra.

29th January, 1965.

IRAQ

Burton (Iraqi affairs) said today that the main development in Iraq during the past two months had been the sharp deterioration in Kurdish/Central Government relations. There had been several increasingly serious clashes between Kurds and Government troops, a particularly bad incident being the attack by Government forces on Kurdish villages in the neighbourhood of Khanaguin on about December 25th. So far the Kurdish leader, Mulla Mustapha Barzani, had reacted moderately, by pressing the Iraqi Government to prevent such incidents recurring. Recent Iraqi/Kurdish contacts had not, however, achieved any prospect of a peaceful settlement and, though these contacts were still continuing and, though both sides, for their different reasons, obviously had no desire yet to break off the dialogue completely, it was generally expected that the spring would see a resumption of hostilities. This would probably be precipitated by an attack by Government forces on Kurdish villages in the plains around Kirkuk, Erbil, and Mosul. Given the difficulty of winter campaigning in the mountains, it was unlikely that the Government would launch an offensive before the spring.

2. In the meantime, the Kurds were believed to be carrying their de facto regional autonomy a stage further with the division of Kurdistan into five administrative districts with Kurdish-appointed governors, judges, and tax collectors. In addition, goods coming across the Turkish and Iranian frontiers were being subjected to Kurdish customs charges.

3. Burton said that, ~~if that~~, if their statement issued last week in Beirut was to be believed, the Kurds would continue to consolidate their autonomy and build up their own administration. It was unlikely, however, that they would go to the point of declaring an independent Kurdistan, at least until it had been shown that all hope of a negotiated settlement with Baghdad was lost. This was in accordance with Mulla Mustapha's own feelings that every avenue should be explored (he more than anyone had been impressed by the hardships the Kurdish civilian population had had to endure in previous wars with the Government) and that the onus for any final rupture should be placed on the Iraqi Government. The Kurdish leader had also not yet given up all hope that Nasser might in the end prevail on Aref to give way to the Kurdish demands.

4. In Baghdad itself a resumption of hostilities would by no means be universally popular. In fact, it could be the death blow to the Aref regime: the elation in the Army last February at the ending of the fighting had certainly been genuine, suggesting that there might be trouble if the Army were now to

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be ordered into yet another offensive. Burton commented that, for his part, Barzani was no fool, and it could well be with the weakness of the Aref regime in mind that he was holding out for the extreme Kurdish demands. Though perhaps the explanation was a little devious, Barzani might also be pinning his hopes on decisive intervention by Nasser on the expectation that the latter would come to see that protracted fighting in Kurdistan could result in the downfall of Aref and his replacement by a Government less friendly towards the UAR.

5. Burton mentioned that when the Iraqi Foreign Minister passed through London last month en route to the General Assembly, he had taken the opportunity in calls on British Ministers to register his concern about the Kurdish problem. The burden of his message had been that an independent or autonomous Kurdistan would be a triumph for the Soviet Union. Burton remarked that, in fact, evidence of Soviet connections with the Kurds was very threadbare; it depended on how you added it up whether you concluded that the connection was anything more than ephemeral. It was the Foreign Office assessment that the Russians had probably never given the Kurds much more than moral support. One or two of the satellites might once have given small amounts of financial aid, but it was not certain that this had been in direct support of the struggle against the Iraqi Government.

Iraqi/Iran relations

6. As a direct result of the deteriorating situation in Kurdistan, the Iraqis had lately shown a desire to mend their fences with Teheran. The Persians, of course, had a long history of covert support for the Kurds (on the grounds that Kurdish resistance in Iraq was a useful counterforce to pan-Arabism and Nasserism) and the fact that the Iranian frontier was in such wild country made it almost impossible for the Iraqis to control. The Kurds had openly admitted that the bazookas and other support weapons received in 1963, had reached them through Iran.

7. Baghdad apparently now hoped to persuade the Iranians to agree to seal the frontier, and even to provide some limited co-operation. Last month in New York, the Iraqi Foreign Minister (Najib Taleb) had made contact with his Iranian counterpart and had told the latter of his Government's desire to try to do something about arresting the deterioration in Iraqi/Persian relations which had continued through most of 1964. This had been followed by a decision to appoint a new Iraqi Ambassador to Teheran and thus fill a vacancy which had lasted many months following the withdrawal in protest early last year of the previous Ambassador.

Internal Political Scene

8. Amongst other recent developments in Iraq was the decision earlier this month to establish a 200-man Consultative Council. This Council, to which members would be appointed, was evidently to be given fairly extensive legislative powers. It had been likened in status by the British Ambassador to the pre-1958 Iraqi National Assembly. What, however, might have been a significant step towards a return to more representative government (and, in particular, to a more "civilianised" government) in Iraq, was being frustrated by the regime's inability to persuade the Kurds to co-operate. So far no appointments had been made to the Council, and the Government obviously feared that to proceed without Kurdish participation would trigger a unilateral declaration of independence by the Kurdish Revolutionary Council. One of the difficulties facing the Government was that Barzani himself was about as moderate a Kurd to deal with as they could find. The only Kurds who refused to accept his leadership, Jalal Talabani and his


supporters in the KDP, did so because they believed Mulla Mustapha to be too soft in his dealings with Baghdad.

9. A recent "non-development" in Iraq had been the failure of the scheduled first meeting of the UAR/Iraqi Unified Political command to take place. As reported in memorandum 1667, this had been expected to be held in the middle of January in the Iraqi capital. In the event, since the announcement on December 21st of the names of the members of the Command, nothing further had been heard of it. Burton said that it was too soon to say whether the headlong rush of the Iraqi Government in a pro-Nasserite direction had been arrested, but there were certainly one or two indications to suggest that at least the momentum had eased. This, of course, might be merely a reflection of Nasser's own caution. Indeed, though there were undoubtedly many elements in the country who would oppose union with the UAR, Aref's own continued existence would seem to depend more or less absolutely on continued progress towards closer ties with the UAR.

10. Burton explained that there had been so many revolutions in Iraq that most people had by now become afraid even to express an opinion lest it should prove unpopular with either the existing Government, or the next, or the next-but-one. At the same time, once the Government - no matter what its complexion - was seen to be failing, almost everyone would turn against it in the hope of being on the winning side next time. This was particularly true of the Army; and, as in most Middle East countries, it was the attitude of the Army that mattered. Against this background, and the Aref regime had chosen from the outset to chart a course pointing towards Cairo. Having done so, Aref and his lieutenants were fully aware of the need to maintain a certain momentum in that direction. So long as it looked to the average Iraqi that union with Egypt was really on the way, it could be expected that he would be very careful not to do anything which might afterwards be turned against him.

11. As an extra insurance policy, Aref was no doubt glad of the presence just outside of Baghdad of the 1,000 Egyptian troops. For, in a crisis, and assuming that Nasser was prepared to commit his troops to the support of the regime, this force would be the only perfectly reliable instrument that Aref could count on. Unlike the Iraqi Army, it would not be subject to the fluctuations of political loyalties noted above. The fact, moreover, that the Iraqi Army would be aware of this might indeed serve to keep the latter in line. For the bandwagon would be seen to be still rolling and the Army officers (who had no wish to risk their necks until they were sure) would tend to remain on it.

12. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to Cairo and Washington.


(Lance Joseph)

for Senior External Affairs Representative

Name of Paper

THE OBSERVER

File No.

173/2/129

Published at

London

Date

15-11-68

IRAQI REBELS

from PATRICK SEALE

Kurds are on the march again

BEIRUT, November 14

THE IRREPRESSIBLE rebel Kurds of Northern Iraq are on the move again. Refreshed by a nine-month truce the tribesmen are filtering down into the plains from their mountain strongholds, gaining by steady pressure what the Iraq Government has long denied them: Administrative control over their own tribal areas.

The strong suggestion is that the Iraqi Government is avoiding a head-on clash. President Arif's regime, distracted by a host of problems, cannot now risk a full-scale Kurdish war. As a result, Government troops and officials are being slowly edged out of the north.

There is no fighting, just a steady shift in the balance of power. According to latest reports, Government tanks have been withdrawn from Sulaymania, the "capital" of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Big prize

Its inhabitants at first thought that this was the prelude to a fresh assault, but no attack has come and the town is now said to be under direct Kurdish administration. This is a big prize for Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani—but not one which he can easily hold in war.

When the Baghdad Government is irresolute, the Kurds fan out into the plain, retreating into the hills when tanks are sent against them. But this time Barzani looks as if he intends to stay. He has in the past month set up a Kurdish "Parliament" of 43 Members as well as an 11-man Revolutionary Command Council, which many Kurds see as the first steps towards self-government.

These moves follow abortive talks with the Iraqi Government in mid-October on the basis of a tough note submitted by Barzani. This note suggested that the pause which followed the cease-fire last February is now at an end and the Kurds are moving into a new militant phase. The note criticised the Iraqi Government for restricting political activity to the State-run Arab Socialist Union because the Kurds—who do not form part of the Arab nation—cannot take part in it.

Complete equality

It demanded complete equality for the Arab and Kurdish national groups in Iraq. It also insisted that in the event of union between Iraq and another Arab State, Iraqi Kurdistan should be a separate autonomous province.

Barzani's hand has been strengthened by his triumph this summer over his rivals within the Kurdish national movement. He is a nationalist with strong tribal and peasant support and has always been uneasy with the urban middle-class leaders of the more doctrinaire Kurdish Democratic Party.

Last June, two leaders, Ibrahim Ahmad and Jalal Talabani, staged a Party Congress without Barzani. The mood was militant and Barzani was attacked for being too soft towards the Iraqi Government and for defending the tribal and feudal order in Kurdistan. Barzani, with Kurdish military support, replied with a rival congress in July at which Talabani and 13 of his friends were expelled. They were promptly attacked by Barzani's forces and driven across the Persian frontier with about 400 supporters.

General Bakravan, head of the powerful Persian Security Organisation, seeing in this a chance to split the Kurds, agreed to help Talabani and his friends cross back into Iraq further south. But once again they were stopped by Barzani and expelled into Persia.

Fresh campaign

There are now rumours of a reconciliation, but it is not clear whether Talabani—one of the ablest of Kurdish leaders—is still in Persia or whether he has been included in Barzani's new Command Council.

In any event, Barzani's supremacy is now complete. In face of this threat, President Arif is dragging his feet in the hope, perhaps, of involving Egypt's President Nasser so deeply in Iraq that a fresh campaign could be mounted with his aid against the Kurds. Few Iraqi leaders seem yet to be considering a political settlement which would give the Kurds the national rights they demand.

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
UPI-236

BEIRUT, JAN. 23 (UPI)--A SPOKESMAN FOR IRAQIS KURDS SAID FRIDAY HE WILL GO THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK AND MAJOR WORLD CAPITALS SEEKING SUPPORT FOR AN AUTONOMOUS IRAQI KURDISTAN.

ISMET SHERIF VANLY, A KEY AIDE TO KURDISH LEADER MULLAH MUSTAFA BARZANI, SAID HE WOULD DELIVER A MESSAGE FROM BARZANI TO U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL THANT IN +A WEEK OR 10 DAYS.+

SIMILAR MESSAGES, HE SAID, WILL BE CARRIED TO WASHINGTON, LONDON, PARIS, CAIRO, NEW DELHI AND OTHER WORLD CAPITALS.

IRAQIS TWO MILLION KURDS ARE DEMANDING, ACCORDING TO VANLY, THAT THEY BE ALLOWED TO GOVERN AND DEFEND THEMSELVES AS AN AUTONOMOUS PEOPLE +WITHIN THE IRAQI REPUBLIC.+



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper INWARD SERV. REG. 2400 No. 1

File No. 133 | 2 | 1

Published at..... Cairo

Date 8-1-65

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On 16th October the membership of the Joint UAR/Iraq
ified Political Command, established by the agreement of 16th
tober, was announced. The Command will consist of 25 high ranking
ministers and officials from both countries, including the two
Presidents. Whilst progress towards union appears to be surrounded
by the usual Arab feeling of unreality, it is possible that the
whole process is acquiring a momentum of its own.

9. Lebanese press reports that 50 Iraqi communists had been arrested following an unsuccessful coup were confirmed by the Iraq Government which accused them of plotting against Aref. According to the Lebanese Al Akhbar, a journal claiming to represent all the Arab communist parties, the Iraq communist party had decided to support the Aref regime and that "our party would not adopt an isolationist attitude towards the A.S.U. On the contrary the party shall adopt a positive stand towards it and draw up necessary measures for co-operation."

10. In mid-December talks took place between Barzani, the Kurdish leader, and a Government delegation including Hamid, the Minister of the Interior. The Government, alarmed at renewed outbreaks of fighting, is reported to be prepared to alter the Constitution to admit "the distinct historical nature of the Kurdish people and their civilization" but only if the Kurdish irregular forces are disbanded.

11. Aref has continued with measures designed to widen popular support for his regime and announced that the Iraq Consultative Council will be selected on the basis of the 1957 census, with each member representing from 70,000 to 100,000 of the population.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper Foreign Report

File No.

173/2/1

20

Published at London

Date

10th December 1964

Kurdistan.—An autonomous Kurdish state within the Iraqi republic was proclaimed on December 1st by Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani. This has followed the failure of the moves for settlement described in FOREIGN REPORT of October 15th. The "further talks" mentioned as planned in the last paragraph of our report were never reached.

The Kurdish "legislative council" has already elected Mullah Mustafa as "head of state." Members of an "executive council" have been elected, "provisional governors" and commanders in chief for the police and armed forces appointed.

In a memorandum dated December 1st, Mullah Mustafa told the Baghdad government that the Kurds had been forced to take this step since Baghdad would not meet representatives to discuss an acceptable and final solution for the problem; but this did not mean the Kurds sought independence; they believed Kurdistan should remain an inseparable part of Iraq. They appealed for the opening of immediate talks on Kurdistan's territories, finances and relations with the central government. If the central government would not talk, they would set up an autonomous administration on their own terms. The Kurds are demanding the immediate withdrawal of central government forces from Kurdish areas including Sulaimaniyah and Kirkuk, and the withdrawal of all Arab officials.

Iraqi official sources describe the setting up of Kurdistan without central consent as "sheer fantasy," and there is no sign now of peaceful change in this attitude.

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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR AUSTRALIA

TEMPLE BAR 2435

In reply quote No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
STRAND.

LONDON, W.C.2.

Memo No. 1484.

173/2/1

CONFIDENTIAL

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra.

20th November, 1964.

IRAQ - KURDS

There has recently been a good deal of press comment on the Kurdish situation. It is claimed that, after nine months of uneasy cease-fire, trouble is now brewing again in Iraqi Kurdistan. Fighting between the Kurds and the Central Government has not yet been resumed, but, according to the Press, the danger of war is great unless Baghdad comes forward quickly with proposals that could be treated as a basis for negotiations.

2. According to Craddock (Foreign Office), the last set of proposals submitted by the Government was in early September at a meeting with Mulla Mustapha at Chewartah, near the Persian frontier. These included an offer to free all remaining Kurdish prisoners, the payment of compensation to individuals who had suffered in last year's fighting, the earmarking of a certain share of Iraq's oil income for expenditure in Kurdistan, and the mounting of an immediate crash programme for rehabilitation of devastated areas. On the other hand, the Government had shown no sign of succumbing to Kurdish demands for full regional autonomy, and had insisted that the Kurds should surrender their arms and hand over Arab officers who had deserted to them. For reasons respectively of expediency and honour, the Kurds had found these conditions unacceptable. Negotiations had accordingly been broken off, and the Government delegation, Prime Minister Tahir Yahya and the acting Chief-of-Staff Aref (the president's brother), had returned to Baghdad.

3. At the end of September, the Kurds held a "National" meeting at which they formally rejected the Government's proposals for a settlement. In addition, and in a step which was proclaimed as the first towards the establishment of full Kurdish autonomy, the meeting set up a new Kurdish Revolutionary Council, whose composition (43 members drawn variously from the KDP, the partisans, leaders of the tribes, and prominent towns people) suggested it would have the function of an embryo legislature. Also, an executive-arm, responsible to the Council, was provided for in the establishment of an 11-man Executive Committee with Mulla Mustapha as "President". With the Kurds already exercising a considerable degree of administrative control on the ground, these developments had presented Baghdad with virtually a fact accompli.

4. The first administrative act of the Executive Committee

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was to draw up a Memorandum on Kurdish rights and despatch it (11th October) to the central Government in answer to the latter's rejected proposals. Craddock said that the Memorandum was a comprehensive document which in effect restated the Kurdish case in full. After complaining bitterly of the Government's evasion and procrastination, and of its cynical disregard for commitments already entered into, the Memorandum went on to demand (a) a regional Kurdish legislature and executive with virtually complete powers over regional affairs (b) the maintenance of a 20,000-strong regular Kurdish Army in Kurdistan (c) a large slice of the oil revenues (d) the appointment of a Kurdish Vice President of Iraq; and (e) proportional Kurdish representation in the Central Government. The Memorandum also demanded that, in the event of a federal union between Iraq and any other Arab state, Iraqi Kurdistan should be a separate autonomous province. Craddock commented that, even allowing for an element of bluff, the extremism of these demands showed just how slim were the chances of a lasting settlement. Some reports suggested that attached to the Kurdish Memorandum was an ultimatum threatening a unilateral declaration of independence in the event of the Government not responding positively.

5. Despite the deterioration in Iraqi/Kurdish relations, and the occurrence of one or two small incidents, Craddock did not foresee an early resumption of hostilities. Indeed, there were indications that the Iraqi Government were going out of their way to avoid a clash. Government troops (notably those of the third battalion of 15 Independent Brigade Group) were being slowly edged out of the north, and tanks had been withdrawn from Sulaymania. Additionally, the new Government formed in Baghdad on November 15th had been specifically charged with "hastening reconstruction in the north" and solving "all outstanding problems there". All this suggested a renewed attempt at negotiations.

6. It would, of course, be a very bad time for the Government to resume hostilities. For it was now winter, and the Army would be much hindered in the mountain snows. It could be expected too that Nasser would use his influence to sway Aref from precipitate action. Nasser would, of course, fear that protracted fighting in Kurdistan might result in the downfall of Aref, and his replacement by a Government hostile to the UAR. Nasser would also see it as providing opportunity for fresh Syrian and Iraqi intervention in Iraq. Then too, he might calculate that it would not do his own image much good for a regime so closely identified with the UAR to engage in wholesale slaughter of a minority. For this reason, Nasser might be expected to appeal for restraint also to the Kurds - with whom, since the days when he helped them with money and arms against Kassem, he had some influence.

7. Craddock said that whether the Kurds took the initiative in re-opening hostilities probably depended, as before, on whether Mulla Mustapha could continue to retain control over the Kurds in the face of any challenge from Jalal Talabani and his supporters within the KDP. Craddock confirmed that Talabani and his followers were at present negotiating for their return to Iraq from the Iranian border area. But, as at present, and despite the tougher attitude being adopted by Mulla Mustapha in his dealings with the central Government, the two men remained unreconciled. The fact was, of course, that the differences between Mulla Mustapha and Talabani ran deeper than mere disagreement over the relative merits of a hard and soft policy towards Baghdad. Talabani was representative of

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the new educated and more sophisticated Kurd who, in addition to desiring an autonomous Kurdistan, had strong views on the need for social and political progress. The much older Barzani, on the other hand, was a nationalist with strong tribal and peasant backing, and a man who stood for the preservation of the existing tribal and feudal order in Kurdistan. He had never been easy with the urban-middle-class leaders of the KDP.

8. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to Cairo and Washington.

Lance Joseph

(Lance Joseph)
for Senior External Affairs Representative

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Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution

IRAQ
April 22, 1964
Section 1

IRAQI KURDISTAN: THE PRESENT PROBLEM

Sir Roger Allen to Mr. R. A. Butler. (Received April 22)

SUMMARY

1. The troubles which began in 1961 have far more the character of a national uprising than earlier troubles. The Ba'ath made a more effective attempt to solve the Kurdish problem by force than had Qasim, but only succeeded in occupying a very small fraction of the mountainous area. They failed to reduce Kurdish power to resist but great hardship was inflicted on Kurdish civil population. (Paragraphs 1-11.)

2. Though there is at present a cease-fire for the purpose of negotiations, it would be very difficult for any Iraqi Government to meet several of the Kurdish political demands and the problem has been further complicated by parallel aspirations of the Shiah. The Government is doing its best to restore life to normal in the hope that this will be enough to bring peace. So far it shows no sign of making the political concessions without which a permanent solution is unlikely. Both the Government and the Kurdish leadership are internally divided. (Paragraphs 12-22.)

3. Future developments in Kurdistan are more likely to depend on internal than external factors. Turkey and Syria have fairly effectively sealed their frontiers with Kurdistan. Nasser is for his own reasons concerned to bring about a Kurdish settlement. The Soviet bloc has given the Kurds little more than moral support. The only significant aid from abroad received by the Kurds has come through Iran. (Paragraphs 23-26.)

(No. 18. Confidential) *Baghdad,*
Sir, April 18, 1964.

The current break in hostilities makes this a suitable moment for a review of the problem of Iraqi Kurdistan and in this despatch I have the honour to submit my observations on the question.

2. Trouble is almost endemic in Iraqi Kurdistan. Under the British mandate there were serious risings in 1924 and in 1930-31 under Shaikh Mahmoud, in 1931-32 under Shaikh Ahmed Barzani. In 1945 there was a further rising under the latter's brother Mulla Mustafa Barzani. The troubles which began under Qasim in the summer of 1961 have however taken on a different nature from the earlier risings. Though the former had their element of Kurdish nationalist inspiration they were in essence attempts by individuals

to establish their feudal authority over as large an area of Kurdistan as they could. The present troubles, though by no means all Kurds have sided with the insurgents, have far more the character of a national uprising.

3. Fighting on a serious scale started early in July 1961 with a full scale offensive by the Barzanis on their Kurdish tribal enemies. When this was seen to have succeeded the Barzanis were joined by other tribes and members of the Kurdish Democratic Party; and most Government posts in tribal areas were ousted or neutralised. The Government did not react until September when a full scale offensive with air attacks on Kurdish villages was launched. This flagged noticeably in 1962. Guerilla warfare continued until the downfall of Qasim in February 1963 when

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the Kurds ceased fire and entered into negotiations with the Ba'ath Government. A Kurdish delegation led by Jalal Talabani and including Shawqat Akrawi and Salah Yusufi was sent to Baghdad to negotiate the terms of a settlement. I shall deal later with the detail of these negotiations. It is sufficient for the moment to say that the Kurds appear to have pitched their demands too high (though they were probably prepared in oriental fashion to settle for a good deal less than the opening bid). By the end of April 1963 it was becoming clear that there was little hope of a settlement and that the Government were making preparations to resume hostilities. At the beginning of June the Kurdish delegation (less Talabani and Akrawi who had left Baghdad) were given the text of Government proposals for a settlement. These were never made public in full but though they did not meet all the Kurdish demands there seem to have been sufficient to be greeted by many Kurds with gratification. While on their way to report back to their leaders the delegation was thrown into prison and the Government offensive began. The object of this subterfuge seems to have been to show that the Government were being reasonable and placatory and that the resumption of fighting was due to Kurdish bad faith. The Government version of the story may have been believed by some Iraqi Arabs but, as already mentioned, Government preparations for a renewal offensive had already been under way for some time, and the imprisonment (and subsequent torture) of the Kurdish negotiating team has been yet another of many factors embittering Kurdish-Arab relations.

4. Though the nature of the Kurdish demands may have been one factor in deciding the Ba'athist Government to try to impose its own solution by force there were other factors, especially a feeling among senior officers that the Iraq Army had been humiliated in circumstances where it had not had a fair chance of showing its military prowess. It was widely believed that Qasim with his policy of divide and rule had not wished to bring the Kurdish war to a successful conclusion. The conflict, it was said, provided a convenient excuse for keeping a large part of the army away from Baghdad. However that may be, Qasim meddled excessively in the minor detail of the day-to-day

conduct of the fighting and this led to inefficiency, and a sense of frustration among the army officers.

5. As the new offensive took shape it became clear that it was organised with more drive and competence than hitherto. The Ba'ath, relying on their National Guard for the preservation of internal security in Baghdad, felt free to transfer even more troops to the north, so that in the end over 90 per cent of the army were engaged there. The first phase of operations was the reduction of Kurdish villages in the plains around Kirkuk, Erbil and Mosul. These were shelled from a safe distance by mixed groups of armour and artillery with air support. When all seemed safe the villages were occupied by the National Guard or Government levies, who looted, burned and sometimes bulldozed the houses flat. In certain cases Arabs were brought in to replace the Kurdish population.

6. The next phase began in mid-July with an offensive directed along the road Erbil-Rowanduz. This was accompanied by operations on a smaller scale in the hills to the north of Mosul. Most of the offensive fighting fell to the lot of irregular levies: the Salahuddin and Khalid Ibn al Walid "Cavalry". These were recruited partly from Kurdish tribes which were traditional enemies of the Barzanis and partly from the Arab Shammar tribes. The army provided fire support from its heavy weapons and considerable moral support. The air force's support was perhaps more effective since the Kurds had acquired a healthy respect for air attack, especially when napalm was used. They generally avoided positional warfare even from naturally strong positions such as the Spilak Pass west of Rowanduz, and drew the army on into the mountains. Once the Spilak Pass had been secured and the brigade which had been isolated at Rowanduz relieved, the column changed the direction of its advance from east to north. It joined up with a force that had gone north-east from Mosul, into the area of the Zibari tribe, part of which sided with the Government, and pushed into Barzani territory occupying the village of Barzan. This provided some good publicity especially as the line of the Ba'ath Government (like that of the Qasim Government before it) was that the rebellion was only a minor affair caused by

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Barzani and a few of his supporters and did not represent Kurdish opinion as a whole. However, although a force of six brigades was used in this operation it achieved very little towards the main object of all warfare, the destruction of the enemy's power to resist. Little progress was made beyond Barzan and the Kurdish forces involved were able to hold their own in the mountainous area adjoining the conjunction of the Turkish and Iranian frontiers. We do not know how serious an attempt was made to bring them to battle but after a short interval part of the force was withdrawn to be put into use on the southern axis.

7. In this sector there had been little serious fighting and the Kurds had succeeded in closing the Kirkuk-Sulaimaniya road (and at times some of the other roads out of Kirkuk) to all but heavily escorted convoys. The offensive in this sector started at the end of October with a drive westwards by four brigades. The intention was clearance of the mountain area north-east of Sulaimaniya but a major intermediate objective was the gorge of Cham Rizan in whose caves were Kurdish supply centres, workshops and hospitals. After some bitter fighting against K.D.P. units the army captured Cham Rizan, but not before the Kurds had evacuated a part of their stores and destroyed the rest. Moreover the army was unable to press the advantage further and capture the more important centre of Mawat. After a few days Cham Rizan passed back again into the hands of the Kurds. Enough is not yet known about this fighting to pass much of a verdict on it but it seems to have been severe and there is little doubt that the K.D.P. came out of it with heightened morale while the army had little to show for its efforts.

8. Fighting in the extreme north in the notorious Dohuk-Zakho-Amadiya triangle was on a relatively smaller scale, probably because the Government put less of an effort into that sector. The army appears to have achieved little control in the regions beyond Dohuk and Amadiya and the road to Zakho remained closed for much of the time. The arrival of a Syrian brigade in the Zakho area in mid-October seems to have had little effect on the fighting.

9. By the time the rains began to fall in late November 1963 the army had

achieved little beyond stretching its resources to the utmost and securing control over only a very small fraction of the mountainous area of Kurdistan. The Kurdish guerillas had suffered little serious loss, and their ability to fight was unimpaired. Army morale was at a low ebb. But the stringent economic blockade and the bombing and burning of villages were beginning to tell on the Kurdish civilian population among whom hardship was very great. In the early stages of the 1963 campaign the Kurds were able to buy foodstuffs from profiteering Iraqis who circumvented the blockade, but as money ran short supplies dwindled. There were signs early in 1964 of an improvement in Kurdish finances due probably to aid from outside the country; but a considerable number of homeless villagers were suffering extreme privation. The sufferings of the civilian population which were aggravated by an exceptionally severe winter seem to have been a major factor in deciding Mulla Mustafa to accept in February 1964 the cease-fire offer of the new Iraq Government which had come to power following the November revolution.

10. To sum up the military situation: the fighting of the past three years has shown that the Iraqi Army has little or no hope of occupying large parts of the mountainous areas of Kurdistan, defeating the Kurdish guerillas and imposing a solution by force. It is very difficult to gauge the effect of this failure on army morale. Numerous observers have spoken of the elation in the army at the ending of the fighting and have inferred that there would be trouble if the army were ordered into yet another offensive but it is difficult to make firm predictions on this score.

11. In the atmosphere of secrecy in which operations were conducted and the boastful and conflicting claims of both sides it is difficult also to assess the performance of the Kurdish guerillas. They seem however in general to have fought a successful guerilla campaign, avoiding as far as possible pitched battles in which they might have suffered serious losses, drawing the army on to over-extend itself in the mountains, and hitting back by means of ambushes and raids in which they inflicted losses and won weapons and supplies with little risk to themselves. The main criticism that might perhaps be made of Kurdish tactics is that they were lacking

in the aggressive spirit to exploit to the full the openings offered to them by the Iraqi Army through the poor siting of camps and very inexperienced picketing. There were also quite a number of openings to them for sabotage which they did not exploit. Their reason for not doing so was a wish not to antagonise Arab opinion (and, in the case of oil installations, Western opinion). This was probably coupled with a desire not to prejudice the future welfare of their own country or to render an ultimate settlement more difficult.

12. On the political side the causes of Kurdish discontent go back a long way. The Treaty of Sèvres, signed in 1920 but never ratified because of Turkish opposition, envisaged the creation of an autonomous Kurdistan. In 1932, after nine petitions to the League of Nations by various Kurdish bodies, the Iraqi Government made a formal declaration to the Council of the League on minorities' rights. It included provisions for primary education in the minorities' own languages. It stipulated districts in which the official languages should be Kurdish or Turkish in addition to Arabic and required that officials in those districts should be conversant with those languages and if possible selected from Iraqis from one of these areas.

13. Nothing has ever been done by any Iraqi Government to put these provisions into effect. The interim Constitution promulgated by Qasim in July 1958 promised in the vaguest of terms equality of treatment as between Kurd and Arab, and Qasim made further vague promises in public speeches. In practice, however, as Kurdish impatience caused relations to deteriorate the Kurds began to be treated worse than under earlier Governments. Kurdish officials were transferred away from Kurdistan or dismissed and replaced by Arabs. Kurdish officers and men were transferred away from the only mountain division stationed in Kurdistan. A promotion barrier for Kurdish officials in the central Government began to materialise and many Kurds in it were dismissed.

14. The negotiations with the Ba'ath Government after the downfall of Qasim led to the definition in fairly clear general terms of what the Kurds considered to be

their "national rights". These can be listed as follows:

- (a) the establishment of a Kurdish provincial administration to handle all matters except defence, finance, foreign affairs and foreign trade throughout Kurdistan;
- (b) the employment of Kurds in the services of the central Government in proportion to their percentage of the total population;
- (c) adequate representation for the Kurds in Ministerial and Vice-Presidential office;
- (d) the establishment of an educational system in Kurdish for Kurdistan;
- (e) a share of the central revenues to be allotted to Kurdistan on a population basis;
- (f) a Kurdish armed force either in the form of a separate militia or an arrangement whereby two divisions would be composed mainly of Kurds.

15. According to publicity material put out by them the Government were prepared to go as far as dividing Iraq into a number of governorates each of which would be allowed decentralised control over its local affairs. The Kurdish Governorate of Sulaimaniya would have been extended so as to include most of the mountainous areas of Kurdistan. The Kurdish language and the Arabic language would both be official languages in the Governorate and Kurdish the language of instruction (with Arabic as a second language) in primary and intermediate education. It is not clear whether the Government were really prepared to make these concessions, or how far they would have gone on the other questions. Certainly the Kurds did not expect all their points to be met in full and were prepared to settle for less. Recently they have indicated to foreign Press correspondents that they are prepared to be flexible on the issues of a share in central revenues and the question of a Kurdish armed force.

16. The latter is the most difficult of all the points at issue. The reason for its being put forward is the Kurds' experience with previous Iraqi Governments. These have often shown themselves in times of crisis willing to make concessions to the Kurds which they have subsequently failed to honour as soon as the heat was off.

Moreover, the standard of probity of Iraqi Governments in such matters appears if anything to have deteriorated in the past few years. It is only natural that the Kurds should wish to have "guarantees" in some form that any agreement made will in fact be executed. It is equally natural however that no central Government should be willing to undermine the structure of its sovereign authority by permitting the existence of independent armies. The Kurds are in any case most unlikely ever to surrender the bulk of their arms, to which they cling by long tradition. If the Government insist on such surrender (as they might reasonably be expected to do), this in itself could be a serious stumbling block to agreement. There seems no very clear way out of this impasse. In recent months there has been some evidence to show that Kurdish thinking on guarantees may be taking the form of inviting the participation of major Powers (especially the United States and the USSR) in an eventual settlement. However, this is not much of a starter, for even if all the parties concerned were willing it is difficult to see what practical steps outside Powers could take to ensure that an agreement was honoured.

17. A further complicating factor which has assumed more important proportions in recent months is the growing political consciousness of the Shias. This has been coupled with the demand that concessions on "national rights" made to the Kurds should be extended equally to their community. As far as administrative decentralisation is concerned this would present no very great problem. But the demand for a fair proportion of Ministerial offices and posts in the Central Government would be a much more serious matter. The Shiah community numbers some 55 per cent of the population of Iraq. The Sunni Arabs, *i.e.*, excluding the Kurds, number only between 20 per cent and 25 per cent of the total population. The allotment of key offices on a population basis would be disastrous to the position of the Sunni Arabs who have since Turkish times formed the majority of Iraq's ruling class. It is only fair to add, however, that the Shias have hitherto pursued their demands with more clamour than courage; they would probably settle for a great deal less than they claim.

18. It is not very easy to judge how the present round of negotiations is going.

There seems little doubt that President Arif was somewhat disingenuous with his vigorous denials of the existence of a secret agreement with Mulla Mustafa. However, the agreement such as it is probably does not go very far; it is probably a working arrangement whereby certain preconditions for a settlement will be met. Its provisions are most probably for such matters as an amnesty and the release of prisoners on either side, the withdrawal of excess army units from Kurdistan, the disbandment of guerilla units and the return of army deserters and their arms, the cessation of the economic blockade, compensation for war damage, and the return of administrative officials and police to tribal areas. It is unlikely that it contained much of substance on the satisfaction of Kurdish demands for their rights or indeed that these have yet been discussed in more than general terms.

19. It is not very likely that lasting peace will be achieved in Kurdistan without the concession of the main essentials of Kurdish demands. So far the Government have merely taken some steps to bring to an end the emergency conditions in Kurdistan and restore life to normal. Units have been withdrawn from the remoter areas, although they still remain on the periphery of Kurdistan as well as in Sulaimaniya and in the Spilak Pass. A start has been made towards assessing war damage compensation. Releases of Kurdish prisoners are taking place, after allowing for Iraqi inefficiency, at a fairly reasonable rate. The economic blockade has been lifted and economic life has been restored to a more healthy footing, for instance by extensive purchases of Kurdish tobacco. But it still remains to be seen whether the Government are willing to make any political concessions. After a period of more than two months in which nothing in this respect has as yet been done the Kurds are beginning to suspect more seriously than ever that the Government are merely trying to jolly them along, hoping that they will be able to avoid major concessions by restoring a degree of peace and normality and that everyone is too tired of the fighting to face the prospect of its breaking out again.

20. It may be that the Government does not as a matter of settled policy harbour such sinister intentions. On the Kurdish issue it is probably to some extent divided, with President Arif perhaps favouring by

inclination and temperament a harsher attitude towards the Kurds, but being impelled by pressure from Nasser to adopt a more reasonable policy, while another group, led by the Minister of the Interior, of its own accord wants to see a settlement, but does not know how to achieve it without making concessions unacceptable to almost any Iraqi Government; yet a third group may be opposed to almost any concessions. One must also take into account the ingrained Arab reluctance to look facts in the face or to come to difficult decisions until actually forced to do so.

21. The Kurdish leadership too is divided on policy. According to reports which seem credible the Kurdish leaders were meeting at the end of March and beginning of April to decide what steps they should take to make the Iraqi Government give serious consideration to their political demands. Mulla Mustafa is now reported to be feeling his age, to have been deeply impressed at the hardships the civilian population have had to endure, and to be willing to make fairly drastic concessions if a settlement can be reached. The K.D.P. under younger leadership are elated at the results of the autumn fighting and in a much tougher frame of mind. Recent reports seem to indicate that at least the extremist section of the K.D.P. has been outlawed, as a result of which Mulla Mustafa may have gained more widespread support in the northern tribal areas including the allegiance of some neutral and even some pro-Government tribes. But he may have seriously endangered his position in southern Kurdistan.

22. At the present stage it would be an impossible task to attempt to predict what will happen. It does not seem for the moment that the Kurds are united in wishing to take the initiative in re-opening hostilities. Much the same applies at present to the Government and whether the army's withdrawal from Kurdistan is carried a stage further with the move south of some formations will probably depend on the outcome of contacts now in progress. The Kurds may present some sort of an ultimatum for the conclusion of political negotiations. This might be accompanied by the threat, open or implied, to seize *de facto* control over the mountain area. The Government's reaction to this will probably decide the issue but it is likely to be a little while yet before any decisions of importance are made. The choice may

well be between allowing the present armistice to drag on indefinitely, or a resumption of hostilities: a lasting settlement seems much less likely.

23. The domestic considerations listed above are likely to be predominant in deciding whether fighting in Kurdistan is resumed. But a number of other countries have an interest in the Kurdish question and are in a position to exert varying degrees of influence. Syria, Turkey and Iran as neighbours with Kurdish minorities of their own can influence the supply position through the degree of help they allow their Kurds to give their Iraqi brethren. The first two have so far maintained, and seem likely to continue to maintain, a fairly effective control over their frontiers. The Iranian frontier is in wilder country and much more difficult to control. Moreover the Iranians sometimes demonstrate an ambivalent attitude towards the Kurdish problem. Their fear of Kurdish separatism seems at times to be influenced by appeals for help by the Kurds on the grounds that they are an Iranian people. They seem all the more apt to listen to such appeals when the Government of Iraq is hostile to them or seems likely to fall too much under the influence of Nasser. It is widely believed in Baghdad that the Iranian Government gave aid to the Kurds during the 1963 fighting and even before that made little attempt to keep its frontier closed. The Kurds openly admit that their bazookas and other support weapons received in 1963, reached them through Iran. They do not deny either that they have received financial aid from Iran.

24. There is no evidence that the Russians have given the Kurds more than moral support. The Kurds do have Soviet *bloc* weapons but these were captured from the Iraq Army. It is possible that one or two of the Satellites may have given small amounts of financial aid but it is not certain that these were in direct support of the struggle.

25. A new factor over the last year has been Nasser's desire for a settlement of the Kurdish question. An explanation for this often heard in Baghdad is that Nasser expects that an autonomous Kurdistan would facilitate the task of incorporating the rest of Iraq into a united Arab State and would at the same time cause trouble for Turkey and Iran. I personally find this explanation too devious. I think it more

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likely that Nasser's obvious efforts to guide developments towards a solution are due to a fear that protracted fighting in Kurdistan might result in the downfall of Arif and his replacement by a Government less friendly towards Egypt. The propaganda efforts of the Russians under Qasim for peace with the Kurds were directed by much the same sort of reasoning.

26. In the event of a resumption of hostilities it seems likely that the foreign countries principally interested in Kurdistan will be guided by much the same considerations as before. The attitude of Iran is the one most likely to have an influence on events. There seems for the moment to be no reason to suppose that

Russia's attitude might change. The struggle for leadership at present in progress between Left and Right-wing Kurds might possibly at some stage lead to the Kurds being more willing to accept Russian aid (though for the present the Right wing seem in the ascendant). But Russia herself may calculate that in the long run she has more to lose than to gain if she should decide to help Kurd against Arab.

27. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Tehran, Cairo, Ankara, POMEK (Aden), Damascus, Moscow, Washington, Bahrain, Beirut, Kuwait, Amman and Nicosia (for Cleary).

I have, &c.

ROGER ALLEN.

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Excerpt from a British Paper on Middle East - April, 1964

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Iraqi-Kurdish Settlement

173/2/1

15. After some nine months of inconclusive and unpopular fighting, a cease-fire was announced on February 10. There is little known so far about the progress of negotiations for a permanent settlement. Meanwhile substantial practical steps are being taken towards a restoration of normal conditions in the North, including the withdrawal of military forces from the out-posts, the opening of roads and the release of Kurdish detainees by the Iraqi authorities.

16. In the short term prospects for return to normal in the North seem reasonably encouraging. It is more difficult to speculate about the prospects for a long term settlement. Though popular opinion and also, apparently, United Arab Republic influence are pressures on the Iraqis to seek a permanent solution, it will not be easy for the Government, in the face of likely army opposition to substantial concessions to their recent enemy, to make far-reaching concessions if these are demanded by the Kurds.



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CANBERRA

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REPRESENTATIVE,

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,

STRAND,

LONDON, W.C.2.

29th June 1964

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Memo 876

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra ACT

Iraq

Craddock (Assistant Head - Eastern Department) said 25th June that the negotiations between the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) and the Iraqi Government which commenced in April were still proceeding. IPC still refused to budge from its demand that the dispute should be referred to arbitration while the Iraqis continued to maintain that Law No.80 (under which IPC's concessionary rights had been expropriated) was immutable. Matters, however, might soon come to a head. September saw the deadline by which, under the legislation setting up the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC), the new national company was to stake claim for the areas it intended to develop. If, as now seemed likely, INOC could entice two or three of the smaller American independents into exploiting the new areas in partnership, the Iraqis would be able to thumb their noses at IPC. Craddock agreed that politically this would be preferable to the head-on collision which might follow any success of IPC in persuading other companies to boycott Iraq and its new national oil corporation.

Kurds

2. Craddock said that no real progress had been made in negotiations between the Kurds and the Government. A new list of Kurdish demands was presented in May but this was only a modified version of earlier demands and was presumably unacceptable to the Government. Craddock commented that it was difficult to judge the sincerity of the Government in their dealings with the Kurds. The only concession they had appeared to have made recently was the inclusion of an additional Kurd in the reshuffled Government, and the release of further Kurdish prisoners. The Kurds had certainly received no acknowledgement of their rights in the new interim constitution.

3. On the Kurdish side, the split between Mulla Mustapha Barzani and the Kurdish Democratic Party had been temporarily patched up on the understanding that the Kurds would not resume hostilities until Barzani was satisfied that the Government had no intentions of meeting the Kurdish demands. Barzani, of course, was reluctant to commit his people to further fighting. He is said to be feeling his age, and to have been deeply impressed at the hardships the civilian population had had to endure during last year's fighting. Nevertheless Craddock thought that it was not likely

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that lasting peace would be achieved in Kurdistan without the concession of the main essentials of Kurdish demands. If hostilities were to resume, it would be likely that they would break out after the harvest in either late July or August.

4. In reply to a question, Craddock listed the public demands of the Kurds as (a) the establishment of a Kurdish provincial administration; (b) the employment of Kurds in the central Government in proportion to their percentage of the total population; (c) adequate representation in the Cabinet; (d) the establishment of an educational system in Kurdistan; (e) a share of Iraq's oil income; and (f) the setting up of a Kurdish armed force. Thus, notwithstanding that these were essentially in the nature of an opening bid, the Kurds had pitched their demands high. Certainly, it seemed that they would be too high for acceptance by the Iraqi Government. For one thing, no central government could be expected willingly to undermine the structure of its sovereign authority by permitting the existence of independent armies. For another, too liberal concessions would run the risk of antagonising senior Army officers already sensitive about their humiliation at the hands of the Kurds. Finally, concessions to the Kurds would encourage similar demands from other fissiparous groups in the country. In recent months, for instance, there had been a growing political consciousness among the Shias who, though they numbered some 55% of the population, were grossly under-represented in the government. The allotment of key officers on a population basis would be disastrous to the position of the Sunni Arabs who form the majority of Iraq's ruling class.

UAR - Iraq Unity Agreement

5. Craddock said that the Eastern Department had now reverted to their former scepticism that the Unity Agreement would never amount to much. He cited a recent speech by the Iraqi Minister for Unity Affairs (Dr. Abdur Razzaq Muhiddin) who had explained that socialism might apply in Egypt, but could never do so in Iraq. He also suggested that, to the extent that the machinery agreed upon in Cairo did become effective, it would be likely to breed its own opposition in Iraq. The most immediate manifestation of "co-ordination" of the two countries policies would be in practice, the consolidation of President Nasser's influence in Baghdad. But, Iraqi nationalist elements, including many Army officers, could not be expected to welcome a process which appeared to give their country an increasingly subordinate status. Similarly, the Kurds and Shias could be expected to oppose a process tending towards their absorption into a greater Arab and Sunni-Moslem unit. Craddock observed that, for the UAR's part, Nasser could not be expected to be enthusiastic about the possibility of yet another unsuccessful attempt at union, and would therefore as likely proceed with some caution.

6. In the wider Arab context, Craddock noted that, though acclaimed as a significant step towards Arab Unity, the new Iraqi-UAR Agreement could well serve rather to divide Arabs than to unite them. Those regimes left out of the Agreement might easily tend to interpret it as directed against them, especially since, by stressing the "revolutionary concept of unity", it seemed to be harking back to Nasser's pre-Summit policy of unity of aims. Thus Kuwait, still smarting from the fact that Cairo radio had carried last month's unprovoked attacks on the Ruler by Mr. Khrushchev, and Saudi

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Arabia, whose relations with Egypt remained strained over the Yemen conflict, were likely to view the Egyptian-Iraqi pact with suspicion. Similarly for King Hussein in Jordan. The Ba'ath in Syria, meanwhile, had already denounced the agreement as Egyptian/Iraqi subterfuge. On the periphery of the Arab world, Iran too was alarmed by conclusion of an Agreement which the Shah regarded as having brought Nasser to his doorstep.

Government Reshuffle

7. A reshuffle in the Iraq Cabinet took place on June 17th. According to Craddock, however, this did not affect the basic alignment of forces within the Government. Lt.-General Tahir Yahya, the Prime Minister, retained the Defence portfolio, while Subhi Abdul Hamid and Rashid Musleh retained their posts of Foreign Minister and Minister of Interior respectively. Of the five new Ministers, three were Shias, while a Shia had replaced a Sunni Moslem as Mutasarrif of Erbil and a further Shia had been appointed the new Under-Secretary at the Foreign Ministry. Taken together these appointments probably represented an attempt to conciliate the Shia community.

8. Regarding the Kurds, the only one of their community to have had a post in the previous Cabinet, Naqshabandg, a pro-Government non-entity, had retained his post as Minister of WAQAF. The inclusion in the new Cabinet of Nasud Muhammad, a known confidant and emissary of Mulla Mustafa, however, was an obvious conciliatory gesture on the part of Baghdad.

Soviet Military Aid

9. Despite the personal dislike Khrushchev had acquired for Aref during his visit to the UAR, Craddock said that it appeared as though the Soviet Union was to resume supplies of military hardware and spares to Iraq. Craddock explained that, under Kassem, Iraq had switched from mainly British and American equipment to Russian. But, after the anti-Communist excesses following the toppling of the Kassem regime, Soviet supplies had been stopped and the Iraqi forces were now urgently in need of spares and replacements, especially for what had been lost fighting the Kurds.

10. Craddock said that a 7-man delegation headed by Major-General Abdel-Rahman Aref, the President's brother and the acting Chief-of-Staff, had gone to Moscow on a buying mission in early June. The delegation had not yet returned but reports received indicated that, in addition to spare parts for existing items, the Russians had agreed to provide new tanks, artillery, aircraft (MIG 21's) and air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles. It also appeared that numbers of Soviet technicians and instructors would be arriving to train the Iraqis in the handling of the new equipment.

10. Copies of this memorandum are being sent to Cairo, Tel Aviv and Washington.

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